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TURNING A BLIND EYE: WHY WASHINGTON KEEPS GIVING 
IN TO WALL STREET 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.* 
As the Dodd–Frank Act approaches its third anniversary in mid-2013, 
federal regulators have missed deadlines for more than 60% of the 
required implementing rules.  The financial industry has undermined 
Dodd–Frank by lobbying regulators to delay or weaken rules, by suing 
to overturn completed rules, and by pushing for legislation to freeze 
agency budgets and repeal Dodd–Frank’s key mandates.  The financial 
industry did not succeed in its efforts to prevent President Obama’s re-
election in 2012.  Even so, the Obama Administration has continued to 
court Wall Street’s leaders and has not given a high priority to 
implementing Dodd–Frank. 
 
At first glance, Wall Street’s ability to block Dodd–Frank’s 
implementation seems surprising.  After all, public outrage over Wall 
Street’s role in the global financial crisis impelled Congress to pass 
Dodd–Frank in 2010 despite the financial industry’s intense opposition.  
Moreover, scandals at systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) have continued to tarnish Wall Street’s reputation since Dodd–
Frank’s enactment.  However, as the general public’s focus on the 
financial crisis has waned—due in large part to massive governmental 
support that saved Wall Street—the momentum for meaningful financial 
reform has faded. 
 
Wall Street’s political and regulatory victories since 2010 shed new 
light on the financial industry’s remarkable success in gaining broader 
powers and more lenient regulation during the 1990s and 2000s.  Four 
principal factors account for Wall Street’s continued dominance in the 
corridors of Washington.  First, the financial industry has spent massive 
sums on lobbying and campaign contributions, and its political 
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influence has expanded along with the growing significance of the 
financial sector in the U.S. economy.  Second, financial regulators have 
aggressively competed within and across national boundaries to attract 
the allegiance of large financial institutions.  Wall Street has skillfully 
exploited the resulting opportunities for regulatory arbitrage 
 
Third, Wall Street’s political clout discourages regulators from 
imposing restraints on the financial industry.  Politicians and regulators 
encounter significant “pushback” whenever they oppose Wall Street’s 
agenda, and they also lose opportunities for lucrative “revolving door” 
employment from the industry and its service providers.  Fourth, the 
financial industry has achieved “cognitive capture” through the 
“revolving door” and other close connections between Wall Street and 
Washington.  A widely-shared “conventional wisdom” persists in 
Washington—notwithstanding abundant evidence to the contrary—that 
(i) giant SIFIs are safer than smaller, more specialized institutions, (ii) 
SIFIs are essential to meet the demands of large multinational 
corporations in a globalized economy, and (iii) requiring U.S. SIFIs to 
comply with stronger rules will impair their ability to compete with 
foreign financial conglomerates and reduce the availability of credit to 
U.S. firms and consumers. 
 
Despite Wall Street’s continued mastery over Washington, two recent 
events could lead to a renewed public focus on the need for stronger 
restraints on SIFIs.  In March 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder 
admitted that global SIFIs are “too big to jail,” and a Senate 
subcommittee issued a stunning report on pervasive managerial failures 
and regulatory shortcomings surrounding JPMorgan Chase’s “London 
Whale” trading scandal.  In response to those events, Senators Sherrod 
Brown and David Vitter introduced a bill that would require SIFIs to 
satisfy much higher capital requirements and would also limit their 
access to federal safety net subsidies.  The Brown-Vitter bill could prove 
to be a milestone because it demonstrates Dodd–Frank’s inadequacy 
and also focuses the “too big to fail” debate on issues where Wall Street 
is most vulnerable, including dangerously low levels of capital at the 
largest banks and extensive public subsidies exploited by those banks. 
 
“Turn a blind eye”: “To knowingly refuse to acknowledge something 
which you know to be real”;1 “to refuse to see: be oblivious”2 
 
 1. Turn a Blind Eye, PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/turn-a-blind-
eye.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). Admiral Horatio Nelson reportedly inspired this saying at the 
Battle of Copenhagen in 1801, when he ignored a superior’s signal to disengage from the enemy fleet. 
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“I remind people, we do have the best capital markets in the world.” 
(Jamie Dimon, chairman of JPMorgan Chase, June 19, 2012)3 
“[T]he size of some of these [financial] institutions becomes so large that 
it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with 
indications that if you do prosecute, . . . it will have a negative impact on 
the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.”  (Attorney 
General Eric Holder, March 6, 2013)4 
“[D]on’t you see?  Too big to fail isn’t a problem with the system.  It is 
the system . . . .  The bigger [global corporations] get, the bigger financial 
institutions will have to get.”  (Robert Rubin, former Treasury Secretary 
and former senior executive at Goldman Sachs and Citigroup)5 
 
I. Introduction ..................................................................................... 1288 
II. The Financial Industry’s Campaign to Block Dodd–Frank’s 
Implementation ........................................................................ 1296 
A. The Industry’s Lobbying Efforts to Impede Dodd–Frank’s 
Reforms .............................................................................. 1296 
1. Enhanced Regulatory Requirements for SIFIs ........ 1297 
 
Instead, he put his spyglass to his blind eye and said, “I have only one eye, I have a right to be blind 
sometimes . . . I really do not see the signal.” JAMES STANIER CLARKE & JOHN M’ARTHUR, 2 THE LIFE 
OF ADMIRAL LORD NELSON, K.B. FROM HIS LORDSHIP’S MANUSCRIPTS 270 (1809). 
 2. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1349 (11th Ed. 2004).  Kathleen Engel and 
Patricia McCoy have previously used this phrase to characterize the manner in which Wall Street 
investment banks “securitize[d] subprime home loans without determining if loan pools contain[ed] 
predatory loans” and thereby “actively facilitated abusive lending.”  Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. 
McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 
2040 (2007). 
 3. William D. Cohan, Wall Street Forgets its Job Is to Create Jobs, BLOOMBERG (June 24, 
2012 6:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-24/wall-street-forgets-its-job-is-to-create-
jobs.html (quoting testimony by Mr. Dimon during a hearing on the “London Whale” trading scandal 
before the House Financial Services Committee on June 19, 2012); see also infra Part IV(C)(2) 
(describing that scandal and Mr. Dimon’s role in it).  
 4. Transcript: Attorney General Eric Holder on ‘Too Big to Jail’, AM. BANKER (Mar. 7, 2013) 
(quoting testimony by Mr. Holder before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Mar. 6, 2013) (available on 
Lexis). 
 5. DAVID ROTHKOPF, POWER, INC.: THE EPIC RIVALRY BETWEEN BIG BUSINESS AND 
GOVERNMENT—AND THE RECKONING THAT LIES AHEAD 266 (2012) (quoting from undated recent 
interview with Mr. Rubin). Mr. Rubin served as co-chairman of Goldman Sachs before serving as 
Treasury Secretary during the Clinton Administration, and he then served as senior counselor, chairman 
of the executive committee, and a director of Citigroup from 1999 to 2009.  During his tenure at 
Citigroup, Rubin encouraged the bank to engage in high-risk securitization and trading activities.  Those 
activities inflicted massive losses on Citigroup and led to the bank’s near-failure and bailout by the U.S. 
government in 2008.  CHARLES GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT: HOW THREE DECADES OF WALL STREET 
GREED AND GOVERNMENT MISMANGEMENT DESTROYED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 145-47, 
190-91, 304-08, 317-20, 482-83 (2009); Eric Dash & Louise Story, Rubin Leaving Citigroup; Smith 
Barney for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009, at B1; Ken Brown & David Enrich, Rubin Under Fire, 
Defends His Role at Citi, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2008, at A1; Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup 
Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost three years have gone by since Congress passed the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank)6 
in July 2010, but Dodd–Frank’s reform program still remains largely 
unfinished.  During the past year, advocates of financial reform have 
expressed growing dismay as federal regulators missed deadlines for 
more than three-fifths of the rulemakings mandated by Dodd–Frank.7  
 
 6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (enacted July 21, 2010). 
 7. For recent expressions of this dismay, see Haley Sweetland Edwards, He who makes the 
rules, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2013, 2013 WLNR 6615176 (“As of now, roughly two-thirds of the 
400-odd rules expected to come from Dodd–Frank have yet to be finalized.”); Barbara Rehm, 
Regulators’ Reputation Sinks Along with Industry’s, AM. BANKER, Mar. 28, 2013, 2013 WLNR 
7543392 (“[I]n the 32 months since [Dodd–Frank’s] enactment, regulators have done little to restore the 
public’s confidence in the government’s ability to police the financial system.”); Gary Rivlin, How Wall 
Street Defanged Dodd–Frank, THE NATION, May 20, 2013 (arguing that the failed implementation of 
Dodd–Frank provides “a perfect case study of the ways an industry with nearly unlimited resources can 
avoid a set of tough-minded reforms it doesn’t like”); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text 
(showing that regulators missed 175 of the 279 rulemaking deadlines that expired by June 2013).  For 
earlier expressions of similar views, see Donna Borak, After Year of Progress, Dodd–Frank Rule Phase 
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As explained in Part II of this article, the financial industry has pursued 
a three-front campaign that has blocked the fulfillment of many of 
Dodd–Frank core reforms.  First, the industry’s aggressive lobbying 
efforts have persuaded regulatory agencies to delay or water down 
regulations mandated by Dodd–Frank.  Second, industry trade groups 
have filed lawsuits to strike down completed rules.  Third, the industry 
helped to elect a Republican majority in the House of Representatives in 
2010 and again in 2012, and Republican leaders have introduced 
numerous bills to repeal or weaken key provisions of Dodd–Frank.  
Although Wall Street failed to defeat President Obama in the 2012 
election, President Obama has continued to court Wall Street executives 
and has not spent meaningful political capital in pushing for a robust 
implementation of Dodd–Frank’s reforms.8 
In response to the financial industry’s efforts to undermine Dodd–
Frank, a group of former senior government officials, private-sector 
leaders and financial experts launched a new nonprofit group known as 
the Systemic Risk Council (SRC) in 2012.9  SRC member and former 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) chairman Brooksley 
Born declared that Dodd–Frank’s reforms “are under attack by many of 
the firms who brought us the financial crisis.”10  SRC chair and former 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) chairman Sheila Bair 
similarly warned that “[t]he public is becoming cynical about whether 
the regulators can do anything right, which is undermining support for 
reforms.”11 
 
Hits Roadblocks, AM. BANKER, July 16, 2012 (quoting Cornelius Hurley’s warning that “every day we 
are realizing more that reform efforts are inadequate”); William D. Cohan, Does Congress Want 
Another Economic Meltdown?, BLOOMBERG, June 10, 2012 (“Wall Street’s well-paid army of lawyers 
and lobbyists continues to make a mockery of the whole re-regulation process.”); Roger Lowenstein, 
Derivatives Lobby Has U.S. Regulators on the Run, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 17, 2012 (“The derivatives 
industry is squeezing Washington like a python.”); Matt Taibbi, How Wall Street Killed Financial 
Reform, ROLLING STONE, June 24, 2012 (“The fate of Dodd–Frank over the past two years is an object 
lesson in the government’s inability to institute even the simplest and most obvious reforms, especially 
if those reforms happen to clash with powerful financial interests.”); Neil Barofsky, Bungled Bank 
Bailout Leaves Behind Righteous Anger, BLOOMBERG, July 22, 2012 (“Dodd–Frank hasn’t solved the 
problem it was meant to address—the power and influence of banks deemed too big to fail . . . .  The 
banks have also been gaming and watering down the [implementing] rules and regulations.”). 
 8. See infra notes 183–85, 401–403 and accompanying text. 
 9. Joe Adler, Bair’s Systemic Risk Council to Highlight ‘What’s Not Happening,’ AM. BANKER, 
June 19, 2012.  SRC’s mission “includes counteracting efforts by the [financial services] industry to 
undercut reforms established by Dodd–Frank.” Id.; see also Former FDIC Chair to Lead Systemic Risk 
Council, Monitor Financial Regulation, BUSINESS WIRE, June 6, 2012 (quoting John Rogers, an SRC 
member, who explained that the SRC “will serve as an essential sounding board for systemic risk 
reforms focused on strong investor protection, and offer a critical voice to promote the enforcement of 
regulations, financial disclosure and transparency”). 
 10. Adler, supra note 9 (quoting Ms. Born). 
 11. Floyd Norris, Group Forms to Urge Strict Oversight of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, 
at B4 (quoting Ms. Bair). 
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The financial industry’s ability to delay and weaken the 
implementation of Dodd–Frank seems surprising at first glance.  Intense 
popular anger at Wall Street for its central role in causing the financial 
crisis provided the political impetus for Dodd–Frank’s enactment.12  
Public confidence in banks and bankers has fallen to very low levels 
since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007.13  In a survey 
taken at the end of 2011, 56% of respondents agreed that “the power and 
influence of banks and other financial institutions represented a major 
threat to the country.”14 
The public has directed much of its outrage at the largest banks.  
Consumers have condemned big banks for their role in triggering the 
financial crisis, for opposing the adoption and implementation of Dodd–
Frank after receiving huge government bailouts, and for engaging in 
abusive foreclosure, debt collection and fee-setting practices.15  As 
 
 12. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd–Frank: Why Financial Reform 
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2012) (stating 
that Dodd–Frank’s enactment followed a “financial collapse . . . that threatened financial institutions on 
a global scale and brought the problem of systemic risk to the attention of a public already infuriated at 
financial institutions (and their highly compensated investment bankers) [for] being bailed out at 
taxpayer expense”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t’ ‘Screw Joe the Plummer’: The Sausage-Making of 
Financial Reform, (Mar. 26, 2012), at 13 (“The public detested the 2008 bailouts and, as economic and 
employment fears lingered into 2010, popular backlash increased, reaching a crescendo as news of 
lavish bonuses and compensation packages at bailed-out financial firms hit the press.”), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925431; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd–Frank Act: A Flawed and 
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 962 (2011) (“The severity 
and duration of the financial crisis, along with rising costs of governmental support for troubled [large 
banks], produced public outrage and created a strong consensus in favor of reforming financial 
regulation.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Remarks by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair to the ABA Government Relations 
Summit, Mar. 16, 2011 (stating that “[i]n April 2010, a Pew Research poll found that just 22 percent of 
respondents rated banks and other financial institutions as having a ‘positive effect on the way things are 
going in the country’”), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2011/spmar1611.html; Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson 
& Francesco Guerrara, US public loses faith in business, FT.COM, Jan. 25, 2011 (reporting on “a 
backlash against bankers and their bonuses, with the number of Americans who trust US banks dropping 
to a low of 25 per cent, down from 33 per cent a year ago and 71 per cent before the financial crisis”); 
Dawn Kopecki, Wall Street Leaderless in Rules Fight as Dimon Diminished, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 20, 
2012 (reporting on a Gallup poll in June 2012, which found that only 21% of Americans had a “great 
deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in U.S. banks, compare with 41% in 2007, representing “the lowest 
level of consumer confidence in U.S. banks since Gallup Inc. began polling on the question in 1979”); 
see also Barbara A. Rehm, Reputation Remains Industry’s No. 1 Problem, AM. BANKER, June 7, 2012 
(stating that “[t]he banking industry’s image is about as awful as it’s ever been.  Polls prove it and 
popular culture reflects it.”). 
 14. Maurice E. Stucke, Occupy Wall Street and Antitrust, Univ. of Tenn. Coll. of Law Res. 
Paper  No. 179, Mar. 2012, at 4 (quoting results of a December 2011 survey by Pew Research Center for 
the People & the Press), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=.2002234. 
 15. See, e.g., Carter Dougherty, Major Banks Largest Source of Consumer Bureau Complaints, 
BLOOMBERG, June 19, 2012 (reporting that Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup “were the 
subjects of the largest number of [consumer] complaints to the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau in 2011”); Joe Nocera, Why People Hate the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2012, at A27 
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explained in Part II(C)(2), a series of recent scandals further eroded 
Wall Street’s reputation.  MF Global, a large commodities broker, 
collapsed in late 2011.  JPMorgan Chase (JPMorgan), the largest U.S. 
bank, disclosed a huge loss from its “London Whale” trading debacle in 
May 2012.  Barclays, UBS and RBS paid large fines in 2012 and early 
2013 to settle charges that they colluded with other major international 
banks to manipulate the London interbank offered rate (Libor), an 
overnight bank lending rate that determines interest rates for more than 
$300 trillion of worldwide debt obligations.  Finally, HSBC and 
Standard Chartered, two of the five largest U.K. banks, paid similarly 
large penalties in 2012 to resolve charges that they violated federal laws 
prohibiting money laundering, terrorist financing and financial 
transactions with Iranian businesses. 
Notwithstanding these new scandals—which resembled the abuses 
that led to the financial crisis—the financial industry has shown a 
continuing ability to influence politicians and regulators.16  The 
industry’s persistent clout is due to the public’s inability to maintain a 
long-term focus on financial reform, as well as the industry’s 
overwhelming advantages in lobbying and other forms of political and 
regulatory influence.  As John Coffee has shown, financial regulatory 
reform typically follows a “regulatory sine curve,” in which (i) a 
financial crisis provokes widespread outrage and public demands for 
reform, which cause Congress and regulators to impose more stringent 
 
(declaring that “the country . . . hates the banks these days” due to the abusive foreclosure and debt 
collection practices of the largest banks); Robin Sidel, Customers to Banks: It’s You, Not Me, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 2, 2011, at C1 (reporting on customers’ anger caused by “rising fees” and “a flood of 
foreclosures” at big banks); Richard Burnett, Consumers unhappy with banks, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
(FL), Dec. 23, 2010, at B5 (reporting that most consumer complaints “involve large banks, while 
community banks and credit unions, though far more numerous, draw far fewer complaints”) (available 
on Lexis); Americans’ anger not easing over banks’ practices, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (WV), Dec. 10, 
2010, at P3D (available on Lexis) (reporting on customers’ anger over “excessive fees” and “foreclosure 
practices they view as unfair,” and quoting the view of bank analyst Paul Miller that “[t]he culture at 
banks has been to chase profits at all costs, even if it hurts their customers”); see also Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the 
Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1046 (2009) (stating that large financial institutions 
“were the primary private-sector catalysts for the destructive credit boom that led to the subprime 
financial crisis, and they have become the epicenter of the current global financial mess”).  For 
discussions of efforts by large financial institutions to defeat Dodd–Frank or, in the alternative, to 
weaken its key provisions, see SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET 
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 191–92, 205–07, 213–14 (2010); Wilmarth, supra 
note 12, at 1025–34; John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule: Obama’s economic adviser and his battles over 
the financial-reform bill, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 25. 
 16. See, e.g., Phil Mattingly, Wall Street Supporters in Congress Unmoved by Libor Probe, 
BLOOMBERG, July 3, 2012 (reporting that “Wall Street’s defenders in Congress are sticking by the 
[financial] industry, undaunted by the Barclays fine or trading losses of more than $2 billion at JP 
Morgan Chase”); John Kemp, Wall St and Republicans team up to curb CFTC, REUTERS, June 7, 2012 
(contending that Wall Street’s Republican allies in Congress were “deeply cynical” in voting to cut the 
CFTC’s operating budget while attacking the CFTC for not having adequately regulated MF Global). 
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rules on the financial industry, and (ii) after the crisis has passed and 
conditions seem to return to “normal,” the public loses interest in the 
financial sector and the industry pushes Congress and regulators to 
repeal or soften the new rules.17  Thus, as the financial crisis recedes in 
the public’s memory, the financial industry can weaken previously 
enacted reforms by exerting direct political influence through campaign 
contributions and lobbying, as well as indirect influence through 
“revolving door” employment opportunities offered to legislators and 
regulators.18 
The financial industry’s success in obstructing Dodd–Frank’s 
reforms—despite recent blows to Wall Street’s already tarnished 
reputation—sheds new light on an enduring mystery from the financial 
crisis.  Commentators have repeatedly asked why financial regulators 
“adopted policies that induced financiers to take excessive risks” during 
the period leading up to the crisis, even though regulators “often knew 
their policies were destabilizing the financial system many years before 
the crisis.”19  Part III of this article provides an overview of legislative 
and regulatory mistakes that helped to inflate the enormous and 
unsustainable credit boom which triggered the crisis.  From the early 
1990s until the crisis broke out in 2007, Congress and federal regulators 
repeatedly ignored warning signs and implemented policies that 
encouraged reckless lending and securitization practices by banks, 
savings associations (thrifts) and nonbank mortgage companies.  Those 
ill-fated policies included repealing restrictions on affiliations between 
banks and securities firms, watering down capital requirements, 
preempting state consumer protection laws, removing regulation of 
over-the-counter derivatives, and giving “superpriority” treatment in 
bankruptcy to derivatives and repurchase agreements for mortgage-
related securities. After the financial crisis began, federal officials gave 
enormous amounts of financial assistance to threatened megabanks and 
also provided extensive forbearance by suspending mark-to-market 
 
 17. Coffee, supra note 12, at 1029–31. 
 18. Id. at 1029–31, 1076–81; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 88–100, 133–37, 
147–49, 175–88 (providing a similar explanation for why financial scandals often do not produce 
effective reforms); infra Part IV (describing the sources of the financial industry’s political and 
regulatory influence). 
 19. JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO JR., AND ROSS LEVINE, GUARDIANS OF FINANCE: 
MAKING REGULATORS WORK FOR US 5 (2012); see also KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, 
THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 149 (2011) (“Federal regulators acted in time to stop a complete collapse of the 
world economy, but where were they when consumers and their advocates, researchers, cities, and states 
were warning about the growing abuses in the subprime market?”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FINANCIAL L. 881, 932 (2012) (“Why didn’t federal regulators stop 
financial institutions from generating huge volumes of high-risk credit that exploited consumers, risked 
their own soundness and undermined the stability of the financial markets?”). 
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accounting rules and by allowing the largest banks to defer losses on 
extensive portfolios of impaired second-lien housing loans.   
Politicians, regulators and bankers subsequently asserted that the 
financial crisis was caused by “an unforeseeable confluence of events” 
that created a “perfect storm . . . no one could anticipate.”20  However, 
those claims are demonstrably false.21  A recent study of regulatory 
failures during the credit boom concluded that “financial 
regulators . . . repeatedly designed, implemented, and maintained 
policies that helped precipitate the global financial crisis . . . .  [T]hey 
recklessly endangered the global economy.”22  Part III of this article 
provides additional support for that conclusion. 
Part IV offers four principal reasons for the pervasive legislative and 
regulatory mistakes that led to the financial crisis, as well as the 
financial industry’s success in undermining the implementation of 
Dodd–Frank.  First, the financial industry wields enormous influence 
due to its massive spending on political campaigns and lobbying and its 
outsized share of the U.S. economy.  The industry spent more than $8.6 
billion on political contributions and lobbying between 1998 and 2012 
and earned very favorable returns on those investments.  The industry 
achieved a series of major legislative victories between 1994 and 2005 
and defeated several bills that attempted to restrict subprime lending.  
While the industry could not prevent Dodd–Frank’s passage, it did 
succeed in weakening several of Dodd–Frank’s key provisions and in 
subsequently obstructing the statute’s implementation.   
Second, regulators have strong incentives to compete within and 
across national borders to attract the allegiance of major financial 
institutions.  Competition among domestic and foreign regulators 
encourages officials to follow policies that please their existing 
 
 20. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 1; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 
11 (“Some people like to call the subprime crisis a perfect storm.  That’s not what it was . . . Had anyone 
in Washington cared, the virus could have been checked.”); compare Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, 
Where Was The Wise Man?, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2008, § BU, at 1 (quoting Citigroup executive 
committee chairman and former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, who stated, “I don’t know of anyone 
who foresaw a perfect storm, and that’s what we’ve had here.”). 
 21. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 1–5, 85–86, 118–20, 204–06; see also id. at 205 
(“[T]his crisis is not essentially about unforeseeable shocks . . . .  Rather, many regulators made many 
mistakes, problems grew ever worse over years, regulators learned of or should have recognized the 
cumulating problems arising from their policies and from the obvious changes in the financial 
landscape, and yet the regulators chose not to respond until it was too late.”); ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 19, at 10, 204 (“[T]he federal government witnessed what was happening [with abusive subprime 
lending] and made a deliberate decision to desist from any meaningful action . . . .  [T]he federal 
government bears strong collective responsibility for the subprime crisis and the enormous financial 
harm it inflicted on ordinary Americans.”). 
 22. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 4–5; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, 
at 11 (“This book is born of frustration: frustration that Congress and federal regulators refused to heed 
warnings about the subprime market and let subprime loans spiral out of control.”). 
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regulated constituents and attract new ones.  Similarly, legislators fear 
that restrictive policies might cause global financial firms to move large 
segments of their operations to foreign jurisdictions.  During the two 
decades leading up to the financial crisis, large financial institutions 
skillfully exploited these opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and 
secured legislative and regulatory concessions that enabled those 
institutions to expand their operations and assume greater risks.  Since 
Dodd–Frank’s enactment, the financial industry has continued to assert 
the need for international “competitiveness” as a rationale for not 
adopting strong new safeguards for megabanks. 
Third, the financial industry’s political clout discourages regulators 
from imposing tougher restraints on financial institutions.  Regulators 
who dare to challenge the industry encounter intense “pushback” from 
industry trade groups and their political and regulatory allies.  In 
addition, the “revolving door” between government service and 
financial-sector jobs encourages regulators to accommodate industry 
demands for deregulation and supervisory “flexibility.”  The most 
egregious form of regulatory accommodation has occurred in the area of 
law enforcement.  Regulators and law enforcement agencies have 
repeatedly invoked the need to preserve financial stability as a reason 
not to impose criminal sanctions (or even harsh civil sanctions) on large 
financial firms or their top executives.  As a result, not a single major 
financial firm, or a single senior executive of such a firm, has been 
criminally prosecuted despite widespread evidence of serious 
misconduct at many large financial institutions. 
Fourth, over the past three decades politicians, regulators and industry 
leaders have developed a common “mindset” that promotes deregulation 
and opposes effective supervision of large financial institutions.  Prior to 
the outbreak of the crisis in 2007, the “conventional wisdom” in 
Washington and on Wall Street strongly supported “financial innovation 
and deregulation” and opposed “governmental interference in the 
economy.”23  Officials who disagreed with this consensus “were 
marginalized as people who simply did not understand the bright new 
world of modern finance.”24   
Since Dodd–Frank’s passage, the largest banks and their political and 
regulatory supporters have continued to advance many of the same 
arguments that were widely accepted as “conventional wisdom” before 
the crisis.  As explained in Part IV(B), those arguments include claims 
that (i) large financial conglomerates are essential to meet the demands 
of a globalized economy, and (ii) requiring megabanks to satisfy 
 
 23. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 89–90, 97–101 (quotes at 89, 101). 
 24. Id. at 97. 
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stronger prudential regulations will  impair their ability to compete with 
foreign universal banks and reduce the availability of credit for 
businesses and consumers.  The continued repetition of these shopworn 
arguments by industry representatives and their political and regulatory 
allies—despite the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression—
speaks volumes about Wall Street’s continuing political clout.  In 
addition, the industry contends that the “costs” of new financial reforms 
will outweigh their likely “benefits.”  However, the industry refuses to 
acknowledge the enormous costs that our nation and many other 
countries have incurred due to weak or nonexistent regulation during the 
pre-crisis boom.25 
As explained in Part IV(C), two events in March 2013 demonstrated 
that megabanks remain too big to fail (TBTF) as well as too big to 
manage or discipline effectively.  First, Attorney General Eric Holder 
acknowledged during a Senate committee hearing that the Department 
of Justice was very reluctant to pursue criminal charges against the 
largest financial institutions because of the potentially destabilizing 
impact of such prosecutions on domestic and global financial systems.  
Second, a Senate investigative report on JPMorgan’s “London Whale” 
trading scandal revealed systemic failures in risk management and 
oversight by both the bank’s management and the bank’s primary 
regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 
The analysis set forth in this article might lead to the discouraging 
conclusion that the battle for financial reform is over, because Wall 
Street’s political influence is just too strong and too pervasive for reform 
advocates to overcome.  However, Part V suggests that Attorney 
General Holder’s “too big to jail” admission and the Senate investigative 
report on JPMorgan’s “London Whale” trades could prove to be 
watershed events.  Shortly after those events occurred, a national survey 
found that half of American adults supported a mandatory breakup of 
the largest banks, and the Senate voted 99–0 in favor of a non-binding 
resolution calling for an end to government subsidies for megabanks. 
In April 2013, Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and David Vitter (R-
LA) introduced a bill that would require banks larger than $50 billion to 
maintain significantly higher levels of equity capital, with the most 
stringent capital mandate imposed on banks larger than $500 billion.  
The bill was hailed by some senior regulators and by many policy 
analysts and journalists as a strong challenge to the TBTF subsidies 
enjoyed by megabanks.  Wall Street institutions and their lobbyists 
fiercely attacked the bill, and the Obama Administration indicated its 
 
 25. See infra Part II(B)(2) (providing a summary of some of the principal costs of the financial 
crisis). 
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lack of support by claiming that Dodd–Frank had already solved the 
TBTF problem.  Notwithstanding that opposition, the Brown–Vitter bill 
could significantly alter the TBTF debate by (i) highlighting the 
inadequacy of Dodd–Frank’s reforms, as implemented to date, and (ii) 
focusing the TBTF debate on issues where Wall Street is highly 
vulnerable, including the largest banks’ dangerously low levels of equity 
capital and the extensive subsidies those banks receive from the federal 
government.  It remains to be seen whether continued revelations of 
excessive risk-taking and other abuses on Wall Street will finally 
mobilize the American people to demand fundamental legislative 
reforms, like Brown–Vitter, which could finally break Wall Street’s 
stranglehold over financial policy. 
II. THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY’S CAMPAIGN TO BLOCK DODD–FRANK’S 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Financial institutions and their trade associations have pursued a 
campaign on three fronts to undermine Dodd–Frank’s reforms.  First, 
they have lobbied extensively to delay and weaken rulemakings 
mandated by Dodd–Frank.  Second, they have filed lawsuits to overturn 
final rules that the industry opposes.  Third, they helped to elect a 
Republican majority in the House of Representatives in 2010 and again 
in 2012, and House Republican leaders have pushed bills to repeal key 
reforms or to hamstring the ability of federal agencies to carry out those 
reforms.26  In mid-2012, former CFTC chairman Brooksley Born 
publicly warned that the financial industry was succeeding in its efforts 
to block Dodd–Frank’s reforms by “lobbying for the dismantling of 
protections in the Act, delay[ing] rulemaking procedures, challenging 
the rules in the courts, trying to defund regulatory agencies and 
preventing appointment of key regulators.”27   
A. The Industry’s Lobbying Efforts to Impede Dodd–Frank’s Reforms 
As soon as Congress passed Dodd–Frank, the financial industry 
unleashed a massive lobbying campaign to undermine the ability of 
federal agencies to issue rules to implement the statute.28  Due in large 
 
 26. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 7; Rivlin, supra note 7; Taibbi, supra note 7. 
 27. Adler, supra note 9 (quoting Ms. Born). 
 28. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2010, at A1; Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Not Over Until it’s in the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2010, at BU1; Stacy Kaper, Now for the Hard Part: Writing All the Rules, AM. BANKER, July 
22, 2010, at 1; Cheyenne Hopkins, Bankers Seek Ways to Gut Prop-Trading Ban, AM. BANKER, Nov. 
19, 2010, at 1; Asjylyn Loder & Phil Mattingly, Wall Street Lobbyists Besiege CFTC to Shape 
Derivatives Rules, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2010, 12:20 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
2013] TURNING A BLIND EYE 1297 
part to the success of that campaign, federal agencies failed to adopt 
more than three-fifths of the 279 rules whose issuance was required by 
June 2013.29  Prominent examples of the financial industry’s lobbying 
prowess include the industry’s ability to delay adoption of final rules 
governing systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) as well as 
implementation of the Volcker Rule and Dodd–Frank’s new regulatory 
regime for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. 
1. Enhanced Regulatory Requirements for SIFIs 
After encountering heavy industry resistance, the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) moved at a snail’s pace toward Dodd–
Frank’s goal of identifying nonbank financial companies that should be 
designated and regulated as SIFIs.30  Dodd–Frank authorizes FSOC to 
designate nonbank SIFIs in order to place those companies under the 
systemic risk oversight regime administered by the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB).31  However, almost three years elapsed before FSOC 
finally proposed to designate the first group of nonbank SIFIs in June 
2013.32   
After withdrawing proposed rules that were strongly opposed by the 
 
14/wall-street-lobbyists-besiege-cftc-to-influence-regulations-on-derivatives.html. 
 29. Frank Pompa & Denny Gainer, Who Killed Financial Reform: After three years, key parts of 
the plan to avert another Wall Street crisis remain undone, USA TODAY, June 4, 2013, at 1A (available 
on Lexis) (reporting that federal regulators missed 175 (about 63%) of the 279 Dodd–Frank rulemaking 
deadlines that had passed by June 3, 2013, and regulators failed to issue proposed rules for 64 of the 175 
missed deadlines); see also DAVIS POLK, DODD–FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 2 (June 2013), available at  
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/3bafb045-659b-40f0-be66 00c49ba3bffd/Presentation/Publi 
cationAttachment/c5d1116c-35b9-46db-8ed1-055523d30e9f/Jun2013_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf 
(providing same information) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Progress Report]. 
 30. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 993–94 (discussing Dodd–Frank’s creation of FSOC and 
FSOC’s responsibility for designating nonbank financial companies as SIFIs if “material financial 
distress” at such companies “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States”) (quoting 
Dodd–Frank § 113(a)(1)). 
 31. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 993–95, 1006–08 (discussing FSOC’s authority to designate 
nonbank SIFIs, and explaining that the FRB may impose a range of prudential regulations, including 
capital and liquidity requirements, to mitigate the systemic risk posed by nonbank SIFIs). 
 32. On June 3, 2013, FSOC “voted to make proposed determinations regarding an initial set of 
nonbank financial companies [that would be designated as nonbank SIFIs] under section 113 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act.”  Jeff Bater, Systemic Risk: Council Votes on Proposed Determinations Of Nonbank 
SIFIs; Doesn’t Name Firms, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 1027 (2013) (quoting Treasury Department 
spokesperson Suzanne Elio).  FSOC did not name the firms that were subject to the proposed 
determinations, but American International Group (AIG), GE Capital and Prudential disclosed that they 
received notices of proposed designation from FSOC.  Update 3-U.S. regulators propose scrutiny of 
AIG, Prudential, GE Capital, REUTERS, June 3, 2013.  Each of the firms receiving the proposed 
designations would have the right to request a hearing within 30 days thereafter.  If any of those firms 
did request a hearing, FSOC would be required to hold a nonpublic hearing to decide whether to issue a 
final order designating that firm as a nonbank SIFI.  Id.  
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financial industry,33 FSOC did not issue final rules governing the 
process for designating nonbank SIFIs until April 2012.  Those rules 
establish a lengthy procedure—including three stages of FSOC 
evaluation, followed by the right of an identified nonbank financial 
company to demand a hearing and seek judicial review—before FSOC 
can make a final designation.34  Due to FSOC’s long delay in issuing 
even its first set of proposed designations, major nonbank financial 
firms—including leading insurance companies and large asset 
managers—have remained outside Dodd–Frank’s systemic risk 
oversight regime, even though “[t]he ability to keep a closer eye on 
financial giants other than banks is a major aspect of [Dodd–Frank].”35 
Dodd–Frank authorized FSOC to designate nonbank SIFIs in order to 
“prevent the chaos that occurred” when federal regulators were forced to 
bail out American International Group (AIG), the nation’s largest 
insurance company, in the fall of 2008.36  By identifying nonbank SIFIs, 
FSOC would bring those companies “within the perimeter of prudential 
rules” and would enable the FRB to exercise the types of supervisory 
powers that it needed but did not possess over large securities firms and 
insurance companies during the financial crisis.37  FSOC’s painfully 
slow progress toward designating nonbank SIFIs has clearly undermined 
one of Dodd–Frank’s primary objectives.38 
 
 33. R. Christian Bruce, Systemic Risk: FSOC Plans Three-Stage Analysis to Tag Systemically 
Risky Nonbanks, 97 BNA’S BANKING REP. 634 (2011) (reporting that FSOC scrapped its original 
proposal for rules governing the designation of nonbank SIFIs after that proposal  “sparked a chorus of 
protests from critics”); see also Dave Clarke, Financial Risk Council Readies Systemic Tag, REUTERS 
(Apr. 3, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/us-financial-regulation-sifi-
idUSBRE83211A20120403 (reporting that “[l]arge insurers, hedge funds and other [nonbank] financial 
firms are hoping to avoid the systemic designation and have been trying to convince regulators to leave 
them alone”). 
 34. Mike Ferrulo, Systemic Risk: Officials Say Selection, Supervision of SIFIs Will Be Tailored 
to Each Firm’s Risks, 98 BNA’S BANKING REP. 891 (May 22, 2012) (describing FSOC’s issuance on 
April 3, 2012, of final regulations governing the process for designating of nonbank SIFIs). 
 35. Clarke, supra note 33; see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2–3 (2010) (explaining that Dodd–
Frank authorizes FSOC to “require nonbank financial companies to be supervised by the Federal 
Reserve if their failure would pose a risk to U.S. financial stability,” in order to prevent “the harm that 
could be inflicted on the financial system and economy by the failure of . . . [systemically important] 
nonbank financial firms operated with inadequate government oversight”). 
 36. Clarke, supra note 33; see also FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 139–42, 200–02, 344–51 (2011) [hereinafter 
FCIC Report], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (describing 
the factors contributing to the federal government’s emergency bailout of AIG, including the lack of 
effective regulation of AIG and the failure by federal officials to identify the systemic risks created by 
AIG’s massive issuances of credit default swaps). 
 37. Daniel K. Tarullo, FRB Governor, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (May 2, 
2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120502a.pdf [hereinafter 
Tarullo, May 2, 2012 Speech]. 
 38. Barbara A. Rehm, Editor at Large: Dodd–Frank’s Big Misses: Systemic Risk, Reg Reform, 
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The financial industry’s opposition has also bogged down the FRB’s 
efforts to establish enhanced prudential requirements for both nonbank 
SIFIs and bank SIFIs (banking organizations with assets over $50 
billion), as required by Sections 165 and 166 of Dodd Frank.39  The 
FRB did not issue proposed rules under Sections 165 and 166 until the 
end of 2011, nearly eighteen months after Dodd–Frank’s enactment.40  
The FRB’s proposed rules included heightened capital and liquidity 
requirements, counterparty credit exposure limits, risk management 
standards, periodic stress test requirements and early remediation 
sanctions for SIFIs that fail to comply with the FRB’s enhanced 
prudential standards.41  The FRB explained that its proposals were 
designed to reduce the systemic risks posed by large, complex financial 
institutions and to decrease the likelihood of future taxpayer bailouts of 
TBTF institutions.42 
In response, financial industry trade groups attacked every major 
aspect of the proposed rules.43  Five trade associations representing the 
 
AM. BANKER, July 21, 2011, at 1 (contending that Dodd–Frank “was supposed to prevent a repeat of the 
2008 financial crisis by identifying which firms are too big to fail and then subjecting them to tighter 
oversight and higher capital standards,” and maintaining that FSOC’s delay in designating nonbank 
SIFIs “exposes a lack of leadership that is fueling uncertainty and anxiety”).  As discussed above, FSOC 
did not issue proposed designations for the first group of nonbank SIFIs until June 2013.  See supra note 
32 and accompanying text.  In contrast, FSOC acted more quickly in designating eight “financial market 
utilities” (FMUs) as “systemically important” under Title VIII of Dodd–Frank in July 2012.  The eight 
designated FMUs operate multilateral systems for clearing, transferring and settling payments and other 
financial transactions (including purchases and sales of securities and other financial instruments). 
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 110–11, 145–87, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 39. See Dodd–Frank, §§ 165–66. 
 40. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered 
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594 (Jan. 5, 2012) [hereinafter FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs]; see also R. 
Christian Bruce, Regulatory Reform: Fed Launches New Phase in Bank Oversight with Tougher Rules 
for Systemic Institutions, 98 BNA’S BANKING REP. 5 (2012). 
 41. See FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 594–602 (providing an overview of the 
FRB’s proposal); Bruce, supra note 40 (same). 
 42. In the preamble to its proposed rules, the FRB stated that “[t]he recent financial crisis 
showed that some financial companies had grown so large, leveraged, and interconnected that their 
failure could pose a threat to overall financial stability.” FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, 
at 595.  The FRB also observed that “[t]he market perception that some companies are ‘too big to fail’ 
poses threats to the financial system” by reducing incentives for market discipline of those companies 
and by producing “competitive distortions” through lower funding costs for those firms.  Id. 
 43. Donna Borak, Regionals, Big Banks Raise Fears on Slew of Fed Rules, AM. BANKER, May 8, 
2012 (reporting that banks and financial trade groups filed 90 comment letters, which included claims 
that the FRB’s proposal “went too far and needs to be significantly reworked”); Dave Clarke, Big Isn’t 
Bad, Banks Tell Fed, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2012, 6:01 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/us-financial-regulation-fed-idUSBRE83Q19Q20120427 
(reporting that “[l]obbying groups representing the big banks are pushing back against” the FRB’s 
proposal); Cheyenne Hopkins & Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan’s Zubrow Says Fed Risk Rule May Hurt 
Markets, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2012, 8:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-
30/jpmorgan-s-zubrow-says-fed-risk-rule-may-hurt-markets.html (reporting that JPMorgan’s comment 
letter argued that the FRB’s proposal  went “well beyond” Dodd–Frank’s mandate and sought to impose 
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largest U.S. financial institutions challenged the FRB’s proposals for 
being “premised” on the view that “big is bad” and “size inherently is a 
major indicator of and contributor to systemic risk.”44  The associations 
alleged that the FRB “has set a course to use Section 165 [of Dodd–
Frank] to achieve . . . a reduction in the size of large banks through size-
based regulation.”45  The associations maintained that any “approach 
grounded in a ‘too big’ or ‘big is bad’ concept is . . . misguided and 
detrimental to a sound, strong banking system and a strong economy.”46   
Wall Street firms and trade associations also strongly opposed the 
FRB’s proposal to establish a single counterparty credit limit (equal to 
ten percent of a SIFI’s capital stock and surplus), which would impose a 
ceiling on its aggregate net exposure to any other nonbank SIFI or bank 
holding company (BHC) having assets over $500 billion.47 Industry 
participants maintained that the credit limit proposal “would needlessly 
reduce liquidity in the financial system and thereby dampen economic 
activity,”48 and “could destabilize markets” by restricting the ability of 
SIFIs to execute risk-hedging transactions with large counterparties.49 
In May 2012, senior executives of several major banks held a 
“closed-door meeting” with FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo (the official 
who heads the FRB’s bank supervision efforts).  During that meeting, 
they criticized the FRB’s efforts to establish stronger prudential 
standards for SIFIs and to implement the Volcker Rule.50  One news 
 
“‘disruptive’ standards”). 
 44. Letter from The Clearing House Ass’n L.L.C., American Bankers Ass’n, Financial Services 
Forum, Financial Services Roundtable, and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Ass’n, to the FRB 
16 (Apr. 27, 2012), available at http://op.bna.com/bar.nsf/id/cbre-
8tukx4/$File/tradegroupletter165166.pdf [hereinafter Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter].  The 
five trade associations that signed the letter “collectively represent financial institutions accounting for a 
substantial majority of banking and financial assets in the United States.”  Id. at 1 n.1. 
 45. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 16 (pointing out that the 
preamble to the FRB’s proposal stated that the proposed rules “would provide incentives for [SIFIs] to 
reduce their systemic footprint”) (quoting FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 596). 
 46. Id. at 16–17; see also infra notes 696-707 and accompanying text (discussing arguments 
presented by the largest financial institutions and their allies in support of the alleged benefits created by 
big banks). 
 47. While Section 165(e)(2)) of Dodd–Frank generally limits single-party credit exposures to 25 
percent of a SIFI’s capital and surplus, the statute authorizes the FRB to adopt rules imposing stricter 
limits if the FRB determines such limits are “necessary to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the 
United States.” Dodd–Frank, § 165 (e)(2); see also FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 
600, 612–14 (discussing proposed single-counterparty credit limit exposure limits for SIFIs). 
 48. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 4. 
 49. Hopkins & Kopecki, supra note 43 (quoting and summarizing JPMorgan’s comment letter); 
see also Lauren Tara LaCapra, Banks Fight Fed’s Push to Make Them Less Entwined, REUTERS (June 
26, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/25/us-banks-derivatives-rules-
idUSBRE85O16820120625 (reporting that “the industry is spooked by [the credit risk exposure] rules”). 
 50. Bradley Keoun et al., Joshua Zumbrun & Cheyenne Hopkins, Dimon Cites “Give and Take” 
After Bank Chiefs Meet at Fed, BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2012, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-03/dimon-meets-tarullo-as-banks-lobby-fed-on-softer-
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report described the meeting as “highlight[ing] the magnitude of Wall 
Street’s campaign to blunt new regulations” because it showed the 
determination of “Wall Street bosses . . . to personally lobby the Federal 
Reserve about softening proposed reforms that might crimp their 
profits.”51 
Mr. Tarullo did not respond directly to the bankers’ objections at the 
meeting.52  However, in a speech given earlier on the same day, Mr. 
Tarullo stated that it was “sobering to recognize that, more than four 
years after the failure of Bear Stearns began the acute phase of the 
financial crisis, so much remains to be done.”53  He also expressed his 
“concern . . . that the momentum generated during the crisis will wane 
or be redirected to other issues before reforms have been completed.”54  
He further warned that, if regulators failed to complete a “rigorous 
implementation” of Dodd–Frank’s reforms, “we will have lost the 
opportunity to reverse the pre-crisis trajectory of increasing too-big-to-
fail risks.”55  The content and timing of Mr. Tarullo’s speech indicated 
that he viewed Wall Street’s lobbying campaign as a significant and 
potentially dangerous obstacle to the accomplishment of Dodd–Frank’s 
reforms. 
In mid-2013—a full year after Mr. Tarullo’s speech—the FRB’s 
proposals for enhanced prudential requirements for SIFIs remained 
unfinished business.56  Indeed, the FRB and its fellow banking agencies 
(the FDIC and OCC) completed less than two-fifths of the regulations 
 
rules.html (describing Governor Tarullo’s private meeting with CEOs of JPMorgan, Bof A, Goldman, 
Morgan Stanley, U.S. Bancorp and State Street); see also Donna Borak, Fed Discloses Details of 
Private Meeting with Bank CEOs, AM. BANKER, May 3, 2012 (same); Craig Torres & Cheyenne 
Hopkins, A Fed Regulator Who Actually Regulates, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 26, 2012, at 13 
(explaining that Mr. Tarullo is “the Fed governor in charge of bank supervisions and regulation” and 
“[i]n the past three years, no one has done more to strengthen the government’s grip on the financial 
system”). 
 51. Keoun et al., supra note 50. 
 52. Borak, supra note 50 (reporting that Mr. Tarullo listened but did not respond to comments 
made by the bank CEOs during the meeting). 
 53. Tarullo, May 2, 2012 Speech, supra note 37; see also Keoun, supra note 50 (reporting that 
Mr. Tarullo delivered his speech “earlier in the day” before he met with the bank CEOs). 
 54. Tarullo, May 2, 2012 Speech, supra note 37. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Barbara A. Rehm, Regulators’ Reputation Sinks Along with Industry’s, AM. BANKER, Mar. 
28, 2013, at 1, 2013 WLNR 7543392 (reporting that the FRB had not yet adopted final rules 
establishing “enhanced prudential standards” for SIFIs even though those rules “are key to preventing 
the next crisis”); see also Satish M. Kini et al., The Federal Reserve’s Proposal and the Foreign 
Banking Community: A Practical Guide for Foreign Banks, 32 BANKING &  FINANCIAL SERVICES 
POLICY REPORT No. 5 (May 2013), at 21, 21, 26 (reporting that the FRB issued proposed rules in 
December 2012 that would establish enhanced prudential standards for large foreign banks with 
significant operations in the U.S., and the proposed standards for foreign banks were “generally 
consistent” with the enhanced prudential standards that the FRB proposed for SIFIs in December 2011 
but had not yet adopted in final form). 
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those agencies were required to adopt by June 2013.57 
2. Regulations Implementing the Volcker Rule and Title VII of Dodd–
Frank 
Wall Street firms and financial trade associations have also waged 
determined wars of attrition against rulemakings designed to implement 
Section 619 (the Volcker Rule) and Title VII of Dodd–Frank.58  By mid-
2013, industry members had battled the Volcker Rule to a virtual 
standstill, and they had significantly delayed the implementation of Title 
VII. 
The Volcker Rule prohibits banking organizations from engaging in 
“proprietary trading,” and it also limits their investments in hedge funds 
and private equity funds.59  The financial industry has sought to 
undermine the Volcker Rule’s effectiveness on numerous grounds, 
including by persuading regulators to adopt very broad interpretations of 
the statute’s exemptions for “market making” and “risk-mitigating 
hedging.”60  When federal regulators issued a proposed set of 
implementing regulations in October 2011, the American Bankers 
Association immediately condemned the “oversized nature and 
complexity” of the proposal and declared that the proposal was 
“unworkable.”61  A month later, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
 
 57. Dodd–Frank Progress Report, supra note 29, at 5 (showing that the FDIC, FRB and OCC 
finished only 40 of 104 rulemakings whose deadlines had passed by June 3, 2013). 
 58. See SEN. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8–9, 29–35, 90–101 (2010) (describing the Volcker Rule and 
the new regime for regulating derivatives under Title VII of Dodd–Frank); Pompa & Gainer, supra note 
29 (describing the financial industry’s success in blocking the implementation of the Volcker Rule and 
Dodd–Frank’s provisions governing derivatives). 
 59. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1025–30 (describing the Volcker Rule, which prohibits 
“proprietary trading” by banking organizations and sharply limits their investments in hedge funds and 
private equity funds); Krawiec, supra note 12, at 14–16 (same). 
 60. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1028–30; Dave Clarke & Jonathan Spicer, Regulators 
Split on Hedging Under Volcker Rule, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2011, 12:42 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/21/us-financial-regulation-volcker-idUSTRE78K42R20110921; 
Hopkins, supra note 28; Yalman Onaran, Attack on Volcker Rule Seen Exaggerating Cost of Disruption 
to Bond Market, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-
18/attack-on-volcker-rule-seen-exaggerating-cost-of-disruption-to-bond-market.html; Cheyenne 
Hopkins, Silla Brush & Phil Mattingly, Volcker Rule Faces Critics as Effective Date Nears, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2012, 11:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-14/u-s-volcker-
rule-faces-harsh-global-critics-months-before-it-takes-effect.html. 
 61. Yin Wilczek, Regulatory Reform: Banking Regulators Issue Volcker Proposal, 97 BNA’S 
BANKING REP. 633 (2011) (quoting the American Bankers Association’s press release issued on Oct. 11, 
2011); see also Phil Mattingly & Cheyenne Hopkins, U.S. Regulators to Defend Volcker Rule Ban on 
Proprietary Trades, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-20/u-s-
regulators-to-defend-volcker-rule-ban-on-proprietary-trades.html (reporting that financial firms attacked 
the regulators’ proposal to implement the Volcker Rule for being “too complex and potentially 
damaging for financial markets,” and noting that the proposal included nearly 1,300 questions and was 
almost 300 pages long). 
2013] TURNING A BLIND EYE 1303 
attacked the proposal as “the poster child of regulatory complexity” and 
demanded that federal regulators withdraw the proposal and issue a new 
set of proposed rules.62   
The complexity of the regulators’ Volcker Rule proposal resulted in 
part from their decision to include highly detailed exemptions and safe 
harbors in response to concerns expressed by the financial industry.63  
Similarly, the industry persuaded regulators to include in the proposal a 
broad extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule, in order to “level 
the playing field” between U.S. and foreign banks.64  However, after 
regulators issued their proposal, U.S. bankers encouraged foreign banks 
and foreign regulators to oppose the proposal’s international scope.65  
American financiers also urged foreign officials to object to the 
regulators’ proposal because it would not permit banks to trade foreign 
sovereign bonds, while the statutory language of the Volcker Rule 
allows banks to trade U.S. government securities.66  Due to the intense 
opposition marshaled by financial industry, federal regulators failed to 
issue final implementing regulations for the Volcker Rule by the 
statutory deadline of July 21, 2012.67  A Treasury official subsequently 
predicted that regulators would adopt a “final version” of the Volcker 
 
 62. U.S. Chamber Calls for Re-Proposal and Delay of Volcker Rule, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/november/us-chamber-
calls-re-proposal-and-delay-volcker-rule; see also Regulatory Reform: U.S. Chamber Calls on 
Regulators to Withdraw, Repropose Volcker Rule, 97 BNA’S BANKING REP. 890 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
 63. Bankers’ Objections to Volcker Rule Fail on the Merits, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2011, 8:00 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-20/big-u-s-banks-main-objections-to-volcker-rule-fail-
on-the-merits-view.html (“The complexity [in the proposal] is largely financial-industry lobbyists’ own 
doing” because “many of the proposed rule’s 298 pages and 383 questions are devoted to carving out 
exceptions” requested by the industry); Mattingly & Hopkins, supra note 61 (reporting the view of Rep. 
Barney Frank that the proposal’s complexity resulted from efforts by regulators to “accommodate[] the 
concerns” of the financial industry). 
 64. Yalman Onaran, Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule, Inciting Foreign Outrage, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 23, 2012, 3:56 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-23/banks-lobbied-to-widen-
volcker-rule-before-inciting-foreigners-against-law.html (quoting Douglas Landy, head of U.S. financial 
regulatory practice at the Allen & Overy law firm). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; Cheyenne Hopkins, U.S. Regulators Exploring Volcker Exemption for Foreign Sovereign 
Debt, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/u-s-
regulators-weigh-volcker-exemption-for-sovereign-debt.html.  The Volcker Rule expressly exempts 
trading by banking organizations in U.S. government securities but does not contain a similar exemption 
for securities issued by foreign governments.  Dodd–Frank § 619(d)(1)(A). 
 67. Donna Donna Borak, Fed’s Raskin Pushes for Tougher Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER, July 25, 
2012 (reporting that “[r]egulators have already missed the statutory deadline to finalize the Volcker Rule 
by July 21”); see also Donna Borak, Fed’s Plosser: “Volcker Rule” Outcome Still Murky, AM. BANKER, 
Apr. 13, 2012 [hereinafter Borak, “Fed’s Plosser”] (reporting that the Volcker Rule proposal was 
“opposed by many banks and even some foreign governments”).  In April 2012, the FRB issued 
guidance confirming that banks would not be expected to comply fully with the Volcker Rule (as finally 
implemented) until July 21, 2014.  Donna Borak, Regulators Offer Long-Awaited Guidance on 
Compliance With Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER, Apr. 20, 2012. 
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Rule by the end of 2012.68  However, in mid-2013 the Volcker Rule 
remained unfinished, and final adoption was “nowhere in sight.”69 
The financial industry has similarly delayed efforts by the CFTC and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement Title VII 
of Dodd–Frank, which establishes a comprehensive regulatory regime 
for OTC derivatives.70  Prior to Dodd–Frank’s passage, the OTC 
derivatives business was largely unregulated and was also a leading 
source of profits for the largest U.S. banks.71  Not surprisingly, major 
banks strongly opposed Title VII’s provisions that mandate centralized 
clearing, public reporting and collateralization of swaps trading, and that 
also require banks to transfer some of their derivatives trading activities 
to separately-incorporated affiliates.72  Since Dodd–Frank’s enactment, 
Wall Street banks and their allies have conducted a massive lobbying 
campaign to weaken or delay the implementation of Title VII that is 
 
 68. Final Volcker Rule Expected by Year-End—Treasury Official, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2012, 
11:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/21/volcker-timeline-idUSL2E8JL4CB20120821. 
 69. Darrell Delamaide, Volcker rule delay shows financial reform’s flaws, USA TODAY, April 
10, 2013, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/04/10/delamaide-column-
volcker-rule/2070951/; see also Pompa & Gainer, supra note 29 (reporting that the Volcker Rule 
“remains unfinished and long behind schedule” in June 2013). 
 70. Under Title VII, the SEC regulates “security-based swaps” while the CFTC regulates other 
types of “swaps.”  The agencies are required to “consult and coordinate” in adopting rules and orders 
governing such instruments with the goal of “assuring regulatory consistency and comparability to the 
extent possible.”  Dodd–Frank, § 712(a)(1), (2).  For discussions of the reforms mandated by Title VII 
of Dodd–Frank, see Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with 
Legislative Sunlight: Dodd–Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an 
Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 152–55 (2011); Adam 
J. Krippel, Regulatory Overhaul of the OTC Derivatives Market: The Costs, Risks, and Politics, 6 
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 269, 281–97 (2011). 
 71. Krippel, supra note 70, at 281–82 (explaining that five large U.S. banks controlled 96% of 
all derivatives held by U.S. banks and also controlled almost two-fifths of global derivatives markets); 
Kambiz Foroohar, Gensler Evolving in Derivatives War Sees No Deed Go Unpunished, BLOOMBERG 
(June 21, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-21/gensler-evolving-in-
derivatives-war-sees-no-deed-go-unpunished.html (reporting that the five largest U.S. banks generated 
$30 billion in annual profits from trading in derivatives). 
 72. See Alison Vekshin & Phil Mattingly, Lawmakers Reach Compromise on Financial 
Regulation, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-
25/lawmakers-reach-compromise-on-financial-regulation.html (describing lobbying battles and debates 
over Dodd–Frank’s provisions regulating OTC derivatives); see also Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1030-
34 (explaining that Section 716 of Dodd–Frank (the Lincoln Amendment) was originally designed to 
force banks to move most of their OTC derivatives trading activities into separate nonbank affiliates; 
however, the House-Senate conference committee significantly weakened Section 716 by inserting 
several exemptions as a result of “intense opposition” from Wall Street banks and their legislative 
allies); Krippel, supra note 70, at 284–85 (explaining that the “watered down” Lincoln Amendment 
applies to less than one-fifth of the OTC derivatives market); see also Jesse Hamilton, OCC Tells Banks 
To Start Planning Safe Phase-out of Swaps Trades, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2013) (reporting that the 
OCC and FRB gave U.S. banks and foreign banks with U.S. operations two additional years—i.e., until 
July 2015—to comply with the Lincoln Amendment’s requirement to transfer equity swaps, commodity 
swaps and certain non-cleared derivatives to separate affiliates), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
06-12/occ-tells-banks-to-start-planning-safe-phase-out-of-swaps-trades.html. 
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comparable to their epic battle against the Volcker Rule.73 
For example, the financial industry persuaded the CFTC and the SEC 
to adopt rules defining “swap dealers” as firms conducting more than $8 
billion of swap trades each year, a much higher trading threshold than 
the $100 million trading level the agencies originally proposed.74  In 
addition, the agencies’ definition of “swap dealers”—which triggers the 
applicability of many of Title VII’s most demanding requirements—
allows dealers to exclude hedging transactions in determining whether 
their annual trading volume exceeds the $8 billion threshold.75  Some 
advocates of financial reform viewed the much higher threshold and the 
broad hedging exemption as “discouraging,” and one advocate remarked 
that “[t]he $8 billion exemption level . . . demonstrates the enormous 
lobbying effort of Wall Street and major energy and commodity 
companies that have been working to undermine Dodd–Frank.”76   
The CFTC and SEC did not adopt final rules defining “swap” and 
“end-user”—terms that govern the scope of many of Title VII’s 
requirements—until July 2012.77  The final definitions of those terms 
contained significant carve-outs from Title VII’s regulatory regime, 
including exclusions of commercial firms and smaller banks from 
clearing requirements as well as exemptions for insurance products, loan 
participations and commodity forwards from the regulatory definition of 
“swaps.”78  The broad scope of those exemptions provoked a dissent 
 
 73. Loder & Mattingly, supra note 28; Lowenstein, supra note 7. 
 74. Alexandra Alper & Sarah N. Lynch, Update 6—U.S. Regulators Spare All But Biggest Swap 
Dealers, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2012, 6:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/financial-
regulation-swaps-idUSL2E8FI44Y20120418. 
 75. Id. (describing the hedging exemption, and explaining that swap dealers “must register with 
regulators and back up their trades with more capital and collateral”); Steven Sloan & Jesse Hamilton, 
Regulators Approve $8 Billion Threshold for Swaps Dealers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 18, 2012, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-18/swap-regulators-set-to-approve-8-billion-threshold-for-
dealers.html (reporting on the new rules defining “swap dealers” and explaining that those dealers “will 
ultimately be subject to the highest capital and collateral requirements for [swap] market participants”). 
 76. Alper & Lynch, supra note 74 (quoting Tyson Slocum, director of Public Citizen’s Energy 
Program). 
 77. Richard Hill, CFTC Adopts Definition for Swaps; Action Key to Breaking Rules Logjam, 44 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1381 (July 16, 2012) (explaining that many of Title VII’s provisions “could 
not be implemented” until the CFTC and SEC adopted a final definition of “swap,” while a final 
definition of “end-user” was needed to delineate the scope of Title VII’s clearing requirements); see also 
Alexandra Alper, U.S. Regulator Finally Defines a Swap, Starts Reform Countdown, REUTERS (July 10, 
2012, 2:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/10/us-cftc-swap-definition-
idUSBRE8690S120120710 (noting that the CFTC and SEC originally proposed rules defining “swap” 
in April 2011 but did not adopt final rules until July 2012). 
 78. Richard Hill, CFTC Adopts Definition for Swaps; Action Key to Breaking Rules Logjam, 44 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1381 (July 16, 2012); Silla Brush, CFTC Approves Swap Definition 
Triggering Dodd–Frank Rules, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-10/cftc-votes-4-1-to-approve-swap-definition-starting-
overhaul-1-.html (explaining that the end-user exemption from Title VII’s clearing requirements 
includes banks smaller than $10 billion of assets as well as commercial and manufacturing firms). 
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from Commissioner Bart Chilton as well as expressions of concern from 
public interest groups.79 
Major U.S. and foreign banks also lobbied federal regulators to 
exempt all swaps traded in overseas jurisdictions from Title VII’s 
regulatory regime.80  Section 722(d) of Dodd–Frank authorizes the 
CFTC to apply Title VII’s provisions to overseas swap activities if those 
activities “have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or 
effect on, the commerce of the United States,” or if overseas activities 
violate regulations adopted by the CFTC “to prevent the evasion of any 
provision of [Title VII].”81  CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler advocated a 
broad application of Title VII’s mandates to foreign derivatives trading 
by U.S. banks and by foreign banks with a significant U.S. presence.  
Mr. Gensler pointed out that several major financial institutions 
(including AIG, Bear Stearns (Bear), Citigroup, JPMorgan and Lehman 
Brothers (Lehman)) had suffered large losses in recent years from 
overseas trading.82  However, Mr. Gensler failed to persuade a majority 
of CFTC’s five commissioners to approve a proposed regulation that 
would reach overseas swaps trades.83   
Instead, the CFTC issued proposed guidance on regulation of 
overseas trading in June 2012.  The proposed guidance recommended a 
“more flexible” approach for regulating cross-border swaps trading, 
including allowing a limited group of overseas units of U.S. and foreign 
banks to rely on “substituted compliance” by following foreign rather 
than U.S. derivatives rules.84  Notwithstanding its less ambitious scope,  
 
 79. Alper, supra note 77 (reporting that Commissioner Chilton dissented because of his concern 
that the final rule’s exclusion for forward contracts could “create loopholes for swaps masquerading as 
commodity forwards,” thereby opening a “new Enron loophole”); Richard Hill, Following Key Dodd–
Frank Rulemaking, Some Worry About Exclusions, Exemptions, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1383 
(July 16, 2012) (describing Commissioner Chilton’s dissent and additional concerns expressed by Public 
Citizen and Americans for Financial Reform about the broad scope of several exemptions in the CFTC’s 
final rule). 
 80. Silla Brush, Goldman Sachs Among Banks Fighting to Exempt Half of Swap Books, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-30/goldman-sachs-
among-banks-lobbying-to-exempt-half-of-swaps-from-dodd-frank.html (reporting that more than half of 
the derivatives trading activities of the five largest U.S. banks took place overseas); Gregory Meyer & 
Aline van Duyn, US Banks Plead to Limit Range of Swap Rules, FT.COM (Mar. 16, 2011, 10:01 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fb9b1c78-500b-11e0-9ad1-00144feab49a.html#axzz2B1t80iX3 
(reporting on lobbying efforts by U.S. and foreign banks). 
 81. Dodd–Frank § 722(d)(i)(1), (2). 
 82. Keynote Address by CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler on the Cross-Border Application of 
Swaps Market Reform at Sandler O’Neil Conference, June 6, 2013, available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-141 [hereinafter Gensler June 6, 2013 
Speech]; Testimony by CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler before the U.S. House Committee on Financial 
Services, June 19, 2012, available at www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-117 
[hereinafter Gensler June 19, 2012 Testimony]. 
 83. Ben Protess, A Debate Goes Behind Doors, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2012, at B1. 
 84. Id.; see also Alexandra Alper, CFTC Floats Overseas Treatment of Swaps Rules, REUTERS 
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the proposed guidance was  strongly opposed by CFTC Commissioner 
Scott O’Malia, by foreign regulators, by “market participants around the 
world” and by “dozens of members of Congress” after aggressive 
lobbying by major banks.85   
In June 2013, Commissioner O’Malia and Wall Street trade 
associations urged the CFTC to postpone any further action on its 
proposed cross-border guidance.  They also argued that the CFTC must 
harmonize its guidance with the SEC’s issuance of a much weaker 
proposal on cross-border trading.  In contrast to the CFTC’s guidance, 
the SEC’s cross-border proposal would give overseas units of U.S. and 
foreign banks much greater leeway to avoid U.S. regulation by showing 
“substituted compliance” with foreign derivatives rules.86  
As described below, the financial industry and its Republican allies in 
Congress have succeeded in cutting or freezing budget appropriations 
for the CFTC and SEC, thereby undermining the ability of both agencies 
to complete dozens of rulemakings mandated by Dodd–Frank.87  In June 
2012, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler condemned industry efforts to 
slash his agency’s budget, declaring that the requested budget cuts 
would “effectively put the interests of Wall Street ahead of those of the 
American public by significantly underfunding this agency.”88  Due in 
large part to the financial industry’s efforts, the CFTC and SEC failed to 
finish almost half of the rulemakings they were required to complete by 
 
(June 29, 2012, 6:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-cftc-cross-border-
idUSBRE85S15M20120629 (explaining that the CFTC’s proposal was issued in the form of “proposed 
guidance”). 
 85. Richard Hill, International Developments: O’Malia Urges Fellow CFTC Commissioners To 
Extend Delay in Cross-Border Swap Rules, 45 SECURITIES REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1097 (2013); see also 
Eric Lipton, Banks Resist Strict Controls of Foreign Bets, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1 (reporting 
that “Wall Street bankers and some of the world’s top finance ministers are waging a bitter international 
campaign to block” the CFTC’s proposed cross-border guidance, and that leading banks have lobbied 
heavily to persuade Democratic and Republican members of Congress to oppose the guidance); Alper, 
supra note 84 (reporting that Mr. O’Malia criticized the guidance as “overly broad” and stated that “if I 
were asked to vote on the proposed guidance as final, my vote would be no”). 
 86. Hill, supra note 85; Dave Michaels, Bill to Limit CFTC Cross-Border Authority Faces U.S. 
House Vote, BLOOMBERG, June 12, 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-
12/bill-to-limit-cftc-cross-border-authority-faces-u-s-house-vote.html; see also Yin Wilczek, SEC’s 
Proposed Cross-Border Approach to Swaps Includes ‘Substituted Compliance, 45 SECUIRITES REG. & 
L. REP. (BNA) 813 (2013) (describing the SEC’s cross-border swaps proposal issued on May 1, 2013, 
and reporting that “market participants welcomed” the proposal but “regulatory watchdog Better 
Markets called the proposal a ‘major disappointment’ that would fail to adequately protect U.S. 
investors”). 
 87. See infra notes 160-62, 405 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of industry-
backed legislative measures reducing or freezing budget appropriations for the CFTC and SEC). 
 88. Stephen Joyce, Derivatives: Gensler Criticizes Vote on CFTC Budget, Says Dodd–Frank 
Requires More Funding, 98 BANKING REP. (BNA) 1030 (June 12, 2012) (quoting speech by Mr. 
Gensler on June 7, 2012, responding to a House subcommittee’s vote to reduce the CFTC’s budget by 
more than 12% compared to the previous year). 
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June 2013.89  As a result, Title VII’s implementation fell far behind 
schedule, and it remained very doubtful in mid-2013 when (or if) Title 
VII would become fully effective.90 
B. The Industry’s Litigation Strategy to Block Financial Reforms 
The financial industry has impeded the implementation of Dodd–
Frank’s reforms through litigation as well as lobbying.  The industry’s 
litigation strategy has focused on attacking new regulations for not being 
supported by an adequate analysis of their likely costs and their potential 
benefits.  The strategy has been successful to date, in part because 
neither the regulators nor the courts have properly accounted for the 
enormous costs of the financial crisis and the very large potential 
benefits of adopting reforms that could prevent or mitigate similar crises 
in the future. 
1. The Industry’s Reliance on “Cost–Benefit Analysis” in Challenging 
Financial Reforms 
In Business Roundtable v. SEC,91 the Business Roundtable and the 
Chamber of Commerce attacked the SEC’s proxy access rule (Rule 14a-
11).92  The D.C. Circuit struck down the rule, agreeing with the trade 
association plaintiffs that the SEC failed to conduct an adequate cost–
benefit analysis (CBA) as required by the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.93  Commentators have 
 
 89. DODD–FRANK PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 5 (showing that the CFTC and SEC 
failed to complete 66 of 141 rulemakings whose deadlines had passed by June 3, 2013); Edwards, supra 
note 7 (explaining how the financial industry used lobbying, the courts and Congress to frustrate the 
CFTC’s and SEC’s efforts to implement Dodd–Frank); Rivlin, supra note 7 (same). 
 90. Rivlin, supra note 7. 
 91. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 92. See id. at 1146–47 (explaining that Rule 14a-11 allowed qualifying shareholders to nominate 
and elect directors by gaining access to the proxy materials distributed by corporate management). 
Section 971 of Dodd–Frank gave the SEC discretionary authority to adopt its proxy access rule.  See 
infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing Section 971). In addition to its role as a plaintiff in 
Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce has played a leading role in lobbying against the 
passage and implementation of Dodd–Frank.  Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 886 n.14 (noting the Chamber 
of Commerce’s determined opposition to Dodd–Frank’s creation of the CFPB); Devin Leonard, Tom 
Donohue: Obama’s Tormentor, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2010 (describing the Chamber of 
Commerce’s implacable opposition to Dodd–Frank and its intention to lobby vigorously against 
implementation of the statute); Taibbi, supra note 7 (describing the Business Roundtable and Chamber 
of Commerce as “Wall Street[‘s] . . . two favorite lobbying arms”). 
 93. Business Roundtable, supra note 91. at 1146, 1148 (holding that the SEC was required to 
“consider” the effect of its proxy access rule on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation”); id. at 
1148–49 (concluding that the SEC “failed . . . adequately to assess the economic effects” of the proxy 
access rule and “inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule”); see also 
Jonathan D. Guynn, Note: The Political Economy of Financial Rulemaking after Business Roundtable, 
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questioned whether it was proper for the court to refuse to defer to the 
SEC’s evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of the rule, 
particularly as the SEC’s preamble to the final rule included a lengthy 
economic assessment of costs and benefits that occupied “nearly twenty 
pages” in the Federal Register.94 
In December 2011, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) and SIFMA filed a similar lawsuit challenging the 
validity of a CFTC regulation, which established “position limits” for 
commodities trading.95  ISDA and SIFMA alleged that the CFTC failed 
to make a statutorily required finding that its position limits were 
“necessary” to prevent excessive speculation or to deter market 
manipulation.96  The trade associations also charged that CFTC “failed 
to satisfy its independent statutory obligation to conduct a meaningful 
cost–benefit analysis.”97 Thus, the suit against the CFTC’s regulation 
involved the “same issue—the supposed lack of sufficient cost–benefit 
analysis—that the Chamber of Commerce used to derail the proxy 
access rule.”98   
In September 2012, the federal district court vacated and remanded 
the CFTC’s regulation, but the court did not address the plaintiffs’ CBA 
 
99 VA. L. REV. 641, 659-62 (2013) (describing “five flaws with the SEC’s [cost-benefit analysis] that 
the court found particularly vexing” in Business Roundtable). 
 94. Guynn, supra note 93, at 641, 643-44, 665, 658 (quote), 658n.111 (citing Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56753-71 (Sept. 18, 2010); see also id. at 667 
(“The court’s decision in Business Roundtable not to defer to the SEC looks much more like de novo 
review.  The SEC had evidence upon which to rely, and according to a recent critique of Business 
Roundtable, the studies favored by the court were methodologically flawed as well.  The SEC’s 
CBA . . . would have been upheld as reasonable under the arbitrary and capricious standard”); Note, 
Administrative Law—Corporate Governance Regulation—D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule 
Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate Economic Analysis—Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.2d 
1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1092-93 (2011) [hereinafter Business Roundtable 
Commentary] (“Courts hardly outperform the SEC at evaluating the imperfect science of 
economics . . . Not surprisingly given the complexity of economic analysis, Judge Ginsburg’s opinion 
[in Business Roundtable] made missteps similar to those for which he scolded the SEC.”); Edwards, 
supra note 7 (“[Judge] Ginsburg appears to ignore the precedent set by the foundational 1984 Chevron 
case, which . . . stressed that judges must afford ‘deference’ to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, 
especially when it’s ‘evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise’”). 
 95. Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n v. 
CFTC, No. 11-CV-2146, 2012 WL 385627 (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 2012); see also Stephen Joyce & Vin 
Wilczek, Derivatives: Publication of Rule Sets Date of Oct. 12 For Start of Contested Position Limits 
Regime, 99 BANKING REP. (BNA) 305 (Aug. 14, 2012) (discussing the filing and status of SIFMA’s and 
ISDA’s lawsuit challenging the CFTC’s rule on position limits).  Section 737(a) of Dodd–Frank 
authorizes the CFTC to establish aggregate position limits for commodities trading contracts in order to 
“diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation” and “to deter and prevent market manipulation” 
while, at the same time, ensuring “sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers” and preserving “the 
price discovery function of the underlying market.” 
 96. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction at 19, Int’l 
Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, No. 11-CV-2146, 2012 WL 385627 (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 2012). 
 97. Id. at 27 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2) (2000)).   
 98. Taibbi, supra note 7. 
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claim. Instead, the court held that the CFTC wrongly interpreted the 
Commodities Exchange Act as requiring the CFTC to establish position 
limits without making any determination as to whether such limits were 
necessary to address excessive speculation or market manipulation. The 
court’s decision did not resolve questions about the nature and substance 
of the CBA that the CFTC would be required to perform before issuing 
a revised position limits rule.99. 
The financial industry’s demands for extensive CBA studies have 
become a highly effective weapon in the industry’s fight to block or 
delay agency rules needed to implement Dodd–Frank.100  One analyst 
warned that if courts support such demands with the fervor 
demonstrated by Business Roundtable, the result could be a “judicial 
blockade on complex financial rulemaking, which would impede 
regulators’ ability to police the marketplace in accordance with 
congressional intent.”101  The same commentator observed that “[s]uch 
stringent [judicial] oversight should be especially suspect when statutes 
suggest proregulatory congressional intent,” as Section 971 of Dodd–
Frank did in granting the SEC specific authority to adopt a proxy access 
rule.102  
 
 99. Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279-84 (D.D.C. 2012); see 
also Yin Wilczek, Future Trading: Court Vacates and Remands CFTC Position Limits Regulation, 99 
BANKING REP. (BNA) 568 (Oct. 2, 2012) (discussing the impact of the court’s decision on the CFTC’s 
authority to adopt a revised position limits rule); Alexandra Alper, Jonathan Leff & Karey Wutkowski, 
Analysis: After Five-Year Push, Is It RIP for Commodity Limits?, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2012, 1:03 AM) 
(same), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/02/us-regulation-commodities-limits-
idUSBRE8901CS20121002.). 
 100. See, e.g., Guynn, supra note 93, at 669 (“The financial industry has already responded to the 
Business Roundtable decision by increasing its focus on agency compliance with applicable CBA 
mandates in its comment letters on proposed rulemaking and by filing lawsuits challenging various rules 
based on an alleged failure to conduct an adequate CBA”); Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, 
supra note 44, at 7 (declaring that “any analysis of the impact of a proposed rulemaking, even more so 
in the context of broad reforms, is incomplete without a cost/benefit analysis”); The Impact of Dodd–
Frank on Customers, Credit, and Job Creators: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets 
and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 112th Cong. 11 (2012) (Testimony of Dennis M. Kelleher, 
President and CEO, Better Markets, Inc.) [hereinafter Kelleher Testimony] (stating that the financial 
industry’s “latest weapon to kill or weaken financial reform is to claim that every rule and regulation 
passed to implement [Dodd–Frank] must be subjected to exhaustive ‘cost–benefit analysis’”). 
 101. Business Roundtable Commentary, supra note 94, at 1092; see also Guynn, supra note 93, at 
671 (“There is already evidence that the financial regulatory agencies have slowed down the process of 
issuing rules under the Dodd–Frank Act as a result of Business Roundtable’s rigorous scrutiny.  Many 
agencies feel bullied by the requirement to improve their CBA apparatus.”); Edwards, supra note 7 
(stating that Business Roundtable has been “paralyzing for the agencies . . . .  How extensive must their 
cost-benefit analyses be? . . .  Everyone is trying to figure out how to move forward without getting 
sued.”) (quoting an unnamed former CFTC staff member). 
 102. Business Roundtable Commentary, supra note 94, at 1094–95.  Section 971 provides that the 
SEC’s proxy rules “may include” a proxy access requirement.  Dodd–Frank § 971(a)(2).  The 
conference report on Dodd–Frank explained that Section 971 “authorizes the SEC to write . . . proxy 
access rules” but requires the SEC to consider “the burden on small [corporate] issuers” and the 
appropriateness of “exemptions” from such rules.  H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 873 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), 
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In their joint comment letter, five leading financial industry trade 
groups attacked the FRB’s proposal to establish enhanced prudential 
requirements for SIFIs because the proposal “reflects little or no 
attempt . . . to weigh the enormous costs to [SIFIs] and U.S. financial 
markets associated with the proposals against the likely benefits of the 
proposals for the goal of U.S. financial stability.”103  The groups 
asserted that the FRB’s proposed rules would impose “excessive 
limitations on the ability of U.S. banks to take controlled risks” and 
would create the danger that “the still nascent economic recovery may 
likely be stalled and future economic growth will be curtailed by a 
reduced availability of credit.”104  The groups also charged that “no 
country has adopted . . . legislation or regulations having the scope of 
Dodd–Frank,” and the “combined impact” the FRB’s proposed rules and 
other rules implementing Dodd–Frank “may place U.S. banks at an 
unwarranted competitive disadvantage compared to those countries that 
have not implemented a comparable approach.”105  
As explained below, the financial industry previously used the same 
arguments to support deregulation and block effective supervisory 
controls during the unsustainable credit boom that led to the financial 
crisis.  During that credit boom, as now, the industry and its supporters 
repeatedly claimed that stronger regulations would impose excessive 
compliance burdens on financial institutions, reduce the availability of 
credit to businesses and consumers, and endanger the global 
competitiveness of U.S. banks and financial markets.106  Congress and 
regulators acceded to the industry’s claims and failed to adopt measures 
that could have prevented or mitigated the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression.107  Given that unfortunate history, policymakers 
and courts should be highly skeptical when the financial industry 
 
reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 729-30.  The Senate committee report on Dodd–Frank stated that 
Section 971 “gives the SEC wide latitude in setting the terms of such proxy access.”  S. REP. NO. 111-
176, at 146 (2010).  The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable did not include any any 
reference to Section 971 or any discussion of its legislative history. 
 103. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 7–8. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
 105. Id. at 9; see also id. at 4 (warning that “excessive limitations on the ability of U.S. banks to 
take controlled risks will reduce the role of the United States as a leader in the global financial system”). 
 106. See infra notes 258-65, 533-49, 696-707 and accompanying text; see also Kelleher 
Testimony, supra note 100, at 9–10 (noting that “[s]ince the emergence of financial market regulation, 
the financial services industry has argued that new regulatory requirements will have a devastating 
impact by imposing unbearable compliance costs” and “[o]pponents of reform under the Dodd–Frank 
law are following this familiar pattern”). 
 107. See infra Parts III(A)-(C), (F); Kelleher Testimony, supra note 100, at 10 (contending that 
“the financial collapse and economic crisis . . . were a direct result of too little regulation.  In the years 
leading up to the crisis, huge sectors of our financial markets (such as swaps) were completely 
unregulated, and other sectors (such as mortgage-backed securities) were poorly regulated”) (emphasis 
added). 
1312 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
presents the same arguments as justifications for blocking Dodd–Frank’s 
reforms. 
2. Any Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Dodd–Frank’s Reforms 
Must Consider the Huge Costs of the Financial Crisis and the 
Comparable Benefits of Avoiding Future Crises 
The financial industry’s cost–benefit arguments are deeply flawed 
because they rarely, if ever, include any detailed consideration of the 
enormous benefits that society would receive from avoiding a 
catastrophic financial crisis similar to the recent crisis.108 A 
comprehensive analysis of the costs of the recent crisis is beyond the 
scope of this article.  However, the following brief overview of some of 
the major costs inflicted on U.S. financial markets and the general 
economy is sufficient to demonstrate the devastating impact of the crisis 
as well as the huge potential benefits from reforms that could avoid or 
mitigate a similar disaster in the future. 
The financial crisis imposed two principal categories of costs on U.S. 
financial markets and the general economy.  First, the federal 
government created serious distortions in the financial markets through 
its dramatic interventions to rescue TBTF financial institutions and 
preserve market stability: 
• The federal government “provided more than $6 trillion of 
support to financial institutions during the financial crisis, when 
such support is measured by the peak amounts of outstanding 
assistance under the [Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)] 
capital assistance programs, [Federal Reserve (Fed) ] emergency 
lending programs, FDIC debt guarantees, and other asset 
purchase and guarantee programs.”109 
 
 108. See Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 3 (stating that the five 
financial industry trade associations supported regulatory reform that “protects the financial system 
against potential systemic meltdowns of the type faced in the recent crisis,” but the associations made no 
effort to quantify the potential benefits of avoiding such a crisis); BETTER MARKETS, THE COST OF THE 
WALL-STREET CAUSED FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND ONGOING ECONOMIC CRISIS IS MORE THAN $12.8 
TRILLION 8 (2012), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/bettermarkets.pdf [hereinafter Financial Crisis Costs] (declaring that the 
financial industry “is really advocating for an incomplete and biased version of ‘cost–benefit analysis’ 
that . . . ignores the costs of the crisis to society and also ignores the benefits of financial reform to 
society”); see also Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation 13 (Aug. 6, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2085336 (observing that “[i]t is 
very difficult to put a dollar value” on the potential benefits of avoiding financial crises, and therefore a 
“strict cost–benefit approach” encourages regulators to ignore such benefits and to focus on the more 
easily quantifiable costs of complying with new regulations). 
 109. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could Solve the Too-
Big-to-Fail Problem and Align US and UK Financial Regulation of Financial Conglomerates (Part 1), 
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• The federal government rescued eleven large financial 
institutions that were threatened with failure.  Officials arranged 
bailouts for two of the three largest U.S. banks (Bank of America 
(BofA) and Citigroup) as well as the largest U.S. insurance 
company (AIG).  Regulators provided financial assistance for 
emergency acquisitions of two other major banks (Wachovia and 
National City), the two biggest thrifts (Washington Mutual 
(WaMu) and Countrywide), and two of the five largest securities 
firms (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch (Merrill)).  Regulators 
also granted emergency approvals for conversions of two other 
leading securities firms (Goldman Sachs (Goldman) and Morgan 
Stanley) into BHCs in order to place those institutions under the 
Fed’s protection.110 
• In early 2009, federal regulators publicly announced—in 
connection with “stress tests” for the 19 largest BHCs (each 
having assets over $100 billion)—that the federal government 
would provide any capital assistance needed to ensure the 
survival of those institutions.  As a practical matter, regulators 
thereby certified the TBTF status of all 19 BHCs.111 
Studies have shown that the TARP capital infusions, FDIC debt 
guarantees and Fed emergency lending programs provided “very large 
transfers of wealth from taxpayers to the shareholders and creditors of 
the largest [financial institutions]” during a period when the recipient 
institutions would have had great difficulty in raising funds in the capital 
markets.112  Other studies have concluded that major banks have 
benefited from large subsidies—including a significantly lower cost of 
raising funds—by virtue of their presumed TBTF status before, during 
and after the crisis.113  The federal government’s TBTF rescues 
 
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Mar. 2012, at 1, 3; see also infra notes 283-86 (describing the 
massive financial assistance provided by the federal government to large financial institutions). 
 110. Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 3. 
 111. Id. at 3; see also Kelleher Testimony, supra note 100, at 5 (quoting a joint statement issued 
by the federal bank regulators on Feb. 23, 2009, which declared that the federal government would 
“preserve the viability of systemically important financial institutions so that they are able to meet their 
commitments”). 
 112. Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 5, 20 nn.40–41 (citing five studies that evaluated the impact of 
federal assistance programs for the largest banks during the financial crisis). 
 113. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 4–5, 19 nn.24–29 (summarizing a study by A. Joseph 
Warburton and Daniz Anginer, finding that large U.S. banks enjoyed a funding cost advantage (due to 
an implicit TBTF subsidy) equal to $4 billion per year before the financial crisis, rising to $60 billion 
annually from 2007 to 2009, and peaking at $88 billion in 2008); Frederic Schweikhard & Zoe 
Tsesmelidakis, The Impact of Government Interventions on CDS and Equity Markets, June, 2012, at 1–
4, 32–34, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943546; (concluding that large U.S. banks benefited 
from total reductions in bond funding costs (due to an implicit TBTF subsidy) of nearly $130 billion 
between 2007 and 2010); Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy 
Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions 3–7, 11–12 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working 
Paper No. WP/12/128, 2012) (finding that large banks in the U.S. and 15 other developed nations 
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confirmed the existence of those subsidies, thereby weakening creditor 
discipline over large financial institutions and encouraging those 
institutions to assume even larger risks.114  In addition, TBTF subsidies 
give big banks unfair competitive advantages over smaller banks and 
therefore create unjustified incentives for “further consolidation and 
concentration in the financial system.”115 
The second major category of costs from the financial crisis results 
from the fact that the crisis triggered the most severe economic 
recession since the 1940s.116 The “Great Recession”117 has inflicted 
tremendous economic losses on the U.S., as shown by the following 
illustrative statistics: 
• The U.S. is projected to lose approximately $7.6 trillion of gross 
domestic product (GDP) from 2008 to 2018, representing the 
cumulative difference between the actual and forecast GDP for 
those years and “potential GDP—what GDP would have been 
but for the financial and economic crises.”118 In addition, 
government spending in response to the crises is expected to 
 
received average funding cost advantages (due to implicit TBTF subsidies) equal to 60 basis points in 
2007 and 80 basis points in 2009); Why Should Taxpayers Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year?, 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 20, 2013 (editorial) (concluding, based on the foregoing study by Ueda and di 
Mauro, that the ten largest U.S. banks receive “a taxpayer subsidy of $83 billion a year” and the five 
largest banks—JPMorgan, BofA, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and Goldman—“account for $64 billion of the 
total subsidy, an amount roughtly equal to their typical annual profits”); see also Joseph Noss & 
Rhiannon Sowerbutts, The Implicit Subsidy of Banks (Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 15, 
May 28, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2071720 (concluding that large U.K. banks 
benefited from a funding cost advantage of £40 billion in 2010, due to an implicit TBTF subsidy). 
 114. Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 4; FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 595; Noss 
& Sowerbutts, supra note 113, at 4. 
 115. FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 595 (stating that “[t]he market perception 
that some companies are “too big to fail”  . . . produces competitive distortions because [such] 
companies . . . can often fund themselves at a lower cost than other companies . . . and tends to 
artificially encourage further consolidation and concentration in the financial system”); accord 
Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 5–6 (“In recent years, and particularly during the present crisis, [large 
banks] have operated with much lower capital ratios and have benefited from a much lower cost of 
funds, compared with smaller banks . . . Given the major advantages conferred by TBTF status, it is not 
surprising that [large banks] have pursued aggressive growth strategies during the past two decades to 
reach a size at which they would be considered TBTF by regulators and the financial markets.”); Noss & 
Sowerbutts, supra note 113, at 4 (“[B]anks that benefit from the implicit [TBTF] subsidy have a 
competitive advantage over those that do not” because the expectation of governmental support results 
in “lowering those banks’ cost of funding” and “may enable guaranteed banks to expand at the expense 
of non-guaranteed banks.”). 
 116. Kevin J. Lansing, Gauging the Impact of the Great Recession, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 
2011–21 (July 21, 2011) (“The ‘Great Recession,’ which started in December 2007 and ended in June 
2009, was the most severe economic contraction since 1947.”). 
 117. Id.; see also Paul Wiseman, US Economic Recovery Is Weakest Since World War II, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Aug. 15, 2012 (reporting that “[m]any economists say the agonizing 
recovery from the Great Recession . . . is the predictable consequence of a housing bust and a grave 
financial crisis”). 
 118. Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 13. 
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“increase the national debt by $8 trillion as of 2018.”119 
• Due to sharp declines in the prices of homes and financial assets, 
household net worth declined by $19 trillion (in 2012 dollars) 
from July 2007 to the depths of the crisis in early 2009.120  
Median household net worth fell 38.8% from 2007 to 2010, and 
average household net worth fell 14.7% during the same 
period.121 
• Home values dropped by one-third from the peak of the housing 
boom in 2006 through the end of 2011, resulting in a loss of 
about $7 trillion in household wealth.122 
• In March 2013, almost ten million homes (representing nearly a 
fifth of all residential properties with a mortgage) were worth 
less than the outstanding balance on their mortgages.123  “About 
7 million mortgage holders have had to leave their homes since 
2007 because of foreclosure or a short sale, in which a property 
is sold for less than is owed.”124  Five million additional homes 
were “at least 30 days delinquent or in some stage of 
foreclosure” in March 2013.125 
• 8.5 million jobs disappeared between 2007 and 2009, and the 
 
 119. Id. at 41, 62; see also Allen, supra note 108, at 12 n.41 (stating that, according to the 
Congressional Budget Office, “the United States incurred an additional $7 trillion in government debt as 
a direct result of the recession following the Financial Crisis”). 
 120. Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 33. 
 121. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL. No. 2, (June 2012), at 1, 16-17 (noting that median 
household net worth in 2010 “was close to levels not seen since the 1992 survey,” while mean 
household net worth in 2010 “fell to about the level of the 2001 survey”), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf. 
 122. Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 36. 
 123. Prashant Gopal, Homeonwers With Negative Equity Below 20% of Borrowers, BLOOMBERG, 
June 12, 2013 (reporting that the number of “underwater homes,” whose owners owed more than the 
market value of their homes, declined to “9.7 million, or 19.8 percent of all U.S. homes with 
mortgages . . . down from 21.7 percent at the end of [2012]”), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
06-12/homeowners-with-negative-equity-below-20-of-borrowers.html. 
 124. Prashant Gopal, Americans Seize Second Chance Mortgages Post-Foreclosure, BLOOMBERG 
(April 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-03/americans-seize-second-chance-post-
foreclosure-mortgages.html; see also Kathleen M. Howley & Thom Weidlich, Seizures Threatened in 
Massachusetts with Naked Loans Challenge: Mortgages, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2012) (reporting that 
“[a]bout 5 million homes have been lost to foreclosure” between 2006 and 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-21/seizures-threatened-in-massachusetts-with-naked-loans-
challenge-mortgages.html; Dan Levy & Heather Perlberg, Foreclosures Jump as Banks Bet on Rising 
U.S. Home Prices, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2013) (stating that 670,000 additional homes were 
repossessed via foreclosures in 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-13/foreclosures-jump-
as-banks-bet-on-rising-u-s-home-prices.html. 
 125. John Gittelsohn, Housing Crash Fades as Defaults Decline to 2007 Levels, BLOOMBERG 
(May 6, 2013) (also reporting that the number of homes in delinquency or foreclosure proceedings in 
March 2013 were “down from a peak of 7.7 million in January 2010, [but] still more than double the 2.2 
million non-currenct mortgages in January 2005”). 
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unemployment rate exceeded 10% at its peak in October 2009.126  
The unemployment rate remained above 8% from February 2009 
through August 2012, representing “the longest stretch in 
monthly [employment] records going back to 1948.”127  In 
addition, the “underemployment rate” (which includes 
unemployed workers, part-time workers seeking full-time 
positions and those who stopped looking for jobs) remained 
above 14% during the same period.128 
• A Labor Department survey revealed that problems with long-
term unemployment persisted after the recession ended in mid-
2009, due to the weakness of the economic recovery.  The survey 
found that only a quarter of six million “displaced workers” who 
lost their jobs between 2009 and 2011 were able to find a job 
with equivalent pay by January 2012.  Almost a third of those 
workers took a job that paid less, and nearly half were still 
unemployed or had stopped looking for work by the latter 
date.129  The percentage of families falling below the poverty 
line rose from 12.5% to 15.1% between 2007 and 2010, and the 
number of Americans receiving food stamps increased from 33 
million to 46 million between 2009 and July 2012.130 
In view of the tremendous losses inflicted by the financial crisis, a 
prominent advocate of financial reform has aptly described as 
“ridiculous” the financial industry’s claims that “it cannot be re-
regulated to prevent it from causing yet another crisis if the costs it must 
bear are too great.”131  Even so, the industry will undoubtedly continue 
to use Business Roundtable as a basis for challenging the compliance 
costs imposed by Dodd–Frank’s reforms.  Without a proper accounting 
of the costs of the financial crisis and the potential benefits of avoiding 
future crises, the industry’s legal challenges pose a very significant 
 
 126. Lansing, supra note 116, at 3. 
 127. Paul Wiseman & Christopher S. Rugaber, US Hiring Picked Up in July; So Did 
Unemployment, ASSOCIATED PRESS FINANCIAL WIRE (Aug. 3, 2012) (available on Lexis) (reporting 
that the unemployment rate increased to 8.3% in July 2012 from 8.2% in June); Shobhana Chandra, 
Miss in U.S. Payrolls Spurs Talk of New Fed Stimulus, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-07/payrolls-in-u-s-rose-96-000-in-august-jobless-rate-
falls.html (reporting that the unemployment rate fell to 8.1% in August 2012, as 368,000 Americans left 
the labor force, and the unemployment rate “has exceeded 8 percent since Feb. 2009, the longest stretch 
in monthly records going back to 1948”). 
 128. See Wiseman & Rugaber, supra note 127, at 3 (reporting an underemployment rate of 15% 
in July 2012); Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 23 & fig. 5 (showing that “the broadest measure 
of unemployment, the U-6 rate,” peaked at 17.5% in October 2009 and remained above 14% through 
July 2012). 
 129. Peter Whoriskey, Laid-Off Workers Struggle to Rebound, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2012, at 
A01 (describing a Labor Department survey of “displaced workers” who lost their jobs due to plant 
closings or layoffs after having been employed for at least three years). 
 130. Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 55–56. 
 131. Kelleher Testimony, supra note 100, at 11. 
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obstacle to Dodd-Frank’s implementation, creating a situation in which 
“the public, the markets, and the economy as a whole will once again be 
vulnerable to another financial catastrophe.”132  
C. The Financial Industry’s Legislative Strategy to Roll Back Financial 
Reforms 
In addition to lobbying and suing regulators, the financial industry 
has pursued an aggressive strategy to secure favorable legislation that 
will (i) repeal or water down key provisions of Dodd–Frank or (ii) 
cripple the ability of regulatory agencies to implement those provisions.  
The industry’s generous contributions helped Republicans to secure 
control of the House of Representatives and to increase their strength in 
the Senate in the 2010 midterm elections.  After the new Congress 
convened in January 2011, Republican congressional leaders (with 
support from pro-industry Democrats) orchestrated a multipronged 
series of attacks on Dodd–Frank’s reforms.  Republican efforts to 
undermine Dodd–Frank persisted despite a series of new financial 
scandals that further tarnished Wall Street’s already battered reputation. 
1. The Industry’s Legislative Efforts to Undermine Dodd–Frank 
After the financial industry failed to prevent Dodd–Frank’s passage, it 
immediately launched an aggressive campaign to secure legislative 
measures that would weaken or roll back Dodd–Frank’s key reforms.  
During the midterm elections of 2010, financial institutions and their 
trade associations gave a majority of their political contributions to 
Republican congressional candidates.133  The industry’s tilt toward 
Republicans in 2010 represented a significant shift from 2008, when the 
industry gave a majority of its support to Democrats.134  That shift 
reflected the industry’s anger over the passage of Dodd–Frank, which 
was supported by most Democrats but opposed by most Republicans in 
Congress.135   
 
 132. Id. at 7. 
 133. See Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS (last visited on June 14, 2013), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=All&ind=F (showing that the finance, insurance 
and real estate sector gave Republican candidates 53% of its $319 million of political contributions 
during the 2010 election cycle) [hereinafter CRP Political Contribution Report]. 
 134. See id. (showing that the finance, insurance and real estate sector gave Democratic 
candidates 51% of its $521 million of political contributions during the 2008 election cycle). 
 135. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 889–90 (discussing reasons for the financial industry’s shift from 
supporting Democrats in 2008 to supporting Republicans in 2010); see also id. at 889 n.25 (noting that 
only 19 Democratic House members and one Democratic Senator opposed Dodd–Frank, while only 
three Republican House members and three Republican Senators supported it). 
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The 2010 midterm elections gave Republicans control of the House 
and several additional seats in the Senate.136  Even before the new 
Congress convened in January 2011, Republican House leaders 
announced plans to challenge Dodd–Frank’s reforms in several key 
areas.137  The financial industry and its Republican allies particularly 
targeted the CFPB, which they had vehemently opposed during the 
debates leading up to Dodd–Frank’s passage.138  In 2011, Republicans 
passed legislation in the House to weaken the CFPB’s independence and 
authority by (i) replacing CFPB’s single Director with a five-member 
bipartisan commission, (ii) expanding FSOC’s authority to veto CFPB’s 
regulations, and (iii) removing CFPB’s assured source of funding from 
the Fed and forcing CFPB to rely on congressional appropriations for its 
budget.139   
In addition, Republican Senators voted to block confirmation of any 
Director of CFPB until the Senate and the President accepted the 
changes to CFPB’s governance and funding proposed by House 
Republicans.140  President Obama sought to overcome this confirmation 
obstacle by using a recess appointment to install Richard Cordray as the 
first Director of CFPB in January 2012.  However, the validity of Mr. 
Cordray’s appointment was challenged in a lawsuit filed by a Texas 
bank in June 2012 and was called into further question by a D.C. Circuit 
decision that struck down similar recess appointments issued to three 
members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).141 
Legislative allies of the financial industry introduced legislation to 
weaken several key derivatives reforms in Title VII of Dodd–Frank.  For 
example, Rep. Jim Hines (D-CT), whose district in southwestern 
 
 136. Id. at 890. 
 137. See, e.g., Cheyenne Hopkins, House GOP Oversight Likely to Shape Reform Rules, AM. 
BANKER (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_214/house-republicans-dodd-
frank-1028295-1.html?CMP=OTC-RSS; Stacy Kaper, Review 2010/Preview 2011: Redrawing the 
Battle Lines on Reform, AM. BANKER (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-
245499160.html; Phil Mattingly, Derivatives, ‘Volcker’ Rule Might Be Targets of House Republican 
Tactics, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-19/derivatives-
volcker-rules-may-be-house-republican-targets.html. 
 138. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 886–90. 
 139. Id. at 891–92, 901–04, 919–25. 
 140. Id. at 892–93, 895–96. 
 141. Kevin Wack, CFPB Suit Faces Long Odds, But May Still Have Impact, AM. BANKER (June 
25, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_121/cfpb-suit-faces-long-odds-but-may-still-
have-impact-1050373-1.html (reporting on lawsuit challenging the validity of Mr. Cordray’s recess 
appointment).  In Noel Canning v, NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), petition for cert. granted, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3695 (June 25, 2013), the D.C. Circuit invalidated President Obama’s recess appointments for 
three members of the NLRB.  Those recess appointments were made on January 4, 2012, the same day 
that Mr. Cordray received his recess appointment.  For a critical assessment of the Canning decision and 
its negative implications for Mr. Cordray’s recess appointment, see Peter M. Shane, The Future of 
Recess Appointments in Light of Noel Canning v. NLRB, 81 U.S.L.W. 1750 (June 4, 2013). 
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Connecticut is the home of many financial executives and hedge funds, 
sponsored a bill that would exempt foreign affiliates of U.S. swaps 
dealers from most of Title VII’s provisions.142  If enacted, Rep. Hines’ 
bill could exempt half or more of the derivatives activities conducted by 
five major U.S. banks from regulation under Dodd–Frank.143 
Republican leaders also introduced bills to repeal FSOC’s authority to 
designate nonbank financial firms as SIFIs under Title I of Dodd–
Frank.144  The Republican bills would also prohibit the Fed from 
regulating nonbank SIFIs and would thereby prevent the Fed from 
acting to stop excessive risk-taking by large nonbank financial firms 
similar to AIG and Lehman.145  Republicans asserted that designating 
nonbanks as SIFIs would give them “an advantage in the marketplace,” 
but that claim is unpersuasive.146  Indeed, large nonbank firms have 
strongly opposed being designated as SIFIs because they want to avoid 
the FRB’s oversight as well as the higher capital requirements and other 
prudential standards that Dodd–Frank imposes on nonbank SIFIs.147  As 
Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) observed, being designated as a SIFI “is a 
gift that no one wants.”148 
House Republicans also sponsored legislation to repeal the “orderly 
liquidation authority” (OLA) created by Title II of Dodd–Frank.149  The 
 
 142. See Cohan, supra note 7 (criticizing H.R. 3283, sponsored by Rep. Hines); Taibbi, supra 
note 7, at 9 (same, and also criticizing H.R. 3336, which would grant broad exemptions from Title VII 
to any company that makes “extensions of credit” to customers). 
 143. See Brush, supra note 80 (reporting that overseas branches or affiliates accounted for the 
following shares of derivatives activities at five major U.S. banks: 62% at Goldman, 77% at Morgan 
Stanley, 59% at JPMorgan, 53% at Citigroup, and half at BofA).  Although the financial industry’s allies 
on Capitol Hill did not succeed in enacting any of the proposed bills to weaken Title VII in 2012, they 
introduced a new set of similar bills in 2013.  See infra notes 404-05 and accompanying text. 
 144. Systemic Risk: Bicameral Bill Takes Aim at FSOC SIFI Designations, 99 BNA’S BANKING 
REPORT 266, Aug. 7, 2012, available at 2012 WL 3164880 (discussing H.R. 6317 and S. 3497 
introduced by Rep. Scott Garrett (R-NJ) and Sen. David Vitter (R-LA)) [hereinafter Systemic Risk]. 
 145. Id.; see also supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why Congress 
authorized FSOC to designate nonbank SIFIs and the importance of Fed regulatory authority over those 
institutions); Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 993–95 (same). 
 146. Kevin Wack, GOP Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Repeal Systemic Designations, AM. 
BANKER (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_149/gop-lawmakers-introduce-
bill-repeal-systemic-designations-1051541-1.html; see also Donna Borak, Is TBTF Over? Only One 
Way to Find Out, AM. BANKER (June 15, 2011), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_114/too-
big-to-fail-dodd-frank-1038950-1.html (describing Rep. Barney Frank’s critique of efforts by House 
Republicans to repeal FSOC’s authority to designate nonbank SIFIs). 
 147. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 994–95; Alistair Gray, Insurers Warn on ‘Too Big to Fail’ 
Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a528bd0e-460f-11e2-ae8d-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JO5Q0JMM; Borak, supra note 146. 
 148. Borak, supra note 146 (quoting Rep. Frank). 
 149. Kevin Wack, House Committee Votes to Repeal Bank Liquidation Authority, AM. BANKER 
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_75/liquidation-authority-House-
republicans-dodd-frank-cfpb-1048541-1.html (reporting on vote to repeal the OLA by the House 
Financial Services Committee). 
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OLA authorizes the FDIC to liquidate a bank or nonbank SIFI that is 
placed in receivership by the Treasury Secretary.150  Regulators and 
some commentators have supported the OLA as a preferable alternative 
to the “Hobson’s choice of bailout or disorderly bankruptcy” that 
confronted federal officials during the peak of the financial crisis.151  A 
repeal of the OLA would put regulators back in the position they 
occupied when Lehman and AIG teetered on the brink of failure in 
September 2008.  As one commentator explained: 
If the FDIC cannot seize a failing firm [under the OLA], regulators are 
left with two choices: let a firm go bankrupt, a la Lehman Brothers, or try 
finding a way of bailing it out. 
 Both choices are equally bad.  Lehman’s bankruptcy nearly caused 
the entire financial system to melt down and directly led to government 
bailouts of [AIG and] the largest banks.152 
Lehman’s bankruptcy severely disrupted the global financial system, 
and regulators in the U.S. and Europe quickly decided that they would 
not allow a disorderly failure of another SIFI.153  Additionally, it took 
nearly four years and $1.8 billion of expenses before Lehman emerged 
from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2012, and Lehman is expected to 
pay less than one-fifth of the $300 billion it owes to creditors.154  The 
snail’s pace and high costs of Lehman’s bankruptcy create serious 
 
 150. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 993, 996–1000 (discussing the OLA). 
 151. Id. at 993, 996 (quoting speech on Feb. 26, 2010, by FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo); see also 
Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, U. CIN. L. REV., 2–3 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037915 (describing the potential advantages and 
possible shortcomings of the OLA procedure in resolving the failure of a large global bank like Bank of 
America, and explaining why it would be very difficult to amend the Bankruptcy Code to deal 
successfully with such a failure).  For a detailed analysis of the strong support expressed by regulators 
and some commentators for the OLA and the opposition voiced by other commentators , see Paul L. 
Lee, The Dodd–Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A Preliminary Analysis and Critique—Part I, 
128 BANKING L.J. 771, 782–97 (2011) [hereinafter Lee Part I]; Paul L. Lee, The Dodd–Frank Act 
Orderly Liquidation Authority: A Preliminary Analysis and Critique—Part II, 128 BANKING L.J. 867, 
868–71, 901–03 (2011). 
 152. Rob Blackwell, House Banking Panel Cynically Uses Scare Tactics, Symbolic Votes, AM. 
BANKER (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/House-Financial-Services-
Committee-Big-Brother-1048584-1.html. 
 153. See, e.g., FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 335–43, 353–60, 373–86; see also Wolfgang 
Schäuble, How to Protect EU Taxpayers Against Bank Failures, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d270a89e-f213-11e1-8973-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JO5Q0JMM 
(stating that Lehman’s bankruptcy “tipp[ed] the world into a financial and economic crisis of nearly 
unprecedented magnitude” and “[a]fter Lehman Brother’s collapse, the international community agreed 
not to let another systemically relevant bank fail”). 
 154. Linda Sandler, Lehman’s Year-End Fees, Filings Match Up With Biggest Bankruptcy, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-21/lehman-s-year-end-fees-
filings-match-up-with-biggest-bankruptcy.html; Linda Sandler, Lehman Comes Back From the Dead, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 12, 2012, at 34, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-12/lehman-comes-back-from-the-dead. 
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doubts whether Chapter 11—even if amended to deal with failing 
SIFIs—could successfully resolve the failure of a megabank like BofA, 
which is far larger and more complex than Lehman.155  In any event, 
when House Republicans voted in committee to repeal the OLA they did 
not vote to amend Chapter 11 to address any of the special challenges 
posed by failing SIFIs.156 
House Republicans and several Senators, including Senator Mark 
Warner (D-VA), also pushed legislation that would require more 
stringent CBA for all regulations issued by the CFTC and SEC.157  As 
described above, the financial industry has already invoked existing 
statutory references to cost–benefit studies as a basis for challenging 
regulations issued by the SEC and CFTC.158  Imposing even stricter 
cost–benefit requirements would create a further obstacle to the 
adoption of rules under Dodd–Frank.159  
As an additional method for slowing down Dodd–Frank’s 
implementation, Republicans blocked any significant increases in the 
budgets of the CFTC and SEC during 2010, 2011 and 2012.160  CFTC 
 
 155. See Lubben, supra note 151, at 33–35 (explaining that a resolution of BofA would be much 
more complicated and difficult than Lehman’s Chapter 11 proceeding). 
 156. See Blackwell, supra note 152 (“Republicans have now voted to repeal [the OLA] and 
replace it with . . . nothing.”) (ellipse in original); see also Lee Part I, supra note 151, at 792–97 
(describing (i) significant shortcomings in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that make it very difficult 
for Chapter 11 to deal effectively with the potential failure of a SIFI, and (ii) legislation that House 
Republicans introduced in 2009 to address those flaws but failed to pass). 
 157. Maria Lokshin, Securities and Exchange Commission: House Passes Omnibus Bill That 
Would Tighten Cost–Benefit Analysis for SEC, CFTC, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1438 (July 30, 
2012) (discussing House passage of H.R. 4078); Maria Lokshin, Securities and Exchange Commission: 
Senate Bill Targets Cost–Benefit Analysis of Independent Agencies’ Rulemaking, 44 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) 1529 (Aug. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Lokshin, Senate Bill Targets Cost–Benefit Analysis] 
(discussing introduction of S. 3468, which would require stricter cost–benefit studies by the CFTC, SEC 
and other independent agencies).  The proposed legislation to require CBA for all CFTC and SEC rules 
was not enacted in 2012, but the financial industry’s allies on Capitol Hill introduced similar legislation 
in 2013.  See infra note 405 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra Part II(B)(1) (describing litigation brought by financial industry groups to 
invalidate SEC and CFTC regulations for allegedly inadequate cost–benefit studies). 
 159. John Kemp, Wall St and Republicans Team up to Curb CFTC, REUTERS (June 7, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/column-kemp-cftc-idUSL5E8H76GF20120607; Lokshin, 
Senate Bill Targets Cost–Benefit Analysis, supra note 157 (citing arguments by House Democrats that 
“requiring [independent agencies] to ramp up their economic assessments would effectively paralyze 
their rulemaking”). 
 160. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 952–53 (describing the Republicans’ success in blocking 
increased funding for the CFTC and SEC during 2011); Silla Brush, House Republicans Seek Cuts in 
Financial Dodd–Frank Agencies, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
06-05/house-republicans-seek-cuts-in-dodd-frank-regulatory-agencies.html (discussing Republican 
efforts to cut the CFTC’s budget and to freeze the SEC’s budget during 2012); Robert Schmidt et al., 
The Great Regulatory Holdup, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 14–20, 2011, at 24 (reporting that 
Congress froze the CFTC’s and SEC’s budgets for 2011 at their 2010 levels); Kelsey Snell, Industry 
Looks to Derail Dodd–Frank Enforcement, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/industry-looks-to-derail-dodd-frank-enforcement-
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chairman Gary Gensler and SEC chairman Mary Schapiro warned that 
budget constraints imposed by Congress jeopardized the ability of both 
agencies to adopt and enforce the new regulations mandated by Dodd–
Frank.161  Mr. Gensler (along with critics of the financial industry) also 
alleged that the Republicans’ budgetary actions were consciously 
designed to help Wall Street by undermining Dodd–Frank.162 
2. The Financial Industry and Its Legislative Allies Have Persisted in 
Their Efforts to Weaken Dodd–Frank Despite Recent Financial Scandals 
The financial industry and its congressional allies have maintained 
their legislative campaign to weaken Dodd–Frank despite a series of 
recent scandals involving major Wall Street firms and leading foreign 
banks.  Those scandals further damaged the reputations of large 
financial institutions, which already had plummeted due to public anger 
over abusive financial practices and excessive risk-taking that led to the 
financial crisis.163  The financial industry’s recent embarrassments have 
included the following revelations: 
• MF Global, a large commodities broker led by Jon Corzine—a 
former co-head of Goldman Sachs who later served as New 
Jersey’s Governor and a United States Senator—filed for 
bankruptcy in late 2011 after suffering heavy trading losses.  
After becoming chairman of MF Global in 2010, Corzine pushed 
the firm to take highly aggressive trading positions, including 
bets on more than $6 billion of sovereign bonds issued by high-
 
20110215?mrefid=site_search (describing Republican plans to cut the CFTC’s and SEC’s budgets, and 
reporting that Republicans “make no bones about their goal: to defang Dodd–Frank”). 
 161. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 952–53; Stephen Joyce, Derivatives: Gensler Criticizes Vote on 
CFTC Budget: Says Dodd–Frank Requires More Funding, 98 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 1030, June 12, 
2012, available at 2012 WL 2092519; Kevin Wack, Reform Implementation and Budget Crunch 
Collide, AM. BANKER (July 22, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-261990109.html. 
 162. Joyce, supra note 161 (quoting Mr. Gensler’s statement that Republican attempts to cut the 
CFTC’s budget would “effectively put the interests of Wall Street ahead of those of the American 
public”); Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 952–53 (criticizing industry-backed efforts by Republicans  to cut 
the CFTC’s and SEC’s budgets); Kemp, supra note 159 (contending that it would be reasonable to 
describe Republican efforts to cut the CFTC’s and SEC’s budgets, while demanding “smarter regulation 
and more cost benefit analysis, . . . as deeply cynical”); Snell, supra note 160 (reporting that Mr. 
Gensler’s “worries” about the adverse impact of congressional budget cuts “are music to the industry”). 
 163. See, e.g., Dawn Kopecki, Wall Street Leaderless in Rules Fight as Dimon Diminished, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/wall-street-leaderless-in-
rules-fight-as-dimon-diminished.html; Floyd Norris, Scandals May Cost The Banks Their Clout, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 2012, at B1; The LIBOR Affair: Banksters, ECONOMIST  (July 7, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21558260; see also Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 10 
(declaring that “Wall Street deserves to be at the top of any list of those responsible for causing the 
[financial and economic] crises”); supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text (discussing public anger 
over the central role of big banks in triggering the financial crisis). 
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risk European countries.164  After investigating MF Global’s 
collapse, the company’s bankruptcy trustee sued Corzine and 
two other senior executives for pursuing high-risk trading 
strategies that “severely strained the company’s liquidity” and 
“ultimately contributed to [the company’s] downfall.”165 
• JP Morgan disclosed in July 2012 that it had lost almost $6 
billion—and faced the threat of additional losses—from massive 
trading in derivatives by a London unit within the bank’s chief 
investment office (CIO).166  JPMorgan created CIO to invest 
excess deposits that  the bank did not use to fund its loans, and 
the bank’s senior management (including chairman Jamie 
Dimon) encouraged CIO to take aggressive trading risks.167  
CIO’s huge trading positions generated substantial profits in 
2010 and 2011, but produced massive losses in 2012.168  
JPMorgan’s trading losses triggered a congressional 
investigation and severely embarrassed Mr. Dimon, who was 
widely praised for steering JPMorgan through the financial crisis 
without reporting a quarterly loss.169  In addition, JPMorgan and 
its senior executives faced a variety of potential legal claims 
after a Senate committee “accused [JPMorgan] of hiding losses, 
deceiving regulators and misinforming investors.”170 
• In June 2012, Barclays paid $450 million to U.S. and U.K. 
regulators to settle charges that it conspired with other banks to 
manipulate the London interbank offered rate (Libor”) and the 
 
 164. Azam Ahmed et al., A Romance With Risk That Brought On a Panic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2011, at A1; Roben Farzad & Matthew Leising, “MF Global’s Jon Corzine Runs Out of Luck, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/mf-globals-jon-
corzine-runs-out-of-luck-11022011.html. 
 165. Richard Hill, Futures Trading: Trustee Freeh Sues Corzine, Deputies, Alleging They Led MF 
Global Into Ruin,  100 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 805 (April 30, 2013) (quoting complaint filed by 
Louis Freeh, bankruptcy trustee for MF Global Holdings Ltd., against Jon Corzine, Bradley Abelow and 
Henri Steenkamp). 
 166. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New Fraud Inquiry as JPMorgan’s Loss Mounts, N.Y. TIMES, July 
14, 2012, at A1 (reporting JPMorgan’s disclosure of $5.8 billion in trading losses and additional 
potential losses of $1.7 billion). 
 167. Dawn Kopecki & Michael J. Moore, Whale of a Trade Revealed at Biggest U.S. Bank With 
Best Control, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-03/whale-of-a-
trade-revealed-at-biggest-u-s-bank-with-best-control.html; see also infra Part IV(C)(2) (discussing the 
investigation of JPMorgan’s “London Whale” trading scandal by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations). 
 168. Kopecki & Moore, supra note 167; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan 
Trade Loss May Reach $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at B1. 
 169. Rob Blackwell, Dimon’s ‘Blood-on-the-Leaf Moment’: How JPM Losses Have Helped the 
Industry’s Opponents, AM. BANKER (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_92/jpmorgan-chase-Dimon-trading-loss-Volcker-Rule-
Dodd–Frank-1049261-1.html; Kopecki, supra note 163. 
 170. Kopecki & Moore, supra note 167; see also infra Part IV(C)(2) (discussing the report issued 
by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations). 
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euro interbank rate for several years beginning in 2005.  
Barclays’ top two officers (Robert Diamond and Jerry del 
Missier) resigned under pressure from U.K. regulators and 
politicians.171  Officials investigating the Libor scandal targeted 
more than a dozen major foreign banks—including UBS and 
RBS, which subsequently entered into settlements similar to 
Barclay’s—along with BofA, Citigroup and JP Morgan.172  The  
Libor-rigging scandal included efforts by bank employees to 
earn illegitimate trading profits as well as attempts by banks to 
disguise their precarious financial condition during the peak of 
the financial crisis in 2008.173  The banks under investigation 
faced potentially massive liabilities from official penalties and 
investor lawsuits, because Libor determines the pricing for more 
than $300 trillion in global financial instruments, including 
derivatives, corporate bonds, mortgages and student loans.174  A 
leading financial journal remarked that the Libor scandal 
“corrodes further what little remains of public trust in banks and 
those who run them.”175 
• A Senate committee report issued in July 2012 revealed that 
HSBC, a leading global bank, engaged in illegal money 
laundering for Mexican drug cartels, terrorists, and rogue states 
(including Iran) between 2003 and 2010.  HSBC subsequently 
paid $1.9 billion to settle criminal money laundering charges 
filed by federal prosecutors.176  In August 2012, New York’s 
 
 171. Josh Gallu et al., The Libor Scandal Claims Its First CEO, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
July 3, 2012, at 9–16, available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-03/the-libor-scandal-
claims-its-first-ceo. 
 172. Id.; Caroline Salas Gage, What’s Fed to Do as 15 of 18 Banks Fixing Libor Aren’t American, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/what-s-fed-to-do-as-15-of-
18-banks-fixing-libor-aren-t-american.html; see also infra notes 441-43 and accompanying text 
(discussing UBS’s agreement to pay $1.5 billion in December 2012, and RBS’s agreement to pay $612 
million in February 2013, in order to settle Libor-rigging charges). 
 173. Gary Gensler, CFTC Chairman, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Agriculture (July 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-118; see also Libor’s Trillion-Dollar 
Question, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-27/libor-s-trillion-
dollar-question.html; The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, at 3. 
 174. Gallu et al., supra note 171; Andrew Harris et al., Wall Street Bank Investors in Dark on 
Libor Liability, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2012),  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-05/wall-street-
bank-investors-in-dark-on-libor-liability.html; see also Libor’s Trillion-Dollar Question, supra note  
173. 
 175. The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 173, at 2; see also The Worst 
Banking Scandal Yet?, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-12/the-
worst-banking-scandal-yet-.html  (“The Libor scandal offers a sad illustration of the moral bankruptcy 
that has infected some corners of finance.”). 
 176. Joe Adler, HSBC: A Study in Anti-Laundering Blunders, AM. BANKER (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_137/hsbc-a-study-in-anti-laundering-blunders-1050998-
1.html; Jeff Day, Money Laundering: Senate Probe Finds Major AML Problems at HSBC 2003-2010; 
Blasts OCC AML Policy, 99 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 153 (July 24, 2012), available at 2012 WL 
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banking regulator charged Standard Chartered, another major 
foreign bank, with illegally laundering $250 billion of funds for 
Iran from 2001 to 2007.177  Standard Chartered ultimately paid 
$670 million to settle New York’s allegations as well as separate 
federal claims.178 
The foregoing scandals further marred the already bruised credibility 
of major U.S. and foreign banks.179  However, the scandals’ negative 
impact on Wall Street’s reputation did not deter the financial industry 
and its Capitol Hill allies from pursuing their anti-reform agenda.180  
Instead, the industry and its legislative allies redoubled their efforts to 
roll back Dodd–Frank’s reforms.181 
During the 2012 political campaign, Republican leaders and industry 
representatives announced that they would seek to repeal or cut back 
several key provisions of Dodd–Frank if Republicans gained control of 
the White House and both houses of Congress in the November 
elections.  Top Republicans and industry groups particularly focused on 
(i) weakening the CFPB’s authority and independence, (ii) repealing or 
watering down the Volcker Rule and many of the derivatives reforms in 
Article VII of Dodd–Frank, and (iii) requiring all financial regulators to 
perform stringent cost–benefit studies before adopting any new rules.182 
 
2995498; see also infra notes 434-38 and accompanying text (discussing HSBC’s settlement of federal 
criminal charges in December 2012).  
 177. Greg Farrell & Tiffany Kary, Standard Chartered Still Faces Fed Probes After N.Y. Deal, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/standard-chartered-faces-
fed-probes-after-n-y-deal.html; Stephen Joyce & Len Bracken, Money Laundering: Standard Chartered 
Bank Hid $250 Billion In Iran Dealings, New York Regulator Says, 99 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 294 
(Aug. 14, 2012), available at 2012 WL 3279507. 
 178. Farrell & Kary, supra note 177 (reporting that Standard Chartered paid $340 million to settle 
New York’s claims); Standard Chartered to pay $327 million to resolve U.S. case, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 
2012) (reporting on Standard Chartered’s agreement to pay $327 million to settle claims by federal 
agencies), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/10/us-stanchart-settlement-idUSBRE8B90OT2012 
1210. 
 179. Kopecki, supra note 163; Norris, supra note 163, at B1. 
 180. Phil Mattingly, Wall Street Supporters in Congress Unmoved by Libor Probe, BLOOMBERG 
(July 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/wall-street-supporters-in-congress-
unmoved-by-libor-probe.html (“Wall Street’s defenders in Congress are sticking by the industry, 
undaunted by the Barclays fine or trading losses . . . at JPMorgan Chase & Co.”); Alan Zibel, Even After 
‘Whale’ Losses, Bankers Hammer Volcker, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2012),  
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/09/10/even-after-whale-losses-bankers-hammer-
volcker/?mod=wsj_streaming_stream (reporting that top financial trade associations continued to 
express strong opposition to the Volcker Rule despite the embarrassment caused by JPMorgan’s trading 
losses). 
 181. Zibel, supra note 180; see also Chris Bruce, Securities: Volcker Rule Needs Major Rewrite, 
Trade Associations Tell House Committee, 99 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 444 (Sept. 18, 2012), available 
at 2012 WL 4067935 (describing letters written by five leading financial trade associations to the House 
Financial Services Committee, calling for major cutbacks or an outright repeal of the Volcker Rule). 
 182. Phil Mattingly, Why Romney Won’t Kill Dodd–Frank, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 6, 
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-06/why-romney-wont-kill-dodd-frank (reporting 
1326 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
 The financial industry supported Republicans even more strongly in 
2012 than it did in 2010.  The industry gave two-thirds of its political 
contributions to Republican candidates during the 2012 election cycle.183  
The financial industry’s overwhelming support for Republican 
Presidential candidate Mitt Romney in 2012 represented a sharp 
departure from 2008, when the industry gave a significant majority of its 
contributions to Barack Obama.184  The obvious reason for this shift was 
Wall Street’s gratitude for Mr. Romney’s strong opposition to Dodd–
Frank and Wall Street’s anger over President Obama’s sponsorship of 
the legislation.185 
Wall Street’s lopsided support for Republican candidates did not 
cause Democratic leaders to move aggressively against the financial 
industry.  Indeed, many observers criticized the Obama administration 
 
that Republicans, even if victorious, probably could not repeal Dodd–Frank but would be likely to “try 
to give the financial industry something it wants more: a diluted financial reform law that would relax 
restrictions on some of its most profitable—and riskiest—investments”); Kevin Wack, What Romney 
Victory Would Mean for Banks, AM. BANKER (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_169/what-romney-victory-would-mean-for-banks-1052289-
1.html (reporting that Mitt Romney’s “stated goal” to repeal Dodd–Frank would probably not happen if 
he won the Presidential election, but Republicans would seek to “chip away at what they see as the 
worst parts of Dodd–Frank, continuing a legislative strategy they began in 2011”); Yin Wilczek, 
Regulatory Reform: Shelby Vows to Pursue ‘Real’ Reform If Republicans Regain Control of Senate, 99 
BNA’s BANKING REP. 210 (July 31, 2012), available at 2012 WL 3067216 (reporting that Sen. Richard 
Shelby (R-AL) announced plans to push for legislation that “would require all financial regulators to 
conduct rigorous cost–benefit analysis before promulgating any regulations,” amend “flawed” 
provisions of Dodd–Frank, and make major changes to the CFPB). 
 183. CRP Political Contribution Report, supra note 133 (showing that the finance, insurance and 
real estate sector gave 68% of its $658 million of political contributions to Republican candidates during 
the 2012 election cycle); see also Jason Kelly & Katherine Burton, Wall Street Wins Neither With 
Obama Nor Romney Amid Glare, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-27/wall-street-wins-neither-with-obama-nor-romney-amid-
glare.html (reporting that Mitt Romney had collected $9.4 million from the securities and investment 
industry, compared to only $3.4 million for President Obama); Kevin Wack, ‘It Can’t Get Any Worse’—
Why Banks Are Making a One-Sided Political Bet, AM. BANKER (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_87/Mitt-Romney-Obama-bank-industry-campaign-
contributions-1049066-1.html (reporting that the banking industry “is backing Mitt Romney and the 
Republican National Committee by a nearly 2-to-1 margin through political donations in the 2012 
campaign”); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (showing that the financial industry gave 
53% of its campaign contributions to Republican candidates during the 2010 election cycle). 
 184. Wack, supra note 183, at 1–2 (reporting that “[t]he banking industry’s strong backing of 
Romney in 2012 marks a sharp reversal from four years ago,” when the industry gave $42 million to the 
Obama campaign and only $31 million to John McCain’s campaign); Jonathan D. Salant, Goldman 
Sachs Leads Split With Obama, as GE Jilts Him Too, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/goldman-sachs-leads-split-with-obama-as-ge-jilts-him-
too.html (reporting that employees at six major banks—Bof A, Citigroup, Goldman, JPMorgan, Morgan 
Stanley and UBS—gave most of their contributions to Romney in 2012 after supporting Obama in 
2008). 
 185. Jonathan D. Salant, Goldman Sachs to Fund Romney Over Obama, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/romney-sees-surge-in-wall-street-donations-as-
obama-s-decline.html; Wack, supra note 183, at 1. 
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for failing to take strong enforcement actions against large financial 
institutions at the center of the financial crisis or their top executives, 
and for not pushing for a vigorous implementation of Dodd–Frank.186  
At the Democratic national convention in August 2012, only one 
primetime speaker—Senate candidate Elizabeth Warren—spoke out 
strongly against Wall Street, while President Obama’s address included 
just a single mild criticism of large banks.187   
Republican leaders’ eager embrace of Wall Street and Democratic 
leaders’ acquiescent attitude toward Wall Street stood in sharp contrast 
to the hostile attitudes of many delegates at both parties’ national 
conventions.  One journalist found widespread support among delegates 
at both conventions for proposals that would mandate a breakup of the 
largest banks.188  However, leaders in both parties showed no interest in 
attacking big banks.189 
Perhaps the disjunct between party leaders and rank-and-file 
delegates was not surprising, after all.  As one critic astutely observed, 
“Why would [party leaders] put pressure on the banks?  Just look at 
who’s funding the conventions and the parties.”190 
 
 186. See, e.g., Barofsky, supra note 7; Simon Johnson, Why Does Wall Street Always Win?, 
BASELINE SCENARIO (Aug. 23, 2012), http://baselinescenario.com/2012/08/23/why-does-wall-street-
always-win/#more-10297; Taibbi, supra note 7, at 2; see also Frank Rich, The Betrayal, OBSERVER, 
Aug. 14, 2011, at 24 (criticizing the Obama Administration for “the stunning lack of accountability for 
the greed and misdeeds that brought America to its gravest financial crisis since the Great Depression.  
There has been no legal, moral, or financial reckoning for the most powerful wrongdoers.  Nor have 
there been meaningful reforms that might prevent a repeat catastrophe.”); infra Part IV(A)(2) 
(discussing the lack of effective enforcement efforts against large institutions that played major roles in 
the financial crisis or their corporate leaders). 
 187. Lisa Lerer & Julie Bykowicz, Bankers Erect Fences to Deflect Attacks That Don’t Come, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-07/bankers-erect-fences-
to-deflect-attacks-that-don-t-come.html (reporting that Elizabeth Warren, the Democratic candidate for 
U.S. Senate in Massachusetts, declared in her convention speech that Wall Street bankers “wrecked” the 
economy and “destroyed millions of jobs,” while President Obama said only that “we don’t want 
bailouts for banks that break the rules”); see also id. (noting that Democratic leaders like Rep. Joe 
Crowley (D-CT), Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel maintained 
friendly relationships with Wall Street); Kevin Roose, Can Wall Street Tame Elizabeth Warren?, NEW 
YORK MAGAZINE, Nov. 30, 2012 (providing a more detailed account of Sen. Warren’s speech at the 
Democratic national convention, in which she declared, “The system is rigged” against ordinary people, 
while “Wall Street CEOs—the same ones who wrecked our economy and destroyed millions of jobs—
still strut around Congress, no shame, demanding favors, and acting like we should thank them.”), 
available at http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/11/can-wall-street-tame-elizabeth-warren.htm. 
 188. Kevin Wack, Big-Bank Breakup Popular with Rank and File of Both Parties, AM. BANKER 
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_172/big-bank-breakup-popular-with-rank-
and-file-1052378-1.html. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Lerer & Bykowicz, supra note 187 (quoting Ben Carroll); see also Rivlin, supra note 7 
(stating that, during the 2012 campaign, “President Obama chose not to trumpet Dodd–Frank so as not 
to alienate deep-pocketed backers on Wall Street”); Wack, supra note 188 (reporting that the idea of 
breaking up the big banks “enjoys broad bipartisan support,” but congressional leaders from both parties 
would not allow a floor vote on any such proposal due to “the reliance of members of Congress on 
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As discussed below in Part IV(A)(1), the financial industry did not 
succeed in its efforts to defeat President Obama and capture the Senate 
for the Republicans in November 2012.  However, the industry’s strong 
support helped Republicans to retain control of the House.  As soon as 
the new Congress convened in 2013, House Republican leaders and the 
financial industry renewed their efforts to enact legislation that would 
repeal or weaken key Dodd–Frank reforms.  In addition, as explained in 
Part IV(B)(3)(a), President Obama appointed a new Treasury Secretary 
(Jacob Lew) and a new SEC chairman (Mary Jo White) who had 
extensive Wall Street connections and were widely viewed as 
sympathetic to Wall Street’s interests.  Thus, the financial industry’s 
electoral defeats in 2012 did not derail the industry’s long-term 
campaign to undermine Dodd–Frank.  
III. FEDERAL REGULATORS AND CONGRESS FOLLOWED DEREGULATORY 
POLICIES PROMOTED BY THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY THAT ENCOURAGED 
RECKLESS LENDING AND LED TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The financial industry’s ability to obstruct Dodd–Frank’s reforms is, 
unfortunately, consistent with the industry’s past record of success in 
promoting a deregulatory agenda that set the stage for the financial 
crisis.  Federal agencies and Congress adopted a long series of measures 
between 1992 and 2007 that encouraged reckless lending and high-risk 
securitization, thereby fueling an enormous credit boom and an 
unsustainable housing bubble in the U.S.  The financial industry eagerly 
supported those actions and helped to spur the greatest expansion of 
private-sector debt since the 1920s.191  The industry also encouraged 
federal regulators to preempt efforts by state officials to stop abusive 
and predatory lending practices.  Thus, major banks and their trade 
associations were deeply implicated in regulatory and legislative policy 
mistakes that paved the way for the financial crisis. 
A. Federal Regulators Permitted Financial Institutions to Engage in 
Unsound and Predatory Lending Practices That Produced an 
Unsustainable Credit Boom 
With the financial industry’s enthusiastic support, federal banking 
agencies adopted deeply flawed policies that enabled large financial 
institutions to originate trillions of dollars of high-risk mortgages and to 
spread the risks of those mortgages to far-flung investors through 
 
campaign contributions from large banks”). 
 191. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 963-67, 971–79 (discussing causes of the credit boom and 
housing bubble that occurred between 1991 and 2007); Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1002–43 (same). 
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hazardous securitization.  This section highlights key policy errors that 
helped to inflate the nonprime lending boom, which in turn led to the 
financial crisis. 
1. Federal Regulators Issued Weak “Guidelines” That Allowed Banks 
and Thrifts to Engage in High-Risk Mortgage Lending 
In 1991, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA) in response to a severe financial crisis that 
resulted in the failures of almost 3,000 banks and thrifts during the 
1980s and early 1990s.192  One of FDICIA’s provisions required the 
federal banking agencies to adopt “uniform regulations” imposing strict 
new standards for real estate lending.193  Congress expected that the new 
lending standards would be much stronger than the “flexible approach” 
followed by the OCC and other agencies during the 1980s.194  The lax 
regulatory standards of the 1980s allowed banks and thrifts to make 
“imprudent” and “abusive” real estate loans that inflicted massive losses 
on depository institutions and the deposit insurance funds during the 
second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s.195 
However, when federal banking agencies issued a proposed joint 
regulation to implement the 1991 statute, the financial industry strongly 
urged the agencies to adopt “flexible guidelines rather than 
regulations.”196  The industry also argued that regulators should avoid 
 
 192. History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., at 10–11, 102–05, 
186–88, 452–54 (Dec. 1997) (discussing the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and early 1990s and 
the enactment of FDICIA) [hereinafter FDIC History Lessons]; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 34–37 
(same). 
 193. Michael Frachioni, Leveraging the Land: The Changing Loan to Value Ratio for Real Estate 
Lending by National Banks, 112 BANKING L.J. 41, 56 (1995) (discussing the enactment of 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1828o in 1991); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority 
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 301 (2004) (same) [hereinafter OCC’s Preemption Rules]. 
 194. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 301; see also Real Estate Lending 
Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 62890 (Dec. 31, 1992) (“The legislative history of [12 U.S.C. § 1828o] 
indicates that Congress wanted to curtail abusive real estate lending practices in order to reduce risk to 
the deposit insurance fund and enhance the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions.”) 
[hereinafter 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards]. 
 195. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 301.  For descriptions of the losses 
suffered by banks and thrifts due to unsound real estate lending during the 1980s, see Frachioni, supra 
note 193, at 53–56; FDIC History Lessons, supra note 192, at 9–10, 137–62, 301–378; L. WILLIAM 
SEIDMAN, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE GREAT S&L DEBACLE AND OTHER WASHINGTON SAGAS 138–
64 (1993). 
 196. 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards, supra note 194 (summarizing comments submitted in 
response to the proposed regulation); see also Barbara A. Rehm, Regulators Agree to Ease Limits On 
Realty Loans by Banks, Thrifts, AM. BANKER (Oct. 14, 1992), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/157_106/-18380-1.html (reporting that “[b]anks and thrifts 
deluged regulators with 1,500 comment letters, arguing that [the original proposal for binding rules] 
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any “rigid application” of loan-to-value (LTV) limits for real estate 
loans, because such limits “would constrict credit, impose additional 
lending costs, reduce ending flexibility, [and] impede economic 
growth.”197  Despite the industry’s lobbying efforts, the FDIC pushed 
for binding regulations that would impose strict LTV limits on real 
estate loans.  However, the Treasury Department and the other three 
federal banking agencies (the FRB, OCC and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS)) agreed with the industry, and they ultimately 
persuaded the FDIC to accept “general guidelines that [would] give 
banks more leeway” in making real estate loans.198 
The four banking agencies issued joint guidelines on real estate 
lending at the end of 1992.  The interagency guidelines did not specify a 
maximum LTV limit for owner-occupied 1-to-4-family residences and 
allowed banks to make loans (including second mortgages and home 
equity loans) that exceeded 90% of a home’s appraised value.199  The 
guidelines specified maximum LTV ratios for other types of real estate 
loans, but the guidelines permitted banks to make loans that exceeded 
those limits if “credit is justifiable under the specific circumstances.”200  
More generally, the interagency guidelines allowed banks to make loans 
that did not conform to the guidelines as long as the bank could justify 
such loans as “prudently underwritten exceptions to its lending 
policies.”201 
In addition to the inclusion of generous exemptions, the 1992 
interagency guidelines did not impose “mandatory” restrictions; instead, 
banks were required only to “consider the guidelines in establishing 
their own real estate lending policies.”202  The 1992 guidelines marked 
the beginning of a fifteen-year trend in which federal bank regulators 
repeatedly issued nonbinding statements of guidance with respect to 
high-risk mortgage lending instead of adopting binding rules with 
 
would curtail lending”). 
 197. 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards, supra note 194 (summarizing comments submitted in 
response to the proposed regulation). 
 198. Barbara A. Rehm, FDIC Eases Tough Plan to Limit Realty Lending, AM. BANKER (Oct. 9, 
1992), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/157_103/-18294-1.html (reporting that the FDIC’s 
concession represented “a big victory” for banks and thrifts); see also Rehm, supra note 196 (reporting 
that Treasury officials persuaded three of the four banking agencies to accept more flexible guidelines 
rather than regulations, and the FDIC finally gave in to the other agencies). 
 199. 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards, supra note 194 (requiring borrowers for residential 
mortgages with an LTV ratio above 90% to provide “appropriate credit enhancement in the form of 
mortgage insurance or readily marketable collateral”). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 54 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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clearly enforceable limits on such lending.203  Between 1999 and 2001, 
the federal banking agencies issued three guidances dealing with 
subprime mortgages and high LTV real estate lending.  The three 
guidances warned banks about the risks of “abusive lending practices,” 
including making loans without regard to the borrower’s ability to 
repay, but the guidances “did not prohibit the abusive practices.”204  In 
2003, the OCC issued two similar “advisory letters” that provided 
“supervisory guidance” rather than binding rules.205  
The agencies’ reliance on precatory guidance created a permissive 
environment in which subprime mortgage originations grew rapidly 
from $40 billion in 1993 to $240 billion in 2002.206  During the same 
period, several studies by federal agencies found growing evidence of 
predatory lending abuses, including “(i) loan flipping (i.e., frequent 
refinancing of high-cost home loans); (ii) equity stripping (i.e., the loss 
of equity resulting from repeated refinancing that requires the borrower 
to pay high fees and closing costs), (iii) asset-based lending (i.e., the 
extension of credit based primarily on the residual value of the 
borrower’s home and other personal assets without regard to the 
borrower’s income), (iv) excessive fees and penalty charges, (v) high-
pressure sales tactics accompanied by inadequate or misleading 
disclosures, and (vi) aggressive foreclosure policies.”207 
The statements of guidance issued by federal bank regulators between 
1999 and 2003 warned banks against engaging in the foregoing abuses 
but did very little to stop them.208  After reviewing these regulatory 
warnings, an OCC staff economist recently observed that “regulators 
knew the risks of subprime lending well and accurately,” and he asked, 
 
 203. Id. at 54–62; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 165–66, 196–97 (describing 
decisions by federal banking agencies to issue nonbinding guidance instead of mandatory regulations 
between the late 1990s and 2008). 
 204. Di Lorenzo, supra note 202, at 57–58. 
 205. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 309–310. 
 206. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 165–66 (stating that agency guidances “allowed for 
slack regulation and permitted lenders to argue that compliance was optional,” resulting in a “downward 
spiral in lending standards”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 393 
n.766 (providing 1993 figure for subprime mortgage originations); Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, 
supra note 193, at 308 (providing 2002 figure). 
 207. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 308–09 (summarizing findings made 
by government studies of predatory subprime lending practices); see also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia 
A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1260, 1260–70 (2002) (same); FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 76–77, 93, 95 (same). 
 208. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 309–10 (noting that one of the 
OCC’s 2003 advisory letters “condemned ‘abusive’ lending practices that . . . ’involve unfair and 
deceptive conduct’” but did not define unlawful conduct with any specificity) (quoting OCC Advisory 
Letter 2003-2). 
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“[H]ow could the subprime crisis happen?”209  The unfortunate answer 
is that federal regulators utterly failed to take effective action in 
response to problems they clearly identified.210  For example, the OCC 
and the FRB issued only three binding rules to address predatory 
lending problems in the early 2000s, and all three rules were weak and 
ineffective.211  
While federal regulators dithered, several FDIC-insured institutions 
that engaged heavily in subprime lending and securitization failed 
between 1997 and 2002, resulting in losses to the FDIC of nearly $2 
billion.212 The most spectacular of those failures involved Superior 
Bank, FSB, a federal savings association with more than $2 billion of 
assets, which specialized in making and securitizing subprime 
mortgages and auto loans.  Superior Bank failed due to high rates of 
delinquencies and defaults on its subprime loans as well as massive 
writedowns that it was forced to take on residual (equity or first loss) 
interests that it retained from its securitizations of those loans.213   
 
 209.  Douglas Robertson, So That’s Operational Risk!,16 (Off. Comptroller Curr. Econ., Working 
Paper 2011-1); see also id. at 15 (pointing out that the 1999 interagency guidance on subprime lending 
“reads like a prophecy from Cassandra” in describing the risks of making and securitizing subprime 
loans). 
 210. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 88–96, 177–78; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 
19, at 167–205. 
 211. The OCC issued two rules in early 2004.  The first rule prohibited national banks from 
making real estate loans based primarily on the “foreclosure or liquidation value” of the borrower’s 
home and “without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.” Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption 
Rules, supra note 193, at 306 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 34.3(b)).  However, that rule was relatively weak 
because it allowed national banks to make subprime mortgages based on the borrower’s credit history, 
thereby allowing national banks to rely on the borrower’s credit score (which frequently proved to be 
unreliable during the housing boom).  ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 168.  The second rule 
prohibited national banks from making real estate loans by using  unfair and deceptive practices, but that 
rule was vague and had little force because the OCC declared that it lacked “authority to specify by 
regulation that particular practices, such as loan ‘flipping’ or ‘equity stripping’ are unfair or deceptive.”  
OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 307 (quoting Bank Activities and Operations: Real Estate 
Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1911 n.55 (2004)).  The FRB issued a regulation in 2001 
that slightly expanded the definition of “high-cost” loans that were subject to the protections provided 
by the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). However, that rule had “little if any 
effect” because it “only covered 1 percent of all subprime loans.”  ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 
194–95; Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd–Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers 
of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 898 (2011) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act]. 
 212. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 312–13. 
 213. Id. at 314.  For discussions of the failure of Superior Bank, see Christian A. Johnson, The 
Failure of Superior Bank, FSB: Regulatory Lessons Learned, 121 BANKING L.J. 47 (2004); Bank 
Regulation: Analysis of the Failure of Superior Bank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois, GAO-02-419T (Feb. 7, 
2002) (Statement of Thomas J. McCool). 
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2. Federal Agencies Adopted Weak Capital Rules That Encouraged 
Banks and Thrifts to Expand Their Involvement with High-Risk 
Mortgage Lending and Securitization 
 Unfortunately, federal regulators failed to heed the clear lessons from 
Superior Bank’s failure about the dangers inherent in subprime lending 
and securitization.  Federal banking agencies did issue a joint regulation 
in late 2001, which imposed much higher capital requirements on banks 
that retained unrated residual interests from securitizations.214  However, 
banks that packaged subprime loans into residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) avoided the impact of the 2001 rule by selling the 
residual interests in RMBS to hedge funds and other institutional 
investors, including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).215  Some 
major banks (including Goldman and JPMorgan) allegedly permitted 
hedge funds that purchased residual interests in subprime CDOs to use 
credit default swaps (CDS) in order to bet against the CDOs’ underlying 
portfolio of RMBS.216 
In addition, the 2001 interagency capital rule contained a major flaw 
that helped to inflate the subprime lending boom.  The regulation stated 
that tranches of subprime RMBS and CDOs would qualify for a 20% 
risk weight under the agencies’ risk-based capital rules (with a resulting 
capital charge of only 1.6% instead of 8%) if the tranches were backed 
by credit enhancements, like CDS, issued by a company rated AAA or 
AA by credit rating agencies (CRAs).217  Thus, the 2001 rule gave 
 
 214. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 155; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Capital Treatment 
of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 
59615, 59616–21, 59625–26 (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Interagency Capital Rule] (requiring 
lenders to satisfy a “dollar-for-dollar” capital charge by holding capital equal to 100% of retained 
residual interests that did not receive an investment-grade rating from a credit rating agency). 
 215. Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 2065–68. Large banks that securitized subprime loans 
frequently provided credit (as prime brokers) to hedge funds in order to enable those funds to purchase 
residual interests in RMBS and CDOs.  In some cases, the lending banks suffered large losses when 
their hedge fund borrowers collapsed during the financial crisis.  Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1026, 
1030; CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 113–23 (2008). 
 216. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1026–27 (discussing Goldman’s payment of $550 million to 
settle SEC charges that Goldman defrauded institutional investors by selling them interests in a 2007 
CDO without disclosing that “a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co., had helped to select the CDO’s 
portfolio of RMBS while intending to short the CDO by purchasing CDS from Goldman”); Hugh Son et 
al., JPMorgan’s $153.6 Million Settlement with SEC Recalls Case Against Goldman Sachs, 
BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-21/jpmorgan-to-pay-153-6-
million-to-settle-sec-allegations-over-housing-cdos.html (reporting that JPMorgan paid $154 million to 
settle SEC charges that JPMorgan “failed to tell investors in 2007 that a hedge fund [called Magnetar 
Capital LLC (Magnetar)] helped pick, and bet against, underlying securities” in a CDO that JPMorgan 
sponsored and sold to investors); FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 191–93 (reporting on Goldman’s 
settlement and also stating that Magnetar and other hedge funds purchased residual interests in CDOs 
while purchasing CDS to short other tranches in the CDOs). 
 217. 2001 Interagency Capital Rule, supra note 214, at 59,625–27.  In the late 1990s, federal bank 
regulators allowed JPMorgan and other leading banks to reduce their risk-based capital requirements 
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tranches of subprime RMBS or CDOs highly-favorable risk-based 
capital treatment that was equal to the treatment given to much less risky 
RMBS issued by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), like Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, as long as the subprime tranches were supported 
by an AAA-rated or AA-rated company.218   
Federal banking agencies adopted the 2001 regulation even though (i) 
Fannie and Freddie pointed out that the rule would allow banks to 
reduce dramatically the capital they were required to hold against 
subprime-related mortgage assets, and (ii) a leading group of economists 
warned that CRAs were subject to a dangerous conflict of interest that 
was likely to produce inflated credit ratings, because banks that issued 
RMBS and CDOs paid CRAs for their credit ratings.219  The 2001 rule 
allowed Wall Street banks to reduce their capital requirements 
significantly by obtaining CDS from AIG or monoline insurance 
companies, and the business of issuing CDS ultimately brought AIG and 
several monoline insurers (including Ambac and MBIA) to the brink of 
collapse in 2008.220  In addition, the 2001 rule “created the incentive for 
[CRAs] to provide overly optimistic assessment of the risk in mortgage 
pools” and also pushed the GSEs to reduce their own lending standards 
“in order to maintain a presence in the [residential mortgage] market.”221 
Federal regulators also permitted Wall Street banks to sponsor 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and other off-balance-sheet (OBS) 
conduits, which were frequently used as receptacles for RMBS and 
CDOs that banks were unable to sell to arms-length investors. The 
sponsored conduits sold asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) to 
investors and used the proceeds to buy structured-finance securities 
underwritten by the sponsoring banks. The conduits faced a dangerous 
funding mismatch between their longer-term, structured-finance assets 
and their shorter-term, ABCP liabilities. The sponsoring LCFIs covered 
that mismatch (in whole or in part) by providing explicit credit 
 
from 8% to 1.6% by pooling CDS on corporate loans to create synthetic CDOs and by obtaining CDS 
from AIG to backstop tranches of those CDOs.  GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM 
OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A 
CATASTROPHE 48–56, 60–66 (2009).  JPMorgan called its CDO structure “BISTRO,” and “some 
bankers started to joke that ‘BISTRO’ really stood for ‘BIS Total Rip Off,’” because JPMorgan used 
CDS from AIG to reduce drastically its risk-based capital requirements established by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) through the Basel international capital accord.  Id. at 60-64 (quote at 64). 
 218. Arnold Kling, Not What They Had in Mind: A History of Policies That Produced the 
Financial Crisis of 2008, 25 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474430. 
 219. 2001 Interagency Capital Rule, supra note 214, at 59,625 (discussing critical comments on 
the 2001 rule); Kling, supra note 218, at 25–26 (same); see also Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 967–70 
(discussing problems created by conflicts of interest at CRAs). 
 220. See, e.g., FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 139–42, 200–02, 276–78, 300–02, 347–51, 376–79. 
 221. Kling, supra note 218, at 26; see also FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 120–24, 131–33, 146–
50. 
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enhancements (including lines of credit) or implicit commitments to 
ensure the availability of liquidity if the sponsored conduits could not 
roll over their ABCP.222  
Federal banking agencies adopted risk-based capital rules that 
encouraged the use of OBS conduits. Those rules did not assess any 
capital charges against LCFIs for transferring securitized assets to 
sponsored conduits if banks provided only implicit (reputational) 
recourse. Instead, the rules required LCFIs to post capital only if they 
provided explicit credit enhancements to their conduits.223 Moreover, 
federal regulators issued a joint regulation in 2004, which approved a 
very low capital charge for sponsors’ lines of credit, equal to only one-
tenth of the usual 8% capital charge, as long as the lines of credit had 
maturities of one year or less.224   
The 2004 joint capital rule was deeply flawed because it allowed 
banks to obtain highly advantageous OBS treatment for ABCP conduits 
under the agencies’ risk-based capital rules, even though the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had issued a 2003 interpretation 
requiring consolidated accounting treatment for many conduits.225  The 
federal banking agencies declined to follow FASB’s approach.  The 
agencies concluded that bank sponsors for ABCP programs had only 
“limited risk exposure” and, therefore, consolidated risk-based capital 
treatment for ABCP conduits would “not appropriately reflect” the 
sponsors’ actual risks.”226   
The agencies’ optimistic assessment of the risks of ABCP conduits 
proved to be tragically mistaken.  After the financial crisis began in 
 
 222. For discussion of the risk exposures of major banks to SIVs and other sponsored conduits, 
see TETT, supra note 217, at 97–98, 127–28, 136, 196–98; Viral V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, How 
Banks Played the Leverage Game, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED 
SYSTEM 83, 88–94 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009); Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 
1033. 
 223. Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 222, at 89. 
 224. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,908, 44,910–11 (July 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
2004 Joint Capital Rule]. See also Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 222, at 89 (noting that capital 
requirements for short-term “liquidity enhancements” were “only 0.8 percent of asset value”). 
 225. 2004 Joint Capital Rule, supra note 221, at 44,909 (explaining that FASB Interpretation No. 
46-R “requires the consolidation of many ABCP programs onto the balance sheets of banking 
organizations”). 
 226. Id.  As Carolyn Sissoko has pointed out, the banking agencies issued “guidance” in August 
2005 that further weakened the already lax terms of the 2004 capital rule.  The 2005 “guidance” allowed 
sponsoring banks to provide lines of credit (as well as implicit recourse) to support mortgage-related 
assets held by ABCP conduits that were seriously delinquent, in default or below investment grade.  In 
contrast, lines of credit supporting such doubtful assets would not have qualified for favorable treatment 
under the original 2004 capital rule.  By expanding the ability of major banks to support low-quality 
assets held their sponsored conduits, the 2005 “guidance” helped ABCP conduits to secure top credit 
ratings and also greatly increased the risk exposures of the sponsoring banks.  Carolyn Sissoko, Is 
Financial Regulation Structurally Biased to Favor Deregulation? 11-22 (USC CLEO Res. Paper C12-4, 
April 13, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2039490. 
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August 2007, several leading banks felt obliged, for reputational 
reasons, either to bring the assets of sponsored conduits back onto their 
balance sheets or to provide financial support that enabled their conduits 
to remain in business.227  By allowing banks to disregard FASB’s 2003 
interpretation in calculating their risk-based capital, the 2004 joint 
capital rule encouraged banks to engage in abusive and misleading OBS 
transactions similar to those that banks had helped Enron to engineer—
and that FASB had specifically tried to stop.228   
As a result of their risk exposures to ABCP conduits and other OBS 
commitments, many of the largest banks were much more highly 
leveraged than their balance sheets indicated.229  In addition, regulators 
failed to prevent large banks from creating “daisy chains” of CDOs that 
served as additional dumping grounds for the banks’ hard-to-sell CDO 
tranches.230  Ultimately, major banks (including Citigroup, HSBC, 
Merrill and UBS) suffered devastating losses due to their exposures to 
sponsored OBS conduits and CDOs, and those losses were a “significant 
reason why [Citigroup, Merrill and UBS] “needed extensive 
governmental assistance to avoid failure.”231 
3. Federal Regulators Allowed Banks and Thrifts to Increase Their 
Exposure to High-Risk Loans by Acquiring Nonbank Mortgage Lenders 
Regulators also permitted leading banks to become deeply enmeshed 
in the subprime mortgage markets by acquiring nonbank subprime 
lenders.  For example, National City (a large Midwestern bank) 
purchased First Franklin in 1999, and WaMu (the nation’s largest thrift) 
 
 227. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 975. 
 228. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From 
Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 46, 59 (Aug. 13, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126778.  Several major banks—including Citigroup, Merrill and JPMorgan—
played leading roles in helping Enron to structure abusive OBS transactions that “enabled Enron to 
overstate its cash flow and disguise its [true] debt.”  Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 999. 
 229. TETT, supra note 217, at 97–98; James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial 
Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON 563, 570 
(2009); see also HENRY KAUFMAN, THE ROAD TO FINANCIAL REFORMATION: WARNINGS, 
CONSEQUENCES, REFORMS 104, 105 (exh. 8.4) (2009) (showing that the 15 largest U.S. financial 
institutions had total assets of $13.6 trillion and OBS exposures of $5.8 billion at the end of 2007). 
 230. Jake Bernstein & Jesse Eisinger, Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis, 
PROPUBLICA, (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/banks-self-dealing-super-charged-
financial-crisis (reporting that Merrill, Citigroup, UBS and other large banks created “fake demand” for 
their subprime CDOs by creating a “daisy chain” in which CDOs sponsored by each bank purchased 
hard-to-sell mezzanine tranches of CDOs sponsored by the other banks); Jake Bernstein & Jesse 
Eisinger, Which CDOs and Banks Had Deals With the Most Cross-ownership?, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 22, 
2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/who-was-self-dealing-cdos (reporting that “the most cross-
ownership [of CDO tranches] occurred in the CDOs built by the top CDO banks: Merrill, Citigroup and 
UBS”). 
 231. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 973 (quotes); Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1033. 
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bought Long Beach in the same year.  Citigroup bought Associates First 
Capital (Associates) in 2000 and also acquired Argent (the parent 
company of Ameriquest) in 2007.  JPMorgan bought Advanta in 2001, 
and HSBC purchased Household in 2002.  Countrywide, the nation’s 
largest mortgage lender, acquired a national bank and became a BHC in 
2001.  Countrywide thereafter established a securitization unit and 
expanded aggressively into subprime and Alt-A lending.232   
The acquiring banks in the foregoing transactions “wagered that they 
could squeeze more fees and profits out of the subprime lending 
business . . . by taking over the direct lending function as well as the 
securitization process for nonprime loans.”233 Federal regulators 
approved the transactions despite the fact that (i) Associates was the 
subject of a federal investigation when it was acquired by Citigroup (and 
Citigroup ultimately paid a large penalty to settle predatory lending 
charges against Associates), (ii) HSBC acquired Household after the 
latter company paid almost $500 million to settle predatory lending 
charges filed by numerous states, and (iii) Citigroup acquired Argent 
after Ameriquest paid $325 million to settle predatory lending charges 
filed by another group of states.234 
Following their aggressive expansion into subprime lending, large 
banking and thrift companies controlled twelve of the 20 biggest 
subprime lenders between 2005 and 2007.235  Banks, thrifts and 
nondepository lenders originated more than $3 trillion of subprime and 
Alt-A mortgages between 2004 and 2007.236  Wall Street banks 
securitized about $2.7 trillion of those nonprime loans to create RMBS 
during the same period.237  In addition to their roles as direct subprime 
lenders, major banks added more fuel to the subprime bonfire by 
funding and securitizing many of the loans originated by nondepository 
lenders.238 
Federal regulators “discovered alarming concentrations of 
nontraditional mortgages at major national banks and federal thrifts” in 
 
 232. For discussions of the foregoing acquisitions of nonprime mortgage lenders by BHCs, see 
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 199–203; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1017–18; FCIC Report, 
supra note 36, at 75, 92–93, 105. 
 233. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1018. 
 234. Id. at 1017–18; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 199–203; see also FCIC Report, supra 
note 36, at 92–93, 96–97. 
 235. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 211, at 917–18; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 19, at 205 (tbl.10.1) (showing that banking  and thrift companies regulated by federal banking 
agencies accounted for 12 of the 15 top subprime lenders in 2006). 
 236. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1016–20. 
 237. Kenneth E. Scott, The Financial Crisis: Causes and Lessons, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 3, 22, 
23 (2010) (Subprime and Alt-A mortgages are frequently referred to collectively as “nonprime” 
mortgages); Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1015–16. 
 238. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1017–20.  
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2005.239  The agencies responded by issuing two more statements of 
precatory “guidance” in 2006 and 2007, which dealt with high-risk 
mortgages such as (i) option adjustable-rate mortgages (option ARMs), 
(ii) mortgages with little or no documentation of the borrower’s ability 
to pay, and (iii) “hybrid” subprime mortgages that featured low 
introductory “teaser” rates followed by sharply higher payments after 
two or three years.240  Both statements of guidance “were presented 
merely as advice on good practices” and “were not directly enforceable” 
by the federal banking agencies.241   
The FRB did not issue binding rules under HOEPA that required 
lenders to verify borrowers’ ability to repay high-cost mortgages until 
July 2008, “a year after the subprime market had shut down.”242  
Moreover, those rules did not take effect until October 2009 and were 
therefore too late to play any effective role in stopping the predatory 
nonprime lending that led to the financial crisis.243  Thus, federal 
regulatory failures played a major role in allowing the largest banks and 
thrifts to become “the primary private-sector catalysts for the destructive 
credit boom that led to the subprime financial crisis.”244 
B. Federal Regulators Failed to Take Effective Enforcement Measures 
to Stop Predatory Lending and Preempted State Efforts to Do So 
In addition to the very weak “guidance” on nonprime lending issued 
by federal banking agencies, the agencies failed to take effective 
supervisory or enforcement actions to prevent predatory lending.  In 
January 1998, the FRB announced that it would not conduct consumer 
compliance examinations of nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs, even though 
several large BHCs owned nonbank subsidiaries that were significantly 
engaged in nonprime mortgage lending.245  The FRB previously 
 
 239. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 211, at 901–02. 
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 241. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 211, at 902. 
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 243. Di Lorenzo, supra note 202, at 62; Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 899. 
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Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 900–01. 
2013] TURNING A BLIND EYE 1339 
declined (in 1992) to apply the interagency real estate lending standards 
to nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs.246 
The FRB maintained its no-supervision policy for nonbank 
subsidiaries of BHCs despite strong criticism of that policy in two 
reports issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 1999 
and 2004.247  FRB Chairman Greenspan rejected proposals in 2000 by 
FRB Governor Edward Gramlich and members of the FRB’s consumer 
division staff to launch a pilot program to investigate whether nonbank 
mortgage lending subsidiaries of certain BHCs were engaging in 
predatory lending.  The FRB imposed a $70 million fine on 
CitiFinancial (a subprime lending subsidiary of Citigroup) for numerous 
consumer law violations in 2004, but the FRB did not take any other 
public enforcement action against a nonbank subsidiary of a BHC until 
after the financial crisis broke out in 2007.248   
In July 2007, the FRB finally launched the pilot program that 
Gramlich had proposed seven years earlier to examine subprime 
mortgage lending by nonbank subsidiaries of several BHCs.  Two years 
later, the FRB officially reversed its 1998 no-supervision policy and 
began to examine all nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs for compliance with 
consumer laws.  However, the FRB’s change in policy “came far too 
late” to prevent widespread predatory lending by nonbank subsidiaries 
of several large BHCs, including Citigroup, Countrywide and HSBC.249   
Similarly, the OTS and OCC compiled very weak records in terms of 
enforcing consumer protection laws against the institutions they 
regulated.  In a previous article, I summarized the lamentable 
enforcement records of those agencies as follows: 
[T]he OTS brought only ‘five to six’ formal enforcement actions against 
federal thrifts for ‘unfair and deceptive practices’ between 2000 and 
2008. 
 . . . .  
 Between 1995 and the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, the 
OCC issued only 13 public enforcement orders against national banks for 
violations of consumer protection laws.  Most of the OCC’s orders were 
issued against small national banks, and none of the orders were issued 
against the top eight national banks, even though large banks were the 
subject of most of the consumer complaints filed with the OCC.250 
 
 246. 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards, supra note 194, at 62,894; see also supra notes 192–99 
and accompanying text (discussing interagency real estate lending standards). 
 247. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 77, 94–95. 
 248. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 901. 
 249. Id.; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 198–203; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 94–95. 
 250. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 905–06 (footnotes omitted). 
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Even worse, the OTS and OCC aggressively preempted efforts by 
many states to enforce their anti-predatory lending (APL) laws against 
federal thrifts and national banks.  Between 1999 and 2007, 30 states 
and the District of Columbia adopted APL laws that prohibited various 
types of unfair and deceptive mortgage lending practices.251  State 
officials also launched aggressive enforcement efforts to clamp down on 
abusive lending practices, “including more than 3600 enforcement 
actions in both 2003 and 2006.”252  State investigations produced 
settlements that required large, state-licensed lenders (including 
Household, Ameriquest, First Alliance and Countrywide) to pay more 
than $1 billion in penalties and restitution.253   
The OTS and OCC severely undermined the effectiveness of state 
efforts by declaring that federal law preempted states from applying 
their APL laws to federal thrifts and national banks and their respective 
operating subsidiaries and agents.  The OTS and OCC also filed amicus 
briefs to support lawsuits brought by federal thrifts and national banks to 
block the enforcement of state APL laws based on preemption claims.  
The preemption initiatives launched by the OTS and OCC received 
enthusiastic support from large federal thrifts and national banks.254  
Federal agency preemption significantly weakened state APL laws 
because preemption (i) encouraged subprime lenders that were targets of 
state investigations to sell themselves to federally-chartered banks to 
avoid state enforcement, and (ii) discouraged state legislatures from 
passing additional APL laws that would constrain state-licensed lenders 
but would not bind federally-chartered competitors.255  
C. The Financial Industry Strongly Resisted  Attempts by Federal 
Regulators to Impose Tighter Supervision during the Credit Boom 
On the rare occasions when federal banking agencies attempted to 
impose stronger regulations during the credit boom, their efforts 
triggered intense resistance from the financial services industry.  During 
a congressional hearing in March 2008, FRB Vice Chairman Donald 
Kohn admitted that encouraging banks to follow more conservative 
lending policies was “a very hard sell” during the credit boom that led 
up to the financial crisis.256  Similarly, Roger Cole, who served as the 
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 254. Id. at 910–14; Wilmarth, supra note 193, at 233–36, 276–77, 282–97. 
 255. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 913–15. 
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2013] TURNING A BLIND EYE 1341 
FRB’s Director of Bank Supervision from 2006 to 2009, told the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) that FRB officials 
encountered significant “pushback” whenever they urged bank 
executives to follow more conservative risk management policies.257 
Banks, thrifts and nondepository mortgage lenders strongly opposed 
even the weak and nonbinding regulatory guidance that federal 
regulators issued in 2006 and 2007 with regard to nontraditional 
mortgages and hybrid subprime ARMs.258  When the FRB and other 
federal regulators proposed interagency guidance for nontraditional 
mortgages in late 2005, FRB officials “got tremendous pushback from 
the industry as well as Congress as well as . . . internally . . . [b]ecause it 
was stifling innovation, potentially, and it was denying the American 
dream [of homeownership] to many people.”259  The American Bankers 
Association (ABA) asserted that the proposed guidance “overstate[d] the 
risk of nontraditional mortgages,”260 while the Financial Services 
Roundtable declared that it was “not aware of any empirical evidence 
that supports the need for further consumer protection standards.”261  
The OTS actively supported the industry by blocking the issuance of the 
interagency guidance for nontraditional mortgages until September 
2006.262   
Similarly, when federal regulators issued their proposed guidance on 
hybrid subprime ARMs in early 2007, trade associations representing 
banks, thrifts and nondepository mortgage lenders vehemently opposed 
the guidance.  The Mortgage Bankers Association asserted that the 
proposed guidance would “restrict credit to many consumers in high-
cost areas and deny credit to many deserving low-income, minority, and 
first-time homebuyers.”263  Similarly, the ABA claimed that the 
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proposed subprime guidance would deny “credit options to creditworthy 
borrowers who otherwise would benefit from the flexibility afforded by 
the products covered by the proposed statement.”264  Due in part to the 
industry’s strong opposition, the 2006 and 2007 statements of guidance 
“were phrased merely as advice on good practices, were not directly 
enforceable by the agencies, and did not give injured borrowers any 
right to file lawsuits if lenders failed to follow the guidance.”265  
Federal bank regulators and the SEC also encountered “strong 
resistance” when they tried to issue guidelines to prevent banks from 
engaging in deceptive transactions involving “complex structured-
finance transactions (CSFTs).”266  The agencies issued their first 
proposed statement of guidance on CSFTs in May 2004, after taking 
enforcement actions against financial institutions  for arranging  CSFTs 
that  Enron Corp. used “to shield the company’s true financial health 
from the public.”267  For example, Citigroup and JPMorgan arranged 
more than $8.3 billion of “prepaid commodity swaps” (prepays) for 
Enron that “were functionally equivalent to loans” but were structured in 
a way that “enabled Enron to inflate its reported cash flow [from 
operations] and disguise its actual debt obligations.”268  Officials at 
Citigroup and JPMorgan “plainly recognized the deceptive nature of the 
structured-finance deals that their banks arranged for Enron.”269   
 
BANKER, Mar. 5, 2007, at 1 (quoting press release from the Mortgage Bankers Ass’n). 
 264. Cheyenne Hopkins, Bankers Find Plenty Not to Like in Loan Guidance, AM. BANKER, May 
10, 2007, at 5 (quoting comment letter from the ABA).  When federal regulators issued their final 
guidance on hybrid subprime mortgages in July 2007, they acknowledged that “many financial 
institution commenters expressed concern that certain aspects of the proposed statement . . . could 
unduly restrict subprime borrowers’ access to credit.”  Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 
Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,570 (July 10, 2007). 
 265. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 902 (quote), 907–08; see also Di Lorenzo, supra note 202, at 
60–61 (noting that the 2006 and 2007 statements of guidance “continued to rely on disclosure, rather 
than regulation, in order to protect consumers”). 
 266. David M. Katz, Feds Soften Structured-Finance Stance, CFO.COM, Jan. 5, 2007 (available 
on Lexis). 
 267. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex Structured Finance 
Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,980, 28981–82, 28,982 n.1 (May 19, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Proposed 
Interagency Statement on CSFTs].  For the SEC’s enforcement orders entered against Citigroup and 
JPMorgan with regard to their involvement with Enron, see In re Citigroup, SEC Administrative 
Proceeding No. 3-11192 (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-
48230.htm  (requiring Citigroup to pay disgorgement and penalties for its Enron-related misconduct); 
SEC Litigation Release No. 18252 (July 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm (requiring JPMorgan to pay disgorgement and 
penalties for its Enron-related misconduct), 
 268. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at 
Universal Banks during the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases of Enron and WorldCom, 
(Geo. Wash. Univ. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Leg. Theory Working Paper No. 234, Nov. 20, 2006), at 12, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952486. 
 269. Id. at 17.  For example, “[a JPMorgan] Chase officer remarked that ‘Enron loves [prepay] 
deals as they are able to hide funded debt from their equity analysts.’  Similarly, Citibank’s Capital 
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The 2004 proposed guidance on CSFTs “called for banks to review 
how companies planned, accounted for, and disclosed CSFTs in both 
their financial and tax reporting.”270 Even though Citigroup, JP Morgan 
and other banks had incurred heavy financial and reputational injuries 
due to their involvement with Enron,271 financial industry trade groups 
strongly attacked the 2004 guidance for “requiring that [banks] police 
their corporate customers.”272  Banks and industry trade groups also 
vigorously opposed the 2004 proposed guidance because its broad 
definition of CSFTs appeared to include RMBS, CDOs and ABCP 
conduits.273  In response to the industry’s determined opposition, federal 
regulators withdrew the 2004 proposed guidance and issued a revised 
and much weaker proposal in May 2006.274  
Federal regulators did not issue final guidelines on CSFTs until 
January 2007, and those guidelines represented a “considerable retreat” 
from the 2004 proposal.275  Instead of warning banks to refrain from 
engaging in CSFTs that “create significant legal or reputational risks,” 
the final guidelines merely advised banks to “take appropriate steps to 
address those risks,” including obtaining “representations or assurances 
from the customer.”276  The final guidelines contained broad exemptions 
and disclaimers that greatly diminished their impact.  For example, the 
guidelines stated that they did not apply to RMBS, CDOs, ABCP 
 
Markets Approval Committee noted that a prepay swap requested by Enron was ‘effectively a loan, 
[but] the form of the transaction would allow [Enron] to reflect its ‘liabilities from price risk 
management activity’ on their [sic] balance sheet and also provide a favourable [sic] impact on reported 
cash flow from operations.’”  Id. at 17–18 (quoting from sources quoted in Third Interim Report of Neal 
Batson, court-appointed bankruptcy examiner for Enron) (footnotes omitted). 
 270. Katz, supra note 266; see also 2004 Proposed Interagency Statement on CSFTs, supra note 
267, at 28,983 (stating that a bank should refuse to participate in a CSFT if the bank determined that “a 
proposed transaction may result in the customer filing materially misleading financial statements”). 
 271. Wilmarth, supra note 268, at 24 (stating that, as of September 2006, banks involved with 
Enron “had paid more than $8 billion and had surrendered about $3 billion of their credit claims against 
Enron, in order to settle various claims asserted by the SEC, Enron’s investors, and Enron itself”); Eric 
Dash, Citigroup Resolves Claims That It Helped Enron Deceive Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2008, 
at C3 (reporting that Citigroup agreed to pay $1.66 billion to Enron’s bankruptcy estate to settle claims 
by Enron’s creditors, and that Citigroup was “the last of 11 financial institutions to resolve claims going 
back to 2003”). 
 272. Tim Reason, Who’s Holding the Bag?, CFO MAG., Oct. 2005 (available on Lexis). 
 273. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured 
Finance Activities, 71 Fed. Reg. 28, 326, 28, 328–29, 28,331 (May 16, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 
Proposed Guidance on CSFTs]. 
 274. Id. at 28,236; see also George M. Cohen et al., Have US Regulators Been Soft on Banks Over 
Structured Products?  Yes, (June 2, 2006), at 2–4 (criticizing the 2006 revised proposal, and maintaining 
that “what began as a presumptive condemnation of deals with [deceptive structured] characteristics [in 
the 2004 proposed guidance] morphed into what can (and we believe will) easily be read as permission” 
in the 2006 revised proposal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523712. 
 275. Katz, supra note 266. 
 276. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured 
Finance Activities,” 72 Fed. Reg. 1372, 1379 (Jan. 11, 2007). 
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conduits, or “hedging-type transactions involving ‘plain-vanilla’ 
derivatives.”277  The final document also declared that it “does not, by 
itself, establish any legally enforceable requirements or obligations” for 
banks, including any duties or obligations to bank shareholders, 
customers or other third parties.”278  
Given the regulators’ long delay in issuing the 2007 guidelines on 
CSFTs and the very weak tenor of those guidelines, it is not surprising 
that the guidelines did not deter major banks from engaging in abusive 
CDO transactions.  Goldman and JPMorgan jointly paid over $700 
million to settle SEC charges arising out of CDOs that the banks 
structured and marketed to investors with inadequate disclosures.  In 
each case, the bank marketed a CDO’s securities without revealing to 
investors that a hedge fund (i) would selectmortgage-related assets for 
the CDO’s portfolio and (ii) intended to short those assets, thereby 
creating a direct conflict of interest with other investors.279 
Similarly, Citigroup agreed to pay $285 million to settle SEC charges 
that Citigroup marketed $1 billion of CDO’s securities to investors 
without disclosing the bank’s stunning conflict of interest.  Citigroup 
sold the CDO’s securities while secretly taking short positions so that it 
could bet against about half of the CDO’s mortgage-related assets.280  In 
addition, a major Japanese bank (Mizuho) agreed to pay $127 million to 
settle charges that it structured and marketed a CDO’s securities to 
investors while misrepresenting the type and quality of assets that were 
actually held in the CDO’s portfolio.281   
The SEC’s complaints against Goldman, JPMorgan, Citigroup and 
 
 277. Id. at 1374, 1377. 
 278. Id. at 1375. 
 279. SEC Litigation Release No. 21592, July 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21592.htm (describing Goldman’s agreement to pay 
$550 million to settle SEC charges); SEC Litigation Release No. 22008, June 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22008.htm (describing JPMorgan’s agreement to pay 
$154 million to settle SEC charges); supra note 216 (describing SEC charges that led to settlements 
with Goldman and JPMorgan). 
 280. SEC Litigation Release No. 22134, Oct. 19, 2011, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22134.htm (describing Citigroup’s agreement to pay 
$285 million to settle the SEC’s charges).  A federal district court issued an order rejecting the SEC’s 
proposed settlement with Citigroup, but the district court’s order was stayed by the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, and the case is currently pending on appeal before the Second Circuit.  Yin Wilczek, 
Securities: Second Circuit Stays SEC, Citigroup Case; Slams Lower Court Rejection of Parties’ Pact, 
98 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 502 (Mar. 20, 2012); SEC Enforcement: Rakoff Defends Rejection of 
$285M Pact Between SEC, Citigroup in Brief to 2d Cir., 44 SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW REPORT 
(BNA) 1560 (Aug. 17, 2012). 
 281. SEC Litigation Release No. 22417, July 19, 2012, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22417.htm (describing Mizuho’s agreement to pay 
$127.5 million to settle SEC charges that Mizuho structured and marketed a CDO to investors with a 
“portfolio containing millions of dollars in dummy assets that inaccurately reflected the [actual] 
collateral held by [the CDO]”). 
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Mizuho for structuring and marketing abusive CDOs were disturbingly 
reminiscent of the charges that the SEC had previously leveled against 
Citigroup, JPMorgan and other banks for arranging deceptive 
transactions for Enron.282  Indeed, leading banks must have recognized 
the risk that their structuring of RMBS, CDOs and ABCP conduits could 
potentially lead to Enron-type problems, because they fought very hard 
(as described above) to exempt those transactions from the agencies’ 
guidelines on CSFTs. 
D. Bank Regulators and Congress Provided Massive Assistance to 
Major Banks during the Financial Crisis 
Federal officials provided huge amounts of financial assistance to 
large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs) during the financial crisis.  
The 19 largest U.S. banks (each with more than $100 billion of assets) 
and AIG collectively received $290 billion of capital assistance from the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by Congress.  
Federal regulators also authorized the same 19 banks and GE Capital (a 
large finance company subsidiary of General Electric) to issue $290 
billion of FDIC-guaranteed, low-interest debt.  In contrast, banks 
smaller than $100 billion received only $41 billion of TARP capital 
assistance and issued only $11 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt.283   
Additionally, the Federal Reserve System (Fed) provided enormous 
amounts of liquidity assistance to financial institutions through a series 
of emergency lending programs. The total outstanding amount of the 
Fed’s emergency credit facilities reached a single-day peak of $1.2 
trillion in December 2008.  The Fed extended the vast majority of this 
emergency credit to large U.S. and European banks and provided very 
little help to smaller institutions.284 
The Fed and the Treasury also provided extensive support to financial 
institutions and the financial markets by making large-scale purchases of 
debt obligations and RMBS that were issued or guaranteed by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.285  In combination, the federal government 
 
 282. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 59–60, 137–39, 142–46, 190–200, 247–48; see also supra 
notes 228, 267-69 (discussing involvement of Citigroup, JPMorgan and other banks in Enron’s 
fraudulent deals). 
 283. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail 
Problem, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT’L LAW 707, 737–38 (2010). 
 284. The highest daily amount of the Fed’s emergency credit to the ten largest U.S. commercial 
and investment banks reached $669 billion, representing more than half of the daily peak amount for all 
Fed lending programs.  Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Trillion in Secret 
Fed Loans, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 22, 2011; Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed 
Loans Helped Banks Net $13 Billion, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 27, 2011. 
 285. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), 
Quarterly Report to Congress, July 21, 2010, at 118–22, 135–38 [hereinafter SIGTARP July 2010 
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provided more than $6 trillion of support to financial institutions 
between 2008 and mid-2010, when such support is measured by the 
peak amounts of outstanding assistance under the TARP capital 
assistance programs, Fed emergency lending programs, FDIC debt 
guarantees, and other asset purchase and guarantee programs.286  The 
United Kingdom (U.K.) and European nations similarly provided more 
than $4 trillion of financial support to their financial institutions by the 
end of 2009.287  
As discussed above, the federal government publicly guaranteed in 
early 2009 that none of the 19 largest U.S. banks would be allowed to 
fail.288  Regulators also stated that they would not impose regulatory 
sanctions on the top 19 banks under the “prompt corrective action” 
(PCA) regime established by Congress in 1991, notwithstanding the 
non-discretionary nature of those sanctions.  Instead of issuing public 
enforcement orders, regulators entered into private and confidential 
“memoranda of understanding” with BofA and Citigroup despite the 
gravely weakened conditions of both banks.289  Federal regulators did 
 
Report] (showing that the Fed and Treasury had purchased more than $1.6 trillion of GSE debt 
securities and GSE-guaranteed RMBS by mid-2010), available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/July2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf.  In 2009 
and 2010, under its first quantitative easing (QE) program, the Fed purchased $1.45 billion of GSE debt 
securities and GSE-guaranteed RMBS, along with $300 billion of Treasury securities, in order to reduce 
short-term and long-term interest rates and thereby produce lower borrowing costs for banks and other 
participants in the financial markets. Id. at 150–54; Michael D. Bauer, Fed Asset Buying and Private 
Borrowing Rules, FRBSF Economic Letter 2012–16, May 21, 2012, at 1–3, available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2012/el2012-16.html.  In order to provide additional 
monetary stimulus to the struggling U.S. economy, the Fed announced a second QE program in late 
2010 (resulting in the purchase of $600 billion of Treasury securities) and a third QE program in 
September 2012 (authorizing the purchase each month of $40 billion of GSE-guaranteed RMBS and $45 
billion of Treasury securities for an indefinite period).  Bauer, supra; Aaron E. Lorenzo, Monetary 
Policy: Fed’s Open-Ended QE3, Longer Window on Zero Rate Stronger Than Some Expected, 99 
BNA’S BANKING REPORT 445 (Sept. 18, 2012).  By May 2003, the Fed had purchased “more than $3 
trillion in longer-term Treasury and mortgage related securities” under its combined QE programs. John 
C. Williams, Economic Outlook: Moving in the Right Direction, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 2013-15, at 
4 (May 20, 2013), available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-
letter/2013/may/economic-outlook-moving-right-direction/. 
 286. The “high-water mark” of the combined programs, based on the largest outstanding amount 
of each program at any one time, was $6.3 trillion in mid-2010.  The federal government’s maximum 
potential commitment under those programs was $23.9 trillion.  SIGTARP July 2010 Report, supra note 
285, at 116–19, 118 tbl.3.1. 
 287. Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with What 
Banks Do, in 2 ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. J., No. 2, at 1, 4–5, 14, 15 tbl.4, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/8/44357464.pdf (stating that the U.S. provided $6.4 trillion of 
assistance to financial institutions through capital infusions, asset purchases, asset guarantees, and debt 
guarantees as of October 2009, while the United Kingdom and European nations provided $4.3 trillion 
of such assistance). 
 288. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 289. Wilmarth, supra note 283, at 744.  A Federal Reserve staff economist determined that 
Citigroup’s tangible common equity (TCE) ratio (common equity as a percentage of tangible assets) was 
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not issue PCA orders or other formal capital enforcement orders against 
any of the largest banks during the financial crisis, even though two very 
large banks (Wachovia and WaMu) failed and two others (BofA and 
Citigroup) needed extraordinary government assistance to avoid 
failure.290  In contrast, regulators issued hundreds of PCA orders and 
other formal capital enforcement orders against smaller banks from 
between 2008 and 2010, and regulators allowed many of those banks to 
fail.291   
E. Federal Agencies Provided Extensive Forbearance to the Largest 
Banks during the Financial Crisis 
In addition to forgoing any use of PCA sanctions against major banks, 
federal officials provided extensive accounting and regulatory 
forbearance to large financial institutions.  As described below, federal 
officials enabled leading banks to avoid or postpone recognition of large 
losses on troubled mortgage-related securities.  Officials also allowed 
 
“very low” (less than 2%) at the end of 2008.  The TCE ratio is viewed by analysts and investors as a 
“more conservative indicator of stability.”  Sherrill Shaffer, Fair Value Accounting: Villain or Innocent 
Victim—Exploring the Link Between Fair Value Accounting, Bank Regulatory Capital and the Recent 
Financial Crisis, (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston Quant. Analysis Unit Working Paper No. 10-01, Jan. 31, 
2010), at 19–21, 21 tbl.5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543210.  A second analyst recently 
reached a similar conclusion as to Citigroup and also found that BofA was in a vulnerable condition at 
the end of 2008.  Marc Jarsulic, Chief Economist, Better Markets, Inc., Written Testimony at a joint 
hearing on “Examining the Impact of the Proposed Rules to Implement Basel III Capital Standards,” 
before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Insurance, 
Housing and Community Opportunity of the House Comm. on Financial Services, Nov. 29, 2012, at 5 
(determining that Citigroup’s TCE ratio was 1.3% at the end of 2008, while BofA’s TCE ratio was 
2.8%), available at http://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Better%20Markets%20Testimony-
%20FSC-%2011-29-12.pdf. 
 290. Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. 
L. J. 645, 690–993 (2012); see also supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing failures of 
Wachovia and WaMu and rescues of BofA and Citigroup).  In early 2009, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair 
determined, based on findings by FDIC examiners, that “Citi[bank] was a troubled 4 by every 
established standard used to measure bank health.”  SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO 
SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 168 (Free Press eds., 2012).  
However, Chairman Bair ultimately decided not to insist on a “4” (problem bank) rating for Citibank 
because she was concerned that Citibank’s foreign depositors would quickly withdraw their funds when 
they learned that Citibank had been placed on the FDIC’s “troubled-bank list.”  Id. at 168–69. 
 291. Hill, supra note 290, at 672–77, 690-93; Wilmarth, supra note 283, at 744, 744 n.145.  More 
than 400 banks failed during the four-year period ending December 31, 2011, and only one of those 
institutions (WaMu) had more than $50 billion of assets.  In sharp contrast to their unprecedented 
measures to protect the 19 largest banks, the federal government did not take significant steps to prevent 
smaller banks from failing.  See Hill, supra note 290, at 668-77, 690-93; Wilmarth, supra note 283, at 
744; 6 FDIC Quarterly No. 1, 4th Qtr. 2011, at 17 (tbl.II-B) (providing information about  banks that 
failed between 2007 and 2011), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2012_vol6_1/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol6No1.pdf; 2 FDIC 
Quarterly No. 4, 3d Qtr. 2008, at 14 (referring to the failure of WaMu, with $307 billion of assets, in 
September 2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2012_vol6_1/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol6No1.pdf. 
1348 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
the largest banks to defer recognition of major losses on second-lien 
housing loans held on their balance sheets.  
1. Federal Officials Demanded Changes in Accounting Rules That 
Enabled Large Banks to Avoid Mark-to-Market Losses on Troubled 
Mortgage-Related Assets 
During the spring of 2009, political leaders, regulators and the 
financial industry pressured the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) to relax fair value accounting rules that forced major banks to 
recognize large losses on RMBS, CDOs and other mortgage-related 
investments.  Under the mark-to-market accounting practices that 
prevailed before 2009, financial institutions were generally required (i) 
to establish fair values for investment securities based on the most 
recent available market transactions and (ii) to recognize mark-to-
market losses on those investments unless banks could demonstrate both 
their intention and their ability to hold those investments to maturity.292   
Mark-to-market accounting placed great pressure on banks to sell 
their RMBS and CDOs as prices for mortgage-related assets plummeted 
during the financial crisis, in order to avoid the possibility of even 
greater losses if they continued to hold such investments.  As a 
consequence, some observers blamed fair value accounting for creating 
“fire sale” conditions in already stressed markets, thereby forcing 
financial institutions to recognize unwarranted, panic-driven losses.293  
To mitigate the continuing mark-to-market losses that banks were 
incurring, FRB Chairman Ben Bernanke, SEC Chairman Mary 
Schapiro, and House Financial Services Committee chairman Barney 
Frank urged FASB to make changes to its fair value rules.294  In 
addition, the financial services industry launched an intense lobbying 
campaign to force FASB to relax those rules. At a House committee 
hearing on March 12, 2009, members of Congress threatened FASB 
chairman Robert Herz that they would pass legislation to override 
FASB’s fair value rules if FASB refused to make the requested 
changes.295 
 
 292. Gauri Bhat et al., Panacea, Pandora’s Box, or Placebo: Feedback in Bank Mortgage-Backed 
Security Holdings and Fair Value Accounting (June 2011), at 2–3, 6, 9–10, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856727; Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules 
Matter? The Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 36 J. CORP. L. 513, 517–20 (2011). 
 293. Bhat et al., supra note 292, at 2–3, 6–10; Robert M. Bowen et al., The Economic 
Consequences of Relaxing Fair Value Accounting and Impairment Rules on Banks during the Financial 
Crisis of 2008–09 (Jan. 10, 2010), at 1, 1, 2 n.3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498912;Epstein 
& Henderson, supra note 288, at 519–21, 534, 544–46. 
 294. Bowen et al., supra note 293, at 10–11, 34 (tbl.1). 
 295. Ian Katz & Jesse Westbrook, Mark-to-Market Lobby Buoys Bank Profits 20% as FASB May 
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In response to the financial industry’s impressive display of political 
clout, FASB issued interpretations that substantially eased mark-to-
market rules on April 2, 2009.  Those interpretations allowed banks (i) 
to use internal models (rather than recent market prices) to determine the 
fair value of securities traded in illiquid or disorderly markets, (ii) to 
reject “distress sale” prices as a reliable indicator of fair values, and (iii) 
to avoid recognizing impairment losses on securities as long as banks 
did not intend to sell the securities prior to maturity.296  In late 2008, 
European politicians and banks forced the International Accounting 
Standards Board to make similar emergency changes to mitigate mark-
to-market losses by large European banks.297 
According to event studies, FASB’s rule changes produced 
significant gains in stock prices for U.S. banks, and the largest gains 
occurred at banks that had (i) greater vulnerability to contagion from 
Lehman’s failure, (ii) lower regulatory capital, (iii) larger amounts of 
illiquid investments subject to treatment as “Level 2” or “Level 3” 
assets, and (iv) higher exposures to potential mark-to-market losses on 
impaired investments.298 The greatest beneficiaries of FASB’s rule 
changes were Citigroup, BofA and other leading banks that were 
burdened with large exposures to mortgage-related investments.299   
2. Federal Regulators Postponed the Imposition of Consolidated Capital 
Requirements for Assets Held by Off-Balance-Sheet Conduits 
Regulators also provided accounting forbearance with regard to 
ABCP conduits, SIVs and other OBS entities that major banks 
sponsored and used as dumping grounds for tranches of RMBS and 
CDOs that they could not easily sell to arms-length investors.300  By 
 
Say Yes, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 30, 2009 (reporting that FASB was under “tremendous pressure” to change 
its fair value rules due to aggressive lobbying efforts by the financial industry); Susan Pulliam & Tom 
McGinty, USA Inc.: Congress Helped Banks Defang Key Rule, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2009, at A1 
(describing the “multimillion dollar lobby campaign” mounted by financial firms and trade groups). 
 296. Bhat et al., supra note 292, at 7–8; Bowen et al., supra note 293, at 10–11, 28–29 
(Appendix); Ian Katz, FASB Eases Fair-Value Rules Amid Lawmaker Pressure (Update 3), 
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 2, 2009. 
 297. Bowen et al., supra note 293, at 8–9; Denise Lugo, Accounting: Former SEC Chief 
Accountant Turner Fears IASB Actions May Slow U.S. Move to IFRS, 91 BNA’S BANKING REP. 779 
(Nov. 3, 2008); Joe Kirwin, Accounting: European Union Quickly Approves Changes to Fair-Value 
Accounting, 91 BNA’S BANKING REP. 683 (Oct. 20, 2008). 
 298. Bowen et al., supra note 293, at 3–4, 20–26; see also Bhat et al., supra note 292, at 4–5, 26–
27, 33–34 (finding that (i) the largest gains in stock prices after FASB’s rule changes occurred at U.S. 
banks that held larger amounts of private label (non-GSE) RMBS and nonperforming loans, and (ii) 
FASB’s revised rules significantly changed reduced the adverse impact of “feedback trading” on such 
banks). 
 299. See authorities cited supra in note 298; Katz & Westbrook, supra note 295. 
 300. See supra notes 222–31 and accompanying text (discussing OBS conduits that were 
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early 2008, FASB officials recognized that large banks had exploited 
ambiguities in accounting rules to create OBS risk exposures that 
resembled the abusive transactions created by Enron.301  For example, 
Citigroup justified its transfer of $72 billion of assets to its sponsored 
OBS conduits by arranging for outside investors to purchase just $77 
million of “first-loss notes” issued by those conduits.  Notwithstanding 
the allegedly independent status of the conduits, Citigroup was later 
obliged (due to reputational concerns as well as liquidity backstops) to 
bring most of their assets back onto its balance sheet.302 
In the summer of 2008, FASB proposed new accounting rules that 
would force banks to bring many securitized assets back onto their 
balance sheets.303  Major financial institutions launched another 
aggressive lobbying campaign to delay the effective date of FASB’s 
proposed new rules. Regulators and members of Congress again 
strongly supported the industry because of their desire to “shore up 
major financial institutions and keep their vulnerabilities from causing 
near-term damage to the ailing economy.”304  In July 2008, FASB 
agreed to defer the effective date for its new rules until January 2010, 
although two of its five members “expressed discomfort with the 
delay.”305 
FASB issued final rules in July 2009 that required consolidated 
accounting treatment (beginning in 2010) for securitized assets held by 
most OBS conduits and many other “special purpose entities.”306  One 
 
sponsored by large banks and later inflicted heavy losses on several of those banks). 
 301. David Reilly, Look Under the Banks’ Hoods: FASB to Re-Examine Whether Financing 
Vehicles That Added to Woes Should Stay Off Books, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2008, at C1; Steve 
Burkholder, Accounting: FASB Chief Blames Loss of U.S. Reporting System’s Global Credibility on 
Subprime Woes, 89 BANKING REP.(BNA) 949 (2007). 
 302. Reilly, supra note 301; see also Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 973–75 (discussing Citigroup’s 
decision to absorb $84 billion of assets from SIVs and other OBS conduits). 
 303. Harry Terris, FASB Rule Delay: Impact Goes Beyond GSEs, AM. BANKER (July 31, 2008), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/173_150/-358851-1.html; Denise Lugo, Financial Coalition 
Wants FASB to Delay Proposals on Off-Balance-Sheet Activities, 40 SEC.REG. & L. REP. 1100 (2008). 
 304. David S. Hilzenrath, Potentially Disruptive Lender Rule Is Delayed, WASH. POST, July 31, 
2008, at D1; see also Lugo, supra note 303 (describing lobbying efforts by a “Wall Street coalition” to 
“delay accounting standards under study by [FASB] that would require companies to bring certain 
securitized assets back on their balance sheets”).  For example, a House Republican leader urged FASB 
to postpone its rules while using “talking points” that had been prepared by the financial industry 
coalition that was lobbying for the postponement.  Hilzenrath, supra (quoting letter sent to FASB by 
House Financial Services Committee ranking member Spencer Bachus (R-AL)). 
 305. Hilzenrath, supra note 304 (quoting FASB chairman Robert Herz, who stated that “[i]t does 
pain me to allow something that has been . . . abused by certain folks, to let that go on another year,” 
and FASB member Lawrence Smith, who stated that “[i]n my mind, things have been broken for a 
while, and it’s about time we fixed the problem”); see also Steve Burkholder, Accounting: FASB Votes 
to Defer Planned Changes on Securitizations, Consolidations to 2010, 91 BANKING REP. (BNA) 185 
(Aug. 4, 2008) (reporting on FASB’s decision). 
 306. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Final rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 4636, 4636–37 (Jan 28, 2010) 
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analyst estimated that FASB’s consolidation rules would compel the 
four largest U.S. banks to bring $550 billion of assets back onto their 
balance sheets.307  The financial industry pressured regulators to grant a 
further delay before imposing regulatory capital charges on securitized 
assets that would be consolidated under the FASB’s new rules.308  As a 
practical matter, consolidated regulatory capital treatment required 
banks to post ten times as much capital as they previously held for OBS 
conduits under the federal regulators’ 2004 capital rule.309  In response 
to the industry’s entreaties, regulators provided a one-year phase-in 
period for consolidated capital treatment, thereby permitting banks to 
postpone full implementation of the much higher capital requirements 
until 2011.310 
3. Federal Officials Provided Forbearance for Second-Lien Loans Held 
by Banks but Refused to Provide Meaningful Principal Relief for 
“Underwater” Homeowners 
Federal regulators granted additional leniency to major banks with 
regard to their extensive holdings of second mortgage liens.  During the 
housing boom, many large banks and thrifts made first and second 
mortgages simultaneously in order to permit borrowers to purchase 
homes with little or no down payments.  Lenders frequently securitized 
the first mortgages while retaining the “piggyback” second mortgages 
 
[hereinafter 2010 Capital Rule] (describing FASB’s adoption of Statements of Financial Accounting 
Standards (FAS) 166 and 167 in June 2009); Accounting Principles: New FASB Rules for 
Securitizations Portend Big Changes to Bank Ledgers, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1179 (June 22, 
2009) (same); see also Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg. 
47,138, 47,140–42 (Sept. 15, 2009) (explaining the accounting changes made by FAS 166 and 167, and 
admitting that “the recent turmoil in the financial markets has demonstrated the extent to which the 
credit risk exposure of the sponsoring banking organizations to [OBS conduit] structures (and their 
related assets) has in fact been greater than the [federal banking] agencies had expected”). 
 307. David Reilly, Banks Need to End $1 Trillion Kick the Can Game, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=acPs3f5Wlny0 (citing report by 
Barclays Capital analyst Jason Goldberg regarding the impact of the new FASB rules on Citigroup, 
JPMorgan, BofA and Wells Fargo). 
 308. 2010 Capital Rule, supra note 306, at 4637–39 (stating that financial industry commenters 
“overwhelmingly supported a delay and/or phase-in of the regulatory capital requirements associated 
with the implementation of FAS 167 for a period of up to three years”). 
 309. Bradley Keoun, Citigroup’s Costly Gaurantees May Be Curbed, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-16/-liquidity-puts-that-cost-citigroup-may-be-curbed-
occ-s-bailey-says.html (reporting that consolidated treatment of conduit assets under regulatory capital 
rules would force banks to provide “10 times as much capital support” for those assets compared to 
prior rules); see also supra note 224 and accompanying text (describing 2004 capital rule that allowed 
banks to provide liquidity support for OBS conduits while posting only one-tenth of the capital required 
for on-balance-sheet assets). 
 310. 2010 Capital Rule, supra note 306, at 4638–39. 
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on their balance sheets.311  In 2006, almost a third of subprime 
mortgages and about one-half of Alt-A loans were made in tandem with 
“piggyback” second mortgages.312   
From 2001 to 2007, home purchase transactions that included 
“piggyback” second mortgages typically resulted in combined LTV 
ratios of 95% or more.313  Regulators allowed banks and thrifts to 
provide “piggyback” second mortgages despite repeated complaints 
from mortgage insurers that those mortgages did not comply with either 
the agencies’ capital rules or their high-LTV lending standards.314  
Banks and thrifts also extended home equity loans and home equity 
lines of credit (HELOCs) that enabled homeowners to extract large 
amounts of cash from their homes.315 
At the peak of the mortgage lending boom in 2007, about $1 trillion 
of second mortgage liens (including home equity loans and HELOCs) 
were outstanding.316  The four largest banks—JPMorgan, BofA, 
Citigroup and Wells Fargo—held $475 billion of second-lien loans at 
the end of 2008,317  and they retained about $400 billion of those loans 
 
 311. Bernanke: Housing Will Stay Strong, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 18, 2005, at 6; Erick 
Bergquist, New Radian CEO Predicts Piggybacks Will Wane, AM. BANKER, May 2, 2005, at 18; Eric 
Bergquist & Marc Hochstein, For MGIC—Slower Growth, Tougher Rivals, AM. BANKER, July 15, 
2004, at 1; see also Harry Terris, As Home Prices Fall, Banks Hold Home Equity Bag, AM. BANKER, 
April 28, 2011 (stating that “[p]iggyback loans—or second liens underwritten simultaneously with first 
liens—were standard substitutes for substantial down payments and mortgage insurance in subprime and 
alternative-A lending, and the data suggests that bank balance sheets were a  principal source for such 
borrowing”); infra note 476 (describing the “piggyback” loans provided by Countrywide as part of their 
“80/20” subprime lending program). 
 312. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1021 & n.289. 
 313. Donghoon Lee et al., A New Look at Second Liens, Fed. Res. Bank of NY, Staff Report No. 
569, (Aug. 2012), at 14–15, 34 (fig. 13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130061. 
 314. Private mortgage insurers criticized “piggyback” second mortgages because they enabled 
borrowers to avoid buying mortgage insurance, which generally had been required prior to the housing 
boom for borrowers whose down payments were less than 20% of the purchase price for their homes.  
Bergquist & Hochstein, supra note 311.  In 2003 and again in 2005, mortgage insurers complained that 
banks and thrifts were using “piggyback” second mortgages to circumvent regulatory standards for 
high-LTV lending as well as agency rules requiring extra capital for banks and thrifts that retained 
“recourse” exposures to securitized loans.  The federal banking regulators refused to act on those 
complaints, asserting that (i) second mortgages, even if originated simultaneously with first mortgages, 
did not represent a “recourse arrangement” for securitized first mortgages, and (ii) regulators were 
applying appropriate “scrutiny” to high LTV mortgage financing.  See Off. of the Comptroller of 
Currency,  Interpretive Letter 1058 (April 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/may06/int1058.pdf (joint letter from the 
federal banking agencies to Suzanne Hutchinson of the Mortgage Insurance Cos. of Am.); Off. of the 
Comptroller of Currency, Interpretive Letter 987 (Mar. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/apr04/int987.pdf (joint letter from the federal 
banking agencies). 
 315. Lee et al., supra note 313, at 10; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1009–10. 
 316. Lee et al., supra note 313, at 10. 
 317. The large holdings of second-lien loans by the top four banks were due in part to BofA’s 
purchase of Countrywide, JPMorgan’s purchase of WaMu and Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia 
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on March 31, 2012.318 
The top four banks were also the largest servicers of first mortgages 
(including securitized loans), and their extensive holdings of second 
liens created a clear conflict of interest.319  The big bank servicers often 
refused to approve principal reductions for homeowners on their first 
mortgages, through either mortgage modifications or short sales, 
because those transactions would have required the banks to write down 
or write off their second liens on the same properties.320  Indeed, some 
commentators claimed that bank servicers “encourage[ed] borrowers to 
miss first lien payments while remaining current on their second liens,” 
because banks could postpone writing down second-lien loans as long as 
borrowers kept making payments on them.321  
Analysts strongly criticized regulators for not forcing major banks to 
recognize losses on their second-lien loans, especially for “underwater” 
homes whose market values were less than their combined mortgage 
liens.322  In 2011, BofA still carried second-lien loans on its books at 
93% of their face value, even though investors typically discounted such 
loans by 50%.323  The OCC supported BofA and other big banks by 
declaring that they were “adequately reserved against losses on second-
liens” in 2011, and the OCC also claimed that national banks did not 
have to write down second-lien loans on “underwater” homes as long as 
the borrowers continued to make payments.324  As indicated above, bank 
 
during 2008.  Kate Berry, Surprising Surge in Home Equity Loans, AM. BANKER, July 2, 2009, at 9. 
 318. Prashant Gopal & John Gittlesohn, Second Loans Keep Houses in Limbo, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, July 30–Aug. 5, 2012, at 40-1 (reporting that the four largest banks “held 48 percent of 
the $849.5 billion in second liens as of March 31, [2012]”). 
 319. Kate Berry & Jeff Horwitz, Hamp Loan Mods Surge at Banks, Languish at Nonbanks, AM. 
BANKER, Aug. 3, 2012 (reporting that the four largest banks and Ally Financial were the top five 
mortgage servicers and controlled the servicing for 66% of all home loans); Lee et al., supra note 313, at 
2 (describing conflict of interest faced by banks that serviced first mortgages and held second-lien loans 
on the same properties); Alex Ulam, Why Second-Lien Loans Remain a Worry, AM. BANKER, May 2, 
2011, at 7 (same). 
 320. Kate Berry, Why Writedowns on 2nd Mortgages Are So Scarce, AM. BANKER, Sept. 20, 
2010, at 1; Ulam, supra note 319. 
 321. Lee et al., supra note 313, at 2; Ulam, supra note 319 (quoting comments by Josh Rosner). 
 322. Berry, supra note 320; Ulam, supra note 319; see also Kathleen Howley, Banks Win 
Reprieve on Home Equity Loans in Settlement,” BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2012) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-27/banks-win-reprieve-on-home-equity-loans-in-settlement-
mortgages.html (reporting that 4.4 million of “underwater “ homes had second-lien loans totaling $180 
billion in late 2011, representing about 20% of all second-lien loans). 
 323. Ulam, supra note 319 (reporting that “[e]xcluding impaired [second-lien] loans it acquired 
with its purchase of Countrywide, BofA’s allowance for home equity losses was equal to 6.5% of its 
portfolio at March 31, [2011,] suggesting a carrying value of more than 93 cents on the dollar.”); Jesse 
Eisinger, In Proposed Mortgage Fraud Settlement, a Gift to Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, at 
B11 (reporting that investors were “bidding about 50 cents on the dollar” for second-lien loans). 
 324. Ulam, supra note 319 (reporting on comments by Tim Long, senior deputy comptroller and 
chief national bank examiner); see also Berry, supra note 320 (citing statement in September 2010 by 
OCC spokesman Bryan Hubbard that a national bank “does not have to classify a home equity loan if 
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servicers reportedly urged borrowers to continue making payments on 
“underwater” second liens even after they defaulted on their first 
mortgages.325 
In February 2012, the four largest banks and Ally Financial agreed to  
a nationwide settlement of state and federal charges that all five banks 
had systematically engaged in unlawful and abusive practices while 
foreclosing on mortgages they serviced.  The national mortgage 
settlement, which included 49 states and the federal banking agencies, 
required the five banks to pay $5 billion in penalties and to earn $20 
billion of credits by approving principal relief for borrowers through 
mortgage modifications and short sales.326  The settlement allowed the 
banks to receive substantial credits for writing down their second-lien 
loans, even though many of those loans were already “underwater” and 
presumably uncollectible.327  A prominent analyst argued that the 
settlement credits for writing down second-lien loans represented “a gift 
to the banks” because “[s]econd liens would typically be wiped out 
before senior-mortgage investors take a loss.”328  The foreclosure 
settlement also gave credits to the banks if they approved principal 
reductions for first mortgages they serviced for others, thereby allowing 
the banks to transfer some of the settlement’s costs to securitized 
mortgages owned by investors.329 
Shortly before the national settlement was announced, federal bank 
 
the value of the property has dropped”).  One analyst suggested that big national banks, which often 
serviced first mortgages owned by investors while holding second liens on the same properties, 
sometimes agreed to postpone foreclosures on the delinquent first mortgages if the borrowers were 
willing to continue making payments on their second liens.  Ulam, supra note 319 (quoting comments 
by Josh Rosner). 
 325. See supra notes 321, 324 and accompanying text; see also Berry, supra note 320 (stating that 
banks were postponing writedowns on “underwater” second liens because borrowers continued to make 
payments on those loans; for example, in mid-2010 Citigroup reported that 47% of its second liens were 
“underwater,” due to combined LTV ratios higher than 100%, but also reported that only 2.4% of its 
second-lien loans were delinquent). 
 326. Kate Davidson, Kate Berry & Joe Adler, Cheat Sheet: Long-Awaited Final Terms of $25B 
Mortgage Settlement, AM. BANKER, Mar. 13, 2012; see also Kate Berry, Too Many Short Sales Mar 
Mortgage Settlement, Advocates Say, AM. BANKER, Feb. 22, 2013, 2013 WLNR 4457884 (reporting 
that, under the settlement,  “servicers get $1 of credit for each $1 of principal forgiveness [through a 
first-lien mortgage modification], but only 45 cents of credit for each $1 in principal forgiven on a short 
sale, and only 20 cents of it if the loan is owned by an investor.”). 
 327. Davidson, Berry & Adler, supra note 326 (reporting that banks would “receive 90 cents for 
every $1 principal write-down for performing second loans.  For seriously delinquent second loans, they 
receive 50 cents of credit per $1 of write-down.  For second liens that are 6 months delinquent, they 
receive just 10 cents of credit for every $1 of write-down.”); Howley, supra note 322 (discussing the 
settlement’s favorable treatment of the banks). 
 328. Howley, supra note 322 (quoting Laurie Goodman). 
 329. Id. (citing comments by Ms. Goodman and Scott Simon); Kate Berry, MBS Investors Cry 
Foul Over National Mortgage Settlement, AM. BANKER, Mar. 20, 2012 (“The settlement allows [bank] 
servicers to receive 45 cents of credit for every dollar of principal reductions paid for by investors” on 
first-lien loans). 
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regulators issued guidance advising banks to create larger loan loss 
reserves for second-lien loans in circumstances where (i) borrowers had 
defaulted on first-lien loans covering the same properties or (ii) market 
values of those properties had fallen below the outstanding amounts of 
the first and second liens.330  The national settlement and the interagency 
guidance finally induced the top five bank servicers to begin approving 
loan modifications and short sales due to (A) settlement credits they 
could earn from approving such transactions,331 and (B) regulatory 
pressure to recognize accrued losses on their second-lien loans.332   
From March 2012 through March 2013, the five big bank servicers 
provided $44.4 billion of principal relief to 475,000 borrowers.  
However, servicers provided more than three-quarters of that principal 
forgiveness through short sales ($20.1 billion) and second-lien 
writedowns ($14.2 billion).  Servicers provided a much smaller amount 
of principal relief through first-mortgage modifications ($10.1 
billion).333  Consumer and civil rights groups criticized the big bank 
servicers for failing to comply with the “spirit of the settlement,” 
because the banks gave “the bulk of relief through short sales and 
forgiveness of second liens”—transactions that frequently did not enable 
borrowers to “stay in their homes.”334  
 
 330. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. et al., Interagency Supervisory Guidance on Allowance 
for Loan and Lease Losses Estimation Practices for Loans and Lines of Credit Secured by Junior Liens 
on 1–4 Family Residential Properties, at 2–3 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20120131a1.pdf (advising banks holding 
second liens to adjust their loss reserves for “high-risk junior lien” loans based on factors such as 
“[d]elinquency and modification status of senior lien loans associated with an institution’s junior liens” 
as well as the combined LTV ratios for first and second lien loans when compared to the property’s 
current market value). 
 331. Berry & Horwitz, supra note 319 (explaining that the foreclosure settlement and other 
federal incentives encouraged the top five bank servicers to approve mortgage modifications and other 
transactions resulting in principal reductions); Kate Davidson, Banks Can Live with $25B Deal—If It 
Gets Approved, AM. BANKER, Mar. 14, 2012. 
 332. See Gretchen Morgenson, Here Comes the Catch in Home Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2012, § BU, 1 (reporting that Wells Fargo “moved $1.7 billion of junior lien mortgages to nonaccrual 
status as a result of the [interagency] guidance” in the first quarter of 2012).  In June 2012, the OCC 
ordered national banks to write down second-lien loans for borrowers who had completed Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceedings.  JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo and Citigroup responded by collectively 
charging off more than $2 billion of their second-lien loans during the third quarter of 2012.  Kate 
Berry, Third-Quarter Earnings Feature More Home Equity Losses, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 22, 
2012.  The fact that major banks had not previously written off such loans indicates the general laxity of 
federal regulatory treatment for second-liens prior to 2012. 
 333. Office of Mortgage Settlement Oversight, Fact Sheet: Updated National Consumer Relief 
Data (May 21, 2013), available at https://www.mortgageoversight.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Fact-Sheet_May-progress-reportFINAL.pdf; see also Kevin Wack, Mortgage 
Relief Surpassing Estimates, Iowa AG Says, AM. BANKER, May 22, 2013, 2013 WLNR 12467907 
(reporting on the types of principal relief provided by the five big banks servicers). 
 334. Kate Berry, Civil Rights Groups Call for More Disclosure in Mortgage Settlement, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 28, 2013, 2013 WLNR 4946771 (also noting that the national mortgage settlement 
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Large holdings of impaired second liens by major banks appear to 
have been a significant factor behind the Obama Administration’s 
repeated refusals to adopt programs that could have provided significant 
principal relief to homeowners threatened with foreclosure.  As noted 
above, seven million mortgage holders have lost their homes to 
foreclosures or short sales since 2007, and an additional five million 
delinquent borrowers could lose their homes during the next few 
years.335  The FRB and private analysts have pointed to this massive 
wave of foreclosures as a major problem that has prevented a sustained 
recovery of the U.S. housing market and the general economy.336 
In recently-published memoirs, former TARP Special Inspector 
General Neil Barofsky and former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair strongly 
criticized the Treasury Department for rejecting their proposals to create 
federal programs offering substantial principal reductions to 
“underwater” homeowners who could meet their mortgage obligations 
with such assistance.337  As Barofsky, Bair and other analysts pointed 
 
monitor, Joseph A. Smith, acknowledged that “[t]here is a fair amount of discretion that the servicers 
have” in determining the types of principal relief they would offer to borrowers under the settlement); 
see also Berry, supra note 326 (“A chief criticism of the $25 billion settlement has been that banks get 
credit for completing short sales—which result in borrowers giving up the property—when the goal is to 
[have] consumers keep their homes.”); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Despite Aid, Borrowers Still Face 
Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at B1 (reporting that only 71,000 borrowers had received 
principal relief through first-mortgage modifications under the settlement, and that other types of 
principal relief—including writedowns of second mortgages—frequently did not allow borrowers to 
stay in their homes). 
 335. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
 336. See, e.g., Letter from Ben Bernanke, Fed. Res. Bd. Chairman, to Spencer Bachus, Chairman 
of Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives and Barney Frank, Ranking Member of 
Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2012), (with an attached 
Federal Reserve staff study entitled “The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy 
Considerations”) (stating that “continued weakness in the housing market poses a significant barrier to a 
more vigorous economic recovery,” and noting that “the large inventory of foreclosed or surrendered 
properties is contributing to excess supply in the for-sale market, placing downward pressure on house 
prices and exacerbating the loss in aggregate housing wealth”), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf; 
Binyamin Appelbaum, Cautious Moves on Foreclosures Haunting Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, 
at A1 (reporting that “housing, left to fester, had become Mr. Obama’s biggest economic problem” 
because “millions of people lost their homes and the economic recovery stalled somewhere between 
crisis and prosperity”); Peter Coy & Robert Farzad, A Long Way From Normal, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, July 30-Aug. 5, 2012, at 37 (describing continuing problems with delinquent 
mortgages and foreclosures, and noting that “[h]ousing is most Americans’ biggest asset and crucial to 
the health of the overall economy”); Clive Crook, U.S. Needs to Be Much More Forgiving on Home 
Loans, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-07/u-s-needs-to-be-
much-more-forgiving-on-home-loans.html (“The housing market is where the Great Recession started.  
It’s the main thing delaying recovery.”); Zachary Goldfarb, Why has the U.S. recovery sputtered?, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2012, at A1 (citing several senior economists who maintained that home 
foreclosures and underwater borrowers represented “a persistent and largely unaddressed problem” that 
caused “the slow economic recovery”). 
 337. NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN 
STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 124–28, 156–57, 193–200, 226–28 (Free Press eds., 2012); 
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out, Franklin Roosevelt’s administration created the Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation (HOLC) in response to a similar foreclosure crisis 
during the Great Depression.  The HOLC restructured and refinanced a 
fifth of U.S. home mortgages with significant principal reductions, 
thereby saving a million families from losing their homes.338  In 
contrast, the Obama Administration rejected proposals for programs that 
could have provided significant principal reductions to large numbers of 
underwater borrowers.  The Administration also refused to support 
legislation in early 2009 that would have given bankruptcy courts the 
authority to reduce the principal balances of individual mortgages by 
ordering “cramdowns” in consumer bankruptcy cases.339   
Instead, the Treasury Department created the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP), which gave mortgage servicers 
financial incentives to modify first-lien mortgages but did not provide 
meaningful support for principal reductions.  Barofsky, Bair and other 
critics contend that HAMP was poorly designed and lacked crucially-
needed incentives to persuade mortgage servicers to provide principal 
relief to borrowers.340  As of March 31, 2013, Treasury had spent only 
$7.3 billion on HAMP and other housing relief programs, and $38.5 
billion of TARP-authorized funding for housing programs remained 
unused.341  HAMP’s mortgage modification program produced only 
863,000 permanent first-lien modifications by March 2013, and only 
96,000 of those modifications included principal relief, while more than 
a million modifications failed.342  In August 2009, Treasury established 
a Second-Lien Modification Program, which offered incentive payments 
to mortgage servicers and investors for writing down second-lien loans, 
but that program disbursed less than $360 million and generated only 
142,000 writedowns of second liens by February 2013.343 
 
BAIR, supra note 290, at 128–29, 147–53, 248–51. 
 338. Appelbaum, supra note 336; BAIR, supra note 290, at 115, 155; see also Adam J. Levitin & 
Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance 23–26 (Geo. Univ. Law Ctr. Pub. L. & Leg. 
Theory Working Paper 12-051, Mar. 13, 2012) (describing the HOLC’s activities), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1966550. 
 339. See authorities cited supra in note 337; see also Appelbaum, supra note 336; Clara Benson, 
Obama Housing Fix Faltered on Carrots-Not-Sticks Policy, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-11/obama-housing-fix-faltered-on-carrots-not-sticks-
policy.html; Ezra Klein, The Best Case Against Obama’s Economic Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 
2012, at A10. 
 340. See authorities cited supra in notes 337 and 339. 
 341. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), 
Quarterly Report to Congress (April 24, 2013) at 49-50, 59. 60 (tbl.2.12), available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_24_2013_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
 342. Id. at 63 (including tbl.2.14), 64, 75–76. 
 343. Id. at 78–79.  Moreover, HAMP’s very limited programs for principal forgiveness applied 
only to mortgages that were not owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  The GSEs 
refused to participate in any mortgage modification programs offering principal reductions to borrowers.  
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According to Barofsky and Bair, the Treasury Department showed no 
interest in providing meaningful principal relief for underwater 
borrowers and instead pursued measures that served the interests of the 
big bank servicers.344  In a hearing before the Congressional Oversight 
Panel during the fall of 2010, Treasury Secretary Geithner stated that 
HAMP would help “foam the runway” for the banks by enabling them 
to “‘handle up to ‘10 million foreclosures,’ over time.”345  During a 
meeting with President Obama and seven leading economists in October 
2011, Geithner rejected the economists’ proposal for a plan to go 
beyond HAMP and provide principal forgiveness to millions of 
underwater homeowners.346 
Similarly, Treasury assistant secretary Herbert Allison stated that he 
wanted to help the banks “earn their way out of this,” and he opposed 
principal reductions for underwater mortgages because they could create 
“moral hazard” among borrowers.347  Barofsky concluded that bank 
servicers had fee-based incentives that discouraged them from granting 
principal reductions, and he also decided that Treasury would never 
support a principal forgiveness program that could reduce bank 
profits.348  Bair reached similar conclusions about the motivations of the 
big banks and Treasury.349   
Thus, it seems likely that a major factor behind Treasury’s opposition 
to large-scale principal reductions for first mortgages was Treasury’s 
recognition that such reductions would have forced the four largest 
banks—which were also the four largest mortgage servicers—to 
recognize significant losses on their $400 billion holdings of second-lien 
 
Id. at 75; Marceline White, Not enough relief: Despite deal reached with banks, too many Md. families 
are still losing their homes, BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 12, 2012), at 21A (reporting that Edward DeMarco, 
acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Authority, would not allow Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
to include principal reductions in any modifications of mortgages that they owned or guaranteed).  
 344. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 125–28, 193–98; BAIR, supra note 290, at 141–53, 249–56. 
 345. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 156–57 (quoting testimony by Geithner). 
 346. Goldfarb, supra note 336 (reporting that Geithner rejected the proposal because “he didn’t 
think anything of such ambition was possible”). 
 347. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 157, 197.  Geithner similarly opposed a principal reduction 
program for underwater mortgages because he feared “it could reward people who tapped home equity 
to support lavish lifestyles.”  Benson, supra note 339.  Given the federal government’s massive 
assistance programs for large banks, Barofsky found it “beyond ironic that Treasury was now 
emphasizing moral hazard with respect to home owners.  Though some home owners might try to take 
advantage of [a principal reduction] program . . . that risk paled in comparison to that created by 
Treasury by the way it had rescued the too-big-to-fail banks.” BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 197. 
 348. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 125–26, 196–97. 
 349. BAIR, supra note 290, at 131–53, 249–56; see also id. at 153 (“HAMP was a program 
designed to look good in a press release, not to fix the housing market.  Larry [Summers] and Tim 
[Geithner] didn’t seem to care about the political beating the president took on the hundreds of billions 
of dollars thrown at the big-bank bailouts . . . I don’t think helping home owners was ever a priority for 
them.”). 
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loans.  In September 2010, a prominent analyst pointed out that if 
regulators forced the big banks to write down their second liens, it 
would probably compel the banks to “come back to the federal 
government for additional bailout money.”350 
The Obama Administration also declined to support bankruptcy 
“cramdown” legislation in 2009 because it “feared the consequences for 
the nation’s biggest banks, which had been rescued just months 
earlier.”351  Similarly, Lawrence Summers (President Obama’s chief 
economic adviser) rejected plans to provide extensive principal relief for 
underwater homeowners because he believed those plans could have 
“‘effects worse than the cure’ . . . , such as cratering the financial system 
by forcing banks to absorb huge losses.”352  In short, the Obama 
Administration—like its predecessor, the George W. Bush 
Administration—assigned a much lower priority to solving the home 
foreclosure crisis than it did to shoring up the largest banks (which bore 
significant responsibility for causing the crisis in the first place).353 
F. The Financial Industry Persuaded Congress to Pass a Series of 
Measures That Facilitated the Subprime Credit Boom 
In addition to the financial industry’s repeated successes in obtaining 
favorable regulatory treatment, the industry achieved a series of 
landmark legislative victories between 1994 and 2006.  With the 
industry’s fervent support, Congress enacted several key statutes 
thatencouraged rapid growth in the size, revenues and influence of the 
 
 350. Berry, supra note 320 (quoting George Mason professor Anthony Sanders); see also supra 
notes 317–18 and accompanying text (stating that JPMorgan, BofA, Wells Fargo and Citigroup held 
$475 billion of second-lien loans at the end of 2008 and still held $400 billion of those loans at the end 
of the first quarter of 2012). 
 351. Paul Kiel, The Great American Foreclosure Story: The Struggle for Justice and a Place to 
Call Home, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-great-american-
foreclosure-story-the-struggle-for-justice-and-a-place-t (discussion under heading entitled “Obama’s 
options”); see also id. (stating that the Administration was concerned that “[i]f too many consumers 
were lured into bankruptcy, they wouldn’t have only their mortgages reduced.  They might very well 
have other debts slashed, such as home-equity loans and credit-card debt.  The cumulative effect could 
devastate the banks, plunging the nation back into a financial crisis”); Benson, supra note 339 (quoting 
former Obama housing finance policy coordinator Peter Swire, who confirmed that “[g]etting the 
financial system to work was a huge priority [for the Obama Administration] . . . .  The vote on cram-
down happened in that context.”). 
 352. Goldfarb, supra note 336. 
 353. BAIR, supra note 290, at 131–53, 249–56; see also BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 124–28, 
194–200, 226–28 (“Under Paulson, Treasury chose to bail out the largest banks without insisting that 
they effect meaningful mortgage reform.  Under Geithner, that original sin was compounded by a series 
of further choices in program design (to ‘foam the runway’ for the banks) and execution (refusing to 
penalize servicers) that always seemed to put home owners’ interests second.  The simple truth is that 
Geithner and Treasury chose to never treat the foreclosure crisis . . . with the same seriousness and 
resolve that they applied to rescuing the banks.”). 
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largest banks and also set the stage for the financial crisis: 
• In 1994, Congress adopted legislation that (i) authorized bank 
holding companies to make interstate acquisitions of banks and 
(ii) empowered national banks and state banks to establish 
interstate branches.  The 1994 statute made possible the 
establishment of large nationwide banking organizations and 
triggered a wave of bank mergers.  As a consequence, the share 
of U.S. banking assets held by the ten largest banks rose from 
25% in 1990 to 55% in 2005.354  
• In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act 
(GLBA), which authorized banks to affiliate with securities firms 
and insurance companies by establishing financial holding 
companies.  GLBA ratified and expanded a long series of 
regulatory approvals that opened loopholes in the walls 
separating banks from securities firms and insurance 
companies—a trend that culminated in the FRB’s approval of the 
merger of Citicorp and Travelers to form Citigroup in 1998.355  
GLBA opened the door to the formation of large “universal 
banks” (financial conglomerates).  In turn, many of those 
financial conglomerates became the “private-sector catalysts for 
the credit boom that led to the [financial] crisis” as well as “the 
epicenter of the world’s financial turmoil.”356 
• In 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act (CFMA), which largely exempted OTC derivatives from 
federal regulation.  CFMA’s deregulatory philosophy helped a 
small group of major financial institutions to dominate national 
and global markets for OTC derivatives.357  CFMA was a “huge 
mistake” because it created a “regulatory void” that allowed 
OTC derivatives markets (including the CDS market) to expand 
rapidly and create dangerous concentrations of risk in leading 
financial firms like AIG.358 
• In 2005, Congress enacted bankruptcy “reform” legislation that 
“radically altered the policies underlying consumer 
bankruptcy . . . in favor of creditors” by making it much more 
 
 354. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 975–76, 1012–13 (describing the significance of the 1994 
interstate banking legislation); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 89 (same). 
 355. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra  note 15, at 89, 91–92, 133–34 (discussing GLBA’s importance); 
Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 972–75 (same); see also Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 306–07 (noting that 
the financial industry spent more than $300 million on lobbying expenses and political contributions to 
secure GLBA’s enactment). 
 356. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 968–97, 1008–20, 1027–46 (quotes at 1043). 
 357. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 7–11, 78–82, 121–26, 134–37; Wilmarth, supra note 
15, at 980–81, 991–94. 
 358. BAIR, supra note 290, at 333; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 7–9, 92, 134–37, 
169–70, 202 (discussing the impact of CFMA and AIG’s role in the financial crisis). 
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difficult for consumers to use bankruptcy proceedings to obtain a 
substantial or complete discharge of their debts.359  A recent 
study found that the 2005 statute triggered a significant rise in 
the subprime mortgage foreclosure rate by reducing the ability of 
subprime borrowers to discharge their unsecured debts 
(including credit card debts) and thereby free up more income to 
pay their mortgages.360  The study concluded that the bankruptcy 
“reform” law was one of several factors contributing to “the 
destabilizing surge in subprime foreclosures” after 2005.361 
• BAPCPA also significantly expanded “safe harbors” in the 
Bankruptcy Code that provided highly favorable treatment for 
holders of derivatives and financial repurchase agreements 
(repos).362  As amended by BAPCPA, the safe harbors confer 
two very important rights on holders of derivatives and repos: (i) 
the right to engage in “close-out” and “cross-product” netting 
(i.e., the ability to terminate derivatives and repos immediately 
after a counterparty files for bankruptcy, and to set off any 
obligations the holder owes the counterparty against any 
amounts the counterparty owes the holder under all such 
contracts), and (ii) the right to seize collateral posted by a 
counterparty for derivatives or repos either before or after the 
counterparty files for bankruptcy.363  The safe harbors, as 
enlarged by BAPCA, effectively give holders of derivatives and 
 
 359. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the ‘Sweat Box’ of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV., 375, 376–77 (2007) (discussing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)); see generally Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of 
BAPCPA. 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31 (2007) (surveying the changes made by BAPCPA to consumer 
bankruptcy statutes). 
 360. Donald P. Morgan et al., Subprime Foreclosures and the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform, FRBNY 
ECON. POL’Y REV., (Mar. 2012), at 47, 47–51, available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n1/1203morg.html.  This study determined that, for a 
state with average home equity exemptions and median home prices, the subprime foreclosure rate rose 
by 11% during the seven quarters following the bankruptcy statute’s enactment in 2005.  Id. at 48, 54–
55. 
 361. Id. at 48, 55. 
 362. Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Market Contracts and BAPCPA, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 
701–09 (2005) (explaining BAPCPA’s expansion of the Bankruptcy Code’s favorable treatment for 
derivatives and repurchase agreements); Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 319, 322–26 (2010) (same); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatves Market’s Payment Priorities as 
Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 546 (2011) (explaining that a “financial repurchase 
agreement—called “repo” in the market—is a sale of a financial instrument . . . with the seller promising 
to buy that asset back, often the next day.  The agreed repurchase price is a little higher than the sale 
price, with the difference being the de facto interest.  The instrument sold is usually called the collateral, 
as the transaction is functionally a loan.”). 
 363. Campbell, supra note 362, at 702, 705–06 (explaining “cross-product netting” under 
BAPCPA); Rober R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, 
and Closeout (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi. Working Paper 2005-03, May 10, 2005), at 4–7 (explaining 
“close-out netting” permitted for holders of derivatives and repos), available at 
http:/ssrn.com/abstract=730648. 
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repos a “superpriority” over other types of creditors who are 
barred under the Bankruptcy Code from taking similar self-help 
measures against bankrupt counterparties.364  BAPCPA also 
expanded the classes of repos that receive safe-harbor treatment 
to include repos collateralized by mortgage-related assets 
(including mortgage loans and RMBS).365 
• BAPCA’s enlarged safe harbors served the interests of large 
financial institutions that were leading participants in the 
derivatives and repo markets.366  Those institutions pushed hard 
to create and expand the safe harbors, which in turn facilitated 
the rapid growth of the derivatives and repo markets during the 
period leading up to the financial crisis.367  Some experts 
maintain that BAPCPA’s expanded safe harbors (i) weakened 
market discipline and encouraged excessive risk-taking in the 
derivatives and repo markets during the pre-crisis period, (ii) 
played a significant role in the failures of AIG, Bear and 
Lehman, and (iii) imposed greater risks on the U.S. government 
as the implicit guarantor for TBTF financial institutions that 
were heavily involved in the derivatives and repo markets.368 
In addition to the foregoing legislative victories, the financial services 
industry defeated numerous attempts by members of Congress to pass 
anti-predatory lending bills prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
2007.369  The industry successfully lobbied to block more than a dozen 
bills introduced in Congress between 2000 and 2007 that would have 
imposed tighter restrictions on high-risk mortgage lending.370 
 
 364. Roe, supra note 362, at 546–49 (explaining that the amended “safe-harbor” provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code give holders of derivatives and repos, “exemptions, insulations and special treatment” 
that amount to “a superpriority over disfavored creditors”). 
 365. Campbell, supra note 362, at 702–03 (explaining that, prior to BAPCPA, repos qualified for 
“safe harbor” treatment only if they were collateralized by government securities, bank certificates of 
deposit or bankers’ acceptances). 
 366. Lubben, supra note 362, at 326 (explaining that “the safe harbors are most likely to benefit 
large financial institutions, as these institutions are more likely to have either demanded pre-bankruptcy 
collateral . . . or have a variety of derivative positions with a single debtor”); see also Campbell, supra 
note 362, at 712 (“A cynic might argue that the financial safe harbors are indeed a ‘bankruptcy opt-out 
clause’ for a certain class of capitalists because their money is more important than anyone else’s . . . .  
BAPCPA suggests that financial markets contracts . . . fall within the privileged class.”). 
 367. Lubben, supra note 362, at 326–28; Roe, supra note 362, at 543–44, 576–78; Michael 
Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 253, 279–83 (2009). 
 368. Lubben, supra note 362, at 319–21, 318–32; Roe, supra note 362, at 549–72; Simkovic, 
supra note 367, at 282–89. 
 369. See BAIR, supra note 290, at 50 (explaining that the financial services industry “successfully 
stopped antipredatory lending proposals on Capitol Hill,” including bills proposed by Rep. Barney 
Frank (D-MA), Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-FL) and Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD)). 
 370. Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the 
Financial Crisis 10, 17–18, 25–26, 54–59 (Appendix) (Dec. 2009) (IMF Working Paper WP/09/87) 
(Int’l Monetary Fund), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531520. 
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IV. WHY DOES WALL STREET EXERCISE SO MUCH INFLUENCE OVER 
WASHINGTON? 
A. The Financial Industry Wields Enormous Political Influence through 
Campaign Contributions and Lobbying 
1. The Financial Industry’s Formidable Political Clout 
The finance, insurance and real estate sector (financial sector or 
financial industry) has become a dominant political force in Washington 
over the past two decades by devoting massive resources to political 
campaigns and lobbying.371  Between 1990 and 2012, the financial 
sector spent more than $3.3 billion on political campaigns and was “far 
and away the largest source of campaign contributions to federal 
candidates and parties . . . .”372  The financial industry also spent more 
than $5.3 billion on lobbying between 1998 and 2012 and ranked third 
among all industry sectors in lobbying outlays.373  Indeed, the financial 
industry accounted for 15% of lobbying expenditures by all industry 
sectors between 1999 and 2006.374  The financial sector employed 3,000 
lobbyists in 2007, and many of those lobbyists were former senior 
 
 371. See, e.g., BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 7, 38, 210 (observing that “financial 
institutions spend enormous amounts of time and money on lobbying politicians both to enact 
sympathetic laws and to pressure regulatory agencies to interpret and implement those laws in 
sympathetic ways”); JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET ALWAYS WINS 19–24, 
106–10, 144–57, 233–50 (2012) (memoir by former senior Senate aide and lobbyist, explaining that 
“Washington has The Blob [, a term that] refers to the government entities that regulate the finance 
industry . . . and the army of Wall Street representatives and lobbyists that continuously surrounds and 
permeates them”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 4–11, 89–104, 118–19, 134–37, 55–57, 191–92 
(“The Wall Street banks are the new American oligarchy—a group that gains political power because of 
its economic power, and then uses that political power  for its own benefit,” id. at 6); ESSENTIAL 
INFORMATION & CONSUMER EDUCATION FOUNDATION, SOLD OUT: HOW WALL STREET AND 
WASHINGTON BETRAYED AMERICA 15 (2009)  [hereinafter SOLD OUT] (“The financial sector showered 
campaign contributions on politicians from both parties [and] invested heavily in a legion of lobbyists,” 
spending $1.7 billion on political contributions and $3.4 billion on lobbying between 1998 and 2008). 
 372. Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, CENTER PUB. INTEGRITY 
(as of Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2012&ind=F; Kiersh, 
Aaron, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Background, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (updated July 
2009), http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/background.php?cycle=2012&ind=F; Interest Groups, 
CENTER PUB. INTEGRITY (as of Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/index.php 
(showing that the financial sector made $658 million of campaign contributions during the 2012 election 
cycle, an amount that was more than $100 million larger than the contributions of any other industry 
sector). 
 373. Lobbying: Ranked Sectors, CENTER PUB. INTEGRITY, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=c (last visited on Jan. 15, 2013) (showing that the 
top three industry sectors for lobbying expenditures between 1998 and 2012 were “Miscellaneous 
Business,” with $5.42 billion, “Health,” with $5.35 billion, and “Finance/Insurance/Real Estate,” with 
$5.34 billion). 
 374. Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 370, at 18, 32 (tbl.1a). 
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administration officials, members of Congress and congressional 
staffers.375 
The financial industry achieved true political dominance when major 
banks, securities firms and insurance companies put aside many years of 
conflict and joined forces to support GLBA’s passage in 1999.  
Previously, divergent interests among the three groups had stymied 
repeated efforts to remove statutory walls that separated banks from 
securities firms and insurers.376  As previously noted, GLBA endorsed a 
“universal banking” model that encouraged banks, securities firms and 
insurers to affiliate by forming financial holding companies.377  After 
GLBA’s enactment, the common interests of the largest financial 
institutions coalesced to produce a “new financial oligarchy” that “used 
its political power to protect its [business interests] from interference 
and to clear away any remaining obstacles to its growth.”378 
The financial sector received excellent returns from the huge political 
investments it made during the period leading up to the financial crisis.  
As described above in Part III(F), the financial industry achieved a 
series of landmark legislative victories and also defeated numerous bills 
that tried to impose tighter constraints on subprime and Alt-A mortgage 
lending.  A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff study 
concluded that lobbying by the financial industry between 1999 and 
2006 significantly increased the likelihood of passage for bills favored 
by the industry, and also enhanced the probability of defeat for bills 
opposed by the industry.379   
Unfortunately, the business judgment of leading financial firms did 
not match their political acumen during the credit boom that led to the 
financial crisis.  According to a second IMF staff study, financial 
institutions that were the most active lobbyists also pursued more risky 
business strategies (including higher-risk mortgage lending and 
securitization) and suffered above-average losses in their stock market 
values during the financial crisis.380 By early 2010, eighteen global 
 
 375. SOLD OUT, supra note 371, at 100–01 (reporting that the financial sector employed 2,996 
lobbyists in 2007, and lobbyists employed by 20 leading financial firms between 1998 and 2008 
included 142 individuals who were formerly senior executive branch officials, members of Congress 
and congressional staffers). 
 376. Sandra Suarez & Robin Kolodny, Paving the Road to ‘Too Big to Fail’: Business Interests 
and the Politics of Financial Deregulation in the U.S., pt. II (June 15, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1625289; Charles C.Y. Yang & Yi David Wang, Explaining the Glass–Steagall 
Act’s Long Life and Rapid Eventual Demise 24–36 (Dec. 8, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722373. 
 377. See supra note 355–56 and accompanying text. 
 378. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 89, 133–34. 
 379. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Three’s Company: Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street 4, 
15–18 (IMF Working Paper, June 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915164. 
 380. Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 370, at 4–6, 19–20, 22, 24–27; see also Wilmarth, supra 
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financial conglomerates had collectively suffered about $900 billion of 
losses from defaulted loans and depreciated securities.381  
Large financial institutions responded to the crisis by appealing for 
and obtaining government bailouts.382  Political influence played a key 
role in determining which firms received bailouts and how much help 
they secured.  Ryan Duchin and Denis Sosyura found that U.S. banks 
were significantly more likely to receive TARP capital assistance if they 
established political connections with government officials, including 
connections based on political contributions and lobbying.383  In 
addition, the preferential treatment given to politically connected banks 
could not be explained by merit-based factors.  The financial 
performance of politically connected banks and unconnected banks was 
about the same before the TARP program was announced in October 
2008.  Moreover, politically connected banks performed significantly 
worse than unconnected banks after receiving TARP assistance.384   
The weaker post-TARP performance of politically influential banks 
indicated that “political connections . . . benefit[ed] connected firms and 
politicians at public expense.”385  Similarly, a study by Benjamin Blau 
and others found that politically influential banks received significantly 
larger amounts of TARP assistance, compared with banks that were not 
actively involved in politics.  Blau and his co-authors determined that 
financial institutions which lobbied actively and hired lobbyists who 
were former federal government employees “received between $3.73 
billion and $6.18 billion more in TARP support than firms that did not 
have both types of political ties.”386  For every dollar that financial 
 
note 12, at 963–75 (explaining that large financial institutions played key roles in inflating the 
unsustainable credit boom that precipitated the global financial crisis). 
 381. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 958–59, 977–78. 
 382. See id. at 957–59, 977–81 (discussing government bailout programs in the U.S., United 
Kingdom and Europe). 
 383. Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, The Politics of Government Investment 3–4, 16–20 (Ross 
School of Business, Working Paper No. 1127, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1426219.  
The study treated a bank as “politically connected” if, during 2008 and 2009, the bank had any of the 
following types of political ties: (i) one or more of the bank’s directors held a current or former position 
with the Treasury, a banking agency or Congress, (ii) the bank maintained its headquarters in the 
congressional district of a member of the House Financial Services Committee, (iii) the bank made 
political contributions to one or more members of the House Financial Services Committee, or (iv) the 
bank lobbied the Treasury, banking regulators or Congress on financial issues.  Id. at 3, 11–14.  The 
study determined that each of those sources of political influence played a statistically significant role in 
increasing the bank’s likelihood of receiving TARP Capital assistance.  Id. at 4, 17–20. 
 384. Id. at 5, 25–28 (finding, based on accounting-based and stock-based measures, that 
politically connected banks performed significantly worse than unconnected banks after receiving 
TARP capital infusions). 
 385. Id. at 28. 
 386. Benjamin M. Blau, Tyler J. Brough, & Diana W. Thomas, Corporate Lobbying, Political 
Connections, and the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program 4 (Sept. 30, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878653. 
1366 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
companies spent on lobbying during the five years prior to TARP, the 
same firms received about $500 of TARP support.387  
Due to widespread public anger over Wall Street’s role in causing the 
financial crisis and the federal government’s bailouts of large financial 
firms, the financial industry could not prevent passage of the Dodd–
Frank Act.388  However, the financial sector used its political clout to 
weaken Dodd–Frank’s reforms.  In 2009 and 2010, the financial 
industry retained more than 1,400 lobbyists who were former federal 
employees, including 73 former members of Congress and two former 
Comptrollers of the Currency.389  During the same period, the six largest 
U.S. banks employed more than 240 lobbyists who were former 
members of Congress, congressional staffers or senior executive branch 
officials.390 
During consideration of the Dodd–Frank Act by the Senate and 
subsequently by the House-Senate conference committee, the financial 
industry achieved several notable victories that significantly reduced 
Dodd–Frank’s potential impact on the largest financial institutions.  For 
example, the industry and its congressional allies (i) defeated an 
amendment offered by Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Ted 
Kaufman (D-DE), which would have placed maximum size limits on 
financial institutions and thereby forced a breakup of the six largest U.S. 
banks;391 (ii) blocked proposals that would have required large financial 
institutions to prefund the Orderly Liquidation Fund so that future 
resolutions of failing financial giants would be paid for in the first 
instance by Wall Street rather than by taxpayers;392 and (iii) inserted 
numerous loopholes in the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment 
that substantially undermined the effectiveness of both provisions.393 
According to a recent study by Yu Gao and others, investors in the 
 
 387. Id. at 4, 22. 
 388. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 962, 1026–27. 
 389. Banking on Connections: Financial Services Sector Has Dispatched Nearly 1,500 
“Revolving Door” Lobbyists Since 2009 3 (Center for Responsive Politics & Public Citizen, June 3, 
2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FinancialRevolvingDoors.pdf (reporting that 
financial industry lobbyists included former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL), former Senate 
Majority Leaders Bob Dole (R-KN) and Trent Lott (R-MS), and former House Majority Leaders Dick 
Armey (R-TX) and Dick Gephardt (D-MO)). 
 390. Kevin Connor, Big Bank Takeover: How Too-Big-To-Fail’s Army of Lobbyists Has Captured 
Washington, INSTITUTE FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (May 11, 2010), 
http://www.ourfuture.org/report/2010051911/big-bank-takeover. 
 391. CONNAUGHTON, supra note 371, at 227–31, 238–44; Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1055. 
 392. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1015–19; Taibbi, supra note 7. 
 393. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1028–35; Christine Harper, Out of Lehman’s Ashes Wall Street 
Get Most of What It Wants, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
12-28/out-of-lehman-s-ashes-wall-street-gets-what-it-wants-as-government-obliges.html; Taibbi, supra 
note 7. 
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stock and bond markets assessed the financial industry’s legislative 
victories as having significantly diminished the possibility that the top 
six banks might lose their TBTF status —including their presumed 
access to future government bailouts—after Dodd–Frank’s passage.394  
Moreover, after the credit rating agencies evaluated Dodd–Frank’s 
impact on the probability that banks would continue to receive 
“systemic support” from the federal government, the ratings agencies 
were more likely to maintain their bond ratings for the six largest banks 
and to reduce their ratings for smaller banks.  Thus, post-Dodd–Frank 
bond ratings indicated that “[credit] rating agencies still assume some 
level of systemic support from the US government for the [top six 
banks]” despite Dodd–Frank’s enactment.395  Similarly, a July 2011 
report by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) concluded that “under certain 
circumstances and with selected systemically important financial 
institutions, future extraordinary government support is still possible.”396 
In addition to its success in diluting the strength of Dodd–Frank’s 
reforms, the financial industry (as shown above) has used its formidable 
lobbying and litigating resources to undermine the implementation of 
those reforms.397  Since Dodd–Frank’s passage, the vast majority of 
meetings held by Treasury officials and other federal financial 
regulators to discuss Dodd–Frank’s implementation have been meetings 
with the financial industry’s agents.  For example, industry 
representatives held 351 meetings to lobby regulators on implementation 
of the Volcker Rule between Dodd–Frank’s enactment in July 2010 and 
the federal agencies’ issuance of proposed regulations in October 2011, 
compared with only 31 similar meetings attended by advocates of 
financial reform.398  Similarly, during the two years after Dodd–Frank’s 
enactment, the twenty largest U.S. banks and their trade associations 
held 1,298 meetings with regulators to discuss all aspects of Dodd–
Frank’s implementation, compared with only 242 similar meetings 
attended by “groups favoring tighter regulations of the financial 
markets.”399  Seven megabanks—Goldman, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, 
BofA, Citigroup, Barclays and Wells Fargo—accounted for more than 
 
 394. Yu Gao, Scott Liao, & Xue Wang, The Economic Impact of the Dodd–Frank Act on 
Systemically Important Financial Firms: Evidence from Market Reactions 3–6, 22–27, 31 (May 21, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919630. 
 395. Id. at 6, 29–30. 
 396. Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 12 (quoting S&P report). 
 397. See supra Parts (II)(A)–(B). 
 398. Krawiec, supra note 12, at 29–32, 50 (tbl.8). 
 399. Lee Drutman, Big Banks Dominate Dodd–Frank Meetings with Regulators, 
SUNLIGHTFOUNDATION.COM (July 19, 2012), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/07/19/dodd-
frank-two-years-later/ (describing results of study by Sunlight Foundation). 
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900 of those meetings with regulators.400 
The enactment of Dodd–Frank showed, and the 2012 elections 
confirmed, that Wall Street is not omnipotent.  President Obama won 
reelection in 2012 despite the financial industry’s overwhelming support 
for his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney.401  The financial sector 
also invested heavily in two key Senatorial elections but failed to defeat 
Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), who actively 
campaigned as opponents of Wall Street.402   
Even so, the 2012 elections hardly dethroned the financial industry as 
a political heavyweight.  President Obama promptly reached out to Wall 
Street executives and other business leaders after the election, and he 
eagerly invited their support for his economic policy (including his 
budget and tax proposals).403  Undeterred by the election results, 
financial industry representatives declared that they would continue to 
push for legislation to weaken Dodd–Frank’s reforms, and would also 
lobby regulators and file lawsuits to undermine Dodd–Frank’s 
implementation.404  By June 2013, House Republicans (with support 
from some Democrats) had advanced several bills that would punch 
significant holes in Dodd–Frank’s regulatory regime for derivatives, 
freeze the CFTC’s budget and require the SEC to perform a more 
 
 400. Id. 
 401. Susanne Craig & Nicholas Confessore, On Wall Street, Time to Mend Fences With Obama, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at B1; Sarah N. Lynch, Emily Stephenson, & Rick Rothacker, Wall Street 
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-campaign-financialregulation-
idUSBRE8A60R620121107; David Weidner, Wall Street Took a Beating at the Polls, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324073504578105433706996720.ht 
ml; see also supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text (explaining that the financial sector gave two-
thirds of its political contributions to Mr. Romney and other Republican candidates in 2012). 
 402. Robert Scheer, Op-Ed., Will Obama Stand up to Banking Industry and Wall Street in Second 
Term?, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (CA) (Nov. 11, 2012) (available on Lexis); Katharine Q. Seelye, A 
New Senator, Known Nationally and Sometimes Feared, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at A33; Deidre 
Shesgreen, GOP Spent $40 Million in Unsuccessful Attempt to Unseat Brown in Ohio, GANNETT NEWS 
SERVICE (Nov. 8, 2012) (available on Lexis). 
 403. Dawn Kopecki & Margaret Talev, Obama Meets With Blankfein, Dimon and Moynihan 
Today, BLOOMBERG (April 11, 2013) (reporting that President Obama would meet “with 15 heads of the 
world’s largest banks,” including the CEOs of Goldman, JPMorgan, BofA, Citigroup and Wells Fargo, 
and that Obama was “seeking to rebuild relationships with big business leaders as he struggles to create 
more jobs”), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-11/obama-meets-with-blankfein-dimon-and-
moynihan-today.html; Zeke Miller, Obama Makes Peace With Business, BUZZFEED.COM (Dec. 8, 
2012), www.buzzfeed.com/zekejmiller/obama-makes-peace-with-business; Nelson D. Schwartz & 
Jonathan Weisman, Unlikely Backers in a Battle Over Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at B1; Andrew 
Tangel & Jim Puzzanghera, Wall St., Obama Healing Rift, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, at B1. 
 404. Cheyenne Hopkins, Technical Fixes Prompt Suspicion From Dodd–Frank Backers, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-10/technical-fixes-
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Shifts on Dodd–Frank, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2012, at C1. 
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stringent cost-benefit analysis before issuing new rules.405 
 The significant benefits that the financial industry has achieved 
through campaign contributions and lobbying are consistent with more 
broadly-based evidence indicating that business firms exploit political 
influence to secure important advantages.  For example, studies have 
shown that (i) from 1979 to 2004, publicly-traded U.S. firms that made 
political contributions to larger numbers of political candidates also 
produced significant “abnormal returns” for their shareholders;406 (ii) 
from 1999 to 2006, publicly-traded U.S. nonfinancial firms that spent 
larger amounts on lobbying also boosted their stock values 
significantly;407 and (iii) from 1997 through 2002, publicly-traded 
financial and nonfinancial companies in 35 countries significantly 
increased their chances of securing government bailouts (including 
bailouts supported by the IMF and World Bank) if the companies 
maintained significant connections with leading politicians.408 
 
 405. Richard Hill & Stephen Joyce, Derivatives: House Easily Passes Bill Requiring SEC, CFTC 
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Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to 
perform more demanding cost-benefit studies before issuing any new regulations), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/17/us-congress-sec-costbill-idUSBRE94G0OD20130517; 
Cheynne Hopkins & Silla Brush, Dodd–Frank Swaps Pushout Would Be Eased by Bipartisan Bills, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2013) (reporting that House and Senate members introduced bipartisan bills to 
weaken Dodd–Frank’s Lincoln Amendment (Section 716) by allowing banking organizations to 
continue to trade “[c]ommodity, equity and structured swaps tied to some asset-backed securities” 
within their banks instead of forcing them to conduct such trades within separately capitalized affiliates 
that would not have access to the federal safety net); see supra notes 72, 80-86 and accompanying text 
(discussing the CFTC’s proposed guidance for cross-border swaps trading and the Lincoln Amendment, 
which would be vitiated by the foregoing bills). 
 406. Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen, & Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, Corporate Political 
Contributions and Stock Returns, 65 J. FIN. 687, 688–90, 718–19 (2010) (noting that firms which make 
larger political contributions also tend to engage heavily in lobbying). 
 407. Matthew D. Hill et al., Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying 3–4, 13, 22–28 (Jan. 
23, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420224. 
 408. Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis, & John J. McConnell, Political Connections and 
Corporate Bailouts, 61 J. FIN. 2597, 2598–2602, 2627–29 (2006) (reporting on results of a study of 121 
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2. Does Wall Street’s Political Clout Help to Explain Why Federal 
Officials Have Not Taken Strong Enforcement Actions Against Major 
Financial Institutions and Their Top Executives? 
An even darker side of corporate lobbying emerges when one 
considers evidence that fraudulent and insolvent firms have frequently 
used political influence to mask their unsound condition and to impede 
enforcement measures.  For example, between 1998 and 2005—a period 
that witnessed massive accounting frauds at Enron, WorldCom, 
Adelphia, Global Crossing and Tyco—publicly-traded U.S. companies 
that engaged in fraud spent significantly more on lobbying, compared to 
non-fraudulent firms.409  Moreover, in contrast to corrupt firms that did 
not lobby, fraudulent companies that actively lobbied succeeded in 
escaping detection for substantially longer periods of time, thereby 
enabling their insiders to sell large amounts of their stock.410  Fraudulent 
companies also used lobbying to reduce significantly the likelihood that 
regulators would discover their frauds.  Notably, however, lobbying did 
not reduce the effectiveness of scrutiny by other types of corporate 
monitors, such as analysts, company stakeholders or the media.411 
Similarly, during the 1980s Charles Keating (owner of the notorious 
Lincoln Savings) and owners of other fraudulent, insolvent thrifts made 
large political contributions that induced Speaker of the House Jim 
Wright (D-TX) and other members of Congress—including five 
Senators known as the “Keating Five”—to obstruct regulatory and 
enforcement efforts by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.412  Studies 
also found that, during the same period, federal regulators acted much 
more slowly in closing insolvent banks and thrifts if they were located in 
congressional districts whose representatives served on congressional 
committees with direct oversight over financial regulatory policies.413 
 
such a politician). 
 409. Frank Yu & Xiaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection 3, 10–13, 30 (June 9, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=954368 (finding that “fraudulent firms spend 77% more on 
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THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS UNDOING 127–94, 200–01, 208–11 (2004) (describing scandals at Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia and Tyco); FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT 
AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS  297–373, 391–94 (2003) (same); Wilmarth, supra 
note 268, at 6–10, 25–30 (discussing collapses of Enron and WorldCom). 
 410. Yu & Yu, supra note 409, at 2–3, 14–18, 16–28. 
 411. Id. at 2, 15–21, 50 (tbl.5, panel A). 
 412. WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 62–166, 184–92, 199–237 (2005); MARTIN 
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188–242 (1990). 
 413. Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 307, n.379 (citing Randall W. Bennett & Christine Loucks, 
Politics and the Length of Time to Bank Failure: 1986–90, Contemp. Econ. Pol’y, Oct. 1996, at 29, 37–
38; Lin Guo, When and Why Did FSLIC Resolve Insolvent Thrifts?, 23 J Banking & Fin., 972–73, 980–
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As noted above, an IMF staff study determined that financial 
institutions which were most active in lobbying prior to the recent 
financial crisis also pursued more risky mortgage lending and 
securitization strategies and suffered greater losses during the crisis.414  
That study raises significant questions about the impact of recent 
financial industry lobbying on financial regulatory and enforcement 
policies.  Indeed, many commentators have asked why federal officials 
have failed to take vigorous enforcement actions against large financial 
institutions that were at the center of the financial crisis and their top 
executives.415 
As the following discussion shows, the federal government’s 
enforcement efforts related to the financial crisis were pathetically weak 
when compared to the enormous damage inflicted by major financial 
institutions and their senior officers.  To date federal officials have not 
secured any criminal convictions against major financial institutions or 
their top executives.  In addition, federal agencies have entered into only 
 
83, 986–87). 
 414. Igan & Mishra, supra note 370, at 4, 15–18. 
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Wrong?, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 3, 2012) (“[T]he only senior executive at a truly major bank named as a 
defendant by the SEC in a case growing out of the 2008 crisis appears to be Angelo Mozilo, the former 
chief executive officer of Countrywide Financial Corp., who settled” civil charges without admitting or 
denying liability); Danielle Douglas, RBS will pay $612 million to settle Libor case, WASH. POST, Feb. 
7, 2013, at A11 (reporting that “no senior bank executives have faced jail time”); Jonathan Weil, Eric 
Holder Owes America Some Answers, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-15/banker-math-meets-the-justice-department-s-cooks.html 
(“[T]here have been no criminal convictions of any top executives at the center of the 2008 financial 
crisis.”); William D. Cohan, How to Crash an Economy and Escape the Scene, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 
21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-22/how-to-crash-an-economy-and-escape-the-
scene.html (“No one—no one—on Wall Street has paid a serious price . . . Every bank has received its 
slap on the wrist, [amounting to] the cost of doing business, don’t you know—and has moved on.”); Ben 
Hallman, Federal Investigators Punt on Goldman Sachs Prosecutions, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Aug. 
10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/investigation-goldman-
sachs_n_1765368.html?view=print&comm_ref=false (quoting former TARP Special Inspector General 
Neal Barofsky, who described the Justice Department’s decision not to prosecute Goldman as “a stark 
reminder that no individual or institution has been held meaningfully accountable for their role in the 
financial crisis.”); Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis With Little Guilt, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 14, 2011, at A1 (“[S]everal years after the financial crisis, which was caused in large part 
by reckless lending and excessive risk-taking by major financial institutions, no senior executives have 
been charged or imprisoned.”); Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 (“Not a single 
executive who ran the companies that cooked up and cashed in on the phony financial boom—an 
industrywide scam that involved the mass sale of mismarked, fraudulent mortgage-backed securities—
has ever been convicted.”). 
1372 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
a small number of relatively weak civil settlements with large banks and 
a handful of their senior officers. 
a. The Lack of Criminal Enforcement Against Leading Financial 
Institutions and Their Senior Executives 
As of mid-2013—nearly six years after the financial crisis began—
not one major financial institution or any senior executive has been 
convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, a single criminal offense.416  In sharp 
contrast, federal officials brought more than 1,100 criminal prosecutions 
against financial executives arising out of bank and thrift failures during 
the 1980s and early 1990s, and more than 800 of those executives 
(including Charles Keating of Lincoln Savings and David Paul of 
CenTrust Bank) were convicted and jailed.417  Similarly, the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) successfully prosecuted and jailed senior executives of 
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Rite Aid and Tyco following corporate 
accounting scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s.418 
Criminal referrals by bank regulators to DOJ fell sharply soon after 
wave of bank and thrift failures ended in the early 1990s.  Bank 
regulators made over 1,800 criminal referrals in 1995 but made only 
about 70 referrals per year between 2006 and 2010.419  OTS failed to 
make a single criminal referral between 2000 and 2010, despite the 
collapse of several of the largest institutions it regulated, while OCC 
made only three referrals during the same period.420 
Beginning in 2004, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assistant 
director Chris Swecker issued public warnings about the growing 
“epidemic” of mortgage fraud that threatened to undermine the U.S. 
financial system.421  Swecker repeatedly asked for additional funding to 
combat mortgage fraud, but senior FBI officials denied Swecker’s 
requests and instead focused FBI’s available resources on fighting 
terrorism.422  As a result, FBI assigned only 240 agents to investigate 
mortgage fraud in 2007, compared with the 1,000 agents that 
 
 416. See authorities cited supra in note 415. 
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investigated crimes related to bank and thrift failures during the late 
1980s and early 1990s.423  Although the Fraud and Enforcement 
Recovery Act of 2009 authorized $165 million of additional funding to 
investigate frauds connected to the financial crisis, Congress 
subsequently appropriated only $30 million for that purpose.424 
In addition to the problems created by a lack of adequate resources 
for investigating complex financial frauds, FBI and DOJ chose to 
investigate and prosecute borrowers and mortgage brokers instead of 
pursuing large financial institutions that funded and securitized 
fraudulent mortgages.425  By late 2012, DOJ had prosecuted more than 
2,000 real estate agents, mortgage brokers and borrowers for criminal 
fraud but had not indicted a single top financial executive or any of the 
big financial institutions that financed the housing bubble.426 Analysts 
criticized federal prosecutors for focusing on “easy targets—low-level 
fraudsters—while going easy on Wall Street executives whose banks 
packaged billions of dollars worth of toxic mortgage securities.”427 
DOJ convicted executives of a midsized mortgage bank (Taylor Bean 
& Whitaker) for defrauding Colonial Bank, but that one successful 
prosecution occurred only after SIGTARP officials repeatedly urged 
federal prosecutors to take action.428  Federal prosecutors failed to 
convict two hedge fund managers of Bear Stearns on criminal fraud 
charges, and they showed little interest thereafter in bringing criminal 
charges against Wall Street bankers.429  DOJ ultimately decided not to 
bring criminal charges against any top officials connected with AIG, 
Bear, Countrywide, Lehman or other major financial institutions that 
played key roles in precipitating the financial crisis.430 
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 429. Id. at 210, 228–29; CONNAUGHTON, supra note 367, at 65–95; Hallman, supra note 415. 
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By mid-2013, only one FDIC-insured bank—Abacus Federal Savings 
Bank, a small New York City thrift that primarily served Chinese 
immigrants—had been indicted for mortgage fraud.431  As one journalist 
observed, “If the point [of indicting Abacus] was to send a message to 
Wall Street, it was a curious choice . . . .  Compared to the whales of 
global finance, [Abacus is] plankton, with roughly one-ten-thousandth 
the assets of JPMorgan Chase.”432 
DOJ’s decisions not to indict leading banks or their senior executives 
apparently reflected the Obama Administration’s reluctance to take any 
action that might threaten the stability of systemically important 
financial institutions or the financial markets.433  DOJ explicitly invoked 
those concerns in December 2012, when it declined to file criminal 
charges against two major foreign banks with substantial U.S. 
operations.  In early December, DOJ entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement that required U.K. megabank HSBC to pay $1.9 billion in 
penalties for massive money laundering violations.434  HSBC’s illegal 
money laundering activities continued for a decade and encompassed 
billions of dollars of prohibited transactions involving nations linked 
with terrorists (including Iran, Burma, Cuba, North Korea and Sudan) 
and Latin American drug cartels.435   
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In announcing HSBC’s deferred prosecution agreement, Assistant 
Attorney General Lanny Breuer (head of DOJ’s criminal division) 
declared that the “record of dysfunction that prevailed at HSBC for 
many years was simply astonishing,” and he confirmed that HSBC had 
been a “vital player” in facilitating large-scale money laundering 
involving drug cartels and terrorists.436  However, Mr. Breuer stated that 
DOJ decided not to indict HSBC because of concerns about “collateral” 
damage to the global financial system, and he emphasized that “[o]ur 
goal here is not to bring HSBC down.”437  Commentators warned that 
the HSBC settlement raised “questions about whether certain financial 
institutions, having grown so large and interconnected, are too big to 
indict.”438 
In the fall of 2012—just a few months before the HSBC settlement—
DOJ obtained guilty pleas on criminal money laundering charges against 
G&A Check Cashing, a small Los Angeles store, and two of its senior 
officers.  DOJ charged G&A and its officers with illegally laundering $8 
million—a tiny fraction of the billions of dollars allegedly laundered by 
HSBC.  Both G&A officers were sentenced to prison following their 
guilty pleas.439  The dramatically different treatment of HSBC and G&A 
and their respective senior officers can hardly be squared with any 
meaningful concept of “equal justice under the law.”440 
A week after DOJ settled with HSBC, Swiss megabank UBS agreed 
to pay $1.5 billion in penalties to U.S., U.K. and Swiss regulators to 
settle charges that dozens of its managers and traders manipulated the 
setting of Libor rates to generate fraudulent trading profits.441  The 
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 440. See Victoria Finkle, Are Some Banks ‘Too Big to Jail’?, AM. BANKER (Jan. 22, 2013), 2013 
WLNR 1675707 (quoting my statement that “[c]oncerns about the ‘stability’ of the financial system do 
not justify DOJ’s policy of leniency for TBTF banks and their executives, especially when DOJ 
routinely indicts smaller institutions and sends their managers to jail for similar offenses.”); Jonathan 
Weil, Why Didn’t Anyone Get Pinched at HSBC?, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-12-11/why-didn-t-anyone-get-pinched-at-hsbc-.html (“Too 
big to fail has turned equal justice under the law into a mockery.”). 
 441. Lindsay Fortado, Gavin Finch, & Liam Vaughan, UBS Is Fined $1.5 Billion for 
Manipulating Libor Rates, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 19, 2012), 
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charges against UBS “detailed a pattern of repeated, far-reaching and 
brazen lawbreaking over a six-year period,” amounting to “a ‘simply 
astonishing’ conspiracy to manipulate rates affecting trillions of dollars 
of home loans, derivatives and other financial contracts around the 
world.”442  UBS’s Libor settlement, like Barclays’s previous settlement 
and RBS’s subsequent settlement, indicated widespread collusion 
involving a dozen or more other global banks, including Deutsche, 
HSBC, BofA, Citigroup and JPMorgan.443  The systematic rigging of 
Libor likely imposed many billions of dollars of losses on parties 
holding contracts with interest rates linked to Libor.444  
UBS was in a particularly vulnerable position, because it had entered 
into two previous agreements with DOJ to settle criminal charges that 
the bank (i) enabled thousands of U.S. clients in to evade taxes and (ii) 
conspired to rig auctions for municipal investment contracts.445  
 
http://www,about.bloomberhlaw.com/legal-news/ubs-is-fined-1-5-billion-for-manipulating-libor-rates/.; 
see also UBS’s ‘Captain Caos’ Breaks New Ground in Libor Scandal, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 19, 
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-19/ubs-s-captain-caos-breaks-new-ground-in-libor-
scandal.html (“What sets UBS apart [from other banks involved in the Libor scandal] is not only the 
sheer extent of the behavior, but also the level of collusion with traders at other banks and the outright 
bribery of brokers who helped coordinate the manipulation.”); Alison Frankel, After Libor, Arguments 
Against Financial Regulation Are a Joke, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2012) (describing “the brazenness of the 
misconduct” at UBS, and noting that “[t]he corruption was breathtakingly widespread” as UBS bribed 
brokers at other institutions to cooperate in rigging Libor rates). 
 442. Jean Eaglesham & Evan Perez, Critics Say UBS Let Off Too Easy, WALL ST. J. ONLINE 
(Dec. 21, 2012), http://www/online.wsj.com/article/SB100014242127887324731304578191801981 
480008.html. 
 443. Ben Protess, Leniency Denied, UBS Unit Admits Guilt in Rate Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2012, at  A1; Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch, Secret Libor Transcripts Expose Trader Rate-
Manipulation, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-13/rigged-
libor-with-police-nearby-shows-flaw-of-light-touch.html; Carrick Mollenkamp, Jennifer Ablan & 
Matthew Goldstein, Special Report: How Gaming Libor Became Business as Usual, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-libor-fixing-origins-idUSBRE8AJ0MH20121120; 
see also Gallu et al., supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing Barclays’ s settlement of Libor 
manipulation  charges in June 2012).  In February 2013, RBS entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement with DOJ and paid $612 million to settle Libor-rigging charges by U.S. and U.K. authorities, 
while RBS’s Japanese subsidiary pleaded guilty to one count of felony wire fraud.  Mark Scott & Ben 
Protess, R.B.S. to pay $612 million in rate-fixing settlement; Japanese subsidiary pleads guilty to charge 
of felony wire fraud, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (Feb. 7, 2013), at 16 (reporting that the Libor investigation 
“centered on R.B.S. and a dozen other banks, including Citigroup and HSBC,” and noting that 
“government complaints against R.B.S. portray a permissive culture that allowed rate rigging to persist 
for about four years”) (available on Lexis).   
 444. Peter Eavis, Making It Easier to Estimate Libor Losses, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (Dec. 20, 2102), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/making-it-easier-to-estimate-libor-losses/ (citing government 
report estimating that Libor manipulation may have cost Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac than $3 billion); 
Darrell Preston, Rigged Libor Hits States-Localities With $6 Billion: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG.COM 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-09/rigged-libor-hits-states-localities-with-6-
billion-muni-credit.html. (citing estimate by analyst Peter Shapiro that Libor manipulation inflicted $6 
billion of losses on issuers of state and local municipal bonds). 
 445. Eaglesham & Perez, supra note 442; see also James B. Stewart, For UBS, A Record of 
Averting Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2012, at B1 (“UBS obtained a deferred prosecution 
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However, federal officials allowed UBS to avoid a criminal indictment 
once again by accepting yet another deferred prosecution arrangement 
(although DOJ did force UBS’s Japanese subsidiary to plead guilty to 
criminal wire fraud and also indicted two former UBS traders).446  
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer explained that DOJ “weighed 
the consequences to market confidence” in deciding not to prosecute 
UBS, a globally significant bank.447  Mr. Breuer also stated—in terms 
virtually identical to what he had said about HSBC—that “[o]ur goal 
here is not to destroy a major financial institution.”448  Senator Charles 
Grassley (R-IA) criticized the DOJ’s settlement, declaring that the 
“reluctance of U.S. prosecutors to file criminal charges over big-time 
bank fraud is frustrating and hard to understand.”449 
DOJ’s decisions to forgo indictments against HSBC and UBS provide 
compelling evidence that federal officials are unwilling to impose 
criminal sanctions against global SIFIs.  It is perhaps not a coincidence 
 
agreement in 2009 for conspiring to defraud the United States of tax revenue by creating more than 
17,000 secret Swiss accounts for United States taxpayers who failed to declare income and committed 
tax fraud . . . UBS agreed to pay $780 million in fines and penalties and disclose the identities of many 
of its United States clients.”); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, UBS AG Admits to Anticompetitive 
Conduct by Former Employees in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and Agrees to Pay $160 
Million to Federal and State Agencies (May 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-at-567.html (announcing that UBS entered into a non-
prosecution agreement and agreed to pay $160 million to settle charges that former UBS employees 
“entered into unlawful agreements to manipulate the bidding process and rig bids on municipal 
investment contracts”). 
 446. Eaglesham & Perez, supra note 442; Fortado et al., supra note 441. 
 447. Jonathan Weil, Let Justice Be Done, Though a Huge Bank Falls, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-20/let-justice-be-done-though-a-huge-bank-falls.html 
(paraphrasing Mr. Breuer’s remarks to reporters). 
 448. Id. (quoting Mr. Breuer).  In sharp contrast to its decision not to file criminal charges against 
UBS, DOJ imposed harsh criminal sanctions on a small Swiss private bank, Wegelin & Co., for 
engaging in tax evasion activities similar to UBS’s  misconduct.  Two weeks after announcing its 
settlement of Libor-rigging charges against UBS, DOJ forced Wegelin to plead guilty to criminal 
conspiracy with U.S. clients to evade U.S. taxes.  Wegelin’s tax evasion work for U.S. clients was 
comparable to the misconduct that resulted in UBS’s deferred prosecution agreement with DOJ on 
similar tax evasion charges in 2009.  In addition to Wegelin’s guilty plea, Wegelin paid fines and 
forfeitures totaling $74 million, equal to almost one-tenth of the $780 million penalty paid by UBS 
under its 2009 settlement.  Bob Van Voris & David Voreacos, Swiss Bank Wegelin & Co. Pleads Guilty 
in U.S. Tax Probe, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/swiss-
bank-wegelin-co-to-plead-guilty-in-u-s-tax-case.html.  Yet Wegelin, with $25 billion of assets, id., was 
only one-sixtieth the size of UBS, which had $1.5 billion of assets at the end of 2011.  Andrew 
Cunningham, Annual Survey: World’s Biggest Banks: The Big Get Bigger, GLOBAL FIN. MAG., Oct. 
2012, at 44.  Like the stunningly disparate penalties assessed against HSBC and G&A Check Cashing 
for money laundering (see supra notes 434-40 and accompanying text), the strikingly different sanctions 
imposed on UBS and Wegelin for tax evasion show that DOJ has followed a much more lenient 
enforcement policy for TBTF banks. 
 449. Eaglesham & Perez, supra note 442 (quoting Sen. Grassley); see also Barofsky, supra note 
433 (criticizing DOJ’s settlement with UBS, and noting that “a significant amount of the illegal [Libor-
rigging] activity took place at the parent company level” within UBS); Weil, supra note 447 (“The 
reality is UBS’s punishment was anything but strict.”). 
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that DOJ adopted new guidelines encouraging the use of deferred 
prosecution agreements, as a preferable alternative for dealing with 
serious misconduct at large corporations, during the summer of 2008, 
just as “the financial storm brewed . . . and [Wall Street] institutions 
feared for their survival.”450  A major Wall Street law firm advised its 
clients that DOJ’s 2008 guidelines represented “an important step away 
from the more aggressive prosecutorial practices seen in some cases 
under their predecessors.”451  Similarly, a former federal prosecutor 
recently remarked that large companies facing criminal charges “are 
happy to enter into these deferred prosecution agreements because it’s 
become so commonplace now . . . .  The stock markets don’t even seem 
to punish them.”452 
In defending the lack of criminal prosecutions against major banks 
and their top executives, federal prosecutors and SEC enforcement 
director Robert Khuzami asserted that such cases are difficult to prove 
and the SEC has only limited funding to pursue such cases.  The validity 
of those assertions is impossible to evaluate in the absence of even a 
single prosecution of a major financial institution or its senior managers 
for misconduct during the financial crisis.453  It is noteworthy, however, 
that federal prosecutors and SEC officials have sued more than 400 
people and have won 70 criminal convictions for insider trading in the 
past few years, while devoting extensive resources to those cases.454  A 
top SEC enforcement official recently described insider-trading 
investigations as “incredibly labor-intensive” efforts that require 
“doggedness, creative thinking, and meticulous analysis of the 
facts”455—a description that would apply equally well to complex 
financial fraud cases. 
The prosecutorial fervor that the SEC and DOJ have shown in 
pursuing insider-trading cases is nowhere to be found when it comes to 
financial misconduct by Wall Street firms, which involved the sale of 
 
 450. Morgenson & Story, supra note 418. 
 451. Id. (quoting memo to clients issued by Sullivan & Cromwell in Sept. 2008). 
 452. Douglas, supra note 415 ((quoting Michael Clark). 
 453. John J. Curran & Jesse Hamilton, Schapiro’s SEC Seen Ineffectual As Republicans Race to 
Scuttle Dodd–Frank, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2011); Finkle, supra note 440; Joshua Gallo & Robert 
Schmidt, Schapiro SEC Reign Nears End With Rescue Mission Not Done, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2012); 
Taibbi, supra note 415. 
 454. William D. Cohan, Is This Big Fish Worth Catching?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 3-
10, 2012, at 6; David Voreacos, Wall Street’s Insider Trading Tricks Spread Across U.S., BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 21, 2012) (reporting that more than 400 people were sued by the SEC or prosecuted by DOJ for 
insider trading between 2009 and 2012, and describing the extensive personnel and other assets devoted 
by the SEC, DOJ and FBI to those cases). 
 455. Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Dangling Man: On the Trail of SAC Capital’s Steven Cohen, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 14-20, 2013, at 46, 51 (quoting Sanjay Wadhwa, senior associate 
director for enforcement in the SEC’s New York regional office). 
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hundreds of billions of dollars of toxic mortgage-backed securities and 
CDOs with inadequate or misleading disclosures.456  After examining 
DOJ’s lack of criminal prosecutions against large financial institutions 
and their senior officers, journalist Matt Taibbi concluded that “the 
shocking pattern of nonenforcement with regard to Wall Street is so 
deeply engrained in Washington that it raises a profound and difficult 
question about the very nature of our society: whether we have created a 
class of people whose misdeeds are no longer perceived as 
crimes, . . . [a] nonjailable class.”457  Similarly, Senator Sherrod Brown 
(D-OH) declared in January 2013 that “Wall Street megabanks aren’t 
just too big to fail, they’re increasingly too big to jail.”458  Two months 
later, as discussed below, Attorney General Eric Holder essentially 
conceded during a Senate committee hearing  that DOJ viewed global 
SIFIs as too big to prosecute.459 
b. Ineffective Civil Enforcement Measures Against Large Banks and 
Their Senior Officers 
The federal government’s record of civil enforcement against major 
 
 456. Cohan, supra note 454; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 169-70.  Moreover, the SEC has 
shown much less appetite for pursuing insider trading cases in recent years when those cases involved 
major Wall Street firms or their executives.  For example, in 2005 the SEC fired Gary Aguirre, an 
agency enforcement lawyer, after he complained that his superiors refused to allow him to depose John 
Mack for possible involvement in alleged insider trading by Pequot Capital Management, a large hedge 
fund.  At that time, Mack was being considered for appointment as chairman of Morgan Stanley, and 
Morgan Stanley’s outside counsel, Mary Jo White, contacted SEC enforcement director Linda Thomsen 
to discuss the SEC’s investigation of Mack.  Two Senate committees reviewed that incident and strongly 
criticized the SEC, stating that “[b]y allowing the perception that ‘going over the head’ of S.E.C. staff 
attorneys yields results, the S.E.C. undermines public confidence in the integrity of its investigations and 
exacerbates the problems associated with ‘regulatory capture.’”  Gretchen Morgenson & Walt 
Bogdanich, S.E.C. Erred On Pequot, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2007, at C1 (quoting joint report 
issued by the Senate Finance and Judiciary Committees); Taibbi, supra note 415 (discussing the 
circumstances surrounding Aguirre’s firing by the SEC).  The SEC subsequently paid Aguirre $775,000 
to settle his claim for wrongful termination.  Phyllis Diamond, SEC, Whistleblower Aguirre Settle 
Lawsuit Over His Termination for $775K, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1283 (July 5, 2010).  In 
addition, the SEC failed to take action after receiving information from Ted Parmigiani, a Lehman 
analyst, indicating that Lehman’s research managers frequently gave advance tips to Lehman’s 
proprietary trading desk and Lehman’s hedge fund customers about upcoming changes in stock ratings 
by Lehman’s analysts.  After reviewing Mr. Parmigiani’s evidence, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) 
declared that the SEC’s failure to take action against Lehman or its managers raised “serious questions 
about the S.E.C.’s culture of deference to Wall Street and big players going back a long time.”  Gretchen 
Morgenson, Is Insider Trading Part of the Fabric?, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, § BU, at 1 (quoting Sen. 
Grassley). 
 457. Taibbi, supra note 415. 
 458. Jeff Bater, Enforcement: Senators Question Justice Department’s Handling of Wrongdoing 
by Big Banks, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 244 (Feb. 5, 2013); see also Barofsky, supra note 433 
(contending that DOJ has adopted a “two-tiered system of justice” that treats major global banks as “still 
too big to fail—and . . . still to big to jail”). 
 459. See infra notes 716-20 and accompanying text (reviewing Mr. Holder’s testimony). 
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institutions and their top executives has been only marginally better than 
the complete lack of criminal enforcement.  The SEC has entered into 
several settlements with major banks in which the banks paid relatively 
modest penalties and neither admitted nor denied liability for the 
violations alleged by the SEC.  As indicated above, Goldman, JPMorgan 
and Citigroup collectively agreed to pay about $1 billion to settle civil 
fraud charges arising out of their marketing of three CDOs to 
investors.460  However, the SEC did not attempt to hold Goldman and 
Citigroup accountable for marketing additional CDOs under similar 
circumstances nor did the SEC sue Deutsche, a major promoter of CDOs 
during the credit boom.461 
The SEC entered into two similar consent judgments based on alleged 
securities disclosure violations by BofA and Citigroup.  The SEC 
alleged that BofA’s proxy statement soliciting shareholder approval for 
BofA’s acquisition of Merrill in December 2008 did not disclose that (i) 
BofA had agreed “to let Merrill pay its executives and certain other 
employees $5.8 billion in bonuses at a time when Merrill was suffering 
huge losses;” and (ii) “Merrill was suffering historically great losses 
during the fourth quarter of 2008 (ultimately amounting to a net loss of 
$15.3 billion, the largest quarterly loss in the firm’s history) 
and . . . Merrill had nonetheless accelerated the payment to certain 
executives and other employees of more than $3.6 billion in bonuses.”462 
BofA agreed to pay $150 million to settle the SEC’s charges after 
District Judge Jed Rakoff refused to approve the $33 million fine  
originally proposed by the SEC.463 Judge Rakoff described the revised 
$150 million fine as “paltry,” and he also observed that the fine 
“penalizes the shareholders for what was, in effect if not in intent, a 
 
 460. See supra notes 279–80 and accompanying text. 
 461. Ben Hallman, Federal Investigators Punt on Goldman Sachs Prosecutions, 
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/investigation-
goldman-sachs_n_1765368.html; see also Yves Smith, Why Robert Khuzami Would Be a Terrible 
Choice to Head the SEC (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/11/why-robert-
khuzami-would-be-a-terrible-choice-to-head-the-sec/ (noting that SEC General Counsel Robert 
Khuzami was General Counsel for the Americas for Deutsche from 2004 to 2009, when Deutsche was 
actively engaged in packaging and marketing CDOs, and asserting that “Khuzami simply can’t afford to 
dig too deeply in this toxic terrain; questions would be correctly raised as to why Deutsche was not 
being scrutinized similarly.”); FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 129–33, 137–46, 192–99, 235–38, 256 
(discussing major roles of Goldman and Citigroup in creating and marketing CDOs); U.S. Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and The Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a 
Financial Collapse: Majority and Minority Staff Report 7–11, 318–625 (April 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2011/PSI_WallStreetCrisis_041311.pdf 
[hereinafter Senate Wall Street Crisis Report] (describing leading roles of Goldman and Deutsche in 
creating and marketing CDOs). 
 462. SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) 
(summarizing the SEC’s charges against BofA). 
 463. Id. at 4. 
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fraud by management on the shareholders.”464  Judge Rakoff further 
criticized the consent judgment because it did not impose any sanctions 
on “the specific individuals responsible for [BofA’s] nondisclosures,” 
but he reluctantly approved the settlement while calling it “half-baked 
justice at best.”465 
Similarly, the SEC alleged that Citigroup misled investors on several 
occasions between July and November 2007 by stating that its exposure 
to subprime mortgage-related securities was $13 billion or less when in 
fact its exposure exceeded $50 billion.  Citigroup agreed to pay $75 
million to settle the SEC’s charges.466  The SEC also charged former 
Citigroup chief financial officer (CFO) Gary Crittenden and former 
Citigroup head of investor relations Arthur Tildesley with participating 
in Citigroup’s disclosure violations.  Like Citigroup, Crittenden and 
Tildesley entered into consent judgments (without admitting or denying 
liability), and Crittenden paid $100,000 while Tildesley paid $80,000.467   
As Judge Rakoff had done with regard to the BofA settlement, 
journalist Andrew Ross Sorkin criticized the Citigroup consent 
judgment for requiring Citigroup’s shareholders to bear the cost of a 
corporate penalty even though they “were arguably defrauded by 
[Citigroup’s] failure to disclose its exposure to subprime mortgages in 
the first place.”468  Mr. Sorkin also pointed out that the $100,000 fine 
paid by Mr. Crittenden paled in comparison with the $32 million of 
compensation he received “during 2007 and 2008, even as [Citigroup] 
was foundering.”469  Mr. Sorkin questioned the fairness of “a system that 
is supposed to hold the financial industry accountable and instead seems 
 
 464. Id. at 4, 5.  In contrast to the SEC’s decision not to sue any of BofA’s senior officers, Judge 
Rakoff noted that New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed civil charges under New York law 
against BofA’s former chief executive officer, Kenneth Lewis, and its former chief financial officer, 
Joseph Price, “accusing them of masterminding a massive fraud and manipulation.”  Id. at 2.  In 
September 2012, BofA paid $2.43 billion to settle a shareholder suit based on the same alleged proxy 
disclosure violations, while New York’s charges against Lewis and Price remained outstanding.  Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, Bank of America Settles Suit Over Merrill for $2.43 Billion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, at A1. 
 465. Bank of America Corp., 2010 WL 624581 at 5; see also id. at 6 (stating that the Court would 
have rejected the settlement as “inadequate and misguided” if it had reviewed the agreement “solely on 
the merits,” but the Court felt obliged to accept the settlement based on considerations of “substantial 
deference” and “judicial restraint”). 
 466. SEC Litigation Release No. 21605, July 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21605.htm. 
 467. SEC Administrative Release No. 34-62593, July 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-62593.pdf. 
 468. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Punishing Citi, or Its Shareholders?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at B1. 
 469. Id.  In August 2012, Citigroup paid $590 million to settle a shareholder suit based on the 
same alleged disclosure violations.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Citigroup in $590 Million Settlement of 
Subprime Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012, at B4. 
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to leave shareholders with the bill.”470  In John Coffee’s view, the SEC’s 
enforcement actions against major banks indicated that the agency was 
following a deliberate policy of seeking “quick, publicity-generating 
settlements” from banks while forgoing “individual actions against 
executives who would be unlikely to settle.”471 
In 2011 and 2012, federal and state officials filed civil cases against 
major banks alleging that the banks committed fraud while selling 
mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities to Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac and federal agencies.  Those cases have produced additional 
settlements requiring payments by banks, but they have not resulted in 
the assessment of penalties against any senior executives of those 
banks.472  It is doubtful whether sanctions imposed on banks are 
effective in deterring future misconduct by their senior executives, 
because executives are likely to conclude that they can keep most of 
their personal gains from financial fraud even if their companies are 
ultimately forced to pay fines.473 
Federal agencies did file civil lawsuits against top executives of 
Countrywide and WaMu, two of the largest and most aggressive 
nonprime lenders during the housing boom.474  However, both cases 
demonstrate that federal regulators have not acted forcefully in pursuing 
charges of serious misconduct against senior managers of major banks.   
In 2009 the SEC filed a civil suit for securities fraud against former 
Countrywide chairman Angelo Mozilo, former Countrywide president 
 
 470. Id. 
 471. Coffee, supra note 415 (explaining that the SEC “knows that suits against senior executives 
will often drag on [and] consume considerable resources” while “major financial institutions almost 
always settle with the SEC at an early point . . . to avoid reputational damage”); see also Donald C. 
Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate 
Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 627, 654 (2007) (“It is easier to get a board of directors to accept a penalty against the company 
than it is to get individuals to agree to painful personal sanctions . . .  [C]ompany sanctions are the path 
of least resistance; the SEC can claim its victory” by settling with the company and forgoing individual 
claims against executives). 
 472. Rick Rothacker & Tanya Agrawal, BofA Reaches $11.6 Billion Settlement with Fannie Mae, 
REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2013/01/07/bofa-reaches-116-billion-
settlement-with-fannie-mae/; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Mortgage Crisis Presents a New Reckoning to 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012, at A1; David McLaughlin, JPMorgan Rivals Face Billions in 
Damages After MBS Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-
02/jpmorgan-rivals-face-billions-in-damages-after-mbs-case.html; see also Ben Protess, U.S. Accuses 
Bank of America of a ‘Brazen’ Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2012, at A1 (reporting that “[f]ew 
cases have taken aim at top executives” and “in the latest [civil] case [filed by federal prosecutors] 
against Bank of America, no company officials were sued as part of the complaint.”). 
 473. See Langevoort, supra note 471, at 632, 635–36, 660–61 (questioning the effectiveness of 
corporate penalties in deterring wrongdoing by senior officers). 
 474. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 178–79, 200–02 (describing the reckless lending 
strategies pursued by WaMu and Countrywide). 
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David Sambol, and former Countrywide CFO Eric Sieracki.475  Mozilo 
caused Countrywide to become the largest U.S. mortgage lender in 2005 
and 2006 by aggressively expanding the firm’s menu of mortgage 
products to include high-risk subprime and “Pay-Option ARM” 
mortgage loans.476  During the same period, Mozilo and Sieracki signed 
Countrywide’s annual reports to shareholders, which stated that 
Countrywide’s mortgage lending policies “ensure our ongoing access to 
the secondary mortgage market by consistently producing quality 
mortgages.”477  Moreover, at an investor conference in May 2006 
Mozilo declared that “Countrywide views the [Pay-Option ARM] 
product as a sound investment for our Bank and a sound financial 
management tool for customers.”478   
While giving these public assurances, Mozilo acknowledged in 
internal email messages to Countrywide managers that Countrywide’s 
subprime loans were “dangerous” and “toxic” and that Countrywide was 
“flying blind” with respect to the risks posed by its Pay-Option 
ARMs.479  In 2006 and early 2007, Mozilo exercised stock options and 
executed trading plans to sell almost 7 million shares of Countrywide 
stock, from which he realized trading profits of $140 million.480   
After Countrywide suffered crippling losses due to its large exposure 
 
 475. SEC v. Mozilo, 2009 WL 3807124 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 3, 2009), at 1–2 [hereinafter Mozilo I] 
(summarizing the SEC’s claims against Mozilo, Sambol, and Sieracki). 
 476. Id. at 2–3.  For example, Countrywide offered an “80/20” piggyback subprime mortgage 
program that enabled borrowers to finance 100% of the purchase price for their homes by taking out 
simultaneous first and second lien subprime loans (which typically covered 80% and 20% of the 
purchase price, respectively).  Countrywide’s “Pay-Option ARM” loans allowed borrowers to make 
very low minimum payments on their mortgages, which resulted in negative amortization until the 
principal balance (including unpaid interest) reached 115% of the original principal amount, at which 
point the borrowers would be required to make much larger payments for the remainder of the loan 
term.  Countrywide also originated many subprime or Pay-Option ARM loans with little or no 
documentation of the borrowers’ income or net worth.  Id. at 2–6. 
 477. SEC v. Mozilo, 2010 WL 3656068 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 2010), at 10 [hereinafter Mozilo II] 
(quoting from Countrywide’s 2005 Form 10-K annual report and stating that “[a] nearly identical 
representation appears in Countrywide’s 2006 Form 10-K”). 
 478. Id. at 12 (quoting Mozilo’s remark during an investor conference on May 31, 2006). 
 479. In a Mar. 2006 internal email, Mozilo acknowledged that Countrywide’s 80/20 subprime 
mortgage was “the most dangerous product in existence and there can be nothing more toxic,” and in an 
April 2006 internal e-mail he stated, “I consider that product line to be the poison of [our business].”  Id. 
at 17 (quoting emails sent by Mozilo on Mar. 27 and April 13, 2006).  In a September 2006 internal 
email, Mozilo admitted  that “[w]e have no way, with any reasonable certainty, to assess the real risk of 
holding [Pay-Option] loans on our balance sheet . . .  [W]e are flying blind on how these loans will 
perform in a stressed environment of higher unemployment, reduced values and slowing home sales.”  
Id. at 13 (quoting Sept. 26, 2006 email). 
 480. Id. at 20.  The SEC alleged that Mozilo violated SEC Rule 10b-5 by engaging in insider 
trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information. Id. Countrywide president Sambol 
exercised Countrywide stock options and sold the underlying shares for total profits of $40 million from 
2005 through 2007. Mozilo I, supra note 475, at 1.  However, the SEC did not sue Sambol for unlawful 
insider trading. 
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to high-risk loans, Mozilo arranged an emergency sale of Countrywide 
to BofA in early 2008.481  The Countrywide deal later inflicted huge 
losses on BofA and was a significant factor (along with BofA’s 
subsequent acquisition of Merrill Lynch) in compelling BofA to seek a 
costly federal bailout during the peak of the financial crisis.482 
The SEC sought civil penalties and disgorgement from Mozilo, 
Sambol and Sieracki.  A federal district court denied motions to dismiss 
and motions for summary judgment by the defendants.483  Despite its 
success on those motions, the SEC entered into a settlement with Mozilo 
in which he did not admit or deny liability but agreed to pay $67.5 
million in penalties and disgorgement and to be permanently barred 
from serving as a public company officer or director.484  Mozilo 
personally paid only $22.5 million of that settlement, while 
Countrywide’s insurance carriers and BofA paid the remaining $45 
million.  As a result, Mozilo was allowed to keep about $500 million of 
the compensation he received from Countrywide between 2000 and 
2008.485  Sambol and Sieracki also settled the SEC’s charges while 
making combined out-of-pocket payments of only $650,000.486 
The FDIC’s civil action against WaMu chairman Kerry Killinger 
 
 481. Gretchen Morgenson, How Countrywide Covered the Cracks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2010, 
§ BU, at 1; Valerie Bauerlein & James R. Hagerty, Behind Bank of America’s Big Gamble, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 12, 2008, at A1. 
 482. Paul M. Barrett & Dawn Kopecki, Can Brian Moynihan Save Bank of America?, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 12–18, 2011, at 60, 62–64; Steve Mufson, A Fateful Step for a 
Banking Giant, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at G1; see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, 
Bank of America Settles Suit Over Merrill for $2.43 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at A1 
(reporting that BofA’s $2.43 billion settlement of a shareholder suit “underscores how two deals in 
2008—the Merrill acquisition and the purchase of [Countrywide] earlier that year—have weighed on the 
bank,” with the Countrywide deal costing BofA “more than $40 billion in losses on real estate, legal 
costs and settlements”). 
 483. Mozilo I, supra note 475; Mozilo II, supra note 477.  The district court did grant Mozilo’s 
and Sieracki’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the SEC’s claim that they violated 
SEC Rule 13a-14 by certifying Countrywide’s false and misleading public securities filings. See Mozilo 
II, supra note 477, at 21 (holding that “a false Sarbanes–Oxley certification does not state an 
independent violation of the securities laws”). 
 484. Antifraud: Countrywide’s Mozilo Agrees to Pay Record $22.5M Fine to Settle SEC Charges, 
42 SECURITIES REGULATION & L. REP. (BNA) 2015 (Oct. 25, 2010); see also Gretchen Morgenson, 
Lending Magnate Settles Charges For $67 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at A1 (noting that “Mr. 
Mozilo and his colleagues neither admitted nor denied the government’s charges” in their settlement 
with the SEC). 
 485. Michael Hiltzik, Getting Tough on Crimes by Firms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at B1 
(reporting that “$45 million [of Mozilo’s settlement] was covered by insurance companies and 
Countrywide’s new owner, Bank of America”); Morgenson, supra note 484 (reporting Mozilo received 
$521.5 million of compensation from Countrywide between 2000 and 2008). 
 486. Morgenson, supra note 484 (reporting that Sambol agreed to a lifetime ban on serving as a 
public company office or director and to pay $5 million in disgorgement and a $520,000 million penalty, 
but also explaining that “Countrywide is paying for all of Mr. Sambol’s disgorged funds,” while 
Sieracki agreed to pay only a $130,000 penalty). 
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produced similarly unimpressive results.  As Mozilo did with 
Countrywide, Killinger caused WaMu to aggressively expand its 
offerings of pay-option ARM, subprime and home equity loans.  
Killinger initiated this high-risk strategy in mid-2004, declaring that he 
wanted to increase WaMu’s assets “by at least 10% per year” while 
achieving “average ROE [return on equity] of at least 18% and average 
EPS [earnings per share] growth of at least 13%.”487  Killinger 
proclaimed that “[i]t is important that [WaMu] focus on growth 
initiatives and risk taking.  Above average creation of shareholder value 
requires significant risk taking.”488 
Killinger pursued his high-risk strategy even though he acknowledged 
in June 2005 that the U.S. was experiencing a “speculative” housing 
boom: 
We are currently experiencing the most speculative housing market we 
have seen in many decades . . . .  Whatever the exact outcome, it is highly 
likely that housing will not be a stimulant to the economy and could 
easily become a significant drag on consumer confidence and consumer 
spending.489 
In mid-2006 Killinger further admitted that “[t]he housing market is 
now showing signs of slowing” and “[w]e expect the housing market to 
be weak for quite some time as we unwind the speculative bubble . . . .  
A collapse of the housing market would significantly increase our credit 
costs.”490  Nevertheless, Killinger continued to press forward with 
WaMu’s high-risk lending strategy.491  By the time WaMu collapsed in 
September 2008—thereby becoming the largest bank failure in U.S. 
history—WaMu had reported huge losses and held more than $100 
 
 487. Complaint ¶ 22, FDIC v. Killinger et al., 2011 WL 910099 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2011)  
[hereinafter FDIC WaMu Complaint] (quoting Killinger’s June 2004 Strategic Direction memorandum). 
 488. Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Killinger’s June 2004 Strategic Direction memorandum). 
 489. Id. ¶ 40 (quoting Killinger’s June 1, 2005 Strategic Direction memorandum). Similarly, in 
March 2005 Killinger told WaMu’s chief risk officer, “I have never seen such a high risk housing 
market as market after market thinks they are unique and for whatever reason are not likely to 
experience price declines. This typically signifies a bubble.”  Id. ¶ 41 (quoting Mar. 2005 email from 
Killinger). 
 490. Id. ¶ 53 (quoting Killinger’s June 12, 2006 Strategic Direction memorandum). 
 491. In mid-2007, Killinger conceded that the “bursting of the housing bubble” that he had 
predicted for two years “has now turned into a reality.” Id. ¶ 64 (quoting Killinger’s June 18, 2007 
Strategic Direction memorandum).  Even so, in August 2007, Killinger told the American Banker that 
WaMu would continue to expand its “non-conforming hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages, payment-
option ARMs, multifamily loans, and home equity loans.”  The following month, he told the Seattle 
Times that, despite the ongoing decline in the U.S. housing market, “this, frankly, may be one of the best 
times I’ve ever seen for taking on new loans into our portfolio.”  Id. ¶ 71 (quoting from Killinger’s 
newspaper interviews). Large percentages of WaMu’s loans were concentrated in California, Florida 
and other states with speculative housing markets, and many of WaMu’s loans contained additional 
high-risk features like “no or low documentation and high loan-to-value (‘LTV’) and debt-to-income 
(‘DTI’) ratios.” Id. ¶¶ 143 (quote), 157–62. 
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billion of high-risk pay-option ARM and home equity loans on its 
balance sheet.492 
The FDIC alleged that Killinger—along with WaMu’s former chief 
operating officer Stephen Rotella and former home loans president 
David Schneider—caused WaMu “to take extreme and historically 
unprecedented risks . . . .  They focused on short term gains to increase 
their own compensation, with reckless disregard for WaMu’s longer 
term safety and soundness.”493  Nevertheless, the FDIC agreed to a 
settlement in which Killinger paid just $275,000 in cash and surrendered 
$7.5 million of dubious claims for retirement benefits against WaMu’s 
bankrupt parent holding company.494  The FDIC obtained similar 
settlements (including modest cash payments) from Rotella and 
Schneider.495   
In view of WaMu’s payment of $88 million of compensation to 
Killinger between 2001 and 2007, the FDIC’s settlement was viewed as 
“a pittance” by journalist Gretchen Morgenson496 and as “[p]retty soft” 
by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI).497  Moreover, despite strong evidence 
that Mozilo, Killinger and other top executives of Countrywide and 
WaMu consciously pursued reckless lending strategies that inflicted 
 
 492. Id. ¶¶ 2–11, 137, 142, 150, 178.   
 493. Id. ¶ 1 (summarizing FDIC’s claims against Killinger, Rotella and Schneider).  From 2005 
through 2008, while WaMu pursued its high-risk lending strategy, Killinger received $65.9 million in 
compensation, while Rotella and Schneider received $23.4 million and $5.9 million, respectively.  Id. ¶¶ 
14–16. The FDIC, as receiver for WaMu, sued the three defendants under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) for gross 
negligence, ordinary negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.  Id. ¶¶ 12, 181–95.  The FDIC allegations 
included claims that Killinger, Rotella and Schneider ignored repeated warnings in 2005 and 2006 from 
WaMu’s risk managers that WaMu’s high-risk lending strategy exposed the bank to a high probability 
of disastrous losses if housing markets weakened and housing prices began to decline.  Id. ¶¶ 26–58, 
119–35; see also KIRSTEN GRIND, THE LOST BANK: THE STORY OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL—THE 
BIGGEST BANK FAILURE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 123–24, 133–35, 149–54, 161–63 (2012) (describing 
how Killinger disregarded numerous warnings from colleagues about the dangers of WaMu’s high-risk 
lending strategy). 
 494. Gretchen Morgenson, Slapped Wrists at WaMu, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, § BU, at 1. 
 495. Rotella paid $100,000 and gave up a doubtful bankruptcy claim against WaMu’s parent 
holding company for $11.5 million in compensation, while Schneider paid $50,000 and surrendered a 
similar bankruptcy claim for $5.8 million in compensation.  The FDIC also received $39.6 million from 
WaMu’s insurance carriers and $125 million from the bankruptcy estate of WaMu’s parent company. 
See id.; FDIC Announces Settlement with Washington Mutual Directors and Officers (Dec. 15, 2011) 
(including Settlement Summary—Fact Sheet) [hereinafter FDIC WaMu Press Release], available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11192.html.  Thus, as was true for the SEC’s settlements 
with BofA and Citigroup (see supra notes 462-70 and accompanying text), most of the payments 
received by the FDIC in the WaMu case were extracted from the shareholders and creditors of WaMu’s 
parent company, not from the senior executives responsible for WaMu’s failure. 
 496. Morgenson, supra note 494. 
 497. Id. (quoting Sen. Levin, and noting that his “dismay over the settlement probably arises from 
his deep knowledge of WaMu and its practices” as a result of the extensive investigation of WaMu by 
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which he chaired); see also Senate Wall Street 
Crisis Report, supra note 461, at 48–242 (presenting results of the investigation of WaMu’s collapse by 
Sen. Levin’s subcommittee). 
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enormous harm on the banking industry and financial markets, federal 
prosecutors decided not to bring criminal charges against any of those 
individuals.498 
The settlements described above with eight senior executives of 
Citigroup, Countrywide and WaMu exhibit a disturbing pattern.  All 
eight officers avoided any admission of personal wrongdoing and 
escaped further civil or criminal liability while paying amounts that 
were a tiny fraction of the compensation they received.499  Even more 
disturbing is the fact that those settlements evidently represent the only 
public enforcement actions brought by federal authorities against senior 
managers of major banks.   
Perhaps most remarkably, federal officials have not brought any 
criminal charges—and have filed only a “handful” of civil claims—
against senior officers of financial companies for falsely certifying their 
companies’ public reports.500  Sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act impose civil and criminal penalties on senior officers for 
false certifications of annual and quarterly reports.501  Sections 302 and 
906 were key components of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act’s effort to hold 
corporate executives accountable by ensuring that “their actions will be 
scrutinized, with the threat of real penalties for violations of their legal 
responsibilities.”502   
The SEC adopted Rule 13a-14 to implement the civil-liability 
 
 498. Hiltzik, supra note 485; Morgenson, supra note 484; Morgenson, supra note 494. Peter S. 
Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at A1. 
 499. See supra notes 466–69,  484–86, 493–98 (describing the SEC’s settlements with Citigroup 
and Countrywide executives and the FDIC’s settlement with WaMu officers, and noting the lack of any 
admission of liability and the relatively small penalties paid by those individuals in comparison with 
their highly lucrative compensation).  In settling with WaMu’s executives, the FDIC agreed not to bring 
any enforcement actions against them or to make any “disparaging comments” about them.  FDIC 
WaMu Press Release (Settlement Summary, Part II), supra note 495. 
 500. Michael Rapoport, Global Finance: Law’s Big Weapon Sits Idle—Sarbanes–Oxley’s Jail-
Time Threat Hasn’t Been Applied in Crisis-Related Cases, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2012, at C3 (reporting 
that federal prosecutors “haven’t brought any criminal cases for false certification related to the crisis” 
while “[t]he SEC says it has brought civil false-certification charges against . . . executives at companies 
involved in the crisis like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Countrywide”). 
 501. Joris M. Hogan, The Enron Legacy: Corporate Governance Requirements for a New Era, 31 
SEC. REG. LAW J. 142, 143–44 (2003) (discussing Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and SEC Rule 
13a-14). 
 502. 148 CONG. REC. E1451 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (extension of remarks) (statement by Rep. 
Sununu); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes–Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform 
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 955–56 (2003) (explaining that Sections 302 and 906 
potentially provide “the sharpest governance teeth” in Sarbanes–Oxley because they “prevent CEOs and 
CFOs from hiding behind the defense of ignorance”); Allison List, The Lax Enforcement of Section 304 
of Sarbanes–Oxley: Why is the SEC Ignoring Its Greatest Asset in the Fight Against Corporate 
Misconduct, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 198–99 (2009) (explaining that Sections 302 and 906 are intended to 
protect investors by “attaching liability to company executives responsible for financial disclosure”). 
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provisions of Section 302.503  However, the SEC filed civil claims 
against bank officers for violating Rule 13a-14 in only two cases: the 
SEC’s lawsuit against Angelo Mozilo and Eric Sieracki of Countrywide 
and a similar suit against Alan Levan, chairman of BankAtlantic (a 
relatively small Florida bank).504  Notably, the SEC has not brought 
enforcement actions under Rule 13a-14 “against executives from any of 
the major banks suspected of misleading the public about their finances 
during the crisis,” despite evidence indicating that senior executives of 
Bear, Citigroup and Lehman certified public reports containing material 
misstatements.505 
The SEC did file civil suits including Rule 13a-14 claims against 
Daniel Mudd and Richard Syron, the former CEOs of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.  The SEC’s complaints alleged that Mudd and Syron 
signed public disclosure documents that materially understated the 
exposures of the GSEs to subprime and Alt-A mortgages.  The SEC’s 
 
 503. Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 
57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002). 
 504. See supra note 483 (discussing the SEC’s claims under Rule 13a-14 against Mozilo and 
Sieracki for falsely certifying Countrywide’s public reports); SEC v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 2012 
WL 1936112 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2012) (discussing the SEC’s claim under Rule 13a-14 against Alan 
Levan for falsely certifying BankAtlantic’s public reports); see also Rachel Witkowski, SEC Files 
Lawsuit Alleging Fraud at BankAtlantic, AM. BANKER (Jan. 19, 2012) 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_12/bankatlantic-fraud-lawsuit-1045848-1.html (reporting 
that BankAtlantic had $3.7 billion of assets).  A federal district court dismissed the SEC’s claims under 
Rule 13a-14 against Mozilo and Sieracki, concluding that “a false Sarbanes–Oxley certification does not 
state an independent violation of the securities laws.” Mozilo II, supra note 477, at 21.  However, 
another federal district court upheld the validity of the SEC’s claim under Rule 13a-14 against Levan in 
the BankAtlantic case, and most other recent decisions have similarly concluded that the SEC has 
authority to bring civil enforcement actions for violations of Rule 13a-14.  BankAtlantic, 2012 WL 
1936112  supra, at 23 & n.5; see also, e.g., SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 & n.4 (D.D.C. July 
19, 2012) (reviewing relevant decisions). 
 505. Rapoport, supra note 500 (reporting that former  chairman James Cayne and other Bear 
executives paid $275 million to settle shareholder litigation that included “allegations that Mr. Cayne 
falsely certified Bear’s financial reports,” while a report by Lehman’s bankruptcy examiner concluded 
“there was enough evidence to support claims that Richard Fuld failed to ensure the firm’s quarterly 
reports were accurate”); see also William D. Cohan, Obama Keeps the SEC in Pocket of Wall Street, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-02/sec-trades-one-wall-street-
lapdog-for-another.html (criticizing the SEC for not filing an enforcement action against Fuld “despite 
the solid evidence of indictable offenses itemized in the post mortem done on [Lehman] by court-
appointed examiner Anton Valukas”); William D. Cohan, Why Does the SEC Protect Banks’ Dirty 
Secrets?, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-28/why-does-the-
sec-protect-banks-dirty-secrets-.html (criticizing the SEC for ignoring whistleblower claims filed by 
former Citigroup executive Richard Bowen, including the fact that Bowen sent an “urgent” email 
message in November 2007 to Citigroup CFO Gary Crittenden and Robert Rubin, chairman of 
Citigroup’s executive committee, warning them about “breakdowns in internal controls and resulting 
significant but possibly unrecognized financial losses existing within our organization”); Taibbi, supra 
note 415 (criticizing the SEC for ignoring whistleblower complaints filed by Oliver Budde, a former 
Lehman attorney, in which Budde alleged that Lehman significantly understated Fuld’s compensation in 
Lehman’s public disclosure reports). 
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Rule 13a-14 claims survived motions to dismiss and are still pending.506  
Given the SEC’s success to date in pursuing Rule 13a-14 claims against 
Mudd and Syron, the agency’s decision not to file similar claims against 
senior executives of big Wall Street firms is more than puzzling 
Unfortunately, the SEC’s decision to forgo Rule 13a-14 claims 
against top Wall Street officials is consistent with the preferential 
treatment given by the SEC to big Wall Street firms and their officials 
who were accused of misconduct prior to the financial crisis.  A recent 
study of SEC enforcement actions in 1998 and from 2005 through early 
2007 concluded that the SEC gave significantly more favorable 
treatment to big broker-dealers and their staff compared to small broker-
dealers and their employees.507  The SEC’s preferential treatment was 
manifested in three ways: (i) “SEC actions against big firms were more 
likely to involve corporate liability exclusively, with no individuals 
subject to any regulatory action,” (ii) “big-firm defendants were more 
likely to end up in administrative rather than court proceedings, 
controlling for types of violation and levels of harm to investors,” and 
(iii) “within administrative proceedings, big-firm employees were more 
likely to receive lower sanctions.”508 
The shocking inadequacy of federal enforcement efforts against major 
banks was vividly illustrated at a Senate committee hearing in February 
2013.  During that hearing, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) asked 
seven federal financial regulators to specify “the last few times you’ve 
taken the biggest financial institutions all the way to trial.”509  She 
observed that if major banks “can break the law and drag in billions in 
profits, and then turn around and settle, paying out of those profits, they 
don’t have much incentive to follow the law.”510  After the seven 
regulators failed to cite even one instance in which they had taken a 
major bank to trial, Senator Warren responded, “I’m really concerned 
 
 506. SEC v. Mudd, 885 F. Supp. 2d 654, 657-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Syron, 2013 WL 
1285572, at *3–*18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013). 
 507. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against 
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAWYER 679, 692-94 (2012) (describing SEC enforcement actions included in 
the study, and explaining that proceedings from 1998 were included in the study “to allow for variation 
in SEC enforcement policies under Democratic and Republican administrations”). 
 508. Id. at 679 (abstract); see also id. at 728 (restating same conclusions). 
 509. David Uberti, Warren Rips Deals with Big Banks, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/14/senator-elizabeth-warren-grills-regulators-ending-
quiet-first-month-office/rWy4b0VnwoFozpkQhZ8mGM/story.html (quoting Sen. Warren’s remarks 
during a Senate Banking Committee hearing on Feb. 14, 2013); see also Victoria Finkle, Warren Takes 
Center Stage in Grilling Regulators on Bank Prosecutions, AM. BANKER (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_32/warren-takes-center-stage-in-grilling-regulators-on-
bank-prosecutions-1056811-1.html (reporting on Sen. Warren’s statements to regulators during the 
hearing). 
 510. Finkle, supra note 509 (quoting Sen. Warren). 
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that ‘too big to fail’ has become ‘too big for trial.’  That just seems 
wrong to me.”511 
B. Large Financial Institutions Have Used Regulatory Arbitrage and 
Capture to Undermine Supervisory Restrictions on Their Activities 
Large financial institutions have skillfully employed arbitrage and 
capture techniques to weaken the effectiveness of regulation.  Both 
before and during the financial crisis, leading banks exploited flawed 
incentives and governance structures in regulatory agencies to 
encourage regulators to cater to their interests.  The financial industry 
also took advantage of “cultural capture”—fostered in part by the 
“revolving door” between industry and government service—to 
persuade regulators to adopt policies consistent with the industry’s 
preferences. 
1. Competition Among Domestic and Foreign Regulators Has 
Encouraged Regulatory Arbitrage 
Financial regulators competed aggressively during the 1990s and 
2000s, both within and across national borders, to attract and retain the 
allegiance of major financial institutions.  Regulatory competition—
which the financial industry actively promoted—pushed agencies to 
adopt policies that would please their existing constituents and attract 
new ones.  The result was regulatory arbitrage, in both domestic and 
global arenas, which undermined the ability and willingness of 
regulators to apply rigorous supervisory policies. 
a. Domestic Competition for Regulatory Charters 
During the 1990s and 2000s, the OCC and OTS actively competed for 
charters by issuing rulings that aggressively preempted state consumer 
protection laws.  The OCC’s and OTS’s preemption rulings induced 
many large state-chartered institutions to convert into national banks or 
federal thrifts.512  Similarly, the FRB, OCC and OTS sought to persuade 
 
 511. Id. (quoting Sen. Warren, and noting that her statements triggered “an unusual smattering of 
applause from the audience at the hearing”). 
 512. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text (discussing preemption initiatives by OCC 
and OTS); BAIR, supra note 290, at 51 (explaining that “by expanding the scope of state preemption, the 
OCC hoped that large, state-regulated banks such as JPMorgan Chase would ‘flip’ their charters and 
become national banks,” and after the OCC issued sweeping preemption rules in 2004, “JPMorgan 
Chase switched from being chartered by New York State to being OCC-regulated”); BETHANY MCLEAN 
& JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 147 
(2010) (describing how preemption became a “recruiting tool” that the OCC and OTS used “to expand 
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leading financial institutions to operate within their respective 
jurisdictions by approving new activities and reducing regulatory 
requirements.513  In one particularly egregious example of regulatory 
competition, OTS persuaded Countrywide to convert from a national 
bank to a federal thrift in early 2007 by promising to give Countrywide 
and its parent holding company more lenient supervisory treatment than 
they were receiving at that time from the OCC and FRB.514 
The OTS attracted the most severe criticism from Congress for its 
regulatory lapses, and Congress decided to abolish OTS when it passed 
Dodd–Frank.515  Congressional and Treasury investigators rebuked OTS 
for lax and ineffective regulation that contributed to the collapse of 
WaMu and three other large thrifts (IndyMac, Downey Federal and 
BankUnited).516  Investigators also condemned OTS for allowing 
IndyMac and BankUnited to backdate contributions of capital made by 
their parent holding companies in 2008.  Those backdated capital 
contributions enabled IndyMac and BankUnited to report that they 
remained “well capitalized” (and therefore eligible to continue 
collecting high-cost brokered deposits)—a false representation that 
delayed their subsequent failures and likely increased the FDIC’s 
resolution costs.517  Investigators also blamed OTS for its very weak 
 
their own empires”); Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 915–16 (explaining how OCC and OTS used their 
preemptive rulings to encourage state-chartered institutions to switch to federal charters). 
 513. Wilmarth, supra note 193, at 265, 265 n.150, 276–77, 277 n.203; RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, 
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
61–67, 465–67, 490–94 (4th ed. 2009) (describing competition between OCC and FRB during the 1990s 
to maintain the loyalty of the largest banks, which could choose between status as national banks or as 
state Fed member banks); FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 151–54 (describing how OTS and SEC 
competed to encourage the largest securities firms to organize nonbank holding companies under their 
oversight rather than forming bank holding companies that would be subject to FRB supervision). 
 514. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 159–60, 201–02; Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic 
Regulation: Regulating Credit Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 160 (2009). 
 515. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 25–26 (2010); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 157–84 
(discussing regulatory failures by OTS); Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator 
Played Advocate Over Enforcer: Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 23, 2008, at A1 (same). 
 516. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 176–81; Senate Wall Street Crisis Report, supra note 
461, at 161–65, 209–35; Joe Adler, OTS Faulted in BankUnited Failure, AM. BANKER, June 25, 2010, 
at 3; Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 515; Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, Finger-Pointing 
Turns to Regulators, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at A1. 
 517. Adler, supra note 516; Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Regulator Let IndyMac 
Bank Falsify Report, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2008, at A01; Story & Morgenson, supra note 516. The 
Treasury Department’s inspector general reportedly made a criminal referral to the Justice Department 
with respect to OTS regional director Darrel Dochow’s approval of IndyMac’s backdated capital 
contribution. However, the Justice Department did not take any action against Mr. Dochow, and he 
retired from OTS in 2009 with a full government pension. Story & Morgenson, supra note 516. Mr. 
Dochow had previously been demoted by OTS in the early 1990s after “federal investigators found that 
he had delayed and impeded proper regulation of Charles Keating’s failed Lincoln Savings and Loan.” 
Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra; see also Black, supra note 412, at 188–205, 209–11 (describing 
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oversight of thrift holding companies, which contributed to the collapse 
of AIG and Lehman as well as Merrill’s near-failure.518 
The FRB and OCC bore shared responsibility, along with OTS, for 
the near-collapse of Countrywide.519  In addition, the FRB and OCC 
were jointly at fault for not taking strong regulatory measures that might 
have prevented (i) the near-failures and massive bailouts of Citigroup 
and BofA, (ii) the failure and emergency sale of Wachovia to Wells 
Fargo in a federally-assisted transaction, and (iii) the near-collapse and 
forced sale of National City to PNC in another federally-assisted deal.520  
The failures and bailouts of so many leading financial institutions made 
it “painfully obvious” that the OTS, FRB and OCC had allowed the 
largest thrifts and banks to become “deeply implicated in the origination 
and securitization of bad mortgage loans.”521  The competition among 
federal agencies for charters was an important factor that contributed to 
those regulatory failures, because it encouraged agencies to offer “a 
bigger menu of legally permissible banking activities and gentler 
regulation” in order to meet the demand by financial institutions for “the 
easiest regulators and laws.”522 
 
Dochow’s role in obstructing attempts by other regulators to take strong measures against Keating and 
Lincoln in the late 1980s). Dochow regained his regional director’s position in 2007 after he played “a 
leading role in persuading Countrywide to move under OTS supervision, a major coup for the agency.” 
Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra; see also Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 515 (reporting that 
Dochow and other OTS officials offered to provide “more lenient” treatment to Countrywide than it was 
currently receiving from the FRB and OCC) (quoting an unnamed Countrywide executive). 
 518. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 151–54, 177–78, 200–04, 346, 351–54; ENGEL & MCCOY, 
supra note 19, at 221–23. 
 519. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 20, 105, 172, 248–50; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 
159–60, 200–02; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 512, at 138–49, 214–16, 219–33, 300–05; Wilmarth, 
supra note 15, at 1018, 1045. 
 520. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 20–23, 111–13, 170–74, 195–200, 263, 302–08, 366–71, 
379–86; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 158–71, 200–03; Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 978 n.105, 
984–85; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the 
Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer 
Protection (Geo. Wash. U. Pub. L. & Leg. Theory Working Paper No. 479, 2010), at 26–31, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499216; Binyamin Appelbaum & David Cho, Fed’s approach to regulation 
left banks exposed to crisis, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 21, 2009, at A01. The Treasury Department 
facilitated Wells Fargo’s emergency acquisition of Wachovia and PNC’s comparable takeover of 
National City by issuing an extraordinary ruling, which declared that purchasing banks could use losses 
from acquired banks to reduce taxes on their future income. That ruling reportedly provided tax benefits 
worth $25 billion to Wells Fargo and $5 billion to PNC.  Cheryl Block, Measuring the True Cost of 
Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 218–19 (2010); Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall For 
U.S. Banks, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 10, 2008, at A01; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 103–04 
(stating that Wells Fargo CEO Dick Kovacevich referred to “a recent tax ruling that made the economics 
of the [Wachovia] deal work better”). Congress repudiated the Treasury’s tax ruling in a subsequent 
statute but “included a ‘grandfather’ clause, giving the benefit of the [ruling] to existing contracts—the 
Wells Fargo transaction, in particular.”  Block, supra, at 219. 
 521. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 204. 
 522. Id. at 158, 159; see also id. at 166 (contending that regulatory competition “encouraged 
lenders to shop for legal regimes and charters,” resulting in a “downward spiral in lending standards”). 
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b. International Regulatory Competition for the Allegiance of Large 
Financial Institutions 
A similar regulatory competition took place across national borders, 
especially between the world’s two leading financial centers—New 
York and London.  During the global credit boom that preceded the 
financial crisis, federal regulators worried that any attempt to impose 
stricter supervision on large U.S. financial institutions might cause those 
institutions to shift more of their operations to London or other foreign 
locations that offered “light touch” regulation.523  Federal officials 
therefore repeatedly offered regulatory accommodations in order to 
persuade major banks to keep more of their activities in the U.S.524  
Federal regulators were not mistaken in fearing that large financial 
institutions might shift operations and assets to foreign jurisdictions with 
more accommodating regulatory schemes.  A recent study found that, 
between 1996 and 2007, global banks headquartered in 26 developed 
countries were more likely to open branches and subsidiaries in other 
nations, and to transfer capital to their foreign operations, if the 
destination countries (i) imposed fewer activity restrictions, lower 
capital requirements, weaker disclosure rules and looser auditing 
standards, and (ii) followed more lenient supervisory policies.525   
 
 523. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 9–10, 96, 192–95, 199 (2013); Dariusz Wójcik, The Dark Side of 
NY-LON: Financial Centres and the Global Financial Crisis (University of Oxford Employment, Work 
and Finance Working Paper No. 11-12, July 20, 2011), at 7, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890644; see also infra notes 526–43 (discussing the fierce competition 
between New York and London).  For discussions of international regulatory arbitrage and its impact on 
supervisory policies, see Viral V. Acharya, Paul Wachtel & Ingo Walter, International Alignment of 
Financial Sector Regulation, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM  
365, 366–71 (Viral A. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009); HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & 
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 283–84, 292–93 (2010); 
John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95  
VA. L. REV. 707, 716–17, 721 (2009); Cristie L. Ford, Macro and Micro Level Effects on Responsive 
Financial Regulation, 44 U.B.C. L. REV. 589, 608, 610–11 (2011). 
 524. Wójcik, supra note 523, at 7; Ford, supra note 523, at 608, 611.  For example, during the 
quarter century leading up to the financial crisis, U.S. banking regulators sought to avoid imposing 
capital requirements on large U.S. banks that would place them at a competitive disadvantage compared 
to foreign banks. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 45–64, 84–85, 210–14 (2008); see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 31–33 
(stating that the FRB and OCC strongly supported Basel II’s internal risk-based capital standards—
which would have allowed big banks to operate with lower capital levels—because the FRB and OCC 
wanted to “maintain the competitiveness of the U.S. financial system” with Europe). Similarly, as 
described above, in 2004 federal regulators adopted an interagency rule setting a very low capital charge 
for banks that provided backup lines of credit to their sponsored off-balance-sheet conduits. See supra 
notes 224–28 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of the 2004 interagency rule).  In adopting 
that very lenient rule, federal regulators rejected a proposed higher capital charge because that proposal 
“would put U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign banks.”  Risk-Based Capital 
Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,908, 44,910 (July 28, 2004). 
 525. Joel F. Houston , Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows 
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The U.K. has long been the most prominent and attractive foreign 
destination for large U.S. financial institutions.  For example, AIG 
Financial Products—which sold massive volumes of credit default 
swaps that destroyed its parent company—carried on most of its 
activities in London.526  Similarly, JPMorgan’s Chief Investment Office 
(CIO) conducted its “London Whale” trading operations—which 
inflicted a $6 billion loss on the bank in 2012—from the CIO’s London 
office.527  
U.K. government leaders actively promoted London as the most 
business-friendly venue for global financial institutions.  U.K. 
politicians pressured the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to adopt 
and follow “light touch” supervisory policies for major financial 
firms.528  The financial industry applauded the U.K.’s embrace of “light 
touch” and “principles-based regulation,” and the industry pushed 
officials to maintain the U.K.’s lenient approach to supervision 
throughout the credit boom of the 2000s.529 
In October 2006, FSA enforcement director Margaret Cole boasted—
 
(J. FIN., forthcoming, Aug. 26, 2011), at 2–5, 17–19, 24–29, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525895. 
 526. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 221–23; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 139–42, 200–
02; Wójcik, supra note 523, at 7. 
 527. Jamie Dimon on the Line, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2012/11/jamie-dimon-tom-brady-hang-in-there (text under heading 
“Killer Whale”). 
 528. U.K. Financial Services Authority, The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland § 3.1.3, ¶ 686, 
at 261 [hereinafter FSA RBS Report], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf.  In a 
press release issued by the U.K. Treasury on May 24, 2005, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown 
declared that he wanted “[n]ot just a light touch but a limited touch” from the FSA in order to improve 
“London’s competitive position” as well as “the ‘competitiveness’ of the U.K. financial services sector.” 
Id. at 261–62 (material quoted from the press release in italics).  Similarly, in June 2006 a senior U.K. 
Treasury official proclaimed that “we must keep the UK’s regulatory system at the cutting edge—the 
best in the world . . . nothing should be done to put at risk a light-touch, risk-based regulatory regime.” 
Id. at 262 n.746 (quoting speech on June 14, 2006, by Economic Secretary to the Treasury Ed Balls, 
MP). 
 529. Gonzalo Vina & Robert Hutton, Brown Says He Was Wrong Not to Toughen Bank 
Regulation as Finance Minister BLOOMBERG, April 14, 2010 (quoting U.K. Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, who stated that he was under “a huge amount of pressure” from the financial-services industry 
to maintain “light touch” regulatory policies); Stephanie Baker et al., Brown’s “Churchill” Moment 
Masks Failure of Regulator He Built, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2008) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=auS77akg6dq0 (explaining that Mr. 
Brown, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, “created the FSA” in 1997 and “held up principles-based 
regulation as a model” because he believed that “Britain needed to take measures to remain competitive 
in an era of globalization”); see also Howard Davies, Comments on Ross Levine’s paper “The 
Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis,” (BIS Working Papers 
No. 329, Nov. 2010), at 15, 16–17 (comment by former FSA chairman, stating that “the political climate 
in which [U.K.] regulators were operating . . . was highly unfavourable to tight regulation” before the 
global financial crisis began in 2007, because “the City of London was seen as a goose that lays golden 
eggs, which should on no account be frightened into flapping its wings and flying away”), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work329.pdf. 
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in a speech delivered in New York—that “London’s philosophy of ‘light 
touch’ regulation has helped it in becoming the world’s leading centre 
for mobile capital.”530  She declared that “[t]he FSA is firmly of the 
view that regulators must be very wary of the damaging effects they can 
have on creativity, innovation and competition.”531  She further claimed 
that “[t]he benefits of this light touch approach to regulation are borne 
out by the figures,” and she cited data showing that London was 
attracting more stock offerings than New York.532  
Two weeks later, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) and New York 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg published an op-ed in the Wall Street 
Journal and announced that they had commissioned a report by 
McKinsey and Company on the competitiveness of U.S. financial 
markets.533  Senator Schumer’s and Mayor Bloomberg’s op-ed warned 
that “we risk allowing New York to lose its pre-eminence in the global 
financial-services sector,” and they called for legal reforms to remedy 
“overregulation” and “frivolous litigation” in the U.S.534  They criticized 
U.S. regulators for “often competing to be the toughest cop on the 
street,” while they praised the FSA for being “more collaborative and 
solutions-oriented.”535  Shortly thereafter, Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson delivered a speech declaring that the op-ed by Senator Schumer 
and Mayor Bloomberg was “right on target.”536 
Senator Schumer and Mayor Bloomberg issued the McKinsey report 
in January 2007, and they again warned that “New York could lose its 
status as a global financial market” if U.S. financial markets continued 
to be “stifled by stringent regulations and high litigation risks.”537  The 
 
 530. The UK FSA: Nobody does it better?, Speech by Margaret Cole, FSA Director of 
Enforcement, at Fordham Law School, Oct. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2006/1017_mc.shtml. 
 531. Id. 
 532. Id.; see also Vina & Hutton, supra note 529 (reporting that “[i]n 2005, London surpassed the 
U.S. as the No. 1 choice for stock listings by foreign companies, especially those from emerging 
markets such as India and Russia”). 
 533. Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London, Wall 
St. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 37 (referring to the McKinsey study 
commissioned by Sen. Schumer and Mayor Bloomberg). 
 534. Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 533. 
 535. Id. 
 536. Remarks by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson before the Economic Club of New York, 
“On the Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets” (Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Paulson Nov. 20, 2006 
Speech], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp174.aspx.  In the 
same speech, Secretary Paulson criticized a “broken tort system [that] is an Achilles heel for our 
economy,” as well as a regulatory enforcement approach that “can appear confusing and threatening” to 
financial institutions and other business firms.  Id. 
 537. Press Release, Bloomberg/Schumer Report, NY in Danger of Losing Status as World 
Financial Center Within 10 Years Without Major Shift in Regulation and Policy, Jan. 22, 2007, 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/cgi-bin/misc/pfprinter.cgi?action=print&sitename=OM&p=13621848 
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McKinsey report called upon U.S. financial regulators to adopt a 
“principles-based” system of regulation and a “measured approach to 
enforcement” similar to the FSA’s policies, which senior financial 
executives described as “easier to deal with” and “responsive to their 
business needs.”538  The McKinsey report also urged U.S. regulators to 
implement the Basel II international risk-based capital accord—and to 
abandon a U.S. interagency proposal for tougher capital requirements—
in order to “place U.S. financial institutions on an equal footing with 
their international competitors.”539 
Similarly, Treasury Secretary Paulson’s speech in November 2006 
endorsed a “principles-based system” of regulation that would be “more 
agile and responsive” and thereby “maintain the competitiveness of our 
capital markets.”540  The Bloomberg–Schumer report and the Paulson 
speech reflected the intense political pressures exerted on U.S. financial 
regulators to conform their policies to the FSA’s “light touch” approach 
and to the more accommodating Basel II capital standards.541  Those 
 
93000. 
 538. Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg & Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York’s and the 
US’ Global Financial Services Leadership (Jan. 2007), at 17, 81, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.  As evidence of the FSA’s “measured” 
enforcement approach, the report quoted an unnamed CEO of a U.S. securities firm, who stated, “The 
FSA is open to discussing issues constructively and resolving problems quietly.”  Id. at 84 (emphasis 
added). 
 539. Id. at 88, 112 (quotes).  The McKinsey report quoted unnamed “CEOs and other thought 
leaders” who criticized the federal banking agencies for issuing a joint proposal for new capital 
requirements that would (i) include “a leverage ratio, which could require banks to hold more capital 
than would be required under a [Basel II] risk-based system,” (ii) require banks to hold more capital “if 
the aggregate capital under the [Basel II] regime falls by 10 percent for the industry as a whole” and (iii) 
reject provisions of Basel II that would allow capital requirements to “decline” in “a strong economic 
environment.”  Id. at 88.  The McKinsey report noted that Citigroup, JPMorgan, Wachovia and WaMu 
had formed a working group to recommend an “alternative” to the agencies’ proposal, and their 
“alternative approach [was] endorsed” by the major banking trade associations.  Id. at 88, 112.  As 
discussed above, Citigroup subsequently needed a huge federal bailout to avoid failure, while Wachovia 
and WaMu both failed in 2008.  See supra notes 110, 231, 290, 520 and accompanying text. 
 540. Paulson Nov. 20, 2006 Speech, supra note 536.  The “principles-based” objectives set forth 
in Secretary Paulson’s speech were subsequently incorporated in the Treasury Department’s Blueprint 
for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar. 2008), which he strongly advocated.  Baker et 
al., supra note 529; see also Damian Paeltta et al., Paulson Plan Begins Battle Over How to Police 
Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2008, at A1 (describing Secretary Paulson’s support for proposals to 
“streamline bureaucracy” contained in the Treasury’s Blueprint, and noting that the Bush 
Administration “has long been working on reducing regulation that, it argues, has hurt U.S. financial 
institutions in competition with overseas centers such as London and Hong Kong”).  Due to the financial 
crisis, Secretary Paulson’s Blueprint was never implemented and was superseded by the Obama 
Administration’s proposals that provided the foundation for the Dodd–Frank Act.  HAL S. SCOTT & 
ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 335 (19th ed. 
2012); Damian Paletta, U.S. to Toughen Finance Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at A1. 
 541. See, e.g., BAIR, supra note 290, at 24, 27 (explaining that, in 2006, most federal bank 
regulators “were still moving in the direction of less regulation, at least for larger institutions,” and 
noting that “[a]dding fuel to the fire was the fact that some of our foreign competitors, particularly in 
Europe, were taking industry self-regulation to new extremes [through] ‘principles-based’ regulation, 
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pressures eased only when the global financial crisis revealed that the 
Basel II standards were woefully inadequate,542 and when the FSA was 
“thoroughly discredited” after U.K. authorities were forced to bail out 
four of the nine largest U.K. banks.543 
As the financial crisis has receded in the public’s memory, major U.S. 
banks and their allies in Congress have once again invoked the need for 
international “competitiveness” and “level playing fields” as a reason to 
avoid rigorous implementation of Dodd–Frank’s financial reforms.544  
For example, major bank trade associations attacked the FRB’s 
proposals to adopt higher capital standards and other enhanced 
prudential requirements for SIFIs because the proposed requirements 
“may place U.S. banks at an unwarranted competitive disadvantage 
compared to those countries that have not implemented a comparable 
approach.”545  Similarly, big banks and their political allies have used 
 
which, in my view, meant articulating high-level standards but then leaving it to the banks themselves to 
interpret and enforce those standards”); id. at  30–39 (describing how FDIC chairman Bair successfully 
resisted intense lobbying by the FRB, OCC and OTS, as well as Senators Schumer and Mike Crapo (R-
ID), to abandon the U.S. leverage capital requirement and conform U.S. capital requirements to the 
weaker Basel II standards as implemented by the U.K., Europe and Japan). 
 542. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 96 (describing how European banks and U.S. 
investment banks “found many creative ways to have very high leverage and evade the [Basel II] 
requirements by shifting risks to others or hiding them behind flawed risk models or misleading credit 
ratings”); id. at 183 (“[T]he financial crisis showed that Basel II was flawed.”); BAIR, supra note 290, at 
257 (“Europe was to pay dearly for its ill-advised implementation of Basel II and failure to impose a 
leverage ratio.”); id. at 40 (explaining that, due to the financial crisis, “the weight of market  opinion had 
swung our way” by the end of 2007, and the Dodd–Frank Act  “essentially killed Basel II as a means of 
reducing big bank capital”). 
 543. BAIR, supra note 290, at 192 (describing the FSA as “weak and a captive of the industry it 
regulated”); see also Eilis Ferran, The Break-Up of the Financial Services Authority (Univ. of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Res. Paper Ser. No. 10/04, Oct. 11, 2010), at 2–5 (discussing the “dramatic 
fall from grace for the FSA” and its abolition by Parliament, but suggesting that “there was not a clear-
cut case for outright abolition of the FSA and . . . fixing it was a solid option”), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690523; Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Finance: London’s Precarious 
Position, FT.COM, July 29, 2012 (reporting that the “FSA’s old reputation for light-touch regulation 
comes in for blame repeatedly as enforcement cases lay bare the excesses of the past”); Kevin Crowley 
& Ambereen Choudhury, Made-in-London Scandals Risk City Reputation as Money Center, 
BLOOMBERG, July 6, 2012 (referring to the U.K.’s bailouts of four of its largest nine banks, “costing the 
country more money than any other project in history outside of world wars”); Ali Quassim, 
International Banking: U.K.’s Chancellor Osborne to Abolish ‘Failed’ Financial Services Authority 
Started by Brown, 94 BNA’S BANKING REP. 1237 (June 22, 2010) (describing plans by the 
Conservative-Liberal coalition government to abolish the “failed” FSA and replace it with three separate 
agencies that would assume responsibility for regulating banks, protecting consumers and combating 
serious economic crimes). 
 544. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 1–3, 10, 194–95, 199; Donna Boark, Three Years 
On, Fears of Flight from U.S. Regs, AM. BANKER, June 17, 2011, at 1 (reporting that members of 
Congress “appear consumed again with a very precisis topic: Is overregulation driving financial 
institutions overseas?”; and quoting, as an example of that concern, a statement by Rep. Shelley Moore 
Capito (R-WV) that “failing to examine the aggregate cost of compliance with Dodd–Frank could lead 
to job losses and, in the worst case, a downgrade in the United States as a financial center”). 
 545. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 9; see also id. at 4 (warning that 
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the same global “competitiveness” rationale to block efforts by federal 
regulators to implement the Volcker Rule and Dodd–Frank’s derivatives 
reforms.546   
The financial industry’s repeated calls for international “level playing 
fields” seek to reduce regulatory standards for global banks to the 
“lowest common denominator” followed by any major financial 
center.547  As a practical matter, that approach would “allow foreign 
nations with the weakest systems of financial regulation to set the 
maximum level of supervisory constraints on global SIFIs.”548  The 
industry’s “level playing field” arguments must be rejected in view of 
the disastrous role played by international regulatory arbitrage in 
undermining financial supervision in the U.S., U.K. and Europe prior to 
the financial crisis.549 
2. Structural Flaws and Conflicts of Interest in U.S. Financial Agencies 
Have Increased Their Vulnerability to Industry Influence and 
Regulatory Arbitrage 
Structural flaws and conflicts of interest within U.S. financial 
agencies further weakened the effectiveness of financial regulation both 
before and after the financial crisis.  As shown above in Part 
IV(B)(1)(a), the OCC, OTS and FRB actively competed to persuade 
financial institutions to operate within their respective jurisdictions.  The 
OCC and OTS had particularly strong financial incentives to adopt lax 
policies that would encourage large depository institutions to operate as 
national banks or federal thrifts.  Assessments paid by federally-
chartered banks and thrifts funded virtually all of the OCC’s and OTS’s 
 
“excessive limitations on the ability of U.S. banks to take controlled risks will reduce the role of the 
United States as a leader in the global financial system”). 
 546. Cheyenne Hopkins et al., U.S. Volcker Rule Faces Harsh Critics, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 14, 
2012 (citing financial industry arguments that the Volcker Rule would hurt the “competitiveness” of 
U.S. banks); Kevin Wack, Regulators: We Don’t Have all the Answers on Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER, 
Jan. 19, 2012, at 1 (reporting on claims by House Republicans that “the Volcker Rule will put the 
United States at a disadvantage internationally”); Michael J. Moore, Citigroup Says Dodd–Frank Drives 
Off Overseas Clients, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 1, 2013 (describing argument by Citigroup that new 
derivatives rules mandated by Dodd–Frank could cause the bank to “lose clients to non-U.S. financial 
institutions that are not subject to the same compliance regime”); Gregory Meyer & Aline van Duyn, US 
Banks Plead to Limit Range of Swap Rules, REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2011 (citing arguments by BofA, 
Citigroup and JPMorgan that proposed derivatives rules could “damage . . . their competitiveness in 
foreign markets”). 
 547. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 10, 94–95; see also Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part 
II), at 7 (referring to the financial industry’s argument that the U.S. “should not implement fundamental 
financial reforms until all other major developed nations have agreed to do so”). 
 548. Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part II), at 7. 
 549. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 96, 177, 187; BAIR, supra note 290, at 27–38; 192, 
257; Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part II), at 7. 
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budgets.550   
For example, the fees paid by WaMu covered about one-seventh of 
the OTS’s total budget, and OTS Director John Reich referred to WaMu 
as “my largest constitutent.”551  OTS examiners uncovered “more than 
500 serious operational deficiencies” at WaMu between 2004 and 2008, 
but the OTS continued to rate WaMu as “fundamentally sound” until 
February 2008 and failed to take any public enforcement action before 
WaMu failed in September 2008.552  A Senate investigation concluded 
that the OTS’s forbearance toward WaMu “reflected an OTS culture of 
deference to bank management” as well as the OTS’s likely “recognition 
of [WaMu’s] unique importance to the agency’s finances.”553  
Congress abolished OTS for its regulatory failings.554 However, the 
OCC continues to have “strong budgetary incentives” to please large 
national banks that fund most of the agency’s operations.555  The OCC is 
“widely viewed as the most committed regulatory champion for the 
interests of major banks,” and it has consistently acted to “retain [their] 
allegiance.”556  In addition to its aggressive preemption of state 
consumer protection laws, the OCC “issued dozens of rulings that 
greatly expanded the permissible activities of national banks in areas 
such as data processing, derivatives, equipment leasing, insurance sales, 
real estate investments and securities activities.”557 In 2005, Acting 
Comptroller of the Currency Julie Williams assured a group of bankers 
that (i) the OCC’s supervisory approach provided “a spacious 
framework, designed to accommodate change,” and (ii) the agency’s 
personnel were “advocates on the national stage [for] measures designed 
to make regulation more efficient, and less costly, less intrusive, less 
complex, and less demanding on [bankers] and [their] resources.”558  
During the debates over Dodd–Frank, the OCC joined major banks 
 
 550. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 158–61; Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, “Making 
Credit Safer,” 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 81–83, 91–94 (2008); Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 915–16; see 
also BAIR, supra note 290, at 41, 79, 192, 339–40 (criticizing the conflicts of interest created by the 
OCC’s and OTS’s charter-based funding). 
 551. Senate Wall Street Crisis Report, supra note 461, at 165, 210 (quoting May 2, 2007 email 
from Mr. Reich to an OTS colleague), 230. 
 552. Senate Wall Street Crisis Report, supra note 461, at 209, 161–62, 177, 228–30. 
 553. Id. at 209–11; see also supra notes 516-18 and accompanying text (citing additional OTS 
missteps that contributed to the failures of IndyMac, Downey Federal , BankUnited and AIG). 
 554. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 918. 
 555. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 912. 
 556. Id. 
 557. Id. at 912–13 (quote); see also supra notes 251–551, 513 (discussing the OCC’s preemption 
of state laws); Saule Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ‘Business of 
Banking’, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1051–99 (2009) (describing how the OCC greatly expanded the 
powers of national banks, especially with regard to derivatives activities, by issuing rulings that adopted 
an ever-expanding definition of “the business of banking”). 
 558. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 905 (quoting speech by Ms. Williams on May 27, 2005). 
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and their trade associations in opposing many of the statute’s key 
reforms.559  After Dodd–Frank’s enactment, the OCC continued to align 
itself with large financial institutions by resisting significant increases in 
capital requirements for bank SIFIs, by opposing the Volcker Rule, and 
by refusing to make significant reductions in the scope of the OCC’s 
2004 preemption rules.560  In June 2011, Acting Comptroller of the 
Currency John Walsh appeared to question the need for fundamental 
financial reform when he warned that “in the frenzy of the moment, we 
can overreact in response to crisis . . . [W]e are in danger of trying to 
squeeze too much risk and complexity out of banking.”561   
Democrats on Capitol Hill strongly criticized Mr. Walsh, and 
President Obama replaced him with Thomas Curry, a former state 
banking commissioner and FDIC board member.562  After taking office 
in April 2012, Comptroller Curry declared that one of his “goals” was to 
“eliminate [the] perception” that “the OCC is too cozy with the banks it 
regulates.”563  He apologized for several OCC mistakes that were 
revealed shortly after he took office, including the OCC’s failures to 
prevent (i) widespread foreclosure abuses by national banks, (ii) 
JPMorgan’s $6.2 billion loss from its “London Whale” trading 
operation, and (iii) massive money laundering violations by HSBC.564  
 
 559. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 913 (discussing the OCC’s opposition during the drafting of 
Dodd-Frank to reforms that would give greater protections to consumers, require national banks to 
retain a substantial portion of the risk of loans they sell for securitization, and impose greater restrictions 
on executive pay). 
 560. Id. at 913–15. 
 561. Id. at 914 (quoting speech by Mr. Walsh on June 21, 2011).  Mr. Walsh did not change his 
views after he was replaced by Thomas Curry in April 2012.  In a subsequent interview, Mr. Walsh 
repeated his concern that “policymakers are trying to wring too much risk and complexity out of the 
financial system.”  He also cautioned that “[w]e can go too far in the direction of safety” and thereby 
restrict economic growth.  Barbara A. Rehm, What Ex-Comptroller Walsh Really Thinks About the State 
of Banking, AM. BANKER, Aug. 31, 2012, at 3 (summarizing and quoting Mr. Walsh’s views). 
 562. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 915–16; Kate Davidson, Curry’s Tricky Balancing Act at OCC, 
POLITICO.COM, Feb. 27, 2013 (available on Lexis). 
 563. Victoria McGrane, Comptroller Got ‘Whale’ of an Intro, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2012, at C9 
(quoting from an interview with Mr. Curry); see also Rob Blackwell & Rachel Witkowski, OCC’s 
Curry on Big Bank Breakup, Basel and Preemption, AM. BANKER, Jan. 22, 2013, 2013 WLNR 1420945 
(quoting Mr. Curry’s view that the OCC should act as “the cop on the beat” and should have “a good 
dose of healthy skepticism” toward the banks it regulates). 
 564. Joe Adler, Watchdog Blames OCC Supervision for Failure to Catch ‘Robo-Signing’ Scandal, 
AM. BANKER, June 4, 2012 (describing the Treasury inspector general’s criticism of the OCC for failing 
to prevent abusive foreclosure practices by national banks, and reporting that Mr. Curry “generally 
agreed with the watchdog’s recommendations”); Ben Protess, U.S. Regulator Concedes Oversight Lapse 
in JPMorgan Loss, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at B5 (reporting that Mr. Curry “conceded . . . that his 
agency stumbled” by failing to identify flawed risk management practices at JPMorgan that led to a 
“multibillion dollar trading loss”); Joe Adler, Comptroller Curry Vows Tougher Enforcement, Higher 
Ethics at OCC, AM. BANKER, July 18, 2012 (describing the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigation’s criticism of the OCC for “feeble enforcement” of anti-money laundering (AML) laws 
against HSBC, and reporting that “Curry acknowledged his agency acted too slowly in addressing the 
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Mr. Curry also developed a plan to “strengthen” the OCC by giving a 
stronger voice to the agency’s examiners and by “diversifying funding 
so the agency doesn’t have to rely solely on assessments from the banks 
it regulates.”565  However, Mr. Curry’s efforts to change the OCC’s 
culture—including his appointment of former FDIC colleagues to fill 
leadership positions at the OCC—provoked criticism from bank 
executives and OCC staff members.  As a result, some analysts 
expressed doubts whether Mr. Curry could successfully transform the 
OCC into a strong and independent regulator.566   
The Fed is not subject to the same budgetary pressures as the OCC, 
because the Fed independently finances its operations by “drawing on 
earnings from [its] portfolio of Treasury securities and other debt 
instruments.”567  However, the banking industry exerts significant 
influence over the Fed through the “unique governance structure” of the 
Fed’s twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks).568  
Member banks in each Fed district elect six of the nine directors of that 
district’s Reserve Bank, and three of those bank-elected directors vote 
(along with three additional directors appointed by the FRB) to select 
the Reserve Bank’s president.569   
 
bank’s problems”); see also Senate HSBC Report, supra note 434, at 8–11, 283–335 (criticizing the 
OCC’s failure to enforce AML laws against HSBC, stating that “[d]espite the many AML problems 
identified by its examiners, OCC supervisors took no formal or informal enforcement actions [from 
2005 until 2010], allowing the bank’s AML problems to fester,” id. at 283); Jesse Hamilton, Bank-
Friendly Regulator Shifts to Revamp Reputation, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 8, 2012 (reporting on initiatives 
taken by Mr. Curry to make the OCC “a regulator for the public, not a regulator that views itself as 
protecting banks”) (quoting former FDIC chairman Sheila Bair, who worked with Mr. Curry at the 
FDIC). 
 565. Davidson, supra note 562. 
 566. Id.; Hamilton, supra note 564; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 341 (noting that Mr. Curry 
would be “fighting an uphill battle” in trying to “change the regulatory culture of the OCC and refocus it 
on protecting the public interest, not the banks” because “the OCC’s decline as a regulator has been 
ongoing for many years”); Victoria Finkle, If CFPB Needs a Commission, Why Not OCC?, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 13, 2013 (reporting on a proposal by Sen. Mike Crapo (R-ID) to replace the OCC’s 
single-director model of governance with a bipartisan commission, and citing analyst Edward Mills’ 
view that Senator Crapo’s proposal might “reflect dissatisfaction with the new regime at the OCC,” 
including Mr. Curry’s efforts “to distance the agency from the perception that it is too lenient on banks.  
If the agency gets tougher on the industry, that may prompt more calls to change its structure” in order 
to give Republican legislators and the banking industry “more control over Curry than they currently 
have”). 
 567. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 941. 
 568. Id.; see also ALLAN H. MELTZER, 1 A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913–1951, at 
65–67, 483–86 (2003) (explaining that the Fed’s governance structure, which was established in 1913 
and modified in 1935, represented a “compromise” between those who wanted a “central bank . . . under 
political control”—as reflected in the President’s appointment of  the FRB’s governors—and those who 
wanted a “central bank . . . run by bankers,” as reflected in the election of two-thirds of each Reserve 
Bank’s directors by member banks); BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 151 (discussing the 
“many compromises” that produced the  “unique . . . private-public nature of the Fed, as well as its 
centralized-decentralized structure”). 
 569. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 941–42 (explaining that (i) member banks elect three Class A 
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Five Reserve Bank presidents are voting members of the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC)—which determines the nation’s 
monetary policy—along with the FRB’s seven governors.570  All twelve 
Reserve Bank presidents participate in the FOMC’s meetings, and each 
Reserve Bank president has shared responsibility (together with the 
FRB) for supervising member banks and bank holding companies 
headquartered in that Reserve Bank’s district.  Thus, Reserve Bank 
presidents—who are subject to substantial influence from member banks 
in their districts—”play significant roles in determining the Fed’s 
monetary policy and bank supervisory policies.”571  
Boards of directors of Reserve Banks have “typically been dominated 
by senior executives of major banks, large [nonbank] financial firms and 
leading nonfinancial corporations that are customers of the biggest 
banks.”572  Many of the same banks and nonbank firms received federal 
support during the financial crisis.  For example, during the peak of the 
crisis between 2007 and 2009, the New York Fed’s board of directors 
included JPMorgan chairman Jamie Dimon, Lehman chairman Richard 
Fuld, General Electric chairman Jeffrey Immelt, and Goldman director 
and former chairman Stephen Friedman.573  Mr. Friedman’s service as a 
Class C director of the New York Fed provoked substantial public 
controversy because the FRB granted a waiver that allowed him to 
continue serving in that role after Goldman converted to a bank holding 
company in September 2008.574  
 
and three Class B directors for each Reserve Bank, while the FRB appoints three Class C directors, and 
(ii) Class B and Class C directors jointly vote to select the Reserve Bank’s president). 
 570. Id. at 942 (explaining that the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New 
York Fed) serves as a permanent voting member of the FOMC, while four additional FOMC voting 
seats rotate among the other eleven Reserve Bank presidents). 
 571. Id.; see also BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 89 (stating that the Fed “is not 
independent of private banks” because “private banks are intimately intertwined with [Fed officials] 
charged with regulating the nation’s major banks”). 
 572. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 943; see also Jonathan Reiss, The Regional Feds Need More 
Independence, BLOOMBERG, June 13, 2012 (pointing out that six of the nine directors of each Reserve 
Bank are elected by the banking industry, and also noting that the New York Fed’s three current Class C 
directors were appointed by the FRB but were also leaders of “nonprofit corporations that rely on 
contributions from financial corporations or their executives”). 
 573. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 943; see also U.S. Senator Bernard Sanders (I-VT), Jamie 
Dimon Is Not Alone, June 12, 2012 (identifying 18 former and current Reserve Bank directors who 
worked in banks and corporations that received Fed liquidity assistance during the financial crisis), 
available at http://www.sanders.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/061212DimonIsNotAlone.pdf; William 
Alden, Dimon Leaves New York Fed Board as His Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (DEALBOOK), Jan. 8, 
2013 (available on Lexis) (reporting that Mr. Dimon left the New York Fed’s board in December 2012 
after completing two three-year terms). 
 574. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 944–45 (explaining that (i) “[w]ithout the FRB’s waiver, 
Friedman would have been disqualified from serving as a Class C director unless he resigned his 
Goldman directorship and divested his Goldman stock,” and (ii) “Friedman purchased 37,000 additional 
shares of Goldman stock while his waiver was pending, and during that period the New York Fed 
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Dimon, Fuld, Immelt, Friedman and fourteen other Reserve Bank 
directors worked at institutions that received massive amounts of 
emergency liquidity assistance from the Fed during the crisis.575  In 
addition, academic studies have shown that (i) “banks were significantly 
more likely to receive capital assistance under [TARP] if their 
executives served as directors of either Reserve Banks or Reserve Bank 
branches,”576 and (ii) banks whose executives served as Reserve Bank 
Class A directors between 1990 and 2009 “experienced significant 
abnormal gains in their stock market values” and “were significantly 
less likely to fail (compared with other banks).”577   
 During the past two decades the FRB has actively competed with the 
OCC to attract the loyalty of major banks by (A) issuing rulings that 
expanded the securities and derivatives activities of bank holding 
companies, (B) granting exemptions that loosened restraints on 
transactions between major banks and their affiliates, and (C) 
advocating the adoption of less demanding capital requirements for the 
largest banks under the Basel II capital accord.578  Both the FRB and the 
OCC advocated an aggressive bailout policy for leading banks during 
the financial crisis, and they also supported giving lenient terms to major 
banks that wanted “to exit the TARP capital assistance program by 
repurchasing the preferred stock they had sold to Treasury.”579 
The foregoing evidence indicates that “large financial institutions 
have exerted substantial influence on Fed policies” as well as those of 
the OCC.580  The nature and extent of the financial industry’s influence 
on the Fed and the OCC become even clearer when one considers the 
 
directed AIG to pay $14 billion to Goldman, representing full payment of AIG’s obligations to 
Goldman”). 
 575. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 945–46; see also Sanders, supra note 573, at 1 (stating that “at 
least 18 former and current directors from Federal Reserve Banks worked in banks and corporations 
that collectively received over $4 trillion in low-interest loans from the Federal Reserve”). 
 576. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 946 (citing a study by Ran Duchin and Denis Sosyura and 
another study by Lei Li). 
 577. Id. at 946–47 (citing a study by Renee Adams). 
 578. Saule Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities 
(Nov. 24, 2012), at 12–14, 33–42 (discussing OCC and FRB rulings that greatly expanded the securities 
and derivatives activities of national banks and bank holding companies), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180647; Saule Omarova, From Gramm–Leach–Bliley to Dodd–Frank: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1702–03, 1706–
55 (2011) (detailing the generous exemptions that the FRB granted to large banking organizations from 
rules limiting affiliate transactions, both before and during the financial crisis); BAIR, supra note 290, at 
31–39 (stating that FRB and OCC officials worked together to promote more lenient capital standards 
for large U.S. banks under Basel II); Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 948 (same). 
 579. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 948–50; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 95–129, 165–74, 207 
(describing the FRB’s and OCC’s strong support for bailouts of large troubled banks and their 
willingness to allow lenient terms for major banks that wanted to leave the TARP program). 
 580. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947, 950. 
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contrasting record of the FDIC.  As I explained in a previous article, the 
FDIC “has demonstrated a significantly higher degree of independence 
from industry influence” by virtue of its “clearly defined mission” as 
well as its “assured source of funding.”581  The FDIC’s twin purposes 
are to protect bank depositors and preserve the Deposit Insurance Fund 
(DIF), and both goals encourage the FDIC to consider the broader public 
interest and not just the financial industry’s self-interest.582  In addition, 
the FDIC funds its operations by collecting premiums from FDIC-
insured banks.  Because FDIC insurance is a practical necessity for all 
banks that accept deposits from the public, the FDIC—unlike the 
OCC—is not vulnerable to industry influence through “charter 
competition.”583 
The FDIC’s “guaranteed funding source” also means that the agency 
is not subject to congressional domination through the appropriations 
process.584  As I previously pointed out, “Congress has frequently 
undermined the effectiveness of CFTC and SEC over the past two 
decades by frequently failing to provide those agencies with adequate 
funds.”585  Two former chairmen of the CFTC and SEC recently 
declared that both agencies “need a robust—and dependable—source of 
funding” that is not subject to deep cuts imposed by congressional 
appropriators.586  As both former chairmen explained, an independent 
funding source “insulates [agencies] from political pressure exerted by 
the deep-pocketed institutions they regulate” and allows agencies to 
“implement strategic decisions to adapt to changing markets and build 
 
 581. Id. at 947. 
 582. Id.; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 8, 12–13, 21–24, 43–47, 81–82, 192–93, 226, 340 
(describing the FDIC’s strong commitments to protect depositors and preserve the DIF as well as the 
FDIC’s relative independence from the financial industry); Brendan Greeley, Ditch Basel Rules, Just 
Raise Capital, Vitter Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESWEEK (May 1, 2013) (stating that the FDIC has 
followed “more conservative” supervisory policies because of its dual role as “both a regulator and an 
insurer”), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-01/ditch-basel-bank-rules-just-raise-capital-
vitter-says. 
 583. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 340 (stating that the FDIC 
“has repeatedly proven itself to be significantly more independent of the big banks than the OCC” 
because the FDIC “does not have to rely on fees from the nation’s biggest banks to fund itself, as does 
the OCC”). 
 584. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947. 
 585. Id. at 951–53; see also supra notes 87–89, 160–62 (describing successful efforts by the 
financial industry and its congressional allies to cut or freeze the budgets of the CFTC and SEC and 
thereby constrain the ability of both agencies to implement Dodd–Frank’s reforms); BAIR, supra note 
290, at 342–43 (stating that “industry lobbyists have found that the best way to harass the SEC and 
CFTC and block efforts at financial reform is through convincing appropriations committees to restrict 
how these agencies can use their money,” and contending that the “effectiveness [of the SEC and 
CFTC] will not be improved if their senior staff and chairmen have to spend time and resources on the 
Hill constantly battling industry lobbyists for enough money to operate”). 
 586. Brooksley Born & William Donaldson, Self-Funding of Regulators Would Help Fiscal Mess, 
POLITICO.COM, Mar. 10, 2013. 
2013] TURNING A BLIND EYE 1405 
needed information technology . . . all of which require multiyear budget 
certainty.”587  
Because of the FDIC’s well-defined public interest mission and its 
assured funding, the FDIC has demonstrated a much higher degree of 
independence from the financial industry than the FRB, OCC, CFTC or 
SEC.  During the period leading up to the financial crisis, the FDIC (i) 
generally took a tougher position against subprime mortgage lending,588 
and (ii) “fought hard to maintain tougher capital rules for U.S. banks 
(including leverage capital requirements) during international 
negotiations over the Basel II capital accord.”589  The FDIC also pushed 
the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision to adopt stronger capital 
standards—including a leverage requirement—in the post-crisis Basel 
III accord,590 although Basel III did not go far enough.591  The FDIC 
prevailed (over the opposition of New York Fed and Treasury officials) 
in deciding that WaMu’s bondholders would not be bailed out when 
WaMu failed in September 2008.592  The FDIC achieved partial 
success—again despite the contrary views of Fed and OCC officials—
when it pressured the largest banks to satisfy tougher capital-raising 
requirements in order to exit the TARP capital assistance program.593   
Sheila Bair, who served as FDIC chairman from 2006 to 2011, 
deserves much of the credit for the FDIC’s comparatively better 
performance during those years.  However, the FDIC’s public interest 
mission and its structural independence from the banking industry also 
appear to be key factors.  An example of that independence is shown by 
the fact that, over the past three decades, industry insiders have 
repeatedly attacked the FDIC for seeking to impose stronger capital 
standards and higher deposit insurance premiums to reduce bank failures 
and protect the DIF.594  Industry critics have frequently mocked the 
FDIC’s acronym as standing for “Forever Demanding Increased 
Capital.”595  An appropriate response to that mockery might be, “Isn’t 
that the FDIC’s job?”   
 
 587. Id. 
 588. BAIR, supra note 290, at 43–49, 57–58. 
 589. Wilmarth. supra note 19, at 947–48; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 30–40. 
 590. BAIR, supra note 290, at 257–72. 
 591. See ADMATI AND HELLWIG, supra note 516, at 96, 169–70, 176–88 (showing that Basel III is 
inadequate to ensure that large global banks can withstand future shocks similar to the financial crisis of 
2007–09). 
 592. BAIR, supra note 290, at 90–94, 99–100; see also Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 948–49, 949 
n.283 (explaining that then-New York Fed president Timothy Geithner and Treasury officials strongly 
favored protecting WaMu’s bondholders). 
 593. BAIR, supra note 290, at 201–07; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 949–50. 
 594. BAIR, supra note 290, at 22–25; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947. 
 595. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947, 947–48 n.279. 
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3. The “Revolving Door” and “Cultural Capture” Provide Important 
Sources of Regulatory Influence for the Financial Industry 
The far-reaching deregulation of the U.S. financial services industry 
after 1980 and the resulting proliferation of new financial activities and 
products promoted rapid growth in the industry’s size, profitability and 
compensation.596  For example, U.S. financial-sector assets (including 
assets under financial management) mushroomed from $15.06 trillion 
(254% of GDP) in 1991 to $37.71 trillion (360% of GDP) in 2002 and 
$55.62 trillion (420% of GDP) in 2006.597  Similarly, U.S. financial-
sector debt rose from 40% of GDP in 1988 to 70% of GDP in 1998 and 
120% of GDP in 2006.598  U.S. financial-sector profits experienced a 
comparable growth curve, rising from 13% of total pretax domestic 
profits in 1980 to 27% of such profits in 2007.599  Stocks of financial 
firms included in the S&P 500 index accounted for the highest aggregate 
market value of any industry sector from 1995 to 1998 and again from 
2002 to 2007.600   
Compensation in the U.S. financial industry steadily moved upward 
 
 596. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 70–87, 104–09, 120–44; Wilmarth, supra note  15, at 
972–97, 1002–15; see also Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. 
Financial Industry: 1909–2006, Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 14644 (Jan. 2009), at 3–4, 
16–22, 30 (finding that the two most important factors behind the significant rise in financial sector 
compensation between 1980 and 2006 were (i) deregulation of banking and financial operations and (ii) 
expansion of corporate finance activities linked to IPOs and credit risk management), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14644. 
 597. For the U.S. financial industry’s assets in 1991, see Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Flow 
of Funds Accounts of the United States, 4th Qtr. 1996 (Statistical Rel. Z.1), at 68, 72–79 (line 1 of tbls. 
L.109, L.114, L.115, L. 116, L.117, L.118, L.119, L.120, L.121, L.122, L.123, L.124, L.125, L.126), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/19970314/z1.pdf.  For GDP in 1991, see Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, 3d Qtr. 1996 (Statistical 
Rel. Z.1), at 12 (tbl.F.6, line 1), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/19961211/z1.pdf.  For the financial industry’s assets in 2002 
and 2006, see Ins. Co. Instit. & Fin. Serv. Roundtable, The Financial Services Fact Book 2008, at 2.  
For GDP in 2002 and 2006, see Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Flow of Funds Accounts of the 
United States, 4th Qtr. 2006 (Statistical Rel. Z.1.), at 12 (tbl.F.6, line 1).  See also Steven M. Kaplan & 
Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, (Nat’l 
Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper 13270, July 2007), at 18 (noting that the global capital of the top 50 
U.S. securities firms grew by more than 20 times between 1987 and 2004, while total assets under 
management at U.S. mutual funds rose from $135 billion to $8.9 trillion between 1980 and 2005), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13270. 
 598. The gods strike back: A special report on financial risk, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2010, at 3 
(Borrowed time chart 1). 
 599. Justin Lahart, Has the Financial Industry’s Heyday Come and Gone?, WALL ST. J., April 28, 
2008, at A2. 
 600. Elizabeth Stanton, Bank Stocks Cede Biggest S&P Weighting to Technology (Update 1), 
BLOOMBERG, May 21, 2008; see also Tom Lauricella, Crumbling Profit Center: Financial Sector 
Showing Life, but Don’t Bank on Long-Term Revival, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2008, at C1 (reporting that 
financial stocks accounted for 22.3% of the toal market value of all stocks included in the S&P 500 
index at the end of 2006, “up from just 13% at the end of 1995”). 
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in tandem with the dramatic growth in the industry’s size and profits 
after 1980.  Wages in the financial sector were approximately the same 
as average wages in the rest of the U.S. economy in 1980.  However, 
relative wages in the financial sector increased rapidly thereafter and 
were seventy percent higher than average wages in the rest of the U.S. 
economy by 2006.601  The peak reached in 2006 for relative 
compensation in the financial industry matched a similarly high level 
recorded in the early 1930s, which also marked the end of a long period 
of aggressive deregulation and rapid growth in the financial sector.602  
The remarkable expansion of the financial industry’s size, profits and 
compensation over the past three decades produced a parallel growth in 
the industry’s political clout.  As described above, the financial sector’s 
lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions increased 
dramatically after 1990.603  Wall Street’s ability to wield great political 
influence and to offer highly-compensated employment also created 
powerful incentives for a rapidly spinning “revolving door” between 
leadership positions in financial regulatory agencies and senior positions 
at Wall Street firms and their law firms, accounting firms and trade 
associations.604  As shown below, the “revolving door” and the related 
problem of “cultural” or “cognitive” capture provide additional 
explanations for Wall Street’s continued ability to shape Washington’s 
financial policies. 
a. The Impact of the “Revolving Door” in Magnifying the Financial 
Industry’s Influence in Washington 
The “revolving door” between government service and Wall Street-
related employment has undoubtedly played a major role—along with 
political contributions and lobbying—in helping to foster a pro-industry 
 
 601. Philippon & Reshef, supra note 596, at 3–4, 8 & fig. 1; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra 
note 15, at 113–14, 252 n.77 (discussing the study by Philippon & Reshef and noting that the “excess 
relative wage” paid to financial industry workers over other workers—representing “the difference 
between [higher] average finance wages and what one would predict based on educational differences—
reaches a peak of around 40 percentage points in the 2000s”); Kaplan & Rauh, supra note 597, at 2–6, 
32–34, 37–40, tbl.8a (concluding that executives of U.S. securities firms, hedge funds, private equity 
funds, venture capital funds and mutual funds accounted for more than half of the most highly-
compensated American individuals in 2004). 
 602. Philippon & Reshef, supra note 596, at 3–4, 8, 16–17 (describing the impact of deregulation 
and the growth of IPOs and other corporate finance activities between 1900 and 1930 and again between 
1980 and 2007). 
 603. See supra Part IV(A)(1); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 90–92. 
 604. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 92–105, 113–19; see also BARTH, CAPRO & LEVINE, 
supra note 19, at 89, 209–10 (stating that “[t]he revolving door spins often and rapidly” between 
financial regulatory agencies and Wall Street and noting that “regulatory officials often raise their 
salaries by a factor of ten, if not more, by moving from their regulatory offices to financial firms”). 
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outlook among many members of Congress, senior Executive Branch 
officials and financial regulators.605  A former senior legislative aide and 
lawyer-lobbyist recently declared, “Money is the basis of almost all 
relationships in [Washington,] DC . . . .  [O]ur political campaign 
system and DC’s mushrooming Permanent Class—who alternate 
between government jobs and lawyering, influence-peddling and 
finance—mean Wall Street always wins.”606 
In recent years the financial industry has employed hundreds of 
former members of Congress, legislative staffers, senior regulators and 
agency staffers as lobbyists and advisers.  In 2009 and 2010, as noted 
above, (i) the financial industry hired more than 1,400 lobbyists who 
were former federal employees, including 73 former members of 
Congress and two former Comptrollers of the Currency, and (ii) the six 
largest U.S. banks employed more than 240 lobbyists who were former 
government insiders.607  Financial industry trade groups frequently 
appoint former politicians as their leaders.608  For example, the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) recently named former 
Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE) as its CEO.  In announcing Senator 
Nelson’s appointment, the president of NAIC declared, “We needed the 
gravitas, the phone calls returned, to go to Capitol Hill, to tell our story, 
defend our turf . . . .  I think all the way up to and including President 
Obama would return Senator Nelson’s phone calls.”609 
 
 605. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 92–93 (contending that the “constant flow of people 
from Washington to Wall Street and back ensured that important decisions were made by officials who 
had absorbed the financial sector’s view of the world and its perspective on government policy, and who 
often saw their future careers on Wall Street, not in Washington”); see also BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, 
supra note 19, at 7, 89, 209–10 (agreeing that the “revolving door” contributes to a situation in which 
“regulators are not completely independent of private financial institutions”); ADMATI & HELLWIG, 
supra note 523, at 204–05, 325–26 n.56 (reaching a similar conclusion). 
 606. CONNAUGHTON, supra  note 367 , at 11. 
 607. See supra notes 389–90 and accompanying text; see also supra note 375 and accompanying 
text (citing study finding that the financial industry employed 3,000 lobbyists in 2007, including many 
former government insiders). 
 608. SIFMA, Wall Street’s preeminent trade association, recently hired former Senator Judd 
Gregg (R-NH) as its CEO while retaining former congressman Kenneth Bentsen (D-TX) as its 
president.  Stephen Joyce, Financial Services: SIFMA Names New Leadership, Says Focus Shifting 
Away From 2008 Crisis, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 980 (May 27, 2013).  The Financial Services 
Roundtable, which represents most of the 100 largest U.S. financial institutions, hired former Minnesota 
Governor and Republican Presidential candidate Tim Pawlenty in September 2012 to replace former 
Texas Republican congressman Steve Bartlett.  Barbara Rehm, Roundtable’s Pawlenty: A Blunt Boss 
Set for Long Haul, AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 2012.  Similarly, the American Bankers Association appointed 
former Republican Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating as its president in 2011.  Stacy Kaper, Next 
Leader of ABA Vows to Put Aside His Politics, AM. BANKER, Nov. 24, 2010, at 1, 2010 WLNR 
23356127. 
 609. Zachary Tracer & Alex Nussbaum, Ex-Senator Nelson to Run Insurer Watchdog Group, 
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 22, 2013 (quoting NAIC president Jim Donelson, and noting that former Senator 
Nelson had previously served as Nebraska’s insurance commissioner and Governor). 
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JPMorgan chairman Jamie Dimon confirmed the crucial importance 
of political influence in shaping financial policy when he described 
government relations as JPMorgan’s “seventh line of business.”610  
JPMorgan has hired a large number of executives and in-house lobbyists 
who formerly worked as top government officials or senior 
congressional staffers.611  Citigroup has employed a similar array of 
former government heavyweights, including former Treasury Secretary 
Robert Rubin from 1999 to 2009,612 as well as former Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Director and current Treasury 
Secretary Jacob Lew from 2006 to 2008, and former OMB Director 
Peter Orszag since 2010.613 
Goldman Sachs is probably the best-known participant in the 
revolving-door phenomenon.  Indeed, the firm is often referred to as 
“Government Sachs,” due to the steady flow of senior personnel 
between the firm and government agencies.614  Two former Treasury 
Secretaries—Robert Rubin (1995–99) and Henry Paulson (2006–09)—
were chairmen of Goldman Sachs before their government service, and 
Henry Fowler joined Goldman Sachs as a partner after his term as 
Treasury Secretary ended in 1968.615  Fowler introduced Rubin to 
 
 610. Jackie Calmes & Louise Story, In Washington, One Bank Chief Still Holds Sway, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2009, at A1. 
 611. John McCormick et al., The Administration: Fixing the Things the Chicago Way, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 17–23, 2011, at 25 (reporting that President Obama appointed 
William Daley as his chief of staff after Mr. Daley—a former Secretary of Commerce under President 
Clinton—worked for JPMorgan for seven years as the bank’s “political coordinator”) (quoting Leo 
Melamed); Robert Schmidt, JPMorgan Drafts Republicans for Damage Control, BLOOMBERG, June 12, 
2013 (reporting that JPMorgan employed former Senator Mel Martinez (R-Fl) as a regional chairman 
and Peter Scher, a former Clinton Administration official, as the bank’s head of global government 
relations); Kevin Wack, JPMorgan Builds Vast Web of Staff, Money Connections to Lawmakers, AM. 
BANKER, June 13, 2012 (explaining that, in addition to giving large political contributions to key 
members of the Senate and House banking committees,  JPMorgan employed 11 in-house lobbyists who 
were former staffers on Capitol Hill, including six who worked for Democrats and five who worked for 
Republicans). 
 612. William D. Cohan, Rethinking Rubin, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 24–30, 2012, at 
60; see also Michael Hirsh, In Bob We Trust, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 2013, at 12, 17–18 
(reporting that Rubin advocated legislation to repeal Glass–Steagall as Treasury Secretary, and 
Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill hired Rubin in 1999 “to secure a ‘highly visible public endorsement’ for the 
repeal of Glass–Steagall later that year”); Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 220–21, 306–07 (explaining that 
the passage of GLBA, which repealed Glass–Steagall, was necessary to enable Citigroup to continue to 
operate as a diversified financial conglomerate). 
 613. Eric Lipton, Advisers’ Citigroup Ties Raise Questions, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A21; 
Jonathan Weil, Citigroup’s Man Goes to the Treasury Department, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 21, 2013; 
Zachary Goldfarb, Regulators see chance to cash in, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2010, at A11; David Griffin, 
Citigroup’s Orszag to Oversee Strategy Unit as Chiefs Picked, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 25, 2013. 
 614. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Ben White, The Guys from ‘Government Sachs,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
19, 2008, § BU, at 1; Michael Hirsh, ‘Government Sachs,’ Italian Style, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 
2011 (available on Lexis); Michael J. De La Merced, Bank of England’s New Leader a Member of the 
‘Government Sachs’ Club, NEW YORK TIMES BLOGS (DEALBOOK), Nov. 26, 2012 (available on Lexis). 
 615. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 93–95; Joseph Weber, The Leadership Factory, 
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Democratic “powerbroker” Robert Strauss in 1971, a step that launched 
Rubin’s active involvement in politics and government.616  Both Rubin 
and Paulson appointed several of their Goldman colleagues to senior 
Treasury posts during their respective tenures as Treasury Secretary.617   
Many other former Goldman partners have served in senior federal 
government positions since World War II.618  As noted above, former 
Goldman chairman Stephen Friedman had a controversial tenure as a 
Class C director of the New York Fed, and he was also chair of the 
search committee that nominated William Dudley, Goldman’s former 
chief economist, as the new President of the New York Fed in 2009.619  
Goldman’s alumni also include two leading international central 
bankers—Mario Draghi (former head of the Bank of Italy and current 
head of the European Central Bank), and Mark Carney (former head of 
the Bank of Canada and current head of the Bank of England).620  
Robert Rubin’s career—including his ability to secure top-level 
government and private-sector positions for his acolytes—provides a 
striking illustration of the revolving door’s powerful impact.621  After 
being mentored by Henry Fowler and Robert Strauss, Rubin was 
appointed by President Clinton as head of the National Economic 
Council in 1993 and as Treasury Secretary in 1995.  Rubin received 
widespread praise for “his handling of the Asian financial crisis and the 
bailout of Long-Term Capital Management” in 1998.622  Along with 
FRB chairman Alan Greenspan and Deputy Treasury Secretary 
Lawrence Summers, Rubin “was lionized on the cover of Time, which 
dubbed the troika the ‘Committee to Save the World.’”623  Rubin helped 
to arrange the appointments of many of his mentees to senior positions 
in the federal government, including (i) Lawrence Summers as Treasury 
Secretary in 1999 and as chief economic adviser to President Obama in 
 
BUSINESSWEEK, June 12, 2006, at 60. 
 616. William D. Cohan, Bob Rubin’s Washington Reign Reaches 20 Years, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 20, 
2013. 
 617. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 93–100; Creswell & White, supra note 614. 
 618. Weber, supra note 615 (noting, inter alia, that former Goldman chairman Jon Corzine served 
as a U.S. Senator and Governor of New Jersey, while former Goldman chairman Stephen Friedman 
served as a senior advisor to President George W. Bush). 
 619. See supra note 574 and accompanying text; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 944–45. 
 620. Hirsh, supra note 612; Landon Thomas Jr. & Jack Ewing, Can Super Mario Savie the Day 
for Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, § BU, at 4; Landon Thomas Jr. & Julia Werdigier, Britain 
Selects a Canadian to Lead the Bank of England, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, at B1; De La Merced, 
supra note 614. 
 621. Gabriel Sherman, Revolver, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, April 18, 2011 (“More than anyone else, 
it was Bob Rubin who made the Democratic revolving door work as smoothly as it has.”) (available on 
Lexis). 
 622. Id. 
 623. Id. 
2013] TURNING A BLIND EYE 1411 
2009, (ii) Timothy Geithner as President of the New York Fed in 2003 
and as Treasury Secretary in 2009, (iii) Peter Orszag as OMB Director 
in 2009, and (iv) Jacob (Jack) Lew as Treasury Secretary in 2013.624 
Three recent Comptrollers of the Currency provide further prominent 
examples of the revolving door between the private sector and 
government service.  Eugene Ludwig practiced law at Covington & 
Burling, served as Comptroller from 1993 to 1998 and was a vice 
chairman at Bankers Trust before he founded Promontory Financial 
Group—”a consulting firm that has built a reputation as a shadow 
regulator by hiring scores of former government officials”—in 2001.625  
John D. Hawke, Jr., served as the FRB’s General Counsel from 1975 to 
1978, practiced law at Arnold & Porter and worked as a top Treasury 
official from 1995 to 1998, after which he served as Comptroller from 
1998 to 2004 and then returned to Arnold & Porter.626  John C. Dugan 
was a senior House banking committee counsel, worked as a senior 
Treasury official and practiced law at Covington & Burling before 
serving as Comptroller from 2005 to 2010, when he returned to 
Covington & Burling.627   
As three economists recently observed, “The speed of the revolving 
door at the SEC makes one’s head spin.”628  Between 2001 and 2010, 
 
 624. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 93–100; Jackie Calmes, Rubinomics Recalculated, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at A1; Cohan,  supra note 612; Hirsh, supra note 612; Eamon Javers, 
Robert Rubin returns, POLITICO.COM, April 8, 2010 (available on Lexis). 
 625. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ex-Chief Lands at Consultant—Schapiro Is Latest Former U.S. 
Regulator to Join Promontory Financial, WALL ST. J., April 2, 2013, at C1 (reporting that Promontory 
hired former SEC chairman Mary Schapiro to lead the firm’s “governance and markets practice and 
advis[e] clients on risk management and compliance” and noting that “[m]ore than one-fourth of 
Promontory’s nearly 400 full-time employees are former regulators”); see also Jeff Horwitz & Maria 
Aspan, How Ludwig’s Promontory Became a Regulatory Braintrust, AM. BANKER, April 2013 
(describing Ludwig’s career and his success in building Promontory as an “ex-regulator omnibus, 
capable of forecasting, mimicking and occasionally even substituting for the financial industry’s 
supervisors”), available at http://www.promontory.com/uploadedFiles/Articles/News/How%20Ludwi 
gs%20Promontory%20Became%20a%20Regulatory%20Braintrust%20%20April%202013.pdf; 
Ludwig: 21st Century Spells Challenge, Change, BANK INVESTMENT SERVICES REP., Mar. 15, 1999, at 
1 (discussing Ludwig’s career) (available on Lexis). 
 626. Arnold & Porter LLP, firm biography of John D. Hawke, Jr., available at 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?u=HawkeJohnDJr&action=view&id=716. 
 627. Covington & Burling, firm biography of John C. Dugan, available at 
http://www.cov.com/jdugan/; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 95 (explaining that Dugan served as 
“a Treasury official during the George H.W. Bush administration, [where] he led a study that advocated 
the repeal of interstate banking restrictions and of the Glass–Steagall Act; as a lawyer advising the 
American Bankers Association, he helped steer [GLBA] through Congress”); see also U.S. Dept. of the 
Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks 
xviii, 5–8, 49–61 (Feb. 1991) (stating that Dugan was “Study Director” for the Treasury study, which 
recommended legislation that would authorize nationwide banking and branching and would also repeal 
the Glass–Steagall Act). 
 628. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 209–10.  The revolving door also spins rapidly 
at the CFTC.  According to one news story, “fully three-quarters of those who had served as CFTC 
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more than 400 SEC alumni filed nearly 2,000 requests to represent 
clients before the SEC within two years after they had left the agency.629  
Former SEC officials have helped Wall Street clients to obtain hundreds 
of special waivers from the agency since 2001.  Those waivers have 
allowed Wall Street firms to continue selling securities in public 
offerings as “well-known seasoned issuers,” and to sell securities in 
exempt private offerings, even though the firms previously settled SEC 
charges for securities law violations.630  In addition, former SEC 
employees obtained dozens of no-action letters that allowed their Wall 
Street clients to provide financial support to sponsored money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs) during the financial crisis.631  SEC alumni also 
actively participated in the mutual fund industry’s lobbying campaign 
that successfully blocked SEC chairman Mary Schapiro’s efforts to 
impose stronger regulations on MMMFs in 2012.632 
The powerful impact of the revolving door is confirmed not only by 
those who enter it but also by those who refuse to enter or decide to 
leave it.  In his recent memoir, Neil Barofsky recounts a meeting in 
April 2010 with Herbert Allison, a senior Treasury official and former 
Wall Street executive.  After first praising Barofsky as “very talented, 
with a bright future,” Allison warned Barofsky that he was causing 
himself “real harm” by issuing reports (in his capacity as Special 
Inspector General for TARP) that sharply criticized Treasury’s 
implementation of TARP.633  Allison advised Barofsky that “[a]ll you 
really have to do is to change your tone, just a bit, and things can really 
 
commissioners over the past decade are among the noisy crowd of lobbyists beseeching [CFTC 
chairman Gary Gensler] to soften the proposed derivatives rules, delay their implementation or simply 
chuck them out altogether.”  Rivlin, supra note 7. 
 629. Project on Government Oversight, Dangerous Liaisons: Revolving Door at SEC Creates 
Risk of Regulatory Capture 8 (Feb. 11, 2013) [hereinafter POGO SEC Revolving Door Report], 
available at http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2013/dangerous-liaisons-revolving-door-at-
sec.html?print=t; see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Securities and Exchange Commission: 
Existing Post-Employment Controls Could Be Further Strengthened, GAO-11-654, at 5,10 (July 2011) 
(finding that, between 2005 and 2010, 224 SEC alumni filed 825 requests to represent clients before the 
SEC within two years after those former employees left the agency) [hereinafter GAO SEC Revolving 
Door Study]. 
 630. POGO SEC Revolving Door Report, supra note 629, at 8–10; Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Is 
Avoiding Tough Sanctions for Large Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at A1.  In many cases the SEC 
granted the requested waivers even though the requesting firms had entered into more than one 
settlement with the SEC.  Id. 
 631. POGO SEC Revolving Door Report, supra note 629, at 14. 
 632. Id. at 3–6. 
 633. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at xii–xiii; see also supra notes 337–40, 344-49 and 
accompanying text (discussing Barofsky’s critique of Treasury’s implementation of HAMP); Gretchen 
Morgenson, TARP’s Watchdog: A Tough Act to Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, § BU, at 1 
(explaining that Barofsky criticized Treasury’s implementation  of several TARP programs, and noting 
that Barofsky’s reports “often put him at odds with the Treasury officials whose work he [was] charged 
with overseeing”). 
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change for you.  Including with the White House.”634  Allison further 
suggested that the Obama Administration might be willing to offer 
Barofsky “[s]omething else in government” or a “judgeship,” but 
Barofsky politely declined to follow Allison’s advice, and he continued 
to criticize Treasury’s implementation of TARP in subsequent reports.635  
Of course, Barofsky did not receive any offers of senior government 
positions or Wall Street partnerships when he completed his government 
service in 2011.636 
While Barofsky’s experience indicates the consequences of refusing 
to enter the revolving door, Gary Gensler’s career reveals the likely 
costs of exiting that door.  After working at Goldman Sachs from 1979 
to 1997, Gensler served as a senior Treasury official under Rubin and 
Summers during the Clinton Administration and later helped Senator 
Paul Sarbanes to draft the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002.637  Although 
viewed as a champion of financial deregulation during his Treasury 
service, Gensler adopted a very different approach after he was 
appointed as CFTC’s chairman in 2009.  Gensler became the leading 
government champion for enacting and implementing Dodd–Frank’s 
new regime for regulating derivatives markets.638  He also became the 
“driving force” for prosecuting large U.S. and foreign banks for having 
manipulated Libor, in sharp contrast to other U.S. and U.K. financial 
regulators who largely ignored evidence of widespread Libor 
manipulation in 2007 and 2008.639 
Gensler publicly declared his independence from Wall Street in early 
2010, while he actively negotiated Dodd–Frank’s derivatives reforms.  
He stated in an interview that he could “take on the banks . . . because 
they are part of his past, not his future.” 640  As Gensler explained, “I 
don’t see myself going back to Wall Street . . . .  That’s very 
liberating.”641  
In response to Gensler’s vigorous reform efforts, Wall Street and its 
 
 634. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at xiv. 
 635. Id. at xiv–xvi; 200–25. 
 636. Id. at 225 (explaining that Barofsky accepted an offer to teach at New York University Law 
School); see also Morgenson, supra note 633 (reporting that “comments by unnamed Treasury officials 
deriding Mr. Barofsky and his work often appeared in news articles after he published his reports.  In 
mid-February [2011], when he announced his retirement, an unidentified Treasury source told The 
Washington Post that the news was ‘a nice valentine to us.’”). 
 637. Fana Foroohar, The Money Cop, TIME, Dec. 24, 2012, at 36, 40; Foroohar, supra note 71; Ian 
Katz & Robert Schmidt, Gensler Turns Back on Wall Street to Push Derivatives Overhaul, 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 12, 2010. 
 638. See authorities cited supra in note 637. 
 639. Foroohar, supra note 637, at 36, 39–40; Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch, “Secret Libor 
Transcripts Expose Trader Rate Manipulation,” BLOOMBERG, Dec. 13, 2012. 
 640. Katz & Schmidt, supra note 637 (paraphrasing Mr. Gensler). 
 641. Id. (quoting Mr. Gensler). 
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legislative allies blocked his requests for increases in the CFTC’s budget 
and used both lobbying and litigation to obstruct the CFTC’s rulemaking 
efforts.642  Gensler’s term as CFTC chairman expired in April 2012, 
although he could potentially remain in that position until the end of 
2013.643  As of mid-2013, the Obama Administration had not nominated 
Gensler for a second term, and efforts by reform advocates to elevate 
Gensler to a more influential position as Treasury Secretary or SEC 
chairman went nowhere.644  In June, industry lobbyists began  to spread 
rumors that President Obama would nominate a replacement for Gensler 
“as soon as July.”645  Analysts explained the absence of any new 
appointment for Gensler—despite his “brave and lonely battle” to 
implement Dodd–Frank’s reforms—by pointing out that Wall Street 
strongly opposed any such appointment.646 
While bypassing Gensler, the Obama Administration received 
widespread praise from the financial industry when President Obama 
appointed two veterans of Wall Street—Jacob (Jack) Lew and Mary Jo 
White—as Treasury Secretary and SEC chairman in early 2013.647  
From 2006 to 2008 Lew worked as a senior executive at Citigroup, 
 
 642. Foroohar, supra note 71; see also supra notes 73–89, 95–99, 160-62 and accompanying text 
(discussing the financial industry’s use of lobbying and litigation to cut the CFTC’s budget and obstruct 
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 643. Silla Brush, Gensler Said to Discuss Chance of Second Term at CFTC, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 5, 
2013. 
 644. Id.; Hirsh, supra note 612, at 15; Simon Johnson, My Top Five Choices for a New Treasury 
Secretary, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 11, 2012. 
 645. Gregory Meyer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission faces top-level shake-up, FT.COM 
(June 18, 2013).   
 646. Hirsh, supra note 612, at 15; see also Faroohar, supra note 637 (reporting that “some 
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Greenberg, With an Obama Victory, Wall Street Pivots to Plan B, NY TIMES BLOG, Nov. 7, 2012, 2012 
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phenomenon limited to the U.S.  In the U.K., leading banks reportedly helped to persuade Chancellor of 
the Exchequer George Osborne to reject Robert Jenkins’ application for a second term on the Bank of 
England’s Financial Policy Committee.  The banks opposed Jenkins’ reappointment because of his 
outspoken advocacy for higher bank capital requirements as well as stricter limits on executive 
compensation paid by systemically important banks.  Ben Chu, How George Osborne threw our 
guardian angel overboard, THE INDEPENDENT (London, U.K.), April 5, 2013 (available on Lexis); Iain 
Dey, Treasury to shake up bank watchdog: Two of City’s fiercest critics may be axed from regulator set 
up after financial crisis, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London, U.K.), Mar. 24, 2013, § Bus., at 2 (available on 
Lexis); see also Meera Louis, Banks Should Defer Bonuses for Up to 10 Years, Jenkins Says, 
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 8, 2012 (reporting on Robert Jenkins’ proposal that “[b]ankers’ bonuses should be 
deferred for as long as 10 years to hold executives accountable for risks,” and noting that Jenkins also 
“called for higher capital requirements and said ‘too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-bail and too-big-to-jail’ 
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 647. Hirsh, supra note 612, at 15–17; William D. Cohan, Mary Jo White Spins the SEC’s 
Revolving Door, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 17, 2013. 
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which hired him on Robert Rubin’s recommendation.648  Citigroup paid 
Lew a bonus of nearly $1 million in late 2008, one day after the federal 
government provided a huge TARP bailout to Citigroup.649  In addition, 
Lew’s employment contract with Citigroup gave him a stock-based 
payout worth up to $500,000 when he left the bank to join the Obama 
Administration in 2009.650  Given Lew’s strong connections with 
Citigroup and Rubin, as well as his past support for financial 
deregulation,651 it is hardly surprising that Wall Street warmly praised 
his nomination.652  
Mary Jo White also attracted strong support from Wall Street when 
President Obama nominated her as SEC chairman.653  White served as 
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York from 1993 to 2002, 
and during her tenure she pioneered the use of deferred prosecution 
agreements instead of indictments to resolve criminal charges against 
large corporations.654  White then spent more than a decade defending 
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for Lew’s appointment from Thomas Donohue, head of the Chamber of Commerce, and Rob Nichols, 
head of the Financial Services Forum); “Forum Statement on Senate Confirmation of Jack Lew,” Feb. 
27, 2013 (press release by the Financial Services Forum, an organization “comprising the CEOs of 19 of 
the largest and most diversified financial services institutions doing business in the United States,” 
which praised Lew as having “a unique understanding of the important role the financial sector plays in 
our economy”), available at http://www.financialservicesforum.org/index.php/news/press-
releases/1403-forum-statement-on-senate-confirmation-of-jack-lew. 
 653. Jessica Holzer, SEC Nominee Signals Shift, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 25, 2013, at 
(quoting Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., a “top official” at SIFMA, “Wall Street’s main trade group,” who 
called White “a solid choice”); ICI Statement on Nominee for SEC Chair, Jan. 24, 2013 (press release by 
Investment Company Institute, praising White’s “record of extraordinary accomplishment” and 
“applaud[ing] her nomination”), available at http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/13_secchair_nominee. 
 654. Dave Michaels, Obama’s SEC Pick Wary of Zealous Wall Street Prosecutions, BLOOMBERG, 
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Wall Street firms and their executives as a partner at Debevoise & 
Plimpton.655  She declared in 2003 that she feared a “feeding frenzy of 
enforcement” after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, and she 
expressed similar concerns in 2012, when she urged prosecutors to 
“distinguish what is actually criminal and what is just mistaken 
behavior, what is even reckless risk-taking, and not bow to the 
frenzy.”656  In 2005, White made a controversial intervention on behalf 
of a Wall Street client in an SEC insider trading investigation, and an 
SEC lawyer involved in that investigation later called her “Wall Street’s 
protector-in-chief.”657  
Given White’s past defense of Wall Street interests and the fact that 
her husband is also a prominent lawyer representing Wall Street clients, 
some analysts warned that the SEC’s conflict of interest rules and her 
 
Feb. 27, 2013 (discussing Mary Jo White’s career and describing her “invention of corporate probation, 
or deferred prosecution” in 1994 as a method for resolving criminal charges against Prudential 
Securities for “fraudulently marketing $8 billion in ruinous energy partnerships to small investors”); 
Kurt Eichenwald, Brokerage Firm Admits Crimes in Energy Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at A1 
(quoting White’s explanation that she approved the deferred prosecution agreement with Prudential 
Securities to avoid “‘crippling collateral consequences to thousands of innocent employees’ that could 
have occurred if the firm had been indicted”); see also Peter Spivak & Sujit Raman, Regulating the 
‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 164 
(2008) (stating that the Prudential Securities settlement was “the first deferred prosecution agreement 
involving a major company”).  For criticisms of the use of deferred prosecution agreements for settling 
criminal charges against large financial firms, see supra notes 434–49 and accompanying text 
(discussing the public outcry against recent deferred prosecution agreements with HSBC and UBS); 
Michaels, supra (quoting former Treasury official Jimmy Gurulé’s charge that “resolving complex cases 
pursuant to deferred-prosecution agreements is creating a culture of impunity within the financial 
services community”). 
 655. Michaels, supra note 654 (reporting that Mary Jo White’s clients as a “Wall Street defense 
lawyer” at Debevoise & Plimpton included JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, UBS and Bank of 
America CEO Ken Lewis). 
 656. Id. (quoting White’s statement during a Bloomberg Radio interview in 2003); Roger 
Runningen & Joshua Gallu, Obama Will Name Former Prosecutor Mary Jo White SEC Chairman, 
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 24, 2013 (quoting White’s statement at a New York University School of Law event 
in Feb. 2012); see also Talks of the Campus, New York University School of Law, THE LAW SCHOOL 
MAGAZINE 84 (2012) (quoting White as criticizing President Obama’s creation of a federal-state 
financial fraud task force during a program at NYU Law School on Feb. 8, 2012, because “[i]t gets back 
to my frenzy concern.  You don’t want that kind of pressure in the system.  You don’t want the search 
for scalps to be the metric for success.  Politics doesn’t belong in this space at all.”), available at 
http://issuu.com/nyulaw/docs/2012mag?mode=embed&layout=http%3A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv
%2Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true. 
 657. Jean Eaglesham & Liz Rappaport, The Six Degrees of Mary Jo White, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 
2013, at B1 (quoting Gary Aguirre, “a former SEC investigator and whistleblower”).  As discussed 
supra in note 456, White contacted SEC enforcement director Linda Thomsen on behalf of Morgan 
Stanley to inquire whether John Mack was implicated in an SEC insider trading investigation involving 
Pequot Capital.  At the time, Morgan Stanley was considering appointing Mack as its CEO.  The SEC 
fired Aguirre after he sought to depose Mack, and the agency took no action against Mack.  A Senate 
joint committee report and an SEC’s inspector general report criticized the SEC for responding to 
White’s inquiry and for creating the impression that White might have influenced the agency’s 
investigation.  Morgenson & Bogdanovitch, supra note 456; Runnigen & Gallu, supra note 656. 
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personal inclinations could discourage her from pursuing strong 
regulatory and enforcement policies against Wall Street firms and their 
executives.658  In any event, the career paths of Robert Rubin, Peter 
Orszag, Jack Lew, Mary Jo White, Neil Barofsky and Gary Gensler 
indicate that the revolving door spins quickly and lucratively for those 
who  sympathize with Wall Street but repels those who criticize Wall 
Street. 
b. The Impact of “Cultural” and “Cognitive” Capture” in Undermining 
the Effectiveness of Financial Regulation 
In addition to the revolving door between government service and the 
financial industry, extensive professional and social contacts encourage 
regulators to align themselves with the outlook of industry officials, a 
phenomenon that analysts have described as “cultural capture” and 
“cognitive capture.”659  As James Kwak has explained, “‘cultural 
capture’ . . . operates through a set of shared but not explicitly stated 
understandings” leading to “regulatory actions that serve the ends of 
industry.”660  Similarly, Willem Buiter has argued  that “cognitive 
regulatory capture” occurs when regulators “internalis[e], as if by 
osmosis, the objectives, interests and perception of reality of the vested 
interest they are meant to regulate and supervise in the public 
interest.”661  The likelihood of cultural capture increases when (i) 
financial regulators feel part of an “in-group” with industry executives 
due to close professional contacts and shared “social networks,” and (ii) 
 
 658. William D. Cohan, Mary Jo White Spins the SEC’s Revolving Door, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 17, 
2013; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Nominee for ‘Sheriff’ Has Worn Banks’ Hat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2013, at 
B1 (noting, inter alia, that John W. White “is a corporate partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore” and 
“counts JPMorgan Chase, Credit Suisse and UBS as clients”); Jonathan Weil, Mary Jo White’s Latest 
Conflict of Interest, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 14, 2013; David Zeiler, Mary Jo White: SEC Pick Compromised 
by Links to Wall Street, MONEY MORNING (Jan. 28, 2013), http://moneymorning.com/2013/01/28/mary-
jo-white-sec-pick-compromised-by-links-to-wall-street/. 
 659. See Lawrence G. Baxter, ‘Capture’ in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the 
Comon Good?, 21 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 175, 183–86 (2011) (explaining that “cultural” and 
“social” capture arise when “the language of regulation is shaped by the common backgrounds, 
education, experience and intermingling of the more powerful players [in government and industry] in 
the policy formation process” and noting the impact of “the very visible revolving doors between the 
SEC and other financial regulators and industry”) (footnotes omitted). 
 660. James Kwak, “Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis,” at 9, in Preventing Capture: 
Special Interest Influence on Regulation, and How to Limit It (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss., eds.) 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013) (forthcoming), chapter manuscript available at 
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Kwak%20Cultural%20Capture%20%281.
16.13%29.pdf. 
 661. Willem H. Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises, in Maintaining Stability in a 
Changing Financial System: Proceedings of the 2008 Economic Policy Symposium 495, 601 (Fed. Res. 
Bank of Kansas City, MO, Aug. 21–23, 2008), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2008/Buiter.03.12.09.pdf. 
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regulators view industry insiders as occupying a “higher status” based 
on wealth, intellectual achievement and social prominence.662   
Regulators and bankers maintain close working relationships through 
frequent supervisory meetings as well as policy discussions about 
regulatory initiatives.663  Banking agencies maintain continuous contacts 
with megabanks by virtue of their “permanent resident teams of bank 
examiners at the largest banks.”664  In addition, financial regulators are 
inclined to identify with the views and experiences of industry officials 
because (i) regulators “operate within a relatively narrow, insulated and 
expertise-based” field of work that they share with “sophisticated repeat 
players” in the financial industry, and (ii) regulators and industry 
officials frequently have similar educational and professional 
backgrounds and are therefore “likely to share social, educational, or 
experiential ties.”665  
The New York Fed calls its on-site examination teams “relationship 
management teams,”666 a term that suggests a very close and symbiotic 
connection between on-site regulators and the institutions they regulate.  
The New York Fed’s self-study of supervisory failures during the 
financial crisis determined that on-site examiners often lacked sufficient 
independence from the banks they regulated.  The study found that “the 
Relationship teams [often] become gate-keepers at their banks, seeking 
to control access [by other regulators] to their institutions.”667  In 
addition, “relationship managers were too deferential to bank 
management and too dependent on the bank’s goodwill and 
[management information systems] to gain information”668  Bank 
examiners complained that they often did not “receive sufficient support 
from senior management when banks complain about supervisory 
 
 662. Kwak, supra note 660, at 11–25. 
 663. Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial 
Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 630 (2012). 
 664. Levitin, supra note 514, at 159 (noting that permanent on-site teams of bank examiners bear 
“an uncanny resemblance to [the teams] of outside accountants at Enron and WorldCom, who abdicated 
their regulatory role to become enablers”). 
 665. Ford, supra note 523, at 614–15. 
 666. Caroline Salas & Bradley Keoun, New York Fed’s Dahlgren Overhauls Bank Supervision to 
Beef Up Oversight, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 21, 2011. 
 667. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Report on Systemic Risk and Bank Supervision” 
(“Discussion Draft” of Aug. 18, 2009 [rev1]), at 11 (emphasis added), FRBNY-FCIC-General10080241 
[hereinafter FRBNY Systemic Risk Report], available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2009-09-10%20FRBNY%20Report%20on%20Systemic% 
20Risk%20and%20Bank%20Supervision%20draft.pdf. 
 668. Id. at 19, FRBNY-FCIC-General10080249; see also id. at 8, FRBNY-FCIC-
General10080238 (“Banks inherently have an information advantage over supervisors . . . .  Getting 
good, timely information is therefore dependent on the willingness and enthusiasm of bank staff in 
providing that information.  Supervisors . . . believe that a non-confrontational style will enhance that 
process.”). 
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intrusion,” and one examiner admitted, “Within three weeks on the job, I 
saw the capture set in.”669 
The precarious position of on-site bank examiners is part of a larger 
context in which politicians and industry leaders have pushed financial 
regulators to treat banks as their “customers.”670  The Clinton–Gore 
Administration promulgated a “Reinventing Government Initiative” that 
described “government as being in the ‘customer service’ business with 
regulatees as the ‘customers.’”671  Frank Keating, head of the American 
Bankers Association (ABA) and a former Oklahoma Governor, 
expressed a similar view of the role of regulators.  When asked by a 
journalist why the ABA’s members gave a “less than friendly reception” 
to FDIC chairman Sheila Bair at a 2011 conference, Keating criticized 
Bair’s “aggressive” remarks and stated that regulators are “servants of 
the served” while bankers are “regulated people who pay [Bair’s] 
salary.”672  In contrast to Bair’s strong personal commitment to 
independence from the industry she regulated,673 some bank regulators 
have accepted the industry’s view that they should treat financial 
institutions as their “constituents.”674 
 
 669. Id. at 8 n.2, FRBNY-FCIC-General 10080238. 
 670. See supra notes 528–43 and accompanying text (describing intense political pressures on 
U.K. and U.S. regulators to adopt industry-friendly policies during the 2000s). 
 671. Levitin, supra note 514, at 159 n.65; see also National Partnership for Reinventing 
Government, Our Vision for the Future: America @ Our Best, (stating a goal of achieving “customer 
satisfaction with federal services equal to or better than the business service sector” and declaring, “We 
provide our customers with products and information they want and need”), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/vision2000.html. 
 672. Barbara A. Rehm, Editor at Large: How Keating Got to ABA and Where He’ll Take It, AM. 
BANKER, May 26, 2011, at 1, 2011 WLNR 10443141; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 312–16 
(describing the “combative heckling” she received at the ABA conference in 2011 after delivering a 
speech in which she called for stronger regulation of banks (including tighter restrictions on bank 
overdraft fees) and also suggested that “the success of the financial sector is not an end in itself, but a 
means to an end—which is to support the vitality of the real economy and the livelihood of the 
American people”). 
 673. BAIR, supra note 290, at 316 (describing Keating’s remarks as “[f]rightening, but that is how 
a lot of industry lobbyists see the role of regulators.  We do not have our jobs to serve the public.  The 
banks pay our salary, so we work for them”); id. at 8, 41 (declaring that Bair based her regulatory 
decisions on “common sense,” including support for “stronger capital and better lending standards,” as 
well as “independence, doing the right thing for the general public, and ignoring the special interests”). 
 674. See supra note 551 and accompanying text (referring to OTS Director John Reich’s 
description of WaMu as “my largest constituent”); see also supra note 517 (discussing Darrel Dochow’s 
controversial career at OTS, during which he was criticized for helping Lincoln Savings, Countrywide 
and IndyMac avoid regulatory constraints); Levitin, supra note 514, at 159–60 (stating that Dochow’s 
career “indicates that at least some bank regulatory agencies view themselves as a business in which 
supervised institutions are customers”); Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal 
Regulator Often Helps Banks Fighting Consumers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A1 (reporting that 
Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. appeared in a 1999 OCC video, which described “how 
the OCC and a national bank charter can help banking organizations achieve their goals,” and also 
quoting Hawke’s statement that the OCC’s preemption of state consumer protection laws was “one of 
the advantages of a national bank charter, and I’m not the least bit ashamed to promote it”). 
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Beyond the deferential supervisory attitudes produced by a “customer 
service” view of regulation, the revolving door between government and 
the financial industry creates additional pressures for regulatory 
acquiescence.  The revolving door encourages a similarity of views 
between regulators and financial executives because (i) “regulators and 
the representatives of financial institutions are [frequently] the same 
people, only at different points in their careers,” and (ii) the continuous 
movement of senior officials between government and the financial 
sector promotes “social connections between people on opposite sides of 
the [revolving] door.”675  For example, after former SEC Commissioner 
Annette Nazareth returned to private law practice at Davis Polk & 
Wardwell in 2008, she maintained close connections with SEC 
Chairman Mary Schapiro and SEC General Counsel and Senior Policy 
Director David Becker.  Nazareth met frequently with Schapiro and 
Becker, and she sent them Davis Polk’s memoranda analyzing Dodd–
Frank’s provisions as the legislation proceeded through Congress.  
Nazareth also invited Schapiro and Becker to attend December holiday 
parties hosted by her and her husband, former FRB Vice Chairman 
Roger Ferguson.  In extending one such invitation, Nazareth noted that 
“we expect [former FRB Chairman Alan] Greenspan to lead us in a 
sing-along,”676 
The perceived socioeconomic and intellectual superiority of Wall 
Street insiders provides further inducements for regulators to accept the 
financial industry’s viewpoints.  During the 1990s and 2000s, 
“[f]inancial regulators . . . saw firsthand the vast sums of money being 
made by Wall Street bankers and traders.  And . . . the financial sector 
was routinely lionized as both an exemplar of the knowledge economy 
and an engine of economic growth.”677  Moreover, “as the world of 
 
 675. Kwak, supra note 660, at 15, 23; see also Omarova, supra note 663, at 630 (agreeing that, 
due to “strong professional and personal relationships” between financial regulators and industry 
executives, regulators “often come to view their institutional interests or mission as largely congruent 
with the interests of their regulated industry constituency”). 
 676. Top Bank Lawyer’s E-Mails Show Washington’s Inside Game, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 5, 2012 
(noting that (i) Nazareth met with Schapiro 11 times in 2009 and 2010, “twice as many as any single 
competitor in the law and lobbying business,” and (ii) “[w]ith Nazareth on board, Davis Polk was hired 
as outside counsel on Dodd–Frank by the six largest U.S. banks and the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association, the Wall Street trade group”).  In her email correspondence with Becker 
about Dodd–Frank’s draft provisions, Nazareth told Becker that the proposed CFPB made her “feel ill” 
and she assured Becker that she had urged SIFMA to “trash” the proposed new office of investor 
advocacy at the SEC after hearing Becker’s strong criticism of that office.  Id. 
 677. Kwak, supra note 660, at 19; see also id. at 20–21 (contending that “as the world of finance 
became more technical, its academic pedigree became more imposing”; as a result, “subscribing to 
cutting-edge financial theories” endorsed by “famous economists”  offered “perceived status benefits” to 
regulators); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 105 (“Over the past twenty years, 
finance . . . [became] the glistening centerpiece of the modern American economy . . . .  [W[here it 
mattered most—on elite campuses, in the business and financial media, and in the halls of power in 
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finance became more complicated and central to the economy, the 
federal government became more dependent” on Wall Street executives 
not only as potential candidates for regulatory posts but also as essential 
sources of information and intelligence about financial institutions and 
markets.678  Thus, the standard response by regulators and industry 
officials to outsiders’ critiques of the revolving door was that only 
people who worked on Wall Street possessed the necessary expertise to 
develop enlightened policies for regulating Wall Street.679 
For all of the above reasons, financial regulators and Wall Street 
executives developed a “confluence of perspectives and opinions” in 
which “Wall Street’s positions became the conventional wisdom in 
Washington.”680  Regulators increasingly viewed the “well-being and 
profitability of the financial sector as [a policy] objective in its own 
right,” regardless of the potential risks of pro-industry policies to the 
broader economy and consumers.681 At the same time, regulators 
“marginalized” the views of consumer advocates and other critics of 
financial deregulation, because they viewed such critics as “people who 
simply did not understand the bright new world of modern finance.”682  
In short, cultural and cognitive capture occurred within financial 
 
Washington—banking became the latest chapter in the American Dream, the way to make vast riches by 
working hard and creating innovative new products that would supposedly improve life for everyone.”). 
 678. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 92–94; see also id. at 94 (“[A]s finance became more 
esoteric and policy questions became more technical, . . . all the people with relevant expertise were 
Wall Street veterans.”); Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 259 (“[T]op financial executives offered to political 
leaders . . . the ability to understand and communicate with markets that were increasingly seen as vital 
to the economic success or failure of governments.”). 
 679. David G. Hilzenrath, SEC head struggles to turn agency around, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2011, 
at A1 (“Regulators frequently draw staff members from the industries they regulate, saying it’s 
impossible to function without industry expertise.”); Sherman, supra note 621 (quoting an unnamed 
former senior Goldman Sachs partner, who argued that it would be “a dangerous and scary thing” to 
conclude that “someone’s past work on Wall Street disqualifies them from playing a role in something 
as complex as government,” because in that case “you’ll essentially have people [in government] who 
have no understanding of how financial markets operate”).  Former regulators have justified their post-
government work on behalf of financial clients in similar terms.  For example, former Comptroller of 
the Currency Eugene Ludwig defended the former regulators employed by his consulting firm, 
Promontory Financial Group, by stating that “his firm sells expertise and not access to their former 
employers and co-workers.”  Jesse Hamilton & Cheyenne Hopkins, Banking Consultant Promontory to 
Face U.S. Senate Panel, BLOOMBERG, April 10, 2013 (summarizing interview with Ludwig). Ludwig 
further explained that “people who dedicated their careers to public service can continue to ensure that 
regulations are implemented properly.”  Id. (same). 
 680. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 97. 
 681. Buiter, supra note 661, at 602. 
 682. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 97; see also id. at 94 (“Financial policy took on the 
trappings of a branch of engineering, in which only those with hands-on experience on the cutting edge 
of innovation were qualified to comment.”); Binyamin Appelbaum, As Subprime Crisis Unfolded, 
Watchdog Fed Didn’t Bother Barking, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, at A1 (reporting that FRB officials 
dismissed repeated warnings by consumer advocates about the dangers posed by subprime mortgage 
lending, because officials believed that those advocates did not have sufficient expertise to provide 
reliable advice). 
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agencies as the financial industry persuaded regulators that 
“deregulation was in the public interest” and “unfettered financial 
activity is always good for society.”683   
FRB chairman Alan Greenspan was the best-known advocate for the 
view that “regulators should seek to minimize any interference with 
innovation and competition in the financial markets” because “market 
discipline and private risk management produced better results than 
government regulation over the longer term.”684  However, Greenspan 
was hardly alone in holding that view.  During the late 1990s, Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin and his deputy and successor Lawrence 
Summers actively pursued the same public policy goals of encouraging 
financial innovation and reducing regulation of financial markets.685  
Rubin and Summers played key roles (along with Greenspan) in passing 
GLBA, which repealed Glass–Steagall, and also in blocking efforts by 
CFTC chairman Brooksley Born to regulate OTC derivatives.686  At the 
Presidential signing ceremony for GLBA in 1999, Summers thanked 
Greenspan “for your constant advocacy for modernization of our 
financial system,” and he also praised “former Secretary of the Treasury 
Bob Rubin, who worked very hard on this.”687  Summers lauded GLBA 
as “the right framework for America’s future financial system,” and he 
stressed “the crucial role of markets” in the Clinton Administration’s 
“national economic strategy of which this bill is a part.”688  
 
 683. Kwak, supra note 660, at 8–9. 
 684. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 903–04 (summarizing Greenspan’s views); see also JOHNSON 
& KWAK, supra note 15, at 100 (stating that there was “no truer believer in the ideology of free markets, 
financial innovation, and deregulation” than Greenspan); ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 192 
(stating that “Greenspan made it his mission to minimize government oversight by outsourcing risk 
management to banks”). 
 685. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 99 (stating that Summers “shared Rubin’s opinion that 
financial innovation and free markets were generally good for America”); Hirsh, supra note 612, at 18 
(“[Rubin’s] advice always sounded sage: Don’t tamper too much with finance or the flow of capital; 
keep changes minimal.”); “America’s Role in Global Economic Integration,” Speech by Treasury 
Deputy Secretary Lawrence Summers at the Brookings conference on “Integrating National Economies: 
The Next Step” (Jan. 9, 1996 [sic]) (“At Treasury, our most crucial international priority remains the 
creation of a well-funded, truly global capital market.”), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/pr9701091.aspx. 
 686. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 8–10, 104, 133–37; Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 220–
21, 306–07; Cohan, supra note 612, at 63–64; Hirsh, supra note 612, at 17; see also ROTHKOPF, supra 
note 5, at 260 (“Robert Rubin led the Clinton administration to promote an aggressively pro-market 
agenda, . . . [including] a systematic effort . . . to continue the process of deregulating the American 
financial community.”). 
 687. Statement by President Bill Clinton at the Signing of the Financial Modernization Bill, Nov. 
12, 1999 (remarks of Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers) [hereinafter Summers GLBA Remarks], 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ls241.aspx.  Rubin stepped down 
as Treasury Secretary in July 1999 and joined Citigroup as co-chairman shortly before GLBA’s 
enactment.  Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 306; Cohan, supra note 612, at 64–65. 
 688. Summers GLBA Remarks, supra note 687.  At the same signing ceremony, Senator Phil 
Gramm (R-TX) declared, “We are here today to repeal Glass–Steagall because we have learned that 
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Greenspan, Rubin and Summers set the tone for a broader regulatory 
“mindset” that favored deregulatory policies during the long boom of 
the 1990s and 2000s.  As FRB General Counsel Scott Alvarez later 
acknowledged, “The mind-set was that there should be no regulation; 
that the market should take care of policing, unless there already is an 
identified problem.”689  Richard Spillenkothen, the FRB’s Director of 
Bank Supervision from 1991 to 2006, observed in 2010 that regulators 
had “a high degree of faith that financial markets were largely efficient 
and self-correcting and, therefore, that counterparty and market 
discipline were generally more effective ‘regulators’ of risk-taking and 
improper practices than government rules and supervisors.”690  The New 
York Fed’s self-study in 2009 similarly conceded that regulators placed 
too much faith in the assumption that “[m]arkets will always self-
correct.”691  
This overriding faith in financial innovation and self-correcting 
markets became part of the “conventional wisdom” among Washington 
policymakers and regulators as well as Wall Street leaders.692  The 
 
government is not the answer.  We have learned that freedom and competition are the answers.”  Id. 
(remarks of Sen. Gramm).  President Clinton agreed with Senator Gramm’s view that GLBA 
represented “a victory for freedom and free markets,” although President Clinton also claimed that 
GLBA was “a victory for consumer protection.”  Id. (remarks of President Clinton).  Unfortunately, 
President Clinton’s second claim proved to be illusory.  Federal regulators repeatedly failed to protect 
consumers during the subprime mortgage boom that led to the financial crisis, and the OCC and OTS 
preempted efforts by the states to safeguard consumers.  Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 896–919; see also 
supra Part III(B). 
 689. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 96 (quoting from an FCIC interview with Alvarez). 
 690. Richard Spillenkothen, “Notes on the performance of prudential supervision in the years 
preceding the financial crisis by a former director of banking supervision and regulation at the Federal 
Reserve Board  (1991 to 2006),” May 31, 2010, at 12 [hereinafter Spillenkothen FCIC Memo]; see also 
id. at 27 (stating that “the culture of the Federal Reserve—an agency dominated by professional 
economists whose mindset and intellectual biases were to enhance the workings of free markets, not to 
design regulations—was reinforced by a Chairman who had a strong, deep, and abiding philosophical 
belief that market and counterparty discipline were more effective in controlling risks than 
governmental regulation and oversight”), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
docs/2010-05-31%20FRB%20Richard%20Spillenkothen%20Paper-%20Observations%20on%20the%2 
0Performance%20of%20Prudential%20Supervision.pdf. 
 691. FRBNY Systemic Risk Study, supra note 667, at 2, FRBNY-FCIC-General0080232; see 
also id. at 6 (describing “the common expectation [at the New York Fed] that market forces would 
efficiently price risks and prompt banks to control exposures in a more effective way than 
regulators . . . .  Regulators faced and often shared skepticism that regulators could push for more 
effective practices than those required by the market for controlling firm risk.”). 
 692. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 105–09 (quotes at 105); see also id. at 67–70, 106–07 
(explaining how neoclassical economic theories, including the “Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis,” 
provided “the intellectual justification for financial deregulation.  If a free market will always provide 
fundamentally correct asset prices, then the financial sector can be left to its own devices,” id. at 69); 
JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON 
WALL STREET xiii (2009) (explaining that “rational market theory,” including “the efficient market 
hypothesis,” persuaded many academics and policymakers that “[f]inancial markets possessed a wisdom 
that individuals, companies, and governments did not.”). 
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resulting “group-think” among policymakers, regulators and financial 
executives was “a major reason why the federal government deferred to 
the interests of Wall Street repeatedly in the 1990s and 2000s.”693  A 
similar mindset held sway in the U.K. and at the IMF.  Two FSA post-
mortem reports on the financial crisis found serious flaws within the 
“intellectual assumptions on which previous regulatory approaches have 
been largely built,” including (i) misplaced confidence in “[m]arket 
discipline . . . as an effective tool in constraining harmful risk-taking” 
and (ii) the mistaken assumption that “[f]inancial innovation can be 
assumed to be beneficial since market competition would winnow out 
any innovations which did not deliver value added.”694  An IMF post-
mortem study similarly concluded that: 
IMF’s ability to correctly identify the mounting risks [of a global 
financial crisis] was hindered by a high degree of groupthink, intellectual 
capture, [and] a general mindset that a major financial crisis in large 
advanced economies was unlikely . . . [because] market discipline and 
self-regulation would be sufficient to stave off serious problems in 
financial institutions . . . [and] ‘sophisticated’ financial markets could 
thrive safely with minimal regulation.695 
Another key component of the mindset shared by Washington and 
Wall Street was the conviction that large financial conglomerates 
(universal banks) were essential institutions for meeting the needs of 
global business corporations and for ensuring the international primacy 
 
 693. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 97–104 (quote at 97); see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 
17 (when Sheila Bair began her tenure as FDIC chairman in 2006, she encountered a regulatory 
“groupthink” based on the assumption that the “golden age of banking was here and would last forever.  
We didn’t need regulation anymore.”); id. at 27, 41 ( Bair discovered that the FRB “had acquired a 
strong antipathy to regulation” under Greenspan’s leadership and “the other bank regulators were still 
moving in the direction of less regulation, at least for larger institutions”; as a result, “early in my 
tenure, I frequently found myself isolated in advocating for stronger regulatory standards.”); 
Spillenkothen FCIC Memo, supra note 690, at 8–9 (contending that “the dynamics of group-think” led 
to widespread confidence by regulators in “a stronger and more resilient financial system” because 
regulators assumed  that “banking organizations’ risk management and measurement 
capabilities . . . were generally effective and with the right incentives would continue to improve”). 
 694. Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global 
banking crisis (Mar. 2009), § 1.4, at 39, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090320232158/http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_re
view.pdf; see also FSA RBS Report, supra note 528. ¶ 3,1.3, at 260 (“A consensus among practitioners 
and policy-makers across the world . . . confidently assumed that the financial system had been made 
more stable as a result of the very financial innovation and complexity which we now understand played 
a significant role in the failure both of the overall system and of [major banks] within it.”). 
 695. Int’l Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation Off., IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the 
Financial and Economic Crisis: IMF Surveillance in 2004–07, ¶¶ 40, 42 at 17 (2011), available at 
http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/Crisis-
%20Main%20Report%20(without%20Moises%20Signature).pdf; see also id. at 34 (Annex 7) (“The 
Fund’s general mindset that markets know best and financial innovation reduces risk would have made 
it difficult for the staff to see the buildup of systemic risks.”). 
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of U.S. financial markets.  In pushing for GLBA’s passage, Greenspan 
and other advocates maintained that the U.S. must authorize universal 
banks in order (i) to provide global corporations with “full-service 
provider[s] that can handle their entire range of financing needs,”696 and 
(ii) to enable U.S. financial institutions to preserve their 
“competitiveness” in foreign markets and thereby ensure “the global 
dominance of American finance.”697 
Amazingly, the global financial crisis—and the enormous sums spent 
by the U.S., U.K. and European governments in bailing out failing 
megabanks—did not shake the confidence of Robert Rubin, Lawrence 
Summers and Timothy Geithner in the value of giant financial 
conglomerates as key ingredients for domestic and international 
economic prosperity.  During a 2009 interview, Summers declared, “I 
don’t think we can or want to turn back the clock” to a time when the 
federal government imposed strong limitations on bank activities.698  In 
2012, Summers dismissed proposals to reestablish Glass–Steagall-type 
restrictions on banks as “revisionism, warped by hindsight and political 
convenience,” and Rubin similarly declared, “It is a myth that the repeal 
of Glass–Steagall contributed to the financial crisis.”699  
Summers and Geithner strongly opposed—and helped to defeat—the 
attempt by Senators Sherrod Brown and Ted Kauffman to amend Dodd–
Frank by imposing strict size limits on banks.700  In separate meetings 
with Senator Kauffman, Summers argued that breaking up the 
megabanks “would hurt our ability to serve large companies and hurt the 
competitiveness of the United States,” while Geithner contended that 
federal regulators could adequately control the risks of megabanks by 
strengthening Basel’s international capital standards, thereby ensuring 
 
 696. Statement by FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan before the House Comm. on Banking and 
Financial Services, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 578, 579 (1997) (providing testimony on H.R. 10, one of GLBA’s 
predecessor bills); see also James R. Barth et al., “Policy Watch: The Repeal of Glass–Steagall and the 
Advent of Broad Banking,” 14 Journal of Economic Perspectives No. 2 (Spring 2000), at 191, 198–99 
(contending that GLBA’s authorization for universal banking powers would benefit the U.S. economy 
by allowing large U.S. banks to provide “one-stop” shopping with improved financing opportunities and 
“more product and service choices to their customers”). 
 697. Senate Report No. 106-44, at 5 (1999) (quoting Greenspan’s testimony). 
 698. ROTHKOPF, supra note 5, at 231–32, 393 (quoting from the author’s interview with Summers 
in 2009); see also id. at 18, 260 (noting that the author worked with Rubin, Summers and Geithner 
during the Clinton Administration). 
 699. Cohan, supra note 612, at 63–64 (quoting statements made by Summers and Rubin in 2012). 
 700. CONNAUGHTON, supra note 371, at 227–44; see also id. at 228 (describing the Brown–
Kauffman amendment, which would have “impos[ed] a strict 10 percent cap on any bank-holding 
company’s share of the United States’ total insured deposits” and “limit[ed] the size of non-deposit 
liabilities at financial institutions (to 2 percent of GDP for banks, and 3 percent of GDP for non-bank 
institutions)”); id. at 243–44 (explaining that Brown–Kauffman was defeated by a vote of 33–61, and 
quoting a senior Treasury official who said, “If we’d been for [Brown–Kauffman] , it probably would 
have happened.  But we weren’t, so it didn’t.”). 
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that “U.S. banks wouldn’t be disadvantaged relative to foreign 
banks.”701  Indeed, Geithner believed that he couldn’t solve the 
economic crisis “without keeping the banks intact.”702  
The most adamant defense of megabanks was offered by Rubin 
himself.  During an interview with David Rothkopf after the financial 
crisis, Rubin maintained that he and Summers “had advocated the right 
policies [during the Clinton Administration] and would argue the same 
things today.”703  When Rothkopf asked “whether the biggest and most 
influential financial organizations ought to be broken up, whether being 
‘too big to fail’ was a problem to be addressed,” Rubin’s response was 
immediate and emphatic: 
“‘No, [Rubin] said, ‘don’t you see?  Too big to fail isn’t a problem with 
the system.  It is the system.  You can’t be a competitive global financial 
institution serving global corporations of scale without having a certain 
scale yourself.  The bigger multinationals get, the bigger financial 
institutions will have to get.’”704 
Trade associations for megabanks have echoed Rubin’s arguments in 
favor of preserving the same universal banking model that precipitated 
the global financial crisis.705  For example, five major financial trade 
associations criticized the FRB’s proposed enhanced prudential 
supervisory requirements for SIFIs because the FRB’s proposal sought 
to provide “incentives” for SIFIs “to reduce their systemic footprint.”706  
The trade associations declared that the FRB was “misguided” in 
suggesting that “big is bad,” and they also asserted, “Banks must mirror 
the economic system they are designed to serve.  In the 21st century, 
 
 701. Id. at 234, 236 (describing arguments made by Summers and Geithner during their meetings 
with Sen. Kaufman). 
 702. Hirsh, supra note 612, at 17; see also BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 156–57, 199–200 
(maintaining that Geithner administered HAMP and other TARP programs in order to “foam the 
runway” for large troubled banks and guarantee their survival); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 
208–09 (noting that Diana Farrell, a member of President Obama’s National Economic Council, rejected 
proposals to break up big banks and argued that “the genie’s out of the bottle and what we need to do is 
to manage them and to oversee them, as opposed to hark back to a time that we’re unlikely to ever come 
back to or want to come back to.”). 
 703. ROTHKOPF, supra note 5, at 266. 
 704. Id. 
 705. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 211 (“A common argument, put forward by 
[advocates for big banks], is that large corporations require financial services that only large banks can 
provide.  Related to this is the idea that the global competitiveness of U.S. corporations requires that 
American banks be at least as large as anyone else’s banks.”); Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, 
Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 Rev. of Banking & 
Financial L. 765, 786–87 (2012) (“Big bank executives insist that . . . modern global banking services 
require large-scale capacity in order to deliver products and innovations that smaller banks could not do 
effectively . . . [and] that U.S. banks would need to be large enough to be competitive internationally.”). 
 706. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 16 (quoting FRB Proposed Rule 
for SIFIs, supra note 40, 77 Fed. Reg. at 596). 
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companies served by international banks compete in a global economic 
system . . . .  [T]hey need banks that are competitive around the 
world.”707 
As Simon Johnson and James Kwak have observed, the arguments 
advanced by advocates for megabanks “suffer from a shortage of 
empirical evidence.”708  Most studies indicate that banks larger than 
$100 billion do not generate favorable economies of scale or scope after 
one eliminates the significant funding advantages that megabanks 
currently enjoy due to their huge explicit and implicit TBTF 
subsidies.709  Even before the financial crisis began in 2007, studies 
confirmed that large financial conglomerates generated “higher levels of 
systemic risk on both sides of the Atlantic.”710  Moreover, financial 
markets did not endorse the universal banking model since they applied 
a significant “conglomerate discount” to the value of banks that engaged 
in multiple lines of financial activity.711   
There is no reason to believe that multinational corporations would 
fail to obtain adequate financial services in the absence of trillion-dollar 
financial conglomerates.  Large corporations have long relied, both 
before and after GLBA, on syndicates (groups) of banks and securities 
firms—not single institutions—for underwriting loans as well as equity 
and debt securities.712  Prior to GLBA’s repeal of Glass–Steagall in 
1999, large U.S. commercial banks and securities firms were widely 
viewed as global leaders in efficiency, innovation and profitability.  
They consistently outperformed European and Japanese universal banks 
 
 707. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 17.  Similarly, three trade 
associations representing the largest financial institutions—the Financial Services Forum, the Financial 
Services Roundtable and SIFMA—issued a joint policy brief in Mar. 2013, which declared, “The value 
provided by large diversified institutions is particularly important to large, globally active U.S. 
corporations and the further development of global markets for U.S. goods and services.”  Victoria 
Finkle, Industry, Lawmakers Clash Over ‘Too Big to Fail’ AM. BANKER (Mar. 12, 2013), 2013 WLNR 
6051393 (quoting policy brief). 
 708. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 211. 
 709. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 89, 136–39, 143–44, 290–91 nn.28–34; Andrew G. 
Haldane, “On being the right size,” The 2012 Beesley Lecture at the Institute of Directors (London), 25 
Oct. 2012, at 12–13, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech615.pdf.  As Haldane 
points out, “Over the period 2002 to 2007, the implied annual subsidy to the world’s [29] largest banks 
averaged $70 billion per year using a ratings-based measure . . . .  That is roughly 50% of the average 
post-tax profits of these banks over the period . . . .  By 2009, the . . . implied monetary subsidy [for the 
largest banks increased to] over $700 billion per year.”  Id. at 4.  For additional evidence of the explicit 
and implicit TBTF subsidies exploited by megabanks, see Wilmarth, supra note  12, at 958–59, 978–84; 
Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 3–5; supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
 710. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 996. 
 711. Wilmarth, supra note 283, at 748–49. 
 712. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 212; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 980–84; Wilmarth, 
supra note 206, at 378–81. 
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in international financial markets.713  Indeed, based on the global 
superiority of U.S. commercial banks and securities firms during the 
1980s and 1990s, some analysts concluded that “the decentralized 
financial industry structure mandated by the Glass–Steagall Act 
encouraged competition . . . [and] spurred continuing innovation by U.S. 
banks and securities firms, [giving] them a clear technical superiority 
over European universal banks.”714  Large U.S. financial institutions 
would likely recover the innovative and competitive spirit they exhibited 
in the 1980s and 1990s if they were obliged to abandon the excessively 
complex universal banking model along with its bloated TBTF 
subsidies.715 
C. Attorney General Holder’s “Too Big to Jail” Admission and 
JPMorgan’s “London Whale” Trading Debacle Show that TBTF Banks 
Continue to Operate Without Effective Control by Federal Regulators 
Two events in March 2013 demonstrated that Wall Street megabanks 
remain a major unresolved problem for U.S. financial policy in view of 
their TBTF status and their ability to operate without effective oversight 
or restraint by federal agencies.  First, during a Senate committee 
hearing, Attorney General Eric Holder acknowledged that DOJ was 
reluctant to pursue criminal prosecutions against the largest financial 
institutions because of the potentially destabilizing effect of such 
proceedings on domestic and global financial systems.  Second, a Senate 
subcommittee’s investigation of the JPMorgan “London Whale” scandal 
revealed that JPMorgan’s executives and the bank’s primary regulator 
(the OCC) failed to prevent the bank’s traders from making disastrous 
bets on high-risk derivatives.  Both events provided dramatic 
confirmation that the largest banks remain too big to fail, manage or 
 
 713. Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 440–43, 451–53. 
 714. Id. at 441; see also id. (“Several observers have noted that [Glass–Steagall] had an ironic but 
important effect on competition and experimentation in U.S. financial markets.”); “A Turning Point: 
Defining the Financial Structure,” Speech by FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig, presented at the 
22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference at the Levy Economic Institute of Bard College (New York, 
NY), April 17, 2013  (“We have a long tradition of financial institutions competing on a global basis and 
doing so successfully under [a Glass–Steagall] model similar to that proposed here. The largest 
commercial banks under the umbrella of the safety net would remain mega banks and hold scale capable 
of offering payments services and loans of any size to firms that operate globally.  U.S. broker–dealers 
and investment banks have long offered specialized capital market services that are competitive and 
second to none in the world.”) [hereinafter Hoenig April 17, 2013 Speech], available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr1713.html. 
 715. See “Finance: The fall of the universal bank,” Economist, Nov. 21, 2012 (predicting that “the 
power of universal banks will be eroded by market forces” and stronger regulation, and concluding that 
“[t]he promise of the cross-selling financial supermarket has long been eclipsed by the destruction of 
shareholder value after the crash”), available at http://www.economist.com/news/21566439-exit-rock-
star-bosses-fall-universal-bank. 
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regulate. 
1. Attorney General Holders’ “Too Big to Jail” Testimony Confirms that 
Federal Agencies Cannot Discipline the Largest Financial Institutions 
Effectively 
During a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 6, 
2013, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) asked Attorney General Eric 
Holder to comment on DOJ’s use of a deferred prosecution agreement to 
settle HSBC’s massive money-laundering violations.  Grassley declared 
he was “concerned we have a mentality of ‘too big to jail’ in the 
financial sector,” and he also noted the absence of “any high-profile 
financial convictions [for] either companies or individuals.”716  In 
response to Grassley’s question, Holder admitted that “the size of some 
of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us 
to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if we do 
prosecute—if we do bring a criminal charge—it will have a negative 
impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.”717 
Holder’s candid recognition of the “too big to jail” problem was 
“stunning” and “even more direct” than Assistant Attorney General 
Lanny Breuer’s prior acknowledgments of DOJ’s reluctance to 
prosecute major banks.718  Holder’s statement was also “embarrassingly 
at odds with the Obama administration’s view that too-big-to-fail was 
fixed by the Dodd–Frank [Act].”719  In addition, Holder failed to explain 
why the “too big to jail” status of megabanks prevented DOJ from 
indicting even one top executive of any of the large financial institutions 
 
 716. Transcript: Attorney General Eric Holder on ‘Too Big to Jail’, AM. BANKER, Mar. 7, 2013 
(quoting statements by Sen. Grassley and Attorney General Holder during the Mar. 6 hearing) 
[hereinafter Holder Transcript] (available on Lexis); see also supra notes 434–38 and accompanying 
text (discussing DOJ’s deferred prosecution agreement with HSBC). 
 717. Holder Transcript, supra note 716 (also conceding that the size of major banks “has an 
inhibiting influence, impact on our ability to bring resolutions that I think would be more 
appropriate . . . .  The concern you raised is actually one that I share.”); see also Rob Blackwell & 
Victoria Finkle, How Holder’s Surprising ‘Too Big to Jail’ Admission Changes Debate, AM. BANKER, 
Mar. 7, 2013 (describing Holder’s “stunning admission” and reporting that his testimony “marked the 
first time such concerns have been raised by a top member of President Obama’s cabinet”)  (available 
on Lexis). 
 718. Blackwell & Finkle, supra note 717; see also Danielle Douglas, Attorney general says big 
banks’ size inhibits prosecution, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2013, at A12 (reporting that “Holder’s admission 
bolsters criticisms that federal prosecutors are deeming some banks ‘too big to jail’”); supra notes 436–
37, 447–48 (discussing Breuer’s explanations as to why DOJ chose not to indict HSBC or UBS). 
 719. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities Behind Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, at 
B1; see also Blackwell & Finkle, supra note 717 (reporting that Holder’s statement appeared “to 
conflict with” the Obama Administration’s repeated claim that Dodd–Frank “effectively ended too big 
to fail”). 
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that were at the center of the financial crisis.720  As Andrew Ross Sorkin 
observed, Holder’s concern about the systemic impact of indictments 
against megabanks created a “powerful argument . . . that prosecutors 
should focus on the individuals responsible for the misconduct” at those 
banks.721 
During a follow-up hearing before the Senate Banking Committee on 
March 7, 2013, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) pointed out that 
HSBC paid a fine, but none of HSBC’s executives was criminally 
prosecuted or was banned from the banking industry and HSBC was 
allowed to continue operating in the U.S.722  In response to a question 
from Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) on how regulators could “explain 
[the HSBC settlement] to your neighbor,” FRB Governor Jerome Powell 
conceded that it was difficult to reconcile HSBC’s treatment with the 
principle that “we’re all equal under the law.”723  Powell also admitted 
that questions about “the fairness of the system” would not be resolved 
until the FRB and other federal regulators demonstrated their ability to 
end TBTF treatment for megabanks.724 
2. The Senate Investigation of JPMorgan’s “London Whale” Scandal 
Shows that Wall Street Banks Continue to Engage in Speculative  
Risk-Taking While Avoiding Regulatory Oversight 
On March 14, 2013, the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations (PSI) released its report on JPMorgan’s “London Whale” 
trading debacle, which inflicted $6.2 billion of losses on the bank.725  
The PSI’s report presented a “devastating” and “scathing” portrayal of 
systemic failures of risk management and oversight by JPMorgan and by 
its primary regulator, the OCC.726  As shown below, JPMorgan’s 
executives (i) allowed the bank’s traders to make enormous bets  on 
synthetic credit derivatives that exceeded the bank’s internal risk limits, 
(ii) sought to conceal the bank’s rapidly growing trading losses from the 
 
 720. Sorkin, supra note 719; supra notes 415-16, 426–30 and accompanying text (discussing the 
absence of criminal prosecutions against any senior executives of major financial institutions). 
 721. Id. 
 722. Victoria Finkle, Six Takeaways from Senate Bruising of Regulators on ‘Too Big to Jail’, AM. 
BANKER, Mar. 8, 2013 (describing the Mar. 7 hearing before the Senate Banking Committee) (available 
on Lexis). 
 723. Id. 
 724. Id. 
 725. Mike Ferullo, Bank Supervision: JP Morgan and OCC Officials Face Criticism For Failure 
to Stem Risky Derivatives Trades, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 502 (Mar. 19, 2013). 
 726. Jessie Eisinger, Lessons Learned After Financial Crisis: Nothing Much Has Changed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2013, at B5 (describing the PSI report as “devastating”); Dan Fitzpatrick et al., Senate 
Slams Bank on ‘Whale’—Panel Says J.P. Morgan Misled Regulators and Investors, Ignored Risks in 
Big Trades, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2013, at A1 (describing the PSI report as “scathing”). 
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OCC until several weeks after the “London Whale” problem was 
exposed by the press, and (iii) made statements to the press about the 
trading losses that were false or misleading.  For its part, the OCC 
ignored numerous warning signs about JPMorgan’s high-risk trading 
activities and failed to take prompt and effective action after the agency 
saw press reports about the bank’s trading losses. 
• In 2005, JPMorgan created the Chief Investment Office (CIO) to 
invest the bank’s “excess deposits,” and CIO began investing in 
synthetic credit derivatives in 2006.727 CIO did not disclose the 
existence of its Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) to the OCC until 
January 2012.728  An internal bank audit in late 2007 stated that 
SCP was pursuing “proprietary position strategies,” and an OCC 
official later described SCP’s operations as “‘classic prop 
trading,’ a view buttressed by the fact that CIO had no client-
facing customers or client-facing activity.”729 
• Between 2007 and 2011, SCP produced about $2.5 billion in 
revenues for JPMorgan, with peak revenues of $1.05 billion in 
2009.730  CIO’s traders expanded the aggregate notional amount 
of SCP’s synthetic credit derivatives from $4 billion to $51 
billion during 2011 and generated trading gains of more than 
$450 million by the end of that year.731  JPMorgan’s senior 
management was pleased with CIO’s performance, and CIO 
head Ina Drew encouraged CIO’s traders to try to “repeat their 
performance” in 2012.732  During 2010 and 2011, Drew received 
total compensation of $29 million, while CIO’s chief investment 
officer, Achilles Macris, received $31.75 million and CIO’s key 
traders—Javier Martin-Artajo and Bruno Iksil—received $22.73 
million and $14.08 million, respectively.733  Those employees 
were “among the most highly-paid employees in [JPMorgan], 
and their compensation was reviewed by the bank’s Operating 
 
 727. By 2012, CIO used JPMorgan’s “excess deposits” to create “a portfolio of approximately 
$350 billion, a historic high.”  U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, JPMorgan 
Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: Majority and Minority Staff 
Report 21-22, 35–37 (Mar. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Senate London Whale Report], available at 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/senate-investigations-subcommittee-holds-hearing-
and-releases-report-on-jpmorgan-chase-whale-trades/?section=alltypes. 
 728. Id. at 35, 38–39. 
 729. Id. at 38, 41–42 (quoting JPMorgan internal audit report dated Nov. 29, 2007, and PSI 
interview with Mike Sullivan, OCC, on Aug. 30, 2012). 
 730. Id. at 50, 56. 
 731. Id. at 50–54. 
 732. Id. at 54–56. 
 733. Id. at 57–58; see also id. at 21–25 (describing the roles of Ina Drew, Achilles Macris, Javier 
Martin-Artajo and Bruno Iksil within CIO). 
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Committee and approved by CEO Jamie Dimon.”734 
• At the end of 2011, JPMorgan’s senior managers told CIO to 
reduce SCP’s risk-weighted assets (RWA) in order to decrease 
the amount of capital JPMorgan would be required to maintain 
under “upcoming Basel III standards.”735  However, instead of 
reducing SCP’s portfolio (which would have involved trading 
losses), CIO’s traders greatly expanded SCP’s notional size from 
$51 billion at the end of 2011 to $157 billion at the end of March 
2012.736  CIO’s traders gambled that their purchases of massive 
volumes of synthetic long positions (which bought protection) on 
investment-grade debt would permit them to reduce JPMorgan’s 
RWA without having to sell SCP’s very large existing synthetic 
short positions (which sold protection) on high-yield debt.737 
• CIO’s traders also gambled that they could generate gains from 
newly-purchased synthetic long positions on investment-grade 
debt that would offset large losses that were already embedded in 
SCP’s existing synthetic short positions on high-yield debt.738  
Unfortunately, “[n]ot only did the SCP’s short positions lose 
value as the economy improved [in early 2012], but the long 
credit protection the CIO purchased for investment grade 
companies did not increase in value as much as was needed to 
offset the losses.”739  As a result, SCP’s losses rapidly escalated 
from early January to the end of March 2012.740 
• When Ina Drew finally ordered CIO’s traders to stop SCP’s 
trading operations on March, 23, 2012, SCP’s portfolio was so 
large that its positions “became visible to the rest of the 
market.”741  News reports about CIO’s “London Whale” trades 
began to appear in early April, and hedge funds and other 
 
 734. Id. at 59. 
 735. Id. at 60–61. 
 736. Id. at 62–85; see also id. at 93 (“At its height in March 2012, the [SCP] portfolio included 
holdings of more than 100 types of credit derivatives, almost all index or tranche holdings, most of 
which had lost value since their acquisition.”). 
 737. Id. at 65–73. 
 738. Id. at 68–85. 
 739. Id. at 75–90 (quote at 78).  The PSI report and the OCC subsequently described the behavior 
of CIO’s traders in the first quarter of 2012 as “doubling down” on a “losing trading strategy.”  Id. at 82 
(quoting email from Elwyn Wong, OCC, to Scott Waterhouse and others, OCC, dated June 29, 2012). 
 740. Id. at 75–90. 
 741. Id. at 85–86, 90.  On Mar. 23, when Drew told CIO’s traders to stop trading in SCP, Bruno 
Iksil told a CIO colleague that “[i]t is over/it is hopeless now . . . .  I tell you, they are going to 
trash/destroy us . . . .  I am going to be hauled over the coals . . . you don’t lose 500M without 
consequences.”  Id. at 123, 124 (quoting Iksil’s instant messages to Julien Grout on Mar. 23, 2012).  In a 
subsequent message on the same day to another colleague, Iksil admitted that “the guys” in the market 
“know my position because [I] am too big for the market . . . .  [I] am too visible.”  Id. at 124 (quoting 
instant message from Iksil to Ade Adetayo on Mar. 23, 2012). 
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investors placed large bets against SCP’s positions.742  Jamie 
Dimon ordered JPMorgan’s derivatives team to “dismantle” 
SCP, and the team transferred most of SCP’s positions to 
JPMorgan’s investment bank for liquidation.  JPMorgan’s losses 
from SCP’s trades exceeded $6.2 billion by the end of 2012.743 
• SCP breached CIO’s trading risk limits on hundreds of occasions 
without any effective response from JPMorgan’s risk managers.  
After SCP surpassed CIO’s value-at-risk (VAR) limit in January 
2012, CIO persuaded JPMorgan’s risk managers to approve a 
new, unproven and flawed VAR model.  The new model—which 
JPMorgan revoked in May 2012—reduced CIO’s reported VAR 
by half and thereby doubled CIO’s VAR risk limit.744  CIO’s 
traders used the new VAR model to justify large increases in 
SCP’s notional size and risk.745  Similarly, when SCP exceeded 
CIO’s Comprehensive Risk Measure (CRM) in March 2012,  
CIO’s chief market risk officer dismissed the CRM results as 
“garbage” and CIO failed to heed the CRM breach.746  SCP also 
jumped over additional trading restrictions, including “credit 
spread risk metrics,” “mark-to-market stress limits,” “stop loss 
advisories” and “concentration limits,” but JPMorgan’s risk 
managers did not respond to any of those breaches.747  The 
Senate PSI report concluded: 
   In contrast to JPMorgan Chase’s reputation for best-in-
   class risk management, the [London] whale trades exposed 
   a bank culture in which risk limit breaches were routinely 
   disregarded, risk metrics were frequently criticized or 
   downplayed, and risk evaluation models were targeted by 
   bank personnel seeking to produce artificially lower capital 
   requirements. 
   . . . In fact, from January 1 through April 30, 2012, 
   CIO risk limits and advisories were breached more than 
   330 times.748 
• When CIO finally disclosed SCP’s existence to the OCC in 
January 2012, “the CIO downplayed the portfolio’s importance 
by misinforming the OCC that it planned to reduce the SCP.”749  
 
 742. Id. at 90–93. 
 743. Id. at 92–93. 
 744. Id. at 160, 166–81, 185–87. 
 745. Id. at 182–25. 
 746. Id. at 187–92; see also id. at 190 (quoting email from Peter Weiland to Javier Martin-Artajo 
dated Mar. 2, 2012). 
 747. Id. at 198–213 (quotes at 198, 207, 208, 211). 
 748. Id. at 154. 
 749. Id. at 216 (quote), 227–29. 
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During February and March, as SCP’s size and losses steadily 
mounted, JPMorgan “began to omit key CIO performance data 
from its standard reports to the OCC.”750  As a result, the OCC 
was “surprised” to learn about SCP’s enormous size and 
extensive losses when “media reports unmasked the role of 
JPMorgan Chase in the whale trades” in April 2012.751  After 
reading these press reports, the OCC asked for more information 
about SCP, but JPMorgan provided “inadequate information that 
delayed effective oversight.”752  Indeed, the OCC “received such 
limited data [from JPMorgan] about the trades and such blanket 
assurances from the bank about them that, by the end of April, 
the OCC considered the matter closed.”753  On May 4, 2012, 
shortly before JPMorgan filed its first-quarter financial results 
showing a large loss from SCP’s trades, JPMorgan’s chief 
financial officer, Douglas Braunstein, finally told Scott 
Waterhouse, the OCC’s examiner-in-chief, about the magnitude 
of SCP’s problems.754 
• Despite having more than sixty resident examiners at 
JPMorgan,755 the OCC failed (i) to inquire about CIO’s 
extraordinary trading gain of $400 million at the end of 2011, (ii) 
to identify SCP’s rapidly growing size and losses until press 
reports about SCP appeared in April 2012, (ii) to inquire about 
CIO’s adoption of a new VAR model that cut SCP’s risk profile 
in half, (iii) to notice or respond to numerous reports from 
JPMorgan indicating that CIO was breaching multiple trading 
risk limits, and (iv) to notice that JPMorgan omitted key CIO 
performance data from its reports to the OCC in February and 
March 2012.756  The OCC understood CIO’s operations so 
poorly that OCC examiners initially viewed SCP as “a low risk 
hedge-management activity, and thus not a high supervisory 
priority.”757   
• Even after JPMorgan publicly disclosed large losses from SCP’s 
trading activities in May 2012, two senior OCC officials at first 
downplayed the seriousness of those losses until Thomas Curry, 
 
 750. Id. at 216 (quote), 230–31. 
 751. Id. at 217 (quotes), 236. 
 752. Id. at 237. 
 753. Id. at 217 (quote), 237–41. 
 754. Id. at 242–43; see also id. at 243 (stating that Waterhouse was “taken aback” by Braunstein’s 
call “since the bank should have updated him about the mounting losses prior to that telephone call”). 
 755. Id. at 27 (stating that the OCC had “approximately 65 on-site examiners who are responsible 
for reviewing nearly every facet of JPMorgan Chase’s activities and operations.  Several OCC 
examiners were responsible for overseeing the CIO.”). 
 756. Id. at 9, 216–17, 226–34. 
 757. Id. at 234, 234 n.1322 (quoting memorandum from Sally Belshaw, OCC, to Mike Brosnan, 
OCC, dated Oct. 26, 2012, entitled “Surrounding Losses at CIO and Lessons Learned”). 
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the recently-appointed Comptroller of the Currency, demanded a 
more thorough review.758  The OCC subsequently issued a case-
and-desist order against JPMorgan in January 2013, which 
required the bank “to undertake a number of actions to 
strengthen its risk management and derivatives trading 
practices.”759  However, as of mid-2013, the OCC had not 
assessed any civil money penalties against JPMorgan despite 
finding that the bank committed “regulatory violations” and 
engaged in “unsafe and sound practices in its derivatives trading 
and valuation activities.760  
• JPMorgan’s evasion of OCC oversight of SCP was part of a 
larger pattern of resistance to OCC supervision.  In December 
2010, when the OCC requested better documentation of CIO’s 
investment policies and portfolio decisions, Ina Drew “sternly” 
declared that the OCC was trying to “destroy” JPMorgan’s 
business and remove “necessary flexibility from the CIO.”761  
The OCC’s examiner-in-charge for JPMorgan admitted that it 
was “very common” for the bank to “push back on examiner 
findings and recommendations,” and that senior bank executives 
“yelled at OCC examiners” and called them “stupid” during one 
meeting.762  In early 2012, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon 
instructed JPMorgan’s investment bank to stop providing daily 
profit and loss reports to the OCC for a week, claiming that the 
OCC did not need such reports.763  When the OCC finally asked 
for daily profit and loss reports from CIO in May 2012, the head 
capital markets examiner told his colleagues, “Bank will likely 
object to this.”764  The PSI’s report viewed the examiner’s 
comment as “disturbing evidence of not only the bank’s 
resistance to OCC oversight, but also the OCC’s failure to 
establish a regulatory relationship in which the bank accepted its 
 
 758. Id. at 246–48 (explaining that Mike Brosnan, head of the OCC’s Large Bank Supervision 
division, and OCC Chief Counsel Julie Williams at first did not view JPMorgan’s disclosure of SCP’s 
trading losses as presenting a serious problem for JPMorgan or the OCC); see also id. at 234–36 
(reporting that senior OCC officials, including Mr. Brosnan and Ms. Williams, “initially accepted the 
bank’s characterization of the SCP as a hedging mechanism intended to reduce bank risk”). 
 759. Id. at 250; see also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., Enforcement Action #2013-001, Jan. 14, 2013 [hereinafter OCC JPMorgan Order], available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-001.pdf. 
 760. Senate London Whale Report, supra note 727, at 236, 249–50; see also OCC JPMorgan 
Order, supra note 759, at 1–4, 25–26 (stating that the OCC reserved the future right to assess civil 
money penalties “based on the findings set forth in this Order”). 
 761. Senate London Whale Report, supra note 727, at 222–23. 
 762. Id. at 224 (quoting PSI interview with Scott Waterhouse on Sept. 17, 2012). 
 763. Id. at 225 (noting that Dimon “raised his voice in anger” when he learned that JPMorgan’s 
chief investment officer ordered the investment bank to resume providing the daily profit and loss 
reports to the OCC). 
 764. Id. at 231 (quoting email from Fred Crumlish, OCC, to Scott Waterhouse and others, OCC, 
dated May 7, 2012). 
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obligation to readily provide data requested by its regulator.”765 
• In an earnings call with investors, analysts and the media on 
April 13, 2012, Dimon called SCP’s trading problems “a 
complete tempest in a teapot” and indicated that it was “our job 
to invest that portfolio wisely and intelligently . . . over a long 
period of time to earn income and to offset other exposures we 
have.”766  During the same call, Braunstein stated that SCP’s 
trading decisions “are made on a very long-term basis” and 
“effectively balanced from a risk standpoint” so that  “[w]e are 
very comfortable with our positions as they are held today.”767  
He further maintained that “those positions are fully transparent 
to the regulators” because the regulators “get the information on 
those positions on a regular and recurring basis as part of our 
normalized reporting.”768 
• The PSI’s report strongly criticized Dimon’s and Braunstein’s 
statements during the earnings call for being “incomplete, 
contain[ing] numerous inaccuracies, and misinform[ing] 
investors, regulators and the public.”769  The PSI’s report 
concluded that the earnings call and other statements by 
JPMorgan misled investors, regulators and the public by 
“downplaying the portfolio’s size, risk profile, and losses; 
describing it as the product of long-term investment 
decisionmaking to reduce risk . . . and claiming it was vetted by 
the bank’s risk managers and transparent to regulators, none of 
which was true.”770 
Gretchen Morgenson concluded that the Senate’s PSI’s report 
“disproves the premise” that the Dodd–Frank Act will “make our system 
safe from the kinds of reckless banking activities that brought the 
economy to its knees.”771  Similarly, in Jesse Eisinger’s view, the PSI’s 
 
 765. Id. 
 766. Id. at 259 (quoting Dimon’s comments during the earnings call on April 13, 2012). 
 767. Id. at 258 (quoting Braunstein’s comments during the same earnings call). 
 768. Id. at 258–59 (same).  Dimon had previously approved a list of “talking points” about SCP’s 
trading problems prepared by JPMorgan’s chief spokesman, Joe Evangelisti, and many of those talking 
points were echoed by Dimon and Braunstein in the earnings call on April 13, 2012.  Id. at 255–56, 
258–59. 
 769. Id. at 252–54. 
 770. Id. at 16; see also id. at 10–13, 252–55, 265–300 (criticizing JPMorgan’s public disclosures 
related to its SCP trading problems in April and May 2012); Eisinger, supra note 726 (“The Senate 
report makes it clear that JPMorgan misled shareholders and the public, particularly on its April 13, 
2012, conference call.”). 
 771. Gretchen Morgenson, JPMorgan’s Follies, for All to See, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, § BU, 
at 1 (contending that the PSI’s report confirms that “JPMorgan is too big to regulate” as well as being 
“too big to be allowed to fail and too big to prosecute”); see also Eisinger, supra note 726 (concluding 
that, in view of the PSI’s report, the claim that bankers and regulators “have learned their lesson” from 
the financial crisis is only “a sham”). 
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report demonstrates that “[b]ankers aren’t acting cautious and chastened.  
Risk managers aren’t in the ascendance on Wall Street.  Regulators 
remain their duped and docile selves.”772  Simon Johnson agreed that the 
“London Whale” scandal “reinforce[s] the view” that the “largest banks 
have become too complex to manage,” while Attorney General Holder’s 
testimony confirms that “too-big-to-fail exists and Dodd–Frank did not 
end it.”773 
V. CONCLUSION: WALL STREET’S “VICTORY” OVER DODD–FRANK, THE 
BROWN–VITTER BILL AND THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE TBTF DEBATE 
Based on the analysis set forth above, one might conclude that the 
battle for financial reform has been irretrievably lost.  Wall Street’s 
leaders are largely unrepentant for the immense harm their institutions 
inflicted on the U.S. economy during the financial crisis, and their 
outlook and behavior have not changed in any significant way since the 
crisis.  Congress and federal regulators continue to knuckle under to the 
enormous political influence wielded by megabanks.  Wall Street has 
blocked any meaningful implementation of Dodd–Frank’s reforms that 
might have forced large financial conglomerates to change their 
business model or to reduce their appetite for risk-taking.  Financial 
giants continue to make speculative bets and to disregard regulatory 
restrictions, believing that federal agencies will not interfere with their 
gambling ex ante and will not hold their managers personally 
accountable for reckless behavior or legal violations ex post.  
Megabanks and their creditors remain confident that federal agencies 
will arrange bailouts when the next systemic financial crisis occurs.  
“And so, despite Dodd–Frank, we are still threatened by the same 
dangers” from Wall Street.774   
 
 772. Eisinger, supra note 726.  In a similar vein, Jonathan Weil alleged that the OCC was 
“complicit” in “keep[ing] quiet while JPMorgan spread falsehoods,” because the OCC failed to correct 
JPMorgan’s assertion on April 13, 2012, that SCP’s positions were “fully transparent to the 
regulators . . . on a regular and recurring basis.”  Jonathan Weil, JPMorgan Silent Partner Revealed in 
Whale Fiasco, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 21, 2013 (also reporting that (i) during the PSI’s hearing on Mar. 15, 
2013, Scott Waterhouse, the OCC’s examiner-in-chief, acknowledged that the statement on April 13, 
2012, by JPMorgan’s chief financial officer, Douglas Braunstein, was “not true,” and (ii) “[t]his was the 
first time anyone from the OCC had said publicly that Braunstein’s statement was false”). 
 773. Simon Johnson, Big Banks Have a Big Problem, NY TIMES BLOGS (ECONOMIX), Mar. 14, 
2013 (available on Lexis). 
 774. Rivlin, supra note 7.  In a speech to a Philadelphia conference in April 2013, Columbia 
University economist Jeffrey Sachs voiced similar but even stronger conclusions in much starker 
language.  He declared, “I regard the moral environment [on Wall Street] as pathological . . . [Wall 
Street bankers believe they] have no responsibility to their clients, they have no responsibility to people, 
to counterparties in transactions, . . . they have gamed the system to a remarkable extent.”  Sachs also 
alleged that “financial fraud” was endemic on Wall Street due to “a docile president, a docile White 
House and a docile regulatory system that absolutely can’t find its voice . . . .  We have a corrupt politics 
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While it is increasingly clear that Dodd–Frank’s key reforms have 
failed to accomplish their goals, that lamentable fact may contain a 
silver lining.  The financial industry may come to regret its remarkable 
achievement in “delaying and undermining the Dodd–Frank financial 
overhaul law and staving off criminal investigations into 
wrongdoing.”775  Wall Street’s apparent victory over Dodd–Frank may 
ultimately prove to be a “catastrophic success.”776   
Attorney General Holder’s “too-big-to-jail” admission and the Senate 
PSI’s “damning report” on JPMorgan could prove to be a “crucial 
turning point,” because they could trigger a new wave of public outrage 
that would force Congress and federal regulators to adopt “more radical 
solutions” to the TBTF problem.777  In late March 2013, a national 
survey found that half of American adults supported a mandatory 
breakup of the twelve largest banks.778  A few days later, Senators voted 
99–0 in favor of a non-binding resolution calling for an end to implicit 
government subsidies for banks larger than $500 billion.779   
Also in March, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard 
Fisher and FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig repeated their previous 
calls for far-reaching reforms to address the TBTF problem.  Fisher and 
Hoenig argued that Dodd–Frank’s complex and highly discretionary 
reforms would not eliminate large explicit and implicit TBTF subsidies 
 
to the core, I am afraid to say, and . . . both parties are up to their neck in this.”  John Aidan Byrne, Wall 
St.’s Criminal Behavior: Sachs rips into bankers, N.Y. POST, April 28, 2013, at 35 (quoting speech by 
Sachs), 2013 WLNR 10678310. 
 775. Jesse Eisinger, In Brown–Vitter Bill, a Bank Overhaul with Possible Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, May 
2, 2013, at B4. 
 776. Ezra Klein, Big Banks’ Success Could Spell Their Doom, BLOOMBERG, April 3, 2013. 
 777. Victoria Finkle, Seven Reasons the Debate Over ‘Too Big To Fail’ Is Here to Stay, AM. 
BANKER, April 2, 2013, 2013 WLNR 7937747; see also CBS News, “Banks too big to jail, fail or nail 
face new scrutiny,” Mar. 15, 2013 (available on Lexis) (detecting “a new spirit . . . among [Washington] 
policy makers, amplified by a growing chorus of media voices, that is willing to challenge Wall Street 
and push for additional reform”); Finkle, supra note 707 (reporting that Attorney General Holder’s 
testimony triggered a petition drive by Moveon.org calling on the Obama Administration “to break up 
the big banks and prosecute the criminals who used them to destroy our economy”); Ben Weyl, Banks 
on the Block in GOP Rebranding, CQ WEEKLY, Mar. 23, 2013, 2013 WLNR 7833025 (reporting that 
Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s “outspoken” attacks on TBTF banks have “drawn popular support”; for 
example, a video clip of a Senate committee hearing in which she “lectured regulators for not 
prosecuting wrongdoing by large institutions . . . has been viewed on YouTube more than 900,000 
times”). 
 778. Jeff Bater, ‘Systemic Risk’ Survey Finds Half of Americans Would Favor Plan to Break Up 
Banks,100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 551 (Mar. 26, 2013) (reporting on a nationwide survey released by 
Rasumussen Reports on Mar. 21, 2013, which found that 50% of American adults supported a 
mandatory breakup of the twelve largest U.S. banks, while 23% were opposed and 27% were 
undecided). 
 779. The unanimous Senate vote occurred on a “non-binding” amendment to a Senate budget 
resolution.  Cheyenne Hopkins, Senators Give Unanimous Support to Ending Too-Big-to-Fail Banks, 
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 25, 2013; Simon Johnson, The Debate on Bank Size Is Over, NY TIMES BLOGS 
(ECONOMIX), Mar. 28, 2013 (available on Lexis). 
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for megabanks.780  Accordingly, they maintained that (i) the federal 
safety net—including federal deposit insurance and the Fed’s emergency 
credit facilities—must be restricted to the traditional deposit-taking, 
payment services and lending activities of commercial banks, and (ii) 
nontraditional activities (including derivatives and other capital markets 
operations) must be conducted in separate nonbank entities that would 
not be protected against failure by the federal government.781  Fisher’s 
and Hoenig’s proposals to deny federal safety net subsidies to nonbank 
affiliates of financial conglomerates are conceptually similar to the 
“narrow banking” proposal I have previously advocated as well as the 
“ring-fencing” reforms that are currently being considered by the U.K. 
and EU governments.782 
Hoenig also maintained—like Andrew Haldane of the Bank of 
England—that global bank regulators should abandon Basel III’s risk-
weighted capital rules.  In place of Basel III, Hoenig would establish 
much higher leverage capital requirements for megabanks, to be 
determined by dividing each bank’s tangible equity by its unweighted 
assets (including off-balance-sheet risk exposures).783  Many analysts 
 
 780. Richard Fisher, “Ending ‘Too Big to Fail’,” Remarks before the Conservative Political 
Action Conference, National Harbor, MD, Mar. 16, 2013  (arguing that Dodd–Frank’s “promise” to end 
TBTF “rings hollow . . . .  Dodd–Frank is long on process and complexity but short on results” and 
“market discipline is still lacking” for the largest banks) [hereinafter Fisher Mar. 16, 2013 Speech], 
available at http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2013/fs130316.cfm]; Thomas M. Hoenig, 
Stop the subsidies for big banks, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2013, at A13 (“While some suggest that the 
2010 Dodd–Frank Act removed all protections and subsidies for these largest firms, there is no evidence 
to support that assertion.”).  For additional evidence that Dodd–Frank has not ended TBTF subsidies for 
megabanks, see Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part I), at 1–18; supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
 781. Fisher Mar. 16, 2013 Speech, supra note 780; Richard Fisher & Harvey Rosenblum, 
“Vanquishing Too Big to Fail,” Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, 2012 Annual Report (2013), available at 
http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/fed/annual/2012/ar12b/index.cfm; Hoenig, supra note 780; Hoenig 
April 17, 2013 Speech, supra note 714; Thomas M. Hoenig, Banking Safety Net Makes Wall Street 
Dangerous, AM. BANKER (online ed.), Jan. 17, 2013, available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/banking-safety-net-makes-wall-street-dangerous-1055949-
1.html. 
 782. For my “narrow banking” proposal, see Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part II), at 1–7; Wilmarth, 
supra note 12, at 1034–52.  For the “ring-fencing” reforms currently under consideration by the U.K. 
and EU governments, see Michael Beaton, Bank Ring-Fencing in the UK: The Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Bill 2013, Feb. 15, 2013, available at 
http://www.economonitor.com/blog/201302/bank-ring-fencing-in-the-uk-the-financial-services-bankin 
g-reform-bill/#idc-container; Julie Patient, International Banking: Next Stage of the UK’s Banking 
Reform Bill: Putting Up the Fencing, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 403 (Feb. 26, 2013); Martin Wolf, 
Liikanen is at least a step forward for EU banks, FT.COM, Oct. 4, 2012; Alex Barker, EU review wants 
bank trading ringfenced, FT.COM, Oct. 2, 2012. 
 783. Thomas M. Hoenig, “Basel III Capital” A Well-Intended Illusion,” Remarks before the 2013 
Research Conference of the Int’l Ass’n of Deposit Insurers, April 9, 2013 [hereinafter Hoenig April 9, 
2013 Speech], available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr0913.html; Andrew G. 
Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee,” Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th 
economic policy symposium, Aug. 31, 2012, at 6–14, 18–20, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech596.pdf. 
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agree that Basel’s regime of complex risk-weighting formulas has long 
been subject to gaming and arbitrage by the largest banks, and that much 
stronger leverage requirements are needed to discourage excessive risk-
taking and reduce the likelihood of a future financial crisis.784 
In April 2013, Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and David Vitter (R-
LA) introduced a bill (Brown–Vitter) that incorporated key aspects of 
Fisher’s and Hoenig’s reform proposals.  Brown–Vitter would (i) direct 
federal banking agencies to abandon the Basel III risk-based capital 
regime and instead impose minimum leverage capital requirements (to 
be phased in over five years) of 8 percent for banks with assets between 
$50 billion and $500 billion and 15 percent for banks larger than $500 
billion, (ii) require large banking organizations to satisfy separate 
capitalization requirements for their nonbank subsidiaries, (iii) prohibit 
FDIC-insured banks from transferring their safety net subsidies to 
nonbank affiliates, and (iv) prohibit regulators from using the federal 
safety net to protect nonbank affiliates.785  Brown–Vitter’s mandate for a 
15 percent leverage capital ratio for banks larger than $500 billion 
would be similar to the capital ratios that large banks maintained 
between the creation of the Fed in 1913 and the establishment of federal 
deposit insurance in 1933.786  Senator Brown declared that the bill 
would impose “more market discipline on the financial services 
industry” and present megabanks with a clear choice: “they can increase 
their capital or bring down their size.”787  Senator Vitter explained that it 
was time to “level the playing field” between big and small banks and 
remove the government “subsidy” favoring megabanks.788 
 
 784. E.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 94–191, 217–24; Brendan Geeley, Ditch Basel 
Rules, Just Raise Capital, Vitter Says, BUSINESSWEEK (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-01/ditch-basel-bank-rules-just-raise-capital-vitter-says; 
Simon Johnson, The Case for Megabanks Fails, NY TIMES BLOGS (ECONOMIX), May 2, 2013 (available 
on Lexis); Gretchen Morgenson, Trying to Slam the Bailout Door, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2013, § BU, at 
1; John Plender, Make simplicity a priority in banking, FT.COM, Dec. 6, 2012; Big Banks Still Aren’t 
Safe Enough, BLOOMBERG, April 30, 2013 (editorial); What’s So Radical About a Safer Financial 
System?, BLOOMBERG, April 9, 2013 (editorial). 
 785. Sherrod Brown & David Vitter, Make Wall Street Choose: Go Small or Go Home, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 24, 2013, 2013 WLNR 9991786; Cjors Bruce, Capital: Senate Bill Would Hike Capital 
Requirements for Large Banks, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 784 (April 30, 2013); Cheyenne Hopkins, 
Too-Big-to-Fail Bill Pitched as Fix for Dodd–Frank Act’s Flaws, BLOOMBERG, April 24, 2013. 
 786. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 243 n.26 (quoting May 16, 2012 op-ed by Alan 
Meltzer, which stated, “In the 1920s, capital ratios for large New York banks ranged from 15% to 20% 
of assets.”); Hoenig April 9, 2013 Speech, supra note 783 (stating that “the equity capital to assets ratio 
for the [banking] industry [from 1913 to 1933] ranged between 13 and 16 percent, regardless of bank 
size”). 
 787. Morgenson, supra note 784 (quoting interview with Sen. Brown). 
 788. David Dayen, Banking Regulation: Closed for Business, AMERICAN PROSPECT BLOGS, April 
24, 2013, 2013 WLNR 10013210 (quoting Sen. Vitter); see also Jack Torry, Brown bill puts onus for 
failure on banks, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (OH), April 25, 2013, at 4A, 2013 WLNR 10171762 (quoting 
Sen. Brown’s statement that “taxpayers shouldn’t have to subsidize . . . risk-taking” by megabanks). 
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Supporters praised Brown–Vitter as a direct challenge to the TBTF 
subsidies enjoyed by megabanks.789  In contrast, Wall Street institutions 
and their lobbyists vehemently attacked the bill for mandating 
“[e]xcessively high capital [that] will restrict banks’ ability to lend to 
business . . . and hurt economic growth.”790  Critics also argued that 
Brown–Vitter would force the largest banks to break up because they 
could not raise the estimated $1 trillion or more in new capital that 
Brown–Vitter would mandate.791   
Wall Street’s assertion that Brown–Vitter’s higher leverage capital 
requirements would significantly reduce business lending is 
unpersuasive.  Additional equity capital would be advantageous as a 
funding source for bank loans (especially if TBTF subsidies are 
removed) because equity investors—unlike depositors and other short-
term creditors—cannot “run” on banks by suddenly withdrawing their 
investments during a crisis.792  In fact, S&P’s report on Brown–Vitter 
concluded that it would be “manageable” for banks with assets between 
$50 billion and $500 billion to satisfy Brown–Vitter’s 8 percent leverage 
capital requirement.793  Most small banks (with assets under $10 billion) 
 
 789. E.g., Matt Taibbi, Too-Big-To-Fail Takes Another Body Blow, May 1, 2013 (describing 
Brown–Vitter as “a gun aimed directly at the head of the Too-Big-To-Fail Beast”), available at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/too-big-to-fail-takes-another-body-blow-20130501; 
see also Morgenson, supra note 784 (“[I]f you’re a large and powerful financial institutions that’s too 
big to fail, you won’t like this bill one bit.”); Simon Johnson, Brown–Vitter Rearranges Financial-
Reform Battlefield, BLOOMBERG, April 28, 2013 (“Intellectually, the tide has turned . . . .  Brown-Vitter 
provides an appropriate roadmap for addressing some of the core problems [of TBTF megabanks] and 
making the financial system significantly safer.”). 
 790. Mark DeCambre, A bank-buster bill; Critics: Regs would cripple big lenders, N.Y. POST, 
April 9, 2013, at 28, 2013 WLNR 8632050 (quoting Rob Nichols, CEO of the Financial Services 
Forum); see also Torry, supra note 788 (quoting Jeff Sigmund of the American Bankers Ass’n, who 
asserted that Brown–Vitter “would harm banks and their customers, local communities and the broader 
economy”); SIFMA Statement on Brown–Vitter Legislation, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, April 24, 2012 
(available on Lexis) (quoting SIFMA news release alleging that Brown–Vitter “would force financial 
institutions to raise capital excessively higher than current levels, which would limit an institution’s 
ability to lend to businesses, hampering economic growth and job creation”). 
 791. Eisinger, supra note 775 (summarizing arguments made by critics of Brown–Vitter); Taibbi, 
supra note 789 (same); see also Standard & Poor’s, “Brown–Vitter Bill: Game-Changing Regulation 
For U.S. Banks,” April 25, 2013 (“We do not see equity markets being able to meet the massive level of 
common equity the bill requires of the largest banks . . . .  Instead, the largest banks would need to break 
up or deleverage.”) [hereinafter S&P Brown–Vitter Report], available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=124535076
2438#ID273. 
 792. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 49–51, 97–100, 107–47; see also Barbara A. Rehm, 
Why We Don’t Need Brown–Vitter, At Least Not Yet, AM. BANKER, May 2, 2013 (summarizing the view 
of Fred Cannon, director of U.S. research for Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, that “higher capital can lead to 
less lending, but it doesn’t have to . . . .  Some banks may choose to shrink assets, including loans, to 
reach the stricter capital ratios, but others won’t.”) (available on Lexis). 
 793. S&P Brown–Vitter Report, supra note 791 (determining that banks with assets of $50 to 
$500 billion already have an average leverage capital ratio of 6.6% and “should be able to meet the 
proposed minimum requirement [of 8%] in five years,” as required by Brown–Vitter). 
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already have tangible equity ratios that exceed 8 percent.794 
The largest banks (with assets over $500 billion), which would need 
to satisfy Brown–Vitter’s 15 percent leverage requirement, devote a 
relatively small share of their assets to business lending.  A recent Fed 
staff study found that big banks (with assets over $250 billion) allocated 
only 14 percent of their assets to business lending in 2007, and that 
share declined to 12 percent in 2012.  In contrast, smaller banks (with 
assets under $10 billion) devoted 30 percent of their assets to business 
lending in both 2007 and 2012. 795  In 2012, smaller banks also provided 
more than half of all loans to small businesses—the most bank-
dependent class of business borrowers—while big banks furnished only 
a quarter of such loans.796  Thus, requiring big banks to maintain higher 
levels of equity capital would be unlikely to reduce lending dramatically 
to bank-dependent business firms. 
Wall Street’s second argument—that it would be impossible for 
megabanks to raise the additional capital required by Brown–Vitter—
actually proves the need for the bill.  If it is true, as claimed in S&P’s 
report, that megabanks would be “[f]aced with little to no access to 
equity markets,” then we should want megabanks to “be forced into 
asset sales, divestitures, or . . . to break up.”797  Moreover, contrary to 
Wall Street’s claim that Dodd–Frank has eliminated TBTF subsidies, 
S&P’s report essentially admitted that an implicit TBTF subsidy still 
exists for megabanks.  In that regard, S&P’s report warned that 
enactment of Brown–Vitter might force the credit agency to remove its 
current ratings upgrade for the largest U.S. banks because that upgrade 
is dependent on the presumed access of those banks to “government 
support” during a crisis: “Under our methodology, we would potentially 
no longer factor in government support if we believed that once large 
banks are broken up [due to Brown–Vitter], we would not classify those 
banks as having high systemic importance.”798 
 
 794. Id. (chart 3) (showing that all size groups of banks smaller than $10 billion had average 
tangible equity ratios higher than 8 percent in 2012, except for banks smaller than $500 million, which 
had an average tangible equity ratio of 5.99%). 
 795. Jeffrey W. Gunther & Kelly Klemme, “A Lender for Tough Times,” in Fed. Res. Bank of 
Dallas, 2012 Annual Report (text and Chart 2), available at 
http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/fed/annual/2012/e2/1201e2.cfm. 
 796. Id. 
 797. Taibbi, supra note 789 (quoting S&P Brown–Vitter Report, supra note 791); see also 
Eisinger, supra note 775 (observing that the claim by megabanks that “they couldn’t sell that much 
stock” actually “make[s] Senator Brown’s and Senator’s Vitter’s case for them.  If investors are so 
terrified of the big banks that they won’t buy their stock, that’s a terrific problem”). 
 798. S&P Brown–Vitter Report, supra note 791; see also Taibbi, supra note 789 (observing that 
the quoted passage represents “an explicit admission that Dodd–Frank didn’t fix the Too-Big-To-Fail 
issue,” despite Wall Street’s assertions to the contrary).  In a previous research report, issued in July 
2011, S&P similarly acknowledged that an implicit TBTF subsidy remained for megabanks, 
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In view of Wall Street’s vehement attacks on Brown–Vitter and likely 
opposition to the bill from the Obama Administration and key 
congressional leaders, the bill’s chances of passage seemed very 
doubtful in mid-2013, as this article went to press.799  However, some 
analysts suggested that Brown–Vitter had produced three significant 
changes in the political and regulatory landscape surrounding the TBTF 
debate.  First, Brown–Vitter highlighted the inadequacy of Dodd–
Frank’s reforms as well as the very poor implementation of those 
reforms.800  Second, Brown–Vitter focused the TBTF debate on issues 
where Wall Street was highly vulnerable, including (i) the dangerously 
low levels of tangible equity capital held by the largest banks, (ii) the 
unfairness of their safety net subsidies, and (iii) the risks to the FDIC 
and taxpayers posed by the ability of megabanks to transfer their 
subsidies to their nonbank affiliates engaged in derivatives and other 
speculative capital markets activities.801  Third, Brown–Vitter could 
 
notwithstanding Dodd–Frank’s reforms.  The 2011 report concluded: “We believe that under certain 
circumstances and with selected systemically important financial institutions, future extraordinary 
government support is still possible.”  Standard & Poor’s, Global Credit Portal: RatingsDirect: The 
U.S. Government Says Support For Banks Will Be Different ‘Next Time’—But Will It?, July 12, 2011, at 
2; see also id. at 8, 9–10 (classifying the U.S. as “supportive” of major banks because “[t]he U.S. 
government indeed has a long track record of supporting its large and systemically important financial 
institutions despite its stated preference for not doing so.  [Dodd–Frank] may limit this activity, but we 
believe the government may try to avoid contagion and a domino effect if a SIFI finds itself in a 
financially weakened position in a future crisis.”), available at http://www.politico.com/pdf/PPM223_7-
12-11_-
_the_us_government_says_support_for_banks_will_be_different_nexttime_but_will_it_071211.pdf. 
 799. Donna Borak, Treasury’s Lew Aligns with Fed, Big Banks in TBTF Debate, AM. BANKER, 
May 22, 2013, 2013 WLNR 12477817 (reporting that Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew testified during a 
Senate Banking Committee hearing that “lawmakers should hold off on further legislative reforms to the 
financial system until Dodd–Frank is fully implemented,” and he “also expressed worry about [the 
Brown-Vitter] bill”); Dayen, supra note 788 (reporting that Treasury Undersecretary Mary Miller 
“poured a giant bucket of cold water” on Brown–Vitter in her speech claiming that Dodd–Frank had 
“already solved” the TBTF problem and that megabanks did not have an “unfair advantage” over 
smaller banks in the form of TBTF subsidies, and noting that “[w]hat’s striking about Miller’s speech is 
how closely it mirrors the arguments set forth in several recent papers put out by the big banks, their 
lobbyists, and their allies”); Victoria Finkle, ‘Too Big To Fail’ Bill Puts Banking Chairmen in Tight 
Spot, AM. BANKER, May 1, 2013 (reporting that (i) Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD), chairman of the 
Senate Banking Committee, probably would not support Brown–Vitter because he was “a staunch 
defender of Dodd–Frank” and also maintained “ties with Citigroup,” whose “employees and political 
action committee were Johnson’s top contributors during the 2012 election cycle,” and (ii) Rep. Jeb 
Hensarling (R-TX), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, also seemed unlikely to 
support Brown–Vitter) (available on Lexis); Shahien Nasiripour & Tom Braithwaite, Finance: Out to 
break the banks, FT.COM, April 30, 2013 (stating that many members of Congress “like the donations of 
the biggest [banking] groups and are susceptible to the argument that breaking up banks such as 
JPMorgan would push their business to foreign groups, such as Deutsche Bank or Barclays, that can 
offer a full suite of products”). 
 800. Finkle, supra note 777; Hopkins, supra note 785; Nasirpour & Braithwaite, supra note 799. 
 801. Rob Blackwell, Why the Brown–Vitter Bill Matters—Even If It Doesn’t Pass, AM. BANKER, 
April 29, 2013 (available on Lexis); Finkle, supra note 777; Johnson, supra note 789; Nasirapour & 
Braithwaite, supra note 799. 
1444 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
provide political cover for federal regulators to wield their (as yet 
unexercised) powers under Dodd–Frank to impose significantly higher 
capital requirements on megabanks and to require divestitures of assets 
by large banks that fail to submit satisfactory orderly resolution plans 
(living wills).802 
As Senators Brown and Vitter explained in floor statements, the 
TBTF issue raises profound questions about the concentrated economic 
and political power wielded by a small group of megabanks.803  In 
1990—before the advent of nationwide and conglomerate banking—the 
four largest U.S. banks held $519 billion of assets, equal to just 9 
percent of domestic GDP.804  By 2011, the four largest U.S. banks—
JPMorgan, BofA, Citigroup and Wells Fargo—held $7.5 trillion of 
assets, equal to 50 percent of GDP.805  Similarly, the total assets of the 
six largest U.S. banks (including Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) 
grew from 18 percent of GDP in 1995 to 63 percent of GDP in 2012.806 
The foregoing figures include only the on-balance-sheet assets of the 
largest banks and considerably understate their actual risk exposures and 
economic significance.807  Under international accounting standards—
which would require on-balance-sheet recognition of much larger 
amounts of their derivatives exposures and mortgage securitizations—
the four largest U.S. banks would have held 93 percent of domestic GDP 
in 2012, while the six largest banks would have held 102 percent of 
GDP.808 
 
 802. Blackwell, supra note 801; Michael R. Crittenden, Banks Feel Heat on Capital—Long-Term 
Debt Proposal Aims to Ensure Creditors Share in Cost of Failure, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2013, at C1; 
Peter Eavis, A New Fed Thought for ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks: Shrink Them, NY TIMES BLOGS 
(DEALBOOK), May 3, 2013, 2013 WLNR 10900409; Nasiripour & Braithwaite, supra note 799. 
 803. 159 Cong. Rec. S994 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2013) (remarks of Sen. Brown) [hereinafter Brown 
Floor Statement]; id. S995 (remarks of Sen. Vitter) [hereinafter Vitter Floor Statement]. 
 804. Fisher & Rosenblum, supra note 781 (text and Chart 1); see also supra notes 354–56 and 
accompanying text (describing 1994 and 1999 federal laws that authorized the creation of nationwide 
banks and financial conglomerates (universal banks)). 
 805. Fisher & Rosenblum, supra note 781 (text and Chart 2) (showing that the four largest U.S. 
banks in 1990 were Citicorp, BofA, Chase Manhattan and JPMorgan). 
 806. Brown Floor Statement, supra note 803, at S994. 
 807. Fisher & Rosenblum, supra note 781. 
 808. Yalman Onaran, U.S. Banks Bigger Than GDP as Accounting Rift Masks Risk, BLOOMBERG, 
Feb. 19, 2013 (providing figure for the four largest banks); Brown Floor Statement, supra note 803, at 
S994 (providing figure for the six largest banks).  Unlike international accounting standards, U.S. 
accounting principles allow U.S. banks to exclude from their balance sheets (i) derivatives positions that 
are subject to netting agreements with counterparties and (ii) mortgage securitizations that are 
guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The on-balance-sheet assets of major U.S. banks, as 
shown under U.S. accounting principles, understate their true risks because (i) derivatives netting 
agreements frequently fail during financial crises due to defaults by counterparties, and (ii) since 2008 
the four largest U.S. banks “have faced demands to take back $67 billion of mortgages sold to 
securitizations backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . . . because the loans hadn’t met underwriting 
standards”).  Onaran, supra. 
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As shown above, the explosive growth and consolidation of 
megabanks during the past two decades have produced a comparable 
expansion of their political clout.809  In criticizing the “intense 
concentration of power” held by the largest banks, Senators Vitter and 
Brown pointed to the examples of Senator John Sherman and President 
Theodore Roosevelt, who opposed “unfettered growth and power” 
among the industrial trusts of the late 19th century.810  Similarly, Louis 
Brandeis and Franklin Roosevelt fought against the concentrated 
economic and political power of the largest banks during the first four 
decades of the 20th century.811  Brandeis denounced the leading New 
York investment banks of the early 1900s as a “financial oligarchy,”812 a 
term also used by Simon Johnson and James Kwak to describe today’s 
megabanks.813  Similarly, Richard Fisher has attacked megabanks as 
beneficiaries of “crony capitalism” that enjoy “an unlevel playing field, 
tilted to the advantage of Wall Street against Main Street, placing the 
financial system and the economy in constant jeopardy.”814 
Writing at the end of 2009, Johnson and Kwak expressed serious 
doubts about the Obama Administration’s financial reform plan that led 
to the Dodd–Frank Act.  As they explained, the Obama reform plan 
presented a series of “technical solutions” based on the assumption that, 
given additional tools, financial regulators could “regulate large banks 
more effectively.”815  Unfortunately, as they also pointed out, “solutions 
that depend on smarter, better regulatory supervision and corrective 
action ignore the political constraints on regulation and the political 
power of the large banks” and also avoid “tackling the underlying 
problem: the existence of TBTF institutions.”816  Accordingly, they 
 
 809. Brown Floor Statement, supra  note 803, at S994 (noting that the four largest U.S. banks are 
the product of 33 mergers involving 37 banks since 1995, and describing the largest banks as “so often 
having their way in this city and with regulators all over the country”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 
15, at 84–152 (discussing the rapid growth of major banks and the political influence they wielded 
during the 1990s and 2000s); supra Parts III and IV(A)(1) (describing the financial industry’s political 
clout and its many legislative and regulatory victories over the past two decades). 
 810. Vitter Floor Statement, supra note 803, at S995; see also Brown Floor Statement, supra note 
803, at S994 (describing Senator Sherman’s opposition to the “outsized economic and political power” 
of the trusts). 
 811. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 22–37, 121; see also id. at 14–22, 33–34 (pointing out 
that Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson provided earlier examples of successful opposition to 
entrenched financial and political power). 
 812. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 3–4 (1914, 
Norman Hapgood reprint ed. 1933). 
 813. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 6, 10, 89–90, 120–21. 
 814. Fisher Mar. 16, 2013 Speech, supra note 780; see also id. (criticizing the “privileged status” 
of TBTF megabanks that “places them above the rule of law” and “undermines citizens’ faith in the rule 
of law and representative democracy”). 
 815. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 191–92, 205–08 (quotes at 191, 207). 
 816. Id. at 207, 213. 
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called for explicit restrictions on the maximum size of banks, based on 
“a popular consensus that too big to fail is too big to exist.”817  As noted 
above, an attempt by Senators Brown and Kauffman to impose 
maximum size limits on banks was opposed by the Obama 
Administration and defeated in the Senate.818  Instead, Congress passed 
Dodd–Frank, which—as partially implemented to date—has left the 
TBTF status of megabanks largely intact.   
Johnson and Kwak warned that anyone “tak[ing] a stand against 
concentrated financial power” today would face daunting political 
obstacles, just as Theodore Roosevelt faced long odds when “he took a 
stand against concentrated industrial power” in the early 1900s:819 
The challenge we face today is similar to the one faced by President 
Roosevelt a century ago . . . .  The conventional wisdom, shaped through 
three decades of deregulation, innovation, and risk-taking that brought us 
the financial crisis, is that large, sophisticated banks are a critical pillar of 
economic prosperity.  The conventional wisdom has entrenched itself in 
Washington, where administration officials, regulators, and legislators 
agree with the Wall Street line on intellectual grounds, or see their 
personal interests (financial or political) aligned with Wall Street . . . .  
The megabanks used political power to obtain their license to gamble 
with other people’s money; taking that license away requires confronting 
that power head-on.820 
Wall Street’s political machine has thus far succeeded in watering 
down Dodd-Frank’s statutory language and in undermining the 
implementation of those provisions that survived the legislative gauntlet.  
Nevertheless, as Johnson & Kwak observed, “the most effective 
constraint on the financial sector is public opinion.”821  It remains 
possible that continued revelations of excessive risk-taking and other 
abuses on Wall Street could finally “shift the weight of public opinion 
against our new financial oligarchy.”822  Critics of Wall Street must 
persevere in their efforts to persuade the American people to demand 
fundamental reforms, like Brown Vitter, that could finally end TBTF 
subsidies for megabanks and thereby break Wall Street’s seemingly 
invincible power. 
 
 817. Id. at 221 (quote).  Johnson & Kwak proposed “a hard cap on size” of 4 percent of domestic 
GDP (about $600 billion in 2009) for commercial banks and a similar cap of 2 percent of GDP for 
investment banks.  Id. at 214–17. 
 818. See supra note 700 and accompanying text (discussing the defeat of the Brown–Kauffman 
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 819. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 222. 
 820. Id. at 221. 
 821. Id. 
 822. Id. at 221–22. 
